Category: 2024

Our relationship with the Armenian church is complicated. Criticism of performance and personalities runs rampant privately, but is strangely silent publicly. Most who are disappointed simply and quietly choose to leave. We should not confuse this with a lack of faith. Many who leave have faith but have chosen to express it through other vehicles. Many of the causes are difficult issues but must be addressed if the church is to remain relevant. Intermarriage, language and ethnic/spiritual balance are some of the topics we occasionally debate but have yet to confront. I would add knowledge and respect to the list of challenges. The former has become problematic, as functional illiteracy has evolved with succeeding generations. We have many laity in positions of influence who have limited knowledge of the history, canons and protocols of our church. I respect the commitment, but they can best be of service as informed individuals. Good quality immersion programs, camps and retreats are doing a credible job of reversing that trend within the emerging generations. The question is whether enough people are exposed for a critical mass going forward. Respect (or a lack of) has always been the major cause of conflict in our church. When egos and power become more important than compromise and collaboration, we all lose. How many talented people have you seen leave the church over conflicts?

His Holiness Catholicos Aram I and His Holiness Catholicos Karekin II

Here in the Americas, we have settled into an institutional division that began decades ago. At face value, the lack of reconciliation is an affront to our Christian value of forgiveness, yet we seem to have convinced ourselves that we are entitled to a waiver with friendly clergy and lay relations between the Diocese and the Prelacy. We all welcome the advances in meaningful relations, particularly in the last 20 years, but a lack of knowledge and respect still finds its way onto our tables. Our church has four hierarchical seats in Constantinople, Jerusalem, the Great House of Cilicia in Antelias and the Mother See in Holy Etchmiadzin. Any practicing Armenian Apostolic Christian has a responsibility to understand and embrace this reality. Unfortunately, that is not the case. Our division here in America has created a byproduct of ignorance that threatens our future. Many of the adherents (lay) to the Etchmiadzin diocese in America have little knowledge of the Holy See of Cilicia and feel little responsibility to respect its presence in the life of the Armenian Church. The Holy See of Cilicia was once the seat of all Armenians and has existed independently since 1441, yet that has little bearing on current views. 

The recent pontifical visit of His Holiness Aram I illustrates this point. We have let our administrative division (as our leaders call it) evolve into a lack of respect for one of the hierarchical sees of our church. There is no malice for the most part, just ignorance and ambivalence. Was Aram I invited by any diocesan church to conduct a simple hrashapar service to honor his presence? I applaud the presence of some diocesan clergy, but our expectations are too low. The reverse is also true. We must all remember that Holy Etchmiadzin is the Mother See. The term “All Armenians” should carry some value. Many in the Prelacy view the Catholicoi as competing, and therefore respecting both is not an option. The Prelacy faithful have a tendency to judge the personality of the current Vehapar and as a result pay less attention to the seat itself. Disagreeing with the policies or practices of a church leader is not an acceptable reason for ignoring the institution. We must be strong enough not to sacrifice knowledge and respect for the sake of short-term opinions. Criticism that is connected to expectations in the interest of the church is not only valid but essential to our sustainability. The absence of knowledge and respect is a threat to our future and tragic in that it is self-inflicted. Our divisions are artificial and should never be an impediment to knowledge and respect. We must strive to individually and collectively become informed people who maintain civil relationships in our communal life.

I was reminded this week of how low our expectations have become. While reading the weekly eastern diocesan newsletter, I noted an article about Catholicos Karekin II making another “non-pontifical” visit to the United States and meeting with the diocesan staff and Fund for Armenian Relief (FAR) team. I was deeply disappointed by the news of another visit by Catholicos Karekin II to America without a public itinerary. It has been 16 years since the last pontifical visit of the Vehapar to these shores, yet during that period there have been at least half a dozen visits of a private nature devoted to benefactors and fundraising for the Mother See. I understand that collecting funds is a high priority and that time is usually allocated to this mission. Catholicos Aram I raised funds for Antelias when he visited this past fall, and I am sure this will continue with the second part of his pontifical visit later this year. Raising money is not the issue. What I find unacceptable is that the leader of the church can come here and make no public appearances during which he can bless the faithful, meet the young people and listen to our concerns. It is a major responsibility to be with the faithful and build that relationship. Our people need the inspiration of their spiritual leaders.

