Category: 2023

Pashinyan reveals details of 2020 ceasefire talks

Sonya Jalatian
Panorama
Armenia – June 20 2023

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on Tuesday shared details of the Russian-mediated ceasefire talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev during the 2020 Artsakh war.

Speaking at a meeting of the parliamentary commission probing the war, Pashinyan said he signed a trilateral statement to end the war on the morning of November 9.

“As a result of discussions, we agreed on a text that said nothing about Shushi or the opening of a corridor through Armenia. It was about the cessation of hostilities, return of seven regions and deployment of Russian peacekeepers on the Lachin Corridor and in Nagorno-Karabakh,” he said.

“On the morning of November 9, I signed that text. Mind you, not at midnight, but on the morning of 9 November I signed the trilateral statement. However, it turned out that Azerbaijan refused to sign the document and instead laid out a number of new demands. The statement I signed in the morning was no longer valid,” Pashinyan stated, adding he categorically rejected a new version of the statement which envisaged the return of the enclaves in Armenia’s Tavush Province to Azerbaijan.

“Sometime later, it turned out that an agreement had been reached to remove that point from the document. At the same time, at around midnight, reports about intensified hostilities and a large number of drones above Stepanakert began to circulate. Eventually, after difficult and long discussions I signed the document you all know about, which, of course, was worse than the one I had signed in the morning, but was better than the other proposed versions, which envisaged either the creation of a corridor through Meghri or the return of the Tavush enclaves,” he noted.

Azerbaijan expected Armenian forces to surrender Shushi for 19 October ceasefire, says Pashinyan

Emil Lazarian

 11:49, 20 June 2023

YEREVAN, JUNE 20, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has reacted to the criticism claiming he had the chance to maintain Armenian control over Shushi during the Second Nagorno Karabakh War.

Speaking at the parliamentary select committee probing the war, Pashinyan said he asked Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 13, 2020 to answer the following direct question: what would it take to end the war.

A more detailed discussion with Putin on this issue took place again on October 16, and the Russian President expressed opinion that they could try to discuss the end of hostilities in exchange of returning the five regions to Azerbaijan, without any clarification of the status of Nagorno Karabakh.

“On that day, we agreed with the President of Russia that the teams would work on developing this idea. On October 17, French President Emmanuel Macron presented his initiative, who told me that the Azerbaijani President was ready to establish ceasefire without preconditions starting midnight October 18. Naturally I agreed to this, and during several hours a statement between France, Armenia and Azerbaijan was agreed upon, which was published late in the evening of October 17. Despite the statement, not even a ceasefire was established on October 18, despite diplomatic efforts proceeding throughout the day to end the war,” Pashinyan said.

Pashinyan and Putin then held a phone call on October 19. Putin reiterated that a Russian plan developed years earlier could be used in an attempt to stop the war. The terms were the following: the 7 regions were to be surrendered with the 5+2 format, the issue of connection between Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia through Lachin Corridor was to be resolved, Russian peacekeepers were to be deployed in Karabakh, the Nagorno Karabakh status was to remain uncertain.

“We agreed with the President of Russia that I would express our position by evening. In the afternoon I initially invited representatives of non-parliamentary forces, and then I convened a session of the Security Council with the participation of the President, the Catholicos and parliamentary forces, where I said that I was planning to call the Russian President and tell him that I agree with the proposed option. Furthermore, like I said, I wasn’t expecting any of the participants to share responsibility of that decision. I was simply informing them on the processes. I called the Russian President in the evening and I told him that I was ready to end the war with those terms. The Russian President said he would talk with the Azerbaijani President and call me back.”

At that time, two of the five regions, Fizuli and Jabrayil, were either completely or partially under Azerbaijani control. Putin called Pashinyan on the next day and said the following: “Azerbaijan is ready to end the war but expects to receive all seven regions, or more accurately the remaining five regions, because two of them, Fizuli and Jabrayil, were already mostly under their control.”

The issue of Shushi was raised the same day, Pashinyan said.