Perhaps of even greater concern is the silence of the adherents in the diocese. Numerous selective visits and 16 years without a public visit are not a matter of concern? There was a time when the standard for a visiting Vehapar was always a pontifical visit, with fundraising a private secondary outcome. Beautiful high badarak, public rallies with our youth, formal gatherings to hear his message and local parish visits with hrashapar services were etched in our memory – no longer with the Mother See. The young people today do not know the Catholicos of All Armenians. Our local leadership apparently finds this acceptable. We are a church driven and at times paralyzed by protocol and formality. The visit of a Vehapar happens as a result of an invitation by the host diocese, but we all know that if the Vehapar wants to visit, the invitation will be forthcoming. Has the diocese extended an invitation to the Vehapar in the last 16 years? If not, has the diocese questioned the need during his numerous private trips? It is rather insulting for the common faithful of the parishes to be denied this opportunity unless you add some financial value to the Mother See. In this most recent visit, unless you are a substantial benefactor or in the leadership of FAR (which funds many programs in Armenia), you have no access. I will not question the integrity of those participating in the financial support of the Mother See, but as long as the faithful of this diocese are denied public visits, then we are all complicit. 

We have lowered our expectations in response to this behavior, because we are taught that challenging authority is disrespectful. In the name of respect for the position, we fail to hold elected officials accountable. In the Armenian church, all lay and clergy leaders are elected by a ratio of lay/clergy prescribed in the bylaws. It is not only possible, but also our responsibility, to show respect while speaking out for the betterment of our church. Unfortunately, we are plagued by concerns of being unpopular or socially isolated if we address some of these problems. Challenging the Vehapar in the proper manner to fulfill his responsibility to the faithful is not disrespectful or counterproductive. It may take courage since most of our proceedings are either procedurally robotic or determined in smaller groups. I remember when the Vehapar came many years ago and the youth gathered in Central Park in New York. Those teenagers are now in their 30s and building families. What about today’s teenagers? Will they have that experience? How about the small parishes that need a spiritual boost from a special experience? I have been told that he is not comfortable in this role. Respectfully, we should have two expectations of our spiritual leaders. The first is to be visible and make a difference in our lives. The second is to use their authority to empower our diverse diaspora dioceses to address the challenges of our survival. If we have learned anything in the last few generations, it is that one size does not fit all in our church. Specifically, the diocesan primate, Bishop Parsamyan, needs the freedom to address the core issues that are unique to the American Armenian experience. The Vehapar is the only person in our structure who can empower that need. It is puzzling to me why this eludes us. Empowering our leaders and being visible will only enhance the credibility of Holy Etchmiadzin. Many Armenians feel aloof from the Mother See because of the lack of presence and relationship. We cannot succeed long term only with selective relationships.

This should not be construed as an attack on our leadership. Quite the contrary. It will hopefully be viewed as a proposal to increase the influence of the Mother See. Our faithful want to be led, and our leaders need followers. During the early decades of the diaspora, intercontinental travel was limited until Catholicos Vasken of blessed memory came to America. This column began with a plea for respect for our hierarchical sees. We should not simply welcome but also insist on our spiritual leaders’ presence to fortify our faith. All Armenians should welcome Aram I here this fall. We should insist on inviting the Catholicos of All Armenians in a similar vein. For those who are focused on behavior and style, cast that aside and focus on our greater needs. Let’s hold each other accountable to build a stronger church.

Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev (President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Jan. 10, 2024)

Aliyev’s recent remarks on Armenia

On January 10, 2024, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev gave a 2.5-hour interview with local TV channels. In his interview, Aliyev not only repeated false remarks and justified the ethnic cleansing of the Armenians of Artsakh but also threatened Armenia. 

When it comes to delimiting and demarcating the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, he rejected the old Soviet maps proposed by Armenia, arguing, “In the 20th century, the lands of Azerbaijan were given to Armenia in parts. One day after the establishment of the Azerbaijan People’s Republic in 1918, the ancient Azerbaijani city of Irevan was handed over to Armenia. After the Sovietization in April 1920, in November, the Soviet government took the bigger part of Western Zangezur from Azerbaijan and handed it over to Armenia. By May 1969, Azerbaijani lands were given to Armenia in parts, and from an area of about 100,000 square kilometers, it dropped to 86,600 square kilometers.” 

Aliyev also continued pushing the false “Zangezur corridor” narrative. He ignored Armenia’s sovereignty over transport routes in its southern province Syunik, insisting that Azerbaijani cargo must pass from Nakhichevan to other parts of Azerbaijan via Meghri without any inspection or customs clearance and under Russian control. If not, Aliyev warned, Baku will continue its blockade on Armenia. 

Regarding the Soviet-era exclaves, Aliyev said, “The four villages should be returned to Azerbaijan without any preconditions. The villages that are enclaves, a separate expert group should be established and the issue should be discussed. The roads leading to these enclaves should have the necessary conditions, and the people living there should be accommodated in these enclaves.” Aliyev added that Azerbaijan will not withdraw its troops from the positions within Armenia it captured in May 2021 and September 2022, meaning that as long as the border is not defined, Azerbaijan can freely occupy Armenian territories. 