“On 19 October 2020, the Russian President told me that the Azerbaijani side has one more condition, it expects guarantees that Azerbaijani refugees which they claim comprised 90% of the population of Shushi would return to Shushi. This was an expected offer for the Russian side because they were saying that the plan on resolving the Karabakh conflict, which had been on the table for many years, always included the issue of the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to Nagorno Karabakh. This is the reason why after 9 November I said in parliament that the issue of Shushi had always been in the negotiations agenda, because if it is said that Azerbaijanis are returning to Nagorno Karabakh, is there a need to clarify that they must return to the settlements where they used to live? This is what I am accused of, that if I had agreed for Azerbaijanis to return to Shushi it would stay under Armenian control, and although populated by Azerbaijanis it would be Armenian. Frankly speaking this wording itself is contentious, but when the issue of Shushi was raised I tried to clarify what the guarantees expected by the Azerbaijanis were to look like according to that proposed variant. And it turned out during that conversation that I had to declare that I agreed to the return of Azerbaijani refugees to Shushi and other settlements in Karabakh. The Russian President offered this issue to be linked with the status of Nagorno Karabakh. That is, the issue of the return of Azerbaijanis to the NKAO was to be resolved in the context of the issue of the Karabakh status, together with the presumed decision in this regard. I agreed to this wording, but the Azerbaijani side, like in the past, rejected this, saying that they weren’t ready to discuss any issue related to the status. Moreover, according to that offer, not only the Azerbaijani who used to live in Shushi but also all Azerbaijanis had to have direct and unimpeded access to Shushi. For example, fifty thousand Azerbaijanis could visit to who knows how many Azerbaijanis living in Shushi, without limitations. They could even go and stay. But the most important issue was how their movement was to be ensured. It turned out, for example, that a new road had to be built linking Shushi with Azerbaijan so that Azerbaijanis had no need to use the Lachin Corridor or any other existing road for traveling to Shushi. That road could’ve passed, for example, through Kubatli. By that proposal of Azerbaijan, Shushi had to have at least 95% of Azerbaijani population, without any limit or control on further increase, they had to have a separate road linking Shushi with Azerbaijan outside Lachin Corridor, under their control. This meant that Azerbaijani military units could be deployed there. This in turn meant that, without exaggeration, this was about surrendering Shushi to Azerbaijan. One of the practical grounds for rejecting this proposal was the following: this would mean that the Lachin Corridor were not to function, because the Azerbaijanis could close it at any moment, because Shushi wouldn’t be inside Lachin Corridor, while Lachin Corridor would pass a few meters from Shushi. The latest developments proved my prediction with well-known circumstances,” Pashinyan said.

Terms of 9 November 2020 agreement were best available choices compared to other proposed conditions, says Pashinyan

Greg Madatian

 12:30, 20 June 2023

YEREVAN, JUNE 20, ARMENPRESS. Talks over what would become the 9 November 2020 trilateral statement had begun on 6 November 2020, Prime Minister Pashinyan told lawmakers on Tuesday.

“I agreed to start negotiations on this topic with one condition, that it won’t contain clauses relating to Shushi and a corridor through territory of Armenia, as well as offered to return Aghdam in exchange of Hadrut, which Azerbaijan had captured. This was the beginning of the process aimed at signing the trilateral statement. I understood that we had reached a turning point. If we were able to keep Shushi, it would be a turning point, if not, again it would be a turning point. But as of 8 November, as much as I was being told that a part of Shushi was still under our control, I realized that we were unable to completely bring it back. The President of Nagorno Karabakh was warning that Stepanakert was becoming vulnerable, and there was a risk that the Azerbaijanis, after solving the issue of Shushi, would attack Stepanakert from the direction of Shosh village, continuing towards Askeran and hitting the Defense Army defensive lines from the rear and invading into Haterk and Sotk. The talks were proceeding through the Russian President, I had over 20 phone calls with him on 8 October, and a total of 60 phone calls during the entire 44-day war. And very quickly it became known that Azerbaijan was not accepting the formula of exchanging Aghdam for Hadrut, and eventually as a result of discussions were reached a text where nothing was said about Shushi, nothing was said about a corridor through Armenia’s territory, but was stipulating the end of hostilities, the return of the seven regions, the creation of the Lachin Corridor and the deployment of Russian peacekeepers there and in Nagorno Karabakh,” Pashinyan said.

Pashinyan said he signed the text in the morning of 9 November but Azerbaijan refused to sign it and put forward new demands.

“The culmination was the evening of 9 November when it turned out that Azerbaijan was offering new amendments to the text that had been practically finalized. This meant that the text I had signed in the morning was no longer valid. But the moment the Russian President said that Azerbaijan wants to add a clause on the return of the enclaves of Tavush province, I declared that I rule out signing such document. And it was officially noted that we are not signing a document. Sometime later it turned out that an agreement was reached to remove that clause. At the same time, around midnight, we started to receive news about intensified military operations and that there were a large number of drones above Stepanakert. After all, after difficult and long discussions I signed the document you all know about, which, of course, is worse than the option I had signed in the morning on that same day, but was better than the rest of the proposed variants, one of which envisaged the Meghri corridor and the other the return of enclaves of Tavush province.”

European Parliament delegation joins EU mission in Armenia for ‘planned patrol to Lachin corridor’

John Hovhannisian

 12:50, 21 June 2023

YEREVAN, JUNE 21, ARMENPRESS. The European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defense (SEDE) delegation led by Chair Nathalie Loiseau have joined the EU Mission in Armenia for a planned patrol to Lachin Corridor, the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) tweeted.

“Head of EU Mission in Armenia Markus Ritter and Head of the EU Delegation to Armenia Ambassador Andrea Wiktorin welcome European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defense Chair Nathalie Loiseau and the SEDE delegation at the Sisian airfield to join EUMA for a planned patrol to Lachin corridor,” EUMA tweeted.

The Members of the European Parliament are visiting Armenia from 19 to 22 June to assess the security situation, the normalization process between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the operation of the civilian EU mission – EUMA.

The Lachin Corridor has been blocked by Azerbaijan since 12 December 2022. 

The United Nations’ highest court – the International Court of Justice (ICJ) – ordered Azerbaijan on February 22 to “take all steps at its disposal” to ensure unimpeded movement of persons, vehicles and cargo along the Lachin Corridor in both directions. Azerbaijan has so far ignored the order. Furthermore, Azerbaijan then illegally installed a checkpoint on Lachin Corridor in violation of the terms of the 2020 ceasefire statement.

Azerbaijan gets the ‘Israel’ treatment at Congressional event

Diana Dabaghian


AYOOB KARA
Ayoob Kara served as Israel’s minister of communications.

( / JNS)

Watching a June 21 panel discussion that the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission hosted at the Rayburn House Office Building reinforced something I had long known. Azerbaijan and Israel not only share a close relationship, but the secular, democratic Muslim state is subjected to vitriol that at least rhymes with the sort that is regularly lobbed at the Jewish state.

Titled “Safeguarding the people of Nagorno-Karabakh,” the event was an ironic program of a commission named after a Holocaust survivor and former congressman.

Speakers voiced outrageous claims against Azerbaijan that bore an uncanny resemblance to the ways the so-called “Squad”—Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.), Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.), Ayanna Pressley (D-Mass.), Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.) and others—treats Israel.

As a former Israeli communications minister, I was outraged to see members of Congress and other prominent Americans attack one of America’s greatest allies against the Iranian regime. They went after Israel as well for standing by Azerbaijan. Biased speech after biased speech, I couldn’t help but wonder if the Squad had gone mainstream in Congress.

Congressional human rights commissions evidently no longer care to treat both sides of a conflict fairly. Event speakers heavily favored the Armenians. Azerbaijani voices were silenced. It even seemed that someone was erasing pro-Azerbaijani comments on the YouTube feed, as with one that linked to a rebuttal of the hearing.