Responding to Aliyev’s interview, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said he considered the Azerbaijani president’s statements a “serious blow to the peace process” and accused Baku of attempting to form territorial claims against Armenia. Aliyev’s remarks were not surprising. Tigran Grigoryan, the head of the Yerevan-based Regional Center for Democracy and Security, said that Aliyev is aiming to impose a “victor’s peace” on Armenia. He warned that Azerbaijan “has no intention of relinquishing control over these territories (occupied in 2021 and 2022) under any circumstances.” 

Such remarks should not come as a surprise, as Aliyev is mobilizing his people before the upcoming presidential elections and seeks a high voter turnover to consolidate his power and legitimize his rule in the eyes of the international community.

Why hold elections now?

In December 2023, President Aliyev called for snap presidential elections on February 7, 2024 (which were originally scheduled for October 2025). The election is also informally known as the “Victory Elections” due to Azerbaijan’s military operation in Artsakh last September. As in previous elections, this election takes place in an authoritarian context in which opposition and independent media are suppressed, and the two main opposition parties, Musavat and Popular Front, are boycotting the election, citing its undemocratic nature.

Bahruz Samadov, a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at Charles University in Prague, argued that the Azerbaijani public has never been so disengaged from politics and political campaigns. Samadov argued that since 2020, Azerbaijan’s political agenda has been dominated by relations with Armenia and Artsakh. After Baku’s military victory in 2020 and 2023 and the mass exodus of Armenians from Artsakh, Azerbaijan has adopted an anti-Western stance, accusing the West of pro-Armenian bias, according to Samadov. Moreover, while the largest opposition parties are boycotting the elections, as they have done for the last two presidential elections, Aliyev’s challengers are “largely sycophants who echo the regime’s talking points.” 

This is unsurprising, as during the first electoral debate on Azerbaijani public TV, all of the candidates praised Aliyev’s military victory in Artsakh. One of the candidates, Fuad Aliyev, called for closer relations with Russia, China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and distancing the country from the West. Ultra-nationalist Elshad Musayev from the “Greater Azerbaijan Party” made territorial demands against Armenia and called for the annexation of Syunik, which he called Azerbaijani “historical land.” MP Gudrat Hasanguliyev from the “Whole Azerbaijan Popular Front Party” vowed to closely cooperate with Turkey, Russia, Israel, Pakistan and the Turkic states.

Observers have speculated on the timing of the elections. An article in the Associated Press suggested that Aliyev moved up the vote to coincide with elections in Russia in an attempt to minimize possible Russian influence. Opposition leader Ali Kerimli argued that authorities “are afraid of political competition even in this repressive atmosphere.” Meanwhile, the Musavat leader Arif Hajili criticized the date of the snap elections and called the election a “formal procedure,” arguing that the majority of people will not go to voting centers due to the cold winter season. 

Unlike previous elections, the current campaign is full of anti-Western hysteria and serves as a direct message to the West. It is also unclear whether this will be the beginning of a divorce with the West and whether Azerbaijan will take a Belarussian path to further consolidate authoritarianism and move closer to Russia. Such a scenario would be seen as a success in Moscow, as Baku’s growing geo-economic importance for Russia within the context of the “International North-South Transport Corridor” is increasing. 

Deepening the divide with Europe

Amid the presidential electoral campaigns, Baku’s relations with the EU are deteriorating. On January 22, 2024, during the first meeting of the winter session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the credentials of the Azerbaijani delegation were not approved, and its voting rights were limited. Some of the reasons offered by PACE for this decision included that Azerbaijan did not allow EU observers to visit the Lachin Corridor in 2023, observe the humanitarian situation in Artsakh nor meet with the Armenian political prisoners currently detained in Baku.

Azerbaijan responded to this action by claiming that “the Karabakh problem has been solved. Azerbaijan currently does not need the Council of Europe, which does not have influence in Europe.” Baku suggested that it may consider leaving the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Azerbaijani MP Azer Badamov also hinted that Azerbaijan may leave the European Court. “The decisions of the European Court regarding Azerbaijan were only related to the protection of the ‘5th column’ of the West. Through the ‘5th column’, the West tried to disrupt social and political stability in Azerbaijan, weaken the country and turn it into a place of color revolutions,” he said.

The government-owned agency APA also accused PACE of being “pro-Armenian,” “Islamophobic,” a “tool against Azerbaijan” and acting like “other Christian clubs like the European Union and the European Parliament.” Interestingly, Azerbaijan, which portrays itself as a secular and multicultural country, has started using sectarian language similar to that of Turkey’s political leaders when addressing European institutions. The media channel also accused the “French-German tandem” of “acting together in recent steps taken against Azerbaijan in Europe.” Amid this crisis, Armenia’s ambassador to the EU Tigran Balayan said that he expects the EU to impose sanctions on the Azerbaijani government.

This anti-Western hysteria in Azerbaijan is marginalizing the voices of opposition and independent voices. Human rights activists have raised concerns over the detention of about a dozen journalists and civil society figures since November. Azerbaijani activist Rustan Ismayilbayli tweeted, “If Azerbaijan is going to leave CoE (Council of Europe) as the next step, all international mechanisms, which let activists and journalists defend themselves at some level, will be gone. We have been through horrible days, much more horrible days are coming.”

Conclusion

Are Aliyev’s recent remarks part of an electoral tactic or in preparation for a new war against Armenia? The Azerbaijani president’s recent interview showed that Aliyev has no sincere intentions to build peace in the region and put an end to his hatred of the Armenian nation. Autocrats always need external (and sometimes internal) enemies to consolidate and justify their rule. If they don’t have any, they must create one. The life of Middle Eastern autocrats is a clear example in which decades-old authoritarian rule and one-party systems justify their rule against existent and sometimes imaginary enemies. With this aim, will Aliyev risk a new escalation? It is unclear whether the Azerbaijani president will risk an open confrontation with the West and abandon his country’s traditionally balanced foreign policy after the elections. While he may dictate new terms against Armenia through a war, he may be forced to abandon his traditional balanced foreign policy if he further isolates his country.

By Yeghia Tashjian, M.A., Benyamin Poghosyan, Ph.D., Michael Rubin, Ph.D.

In the wake of President Joe Biden’s affirmation of America’s renewed engagement on the global stage post-2020 elections, U.S. foreign policy faces a complex landscape in the post-Soviet space, underscored by the tension between democratic ideals and authoritarian forces. Historically, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States fostered warm relations with Russia and the nascent independent states, actively supporting nuclear disarmament and democratic transitions, albeit with varying degrees of involvement across regions. U.S. policy has traditionally been cautious in the South Caucasus, balancing support for democratization with strategic interests, as evidenced by its tempered stance on the Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute. However, the limited response to the second Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) war and the subsequent Russian-dominated ceasefire have highlighted the constraints of U.S. influence and spurred a reevaluation of its role in regional dynamics.

Recent regional turmoil, from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine to the fraught tensions in Artsakh, has catalyzed a strategic pivot in U.S. policy towards the South Caucasus. The Biden administration’s approach signals a readiness to engage more assertively, advocating for humanitarian support, acknowledging indigenous rights and reinforcing self-determination for the people of Artsakh. The U.S. rejects external territorial ambitions over Armenia, emphasizing the inviolability of established borders and promoting a recalibration of regional power dynamics to curb Russian influence. This potential renaissance in American diplomacy, underscored by a commitment to Armenia’s security and regional stability, challenges the narrative of U.S. ineffectiveness and seeks to shape a future grounded in democratic values and peaceable state relations.

Introduction

After his November 2020 victory in the U.S. presidential elections, Joe Biden declared, “America is back.” The United States would once again take its involvement seriously in the world. President Biden’s vision of 21st-century geopolitics as a battle between democracy and authoritarianism implied more U.S. involvement in the post-Soviet space to deter and counter Russia and its like-minded allies. 

Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States sought to establish warm relations with Russia and the newly independent Soviet states. President George H.W. Bush was solicitous of Russian concerns and coerced Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to forfeit their legacy Soviet nuclear arsenals. At the same time, the United States supported democratization and eventually European Union membership and NATO accession for the three Baltic States. 

Washington’s approach to the Caucasus was more restrained. It supported a diplomatic process to address the Azerbaijan-Armenia dispute and generally stated its support for democratization, albeit tempered by the desire to treat Azerbaijan as an energy resource, regardless of its governance. Successive U.S. administrations also sought to minimize Russia’s influence when opportunities presented themselves, such as with the November 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia or the 2018 “Velvet Revolution” in Armenia.

U.S. inaction against the backdrop of the Second Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) War highlighted the limits of U.S. influence. The ceasefire agreement imposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin sidelined the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group as an institution, as well as France and the United States that, alongside Russia, acted as its co-chairs.

Recent crises ranging from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to Azerbaijan’s conquest of Artsakh and Azerbaijan’s military build-up along its borders with Armenia have refocused Washington’s attention on the region. The Biden administration has sought to facilitate a peace process between Baku and Yerevan as Russian influence declines due to Moscow’s inability or unwillingness to enforce the November 9, 2020 agreement.

 The United States believes that the normalization and economic cooperation between regional states will de-escalate tensions and decrease Russian influence in Armenia. Analysts are right to recognize that Armenia has less reason to tie itself to Russia militarily if it no longer faces existential threats from its neighbors. For the first time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there is an opportunity for a fundamentally new and more proactive American strategy to preserve and develop its interests in the South Caucasus.

Is the U.S. interested in regional stability and peace?