Sam Brownback, a former U.S. ambassador, stated falsely that Azerbaijan drove Christians out of Karabakh.

“Do we want to see yet another ancient Christian population driven out of its homeland? A lot of this is with U.S. weaponry or with Israeli weaponry that the Azeris have. This should not be taking place on our watch and at this time,” he said.

He neglected to mention that 30,000 Jews and up to 450,000 Christians live in Azerbaijan as equal citizens.

Also ignored: Armenia banished a million Azerbaijanis from their homes and destroyed more than 60 mosques in Karabakh. They defiled others with pigs, used them as watch-towers or transformed them into Iranian mosques. To the Lantos commission, however, the conflict was about “driving the Christians out,” not ethnic cleansing of Azerbaijanis from 20% of the country.

That rhymes with the Squad’s false claims that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is about “driving the Palestinians out,” when it is really about the Palestinian attempt to drive Jews out.

The former ambassador’s argument also bore an uncanny similarity to the arguments of the BDS movement. Brownback argued for “a bipartisan Nagorno-Karabakh Human Rights Act,” imagining a law—not just a resolution—under which Washington would dictate to Azerbaijan what its “minimal human rights standards” should be. The U.S. would also give “basic security guarantees” to Armenia.

Brownback also declared that Washington should stop sending weapons to Azerbaijan unless the latter removes its checkpoint from the Lachin Corridor. It’s worth noting that Russia and Iran—both staunch enemies of the United States—are the chief proponents of removing that checkpoint.

Russians want to keep exploiting Azerbaijan’s natural resources, in violation of international law, while Iran aims to keep using Armenia to bypass Western sanctions. The panel did not mention Armenia’s close ties to Russia and Iran.

Michael Rubin, an American Enterprise Institute senior fellow, said Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev has been acting in a way that is “almost analogous to what we saw with Saddam Hussein.”

Aliyev recently opened an embassy in Tel Aviv and hails from a country with a friendly relationship with Israel. Hussein launched Scud missiles at Israel during the Gulf War and used to issue grants to families of Palestinian suicide bombers, who murdered Israelis in the second intifada. (He also compared Azerbaijan reclaiming Karabakh—which it did in accordance with four U.N. Security Council resolutions—to Hussein’s illegal invasion of Kuwait.)

That would all have been sufficiently problematic. But Rubin also proclaimed that Washington should “diplomatically convince Israel that perhaps it’s not entirely in its interest to continue blind support for Azerbaijan.”

“How can Israel expect the international community to rally behind it to embrace the importance of preserving Jewish cultural heritage in the West Bank in the face of some Palestinian leaders, who would like to see it entirely destroyed, if Israel is not contributing to the preservation of Armenian heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh?” he asked.

In other words, Israel should be threatened into switching sides—counter to its interests in supporting Azerbaijan in the face of threats from Iran and its proxies—merely because of a strong Armenian lobby, which hopes to make Israel into “America’s stooge,” which does its bidding.

One speaker, an academic, even referred to Azerbaijan committing a “second Armenian genocide,” an eerie similarity to some members of Congress accusing Israel of a “Palestinian genocide.”

Sadly, no member of Congress has objected to any of this, which makes me wonder, again, whether the Squad has gone mainstream.

I’ve offered just a small taste of the propaganda put forth at the event. The question remains: How should Israel respond to this sort of pressure?

My advice is that Israel should resist U.S. pressure of this sort and stick with Azerbaijan—one of its greatest allies against the Iranian threat. Allies should have each other’s back.

Just as Azerbaijan stands with Israel, we should stand with Azerbaijan—united against our common enemies.

EU Worries Russia Will Try Thwarting Lucrative Gas Deal With Azerbaijan

Bedik Zaminian
Forbes
Kenneth Rapoza

Blaming Moscow, the EU and Azerbaijan think that Russian backed separatists in Armenia are aching to start another war.