Ask any American diplomat if the U.S. is interested in regional stability and peace, and the answer would be, of course. There is little evidence, however, to suggest any serious commitment. The National Security Council has yet to publish any official strategy on the South Caucasus in the way it has with Africa or the Indo-Pacific region. The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy mentioned the South Caucasus only once to report the U.S. would back diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Similarly, there were no mentions of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia or the South Caucasus in the 2022 National Defense Strategy. The Director of National Intelligence’s Annual Threat Assessments argued that relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan were likely to remain tense and occasionally volatile in the absence of a peace treaty. Against the backdrop of renewed fighting, the intelligence community’s assessment reflected the continued downplaying and misanalysis of Azerbaijan and its anti-Armenia agenda. Anatol Lieven, director of the Eurasia program at the Quincy Institute, concurred that the United States had no clear and formal strategy for the South Caucasus. *

Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States has sought to contain and isolate Russia. Weakening Russian influence in the South Caucasus would conform to this strategy. Indeed, the United States continued to oppose the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Artsakh, in the wake of Azerbaijan’s September 2023 invasion of Artsakh, or anywhere else in the region. While the United States does not call openly for the withdrawal of Russia’s approximately 3,000 troops stationed at a military base in Gyumri, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Yuri Kim stated on September 14, 2023, that Washington had a strategic opportunity to reduce the malign influence in the region from actors like Russia, China and Iran. She argued for a durable peace that would expand U.S. bilateral economic and security cooperation and provide greater energy security for European partners and allies.

The State Department hopes Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize each other’s territorial integrity. While the United States supports Armenia’s decision to recognize Artsakh as Azerbaijan’s sovereign territory, it also has long called for assuring the rights of Artsakh’s indigenous Armenian community. However, the September 19, 2023, Azerbaijani offensive and the forced displacement of Armenians from Artsakh did not elicit any tangible American response, except for the Armenian Protection Act of 2023, unanimously passed in the U.S. Senate. There were neither sanctions nor symbolic gestures to express U.S. frustration with Azerbaijan. U.S. Agency for International Development administrator Samantha Power and Kim visited Armenia after Artsakh’s collapse but offered humanitarian assistance equivalent to less than $100 per displaced person.

Does fear of Iran shape U.S. policy in the South Caucasus?

From Iran’s perspective, the countries’ shared Shiite faith and close cultural ties reinforce mutual bonds with Azerbaijan. The region became more important to Iran after the Second Artsakh War upset Iran’s decades-long cautious embrace of the status quo in which it could leverage influence over Armenia to preserve its northward trade routes. Additionally, Tehran had leverage over Baku, as it was the only way Azerbaijan could access its Nakhichevan exclave by land without passing through Armenia.

The war’s outcome upended the geopolitical landscape by allowing Turkish military and political penetration of the region. Baku, backed by Ankara, embraced a narrative of establishing an extraterritorial “Zangezur” corridor across southern Armenia from Azerbaijan proper to Nakhichevan, effectively cutting Armenia off from Iran. Aliyev even proposed populating southern Armenia with “Azerbaijani refugees who left Armenia in 1988.” 

While some American officials may believe isolating Iran and increasing Turkish influence in the region might serve U.S. interests in the short-term, Turkey’s tilt toward Russia and China and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s efforts to minimize Western influence suggest such a benefit to be illusionary. Nor does such an assessment accurately reflect the Turkish and Azerbaijani contradictions in the region. Azerbaijan’s trade with Iran is equivalent to Armenia’s, and Turkey’s trade with Iran is an order of magnitude higher. Furthermore, the growing economic relations between Moscow and Ankara jeopardize the U.S. interests in the Caspian region.

It is naïve to believe that, should Baku feel no threat from Yerevan, Azerbaijan would focus on countering Iran. Growing energy and trade relations between the two countries suggest that, rhetoric aside, both Aliyev and the Islamic Republic respect each other’s red lines. While Azerbaijan has cooperated with both Israel and the United States with regard to monitoring Iran, Azerbaijan lobbyists often exaggerate its role. Most Israeli operatives infiltrate Iran not through Azerbaijan but rather from Iraqi Kurdistan. Additionally, as Turkey turns on Israel and because Turkey looks at Azerbaijan as a subordinate partner, it is doubtful Erdogan would tolerate continued tight Azerbaijan-Israel ties.  

Does energy shape American strategy?

On September 20, 1994, then-Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev and oil executives from several international companies gathered in Baku for the ceremonial signing of what the Azerbaijani president called the “deal of the century.” A consortium of 11 foreign oil companies signed a contract with the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) to develop three major oil fields in the Caspian Sea. As a result, American companies – Amoco, Exxon, Unocal and Pennzoil – collectively took a 40 percent share, followed by BP (formerly British Petroleum) with 17 percent in developing Azerbaijan’s huge Caspian oil. 