Azerbaijan and Armenia – located in the South Caucasus – fought a hot, smoldering war with one another between 1988-1994, and again in the fall of 2020 with a final cease fire declared that year. Those days are not mere bygones to some, as Armenia has yet to sign an official peace treaty.

The main problem now is with a region in Azerbaijan known as the Karabakh , patrolled by Russian peacekeepers, along with ethnic Armenians who live there and do not want to become Azerbaijani citizens. Karabakh is a mountainous area is in between the two countries, once part of the USSR.

Armenia took the Karabakh region over in a war in the 1990s from Azerbaijan but lost it in the last cease-fire. The two neighbors are still at loggerheads, and tensions are rising at a time when Azerbaijan has a memorandum of understanding with the EU in a lucrative gas deal signed in July 2022. The agreement with Azerbaijan will supposedly double imports of natural gas to at least 20 billion cubic meters annually by 2027. The EU is seeking alternative suppliers to Russia.

"Azerbaijan's role as a reliable energy partner is important on the global landscape. By committing to increase natural gas supplies to 20 billion cubic meters by 2027, Azerbaijan is already significantly contributing to strengthening Europe's energy security," British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said in his address to the participants of the Baku Energy Week conference, which ended in the capital city of Baku on June 6.

Before the war, in 2021, EU countries imported 155 billion cubic meters of Russian natural gas, or 45% of total gas imports, according to the European Council on Foreign Relations.

In the past 12 months, the EU’s energy partnership with Azerbaijan has become one of Europe’s topmost essential strategic relationships. Several EU member states are already importing and using Caspian gas from the Caspian Sea, where Azerbaijan is located. Deliveries began in 2020 using the Trans-Adriatic and Trans-Anatolian pipelines included in the Southern Gas Corridor. In increasing numbers, Azerbaijan gas has been heading to Italy, Croatia, Czech Republic, Portugal, Spain, Germany, Romania, Greece, Austria and Bulgaria.

Recently, European Council President Charles Michel held calls with the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to discuss the situation in Karabakh. He stressed the EU’s readiness “to help advance peace and stability in the region.”

Could the border problems in the Karabakh, once part of the Soviet Union, upend the European gas deal?

“Major oil and natural gas export from Azerbaijan is not dependent on a peace accord between Armenia and Azerbaijan,” says Brenda Shaffer, a faculty member at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in California. She is an expert on Caspian energy and a non-resident fellow at The Atlantic Council.

“The results of the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan War impacted the security of the energy export corridor,” she says. “Armenia is now deterred from attempting to attack that corridor, as it did in the past.”

The EU sent a civilian mission to help police the Armenian side of Karabakh region. Azerbaijan was reportedly not happy with the EU presence there, according to a report by Politico EU.

Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev criticized outside interference in his country’s standoff with Armenian separatists. He said those providing support for the separatists were not helping matters.

“We are warning certain countries that stand behind Armenia from here…to stop these dirty deeds,” he said in his March 18 statement. “The mediators involved in the Karabakh conflict [try] not to solve the issue but to freeze it,” he said, adding that ethnic Armenians living in the Karabakh region, now Azerbaijan, were not getting any special guarantees beyond what an Azerbaijani citizen would get.

Russia has historically been both a meddler and peace mediator there since Soviet times.

The entire region was a Russian imperial province and later became one of the Soviet states in a patchwork creation of made-up borders in the 1920s. Joseph Stalin personally drew the boundaries of the three South Caucasus republics: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, to leave large groups of minorities in each republic to deliberately exacerbate tensions, some historians say, to maintain a military presence there.

At present, some two thousand Russian troops are there today as peacekeepers.

Russia held talks between the two sides in May, but some in the Baku natural gas business are getting angry with Moscow now. Gazprom lost market share for natural gas in Europe because of sanctions. On balance, they have been doing okay in selling to new markets. However, Azerbaijanis are concerned that Russia could escalate in the South Caucasus by using Armenia separatists to thwart Europe’s interest in working with Azerbaijan – or, just to get back at Europe.