To minimize Europe’s energy dependence on Russia, the Americans and the British initiated and financed the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, completed in 2005. The 1,768-kilometer [1,100 mile] pipeline traverses Azerbaijan and Georgia before ending at the port of Ceyhan in Turkey. Today, it can transport 1.2 million barrels per day, and in total it has transported more than 3.6 billion barrels of crude oil from the Caspian to the Mediterranean, bypassing Russia and Iran to decrease Europe’s energy dependence on either. In May 2006, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey launched a further Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline to bring Azerbaijani gas to northern Turkey. Beginning in December 2020, the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline and Trans Adriatic Pipeline supplemented these to provide up to 10 billion cubic meters of Azeri gas annually to Greece, Italy and other European countries. 

The Ukraine war pushed the Europeans to reduce gas imports from Russia further. On July 18, 2022, the European Commission, backed by the Americans, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Azerbaijan to double imports of Azerbaijani natural gas to at least 20 billion cubic meters a year by 2027. “The EU and Azerbaijan are opening a new chapter in energy cooperation. Azerbaijan is a key partner in the EU’s efforts to move away from Russian fossil fuels,” said European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev stressed that “issues of energy security today are more important than ever.” Azerbaijan started increasing natural gas deliveries to the EU from 8.1 billion cubic meters in 2021 to around 12 billion cubic meters in 2022 via the Southern Gas Corridor. The Azerbaijani option is less than meets the eye, however. To meet Europe’s gas demands, Baku imports gas from Russia.

Does the U.S. support the “Zangezur” corridor?

The OSCE Minsk Group supported reopening trade links between Armenia and Azerbaijan during the two decades it led negotiations to resolve the Artsakh conflict. The subsequent November 2020 trilateral statement also called for the opening of economic and transport links to enable safe passage between Azerbaijan proper and its non-contiguous Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. Russia’s Federal Security Service was to secure the corridor. The Kremlin would not support any revision that would eliminate its role in the region.

Almost immediately, Azerbaijan sought to redefine the “Zangezur” corridor. Baku argued it was not meant simply to be a transport route but insisted Armenia had agreed to provide an extraterritorial corridor via Syunik, the Armenian province that falls between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. Azerbaijan took further steps to include the “Zangezur” corridor into the “Middle Corridor” which envisages the establishment of the new land route between China and Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, South Caucasus, the Black Sea and Turkey. While the “Middle Corridor” can operate without passing through Armenia, Azerbaijan’s characterization of “Zangezur” distorts reality.  Nor does the establishment of railway and highway connections between Azerbaijan, Nakhichevan and Turkey via Armenia have any direct linkage with the “Middle Corridor.” 

The United States has always supported the idea of restoration of economic ties, including transport communications between Armenia and Azerbaijan, to encourage post-conflict stability and security. In the context of the establishment of railways and highways connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan and Turkey via Armenia, the United States believes that these routes should not be under Russian control. This would require Armenia to change the modalities of Article 9 of the trilateral statement and reject Russian control over any transport communication. Armenia has grounds to reject Russian involvement given Moscow’s failure to uphold its commitments under the trilateral statement. Encouraging Turkey’s trade across Armenia absent Russian involvement could advance U.S. interests by denying space to Russia. Such an outcome, however, would require a fundamental change in Turkey’s attitude toward Armenia. Rather than demand Armenia accept an irredentist Turkey as is, the United States might better achieve its goals if it sought diplomatically to demand Turkey’s acceptance of Armenia’s rights and legitimacy. 

Is Armenia-Turkey normalization possible?

Turkey blockades Armenia in contravention of the 1921 Treaty of Kars and rejects diplomatic relations with Armenia in solidarity with Azerbaijan. The State Department has pushed for Armenia-Turkey normalization since the early 1990s. The idea behind this approach is simple: If Armenia established normal relations with Turkey, it would no longer need to rely on Russia as a guarantor for its sovereignty nor Iran as an economic lifeline. The United States supported the “Football Diplomacy” of 2008-2009 and expressed readiness to contribute to the normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations after the end of the 2020 Artsakh war.  

Recommendations 

Azerbaijan mocks the United States as ineffective and a paper tiger, unwanted and unneeded as a diplomatic intermediary. In this, Baku’s rhetoric is similar to Tehran’s and Moscow’s. Washington does have a role, though. Proactive engagement in diplomacy toward Armenia and the broader South Caucasus can have a tremendous impact on outcomes. As such, the United States should undertake the following actions:

• First, the United States must address the immediate crisis. The State Department should increase humanitarian aid to Armenian refugees from Artsakh. 
• Second, the United States immediately and openly should endorse the right of return for Armenian refugees from Artsakh. The State Department must acknowledge these refugees as the indigenous population of Artsakh. 
• Third, the State Department should recognize that the indigenous population of Artsakh maintains its right of self-determination. This was the case legally under the Soviet Constitution – no action or statement by Armenian authorities in Yerevan strips Artsakh Armenians of their fundamental rights.  
• Fourth, Artsakh was a democratic republic with regular one-person, one-vote elections to determine its representatives. In contrast, Azerbaijan is a dictatorship. The exercise of self-determination mandates Artsakh Armenians establish a government-in-exile to represent the interests of Artsakh Armenians in future negotiations.
• Fifth, the United States should reject Azerbaijan’s conception of the “Zangezur” corridor outright. Rationalizing Baku’s position would only legitimize it and encourage Azerbaijan to take even more extreme positions. The United States, like France, should recognize the sanctity of Armenia’s 1991 borders and reject any Azerbaijani attempts to revise or redraw them.
• Sixth, the United States is right to reduce Russian influence, but this requires ending the security threats Armenia faces from its neighbors. There are no shortcuts. The United States must first demand an end to Turkey’s illegal blockade of Armenia and demand that Azerbaijan recognize Armenia’s borders and allow unrestricted Armenian trade. 
• Seventh, the United States should recognize Armenia’s legitimate security needs. Israel’s military exports to Azerbaijan shifted the balance of power and convinced Azerbaijan it could impose through military force what it could never achieve at the negotiating table. Security in the South Caucasus has suffered since. As such, the United States should seek to restore a regional balance of power to stabilize the region. The United States should enhance arms trade and military training with Armenia. The United States should also encourage like-minded countries like France and India to provide arms to Armenia while opposing sales of weaponry to Azerbaijan. 

*Interview was conducted by Benyamin Poghosyan on September 13, 2023.

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About the Authors

Yeghia Tashjian, M.A., is a regional analyst and researcher. He graduated from the American University of Beirut with a public policy and international affairs degree. He pursued his B.A. in political science at Haigazian University in 2013. In 2010, he founded the New Eastern Politics forum/blog. He was a research assistant at the Armenian Diaspora Research Center at Haigazian University. He has participated in international conferences and has presented various topics, from minority rights to regional security issues. His thesis topic was China’s geopolitical and energy security interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf. He is a contributor to various local and regional newspapers and a columnist for the Armenian Weekly. He is the International Affairs Cluster Coordinator at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut and a part-time instructor in International Affairs at the American University of Science and Technology (Beirut Campus). 

Benyamin Poghosyan, Ph.D., is the chairman of the Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies. He was head of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense Research University in Armenia from August 2016 to February 2019. He joined the Institute for National Strategic Studies in March 2009 as a Research Fellow and was appointed INSS Deputy Director for research in November 2010. During his tenure at the only Armenian state think tank dealing with Armenian foreign policy and regional and international security, Dr. Poghosyan prepared and supervised the elaboration of more than 100 policy papers that were presented to the political-military leadership of Armenia. Since 2009, Dr. Poghosyan has participated in more than 150 international conferences and workshops as a regional and global security dynamics speaker. 

Michael Rubin, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, specializing in Iran, Turkey and the broader Middle East. A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen and pre- and post-war Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For over a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture and terrorism to deployed U.S. Navy and Marine units. Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies and Shi’ite politics, including Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East? (AEI Press, 2019); Kurdistan Rising (AEI Press, 2016); Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes (Encounter Books, 2014); and Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos (Palgrave, 2005). Dr. Rubin has a Ph.D. and an MA in history from Yale University and obtained a BS in biology.

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About the Institute

The Aram Manoukian Institute for Strategic Planning has been formed to work with experts in various fields to develop plans for the future of the Armenian nation in Armenia, Artsakh and the Diaspora. The overarching vision of the Institute is to work towards the creation of a prosperous and just society in Armenia, Artsakh and the Armenian diaspora, where the rights and dignity of all individuals are respected and where peace, democracy and sustainable development are achieved.

The Institute will identify appropriate target audiences, including government officials, civil society organizations, academia, businesses and the public, to ensure its work reaches various stakeholders. It will also build a diverse team with expertise from various fields, including academics, practitioners, individuals from the Armenian diaspora and youth, to provide a holistic perspective in addressing the nation’s challenges. Additionally, it underscores the significance of developing partnerships and collaborations with government agencies, NGOs, research institutions, businesses, international organizations and diaspora organizations to leverage resources and knowledge effectively. The Institute’s agenda will focus on pressing issues such as national security, economic development, education, good governance, health care, diaspora engagement and environmental sustainability. By addressing these challenges through research-based insights and policy recommendations, the Institute will contribute toward the betterment of the Armenian nation.

About the Institute’s Namesake

Aram Manoukian, born in 1879 in Karakilisa, was a prominent Armenian revolutionary who played a pivotal role in the formation of the First Armenian Republic in 1918. His educational journey began in local Armenian schools, followed by studies at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute in Russia.

While still a student in St. Petersburg, Manoukian became deeply involved in the Armenian national liberation movement. In 1902, he formally joined the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) and actively participated in various ARF activities, including armed struggles against oppressive regimes in the Caucasus and the Middle East, notably the Ottoman Empire. He successfully led the self-defense of Van, saving the lives of tens of thousands of Armenian civilians from deportation massacre by the Turkish government.