“This spring has been the deadliest along the border since the cease-fire in 2020,” Oleysa Vartanyan, a senior researcher at a Tbilisi, Georgia-based peace studies think tank The Crisis Group, told German news channel DW on May 25. She said at least four people have died in the shootings.

The one name that always comes up in this story is a famous Armenian financier named Ruben Vardanyan. He is close to Vladimir Putin and has been seen at fundraisers with George Clooney.

The Washington Times in January published an op-ed written by Janusz Bugajski, a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and one of the leading Caucasus and former Soviet Union experts who enumerated a long list of allegations against him – from money laundering to helping provide logistical support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Because of the last part, Vardanyan is considered "a person subject to immediate detention and transfer to law enforcement agencies of Ukraine or NATO countries,” by Kiev, which included him in the Mirotvoretz (Peacemaker) database – this is a list of people deemed by Kiev as enemies of Ukraine.

A bill last year, H.R. 6422 called the Putin Accountability Act, led by Republican Congressman Jim Banks of Indiana, had Vardanyan targeted for sanctions. It is still in committee and has not been voted on yet.

The wealthy tycoon (and founder of one of Russia’s first investment banks – Troika Dialog) is seen as a leader in blocking a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

On May 28, Vardanyan said separatists should not sign onto any agreements with Azerbaijan on his Russian language Telegram channel. He brought up the awful specter of the Armenian genocide to win them over.

He wrote: (Azerbaijan president) “Aliyev has one strategy — the expulsion and genocide of the people of Artsakh.” Artsakh is what Armenians call the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. “The last line has been passed. You either stand up for Artsakh, or against the entire Armenian people.”

Vardanyan has been entwined in the separatist government for some time. On his Twitter page, Vardanyan writes about human rights issues related to Karabakh region and has been especially vocal about the alleged blockade of a road connecting the region to Armenia.

I reached out three times to his personal foundation and twice to his Twitter account to ask him to push back against these Azerbaijani claims that he has been stirring the pot to serve Russian interests. He has not responded to requests for comment.

As a Forbes-listed billionaire, he surely has the cash to play to his passions.

Shaffer said Russia is a huge player in the region and Vardanyan has Moscow’s blessing.

“The Russian peacekeepers had the de facto control of security. Moscow was allowing arms, Armenian soldiers, mines and more to flow to the Armenian community in Karabakh,” she said.

In September 2022, they dispatched Vardanyan to the areas controlled by Russian peacekeepers, she said.

“Vardanyan quickly established himself as de facto leader of the Armenian population there and began to undermine the peace talks. Given the Russian control over the territory and the ties of the Karabakh Armenians to Moscow…it is unthinkable that Vardanyan would have been offered the leadership post without Moscow’s urging,” Shaffer says.

Azerbaijan’s blockade, or checkpoints as they call them, have allegedly been designed to stop any threats of arms flow into Karabakh. Moreover, Armenia is one of Russia’s ways to get around sanctions. Armenia has been a source for banned products to get into Russia – namely computer electronics, such as microchips used for military weapons, The New York TimesNYT -0.1% reported in April.

Still, for Armenian separatists, the checkpoint is a blockade as it seals off the only road to Armenia. Some say the road is completely closed, and that there is no checkpoint except for maybe official government vehicles.

On June 21, separatists called for an international intervention, saying humanitarian aid could not get to the region because of the situation.

Another war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is unlikely to stop gas flows, but that depends on whether Europe picks sides. If they come out as anti-Azerbaijan, sanctions could undermine EU energy policy yet again. This is the worst-case scenario.

As it is, the U.S. is looking anti-Azerbaijan.

The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission in Washington held a hearing on June 21 spotlighting Azerbaijan’s checkpoints in the Karabakh. At least one member of the Commission, Hollywood, California Congressman Adam Schiff, called for sanctions in his written statement. He even referred to Karabakh by Vardanyan’s preferred term, “Artsakh”. Maybe Clooney got to him.