In 1917, after the Russian Revolution, Manoukian returned to Armenia and assumed a central role in establishing the First Armenian Republic in 1918. He served as the commander-in-chief of Armenian forces during intense battles against Ottoman forces in the Caucasus, ultimately securing Armenia’s independence.

Beyond his military leadership, Manoukian’s contributions extended to politics and economics in the nascent republic. As the prime minister, he championed social justice, equality and progressive policies, focusing on land reform, education and other measures to improve the lives of ordinary Armenians.

Today, Aram Manoukian’s legacy endures, serving as a timeless source of inspiration for Armenians, commemorating his unwavering dedication to his nation and his role as a patriotic statesman.

Narineh Abrimian is ushering in an era of dating with intention through Achkt Louys, a matchmaking service for Armenian singles in the United States.

“We’ve all been there with the dating apps. We’ve all been there thinking someone Armenian was going to come around, and you’re going to get married. It doesn’t always play out for everybody,” Abrimian said in an interview with the Weekly. 

Abrimian, a 36-year-old middle school English teacher from Waltham, Massachusetts, launched Achkt Louys at the start of 2024 to “help Armenians ages 21-50 find someone with whom they truly feel a connection and can see themselves with in a long, happy and healthy relationship,” as stated on the Achkt Louys website.

While taking certification courses in matchmaking in 2023, Abrimian realized that her communication skills as an educator have prepared her to be a matchmaker. “My friends and family have always shared how I’m a very good listener, and many of my friends call me their life coach. They always come to me for advice. Even my eighth graders come to me, and I’m like, ‘I can’t be talking to you about these things,’” Abrimian shared with a laugh. “Their personal lives, families, boyfriends, girlfriends, friend drama.” 

Abrimian draws on her teaching experience and her years-long interest in psychology and human behavior to determine compatibility, set up matches and guide people through dates. Over Zoom calls, she gets to know her clients intimately, asking them about their professional goals, whether or not they want children and the strengths and weaknesses they bring to a relationship. “I save you the first few dates,” Abrimian summed up. “I’m basically dating the client for them before I introduce them.” After each date, she has a follow-up meeting with each client to debrief and reflect on their experience – yet unlike filling in a friend about a date, Abrimian offers unbiased, professional guidance. 

Like many, Abrimian feels disillusioned with the failed promise of dating apps to deliver romance. In the era of cursory swiping, she believes matchmaking can be a successful alternative for people seeking committed and meaningful relationships. While working with a matchmaker, clients learn about the qualities and goals of their potential dates before seeing photos of them, thereby eliminating snap judgments. “I don’t think people take dating apps very seriously,” Abrimian said. “You don’t know the person’s intention behind the screen, as compared to with a matchmaker. If they come to seek me, I know they’re serious.” 

For Abrimian – an active member of her local Armenian community and the Armenian Relief Society and as an Armenian language teacher at St. Stephen’s Saturday School – dating within the Armenian community can build on the mutual understanding each person brings to the relationship in regards to their culture, traditions and upbringing. “You don’t need to worry about their background or their overprotective parents, because you already know what having an overprotective parent is like. You don’t have to explain yourself. It makes things a bit easier,” she said.

Achkt Louys adapts old Armenian customs to the needs of the contemporary dating pool. Many Armenians traditionally met their spouse through a matchmaker. Abrimian is reviving this tradition, yet not purely for the purpose of creating Armenian matches, but rather creating Armenian matches that will last, founded on compatibility and equality. Abrimian has witnessed how, within the Armenian community, being single and eligible are sometimes treated as sufficient qualities to set two people up on a date. She urges Armenians who want to date within their community to prioritize the fundamental traits and values necessary to build a partnership, alongside identity. 

“Sometimes you let go of things you actually want to make an Armenian union,” Abrimian reflected. “I don’t like the idea of just marrying an Armenian just to be with an Armenian. We live one life, and if that person’s not compatible with you, you’re giving away your whole life for something you probably weren’t looking for and sacrificing, potentially, your happiness.” 

Achkt Louys is also updating Armenian matchmaking for the modern age through its inclusivity. Abrimian extends her matchmaking services to Armenian men, women and members of the LGBTQ community. “Everyone deserves their right to happiness. No one’s more special, as I tell my students, than anybody else,” she said. “If I could have a safe space for people to reach out to look for a same-sex partner, then I want to be that safe space for them.”

For Valentine’s Day, Abrimian is offering gift certificates for a free interview and to be entered into the Achkt Louys singles database. 

“I often have friends say to me, ‘You love seeing others in relationships and being happy.’ It never crossed my mind that that’s how I felt, but once a friend made the comment, I realized how true it was. It fills me with energy, positivity and life to see happy relationships,” Abrimian shared.