Would Washington again sanction a country important to European energy security? It’s done so before.

Politico EU says efforts by Brussels to calm tensions are falling short.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is under pressure to protect the rights of the ethnic Armenians in Karabakh, but Baku naturally wants the separatist government and military structures to be dissolved. They want the Armenians there to become full Azerbaijani citizens, Reuters reported.

Azerbaijan denies Vardanyan’s take that they are putting the Armenians through another genocide or that the road checkpoints are designed to make life miserable.

It looks like Vardanyan has “retired” from his post in the Karabakh and is now working to get his message out about his new human rights campaign on social media. He stepped down from the separatist government in February, Reuters reported, despite Vardanyan arguing he was not, nor that was he appointed to any role by Moscow..

Vardanyan may have stepped down to avoid the risk of individual sanctions. Some in the Azerbaijan government are pleased to see him go, even going so far as asking Brussels and Washington to add him to an Interpol list of wanted criminals.

Russia’s and Europe’s goals in the Caucasus are diametrically opposed. Armenia and Azerbaijan do not need another war. Peace in the Karabakh also secures Armenia’s economic development after decades of isolation and poverty. Millions of Armenians have left their homeland over the years, spreading out into Armenian communities in the U.S., Europe and Russia.

A calm Caucasus is imperative to ensure Europe’s energy security.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2023/06/25/eu-worries-russia-will-try-thwarting-lucrative-gas-deal-with-azerbaijan/?sh=17f5a02018cf

Armenia at a crossroads: will the country leave Russia’s sphere of influence

Ani Kharatian
  • Arthur Khachatryan
  • Yerevan

Crisis in relations between Armenia and Russia

“If Armenia de jure decides to withdraw from the CSTO, then this will happen after Yerevan records that the CSTO has left Armenia.” Similar statements by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan have been heard since May 2021, when Armenia turned to Russia with a request to protect the borders of Armenia and received no assistance.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the Armenian authorities did not wait not only for military assistance to protect their territory, but also for a political statement from Russia and the CSTO allies. They still did not state that the Azerbaijani Armed Forces had invaded the sovereign territory of the country. Moreover, they refused to assist allied Armenia under the pretext that the delimitation and demarcation of the border had not been carried out.

“Over the past two years, Armenia has been subjected to aggression by Azerbaijan at least three times. It is depressing that Armenia’s membership in the CSTO did not deter Azerbaijan from aggressive actions and that, in fact, until today we have not been able to reach a decision on the CSTO’s reaction to this aggression. These facts cause great damage to the image of the CSTO both inside and outside our country,” Pashinyan said.

The prime minister does not rule out that Armenia may leave the military bloc operating under the leadership of Russia. If this really happens, Yerevan will actually break allied relations with Moscow and take a course towards integration with the West. At the same time, the rating of Armenia’s strategic ally is already at the lowest positions in the last 30 years.

The fact that relations between Armenia and Russia are going through hard times, to put it mildly, is already openly stated. The Armenian authorities have never directly criticized Moscow and the CSTO in this way. People in Armenia are watching with surprise Pashinyan’s string of statements critical of Russia, including the inaction of Russian peacekeepers stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh.

In particular, the Prime Minister of Armenia criticized RMK, commenting on the blockade of the Lachin corridor, the only road linking the unrecognized republic with Armenia:

“Of course, this is due to the actions of Azerbaijan, but this does not change the meaning. This is the key meaning of the presence of Russian peacekeepers – not to allow illegal actions and to keep the Lachin corridor under control.”

Yerevan’s dissatisfaction with the position of Moscow and the countries belonging to the Collective Security Treaty Organization grew like a snowball. It all started with incidents on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border after the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The country’s authorities say that over the past two years, Azerbaijan has several times launched large-scale military operations, simultaneously conducting creeping expansion and deepening deep into the territory of Armenia. Weakened after the defeat in the second Karabakh war, Armenia counted heavily on the support of the allies.

“The aggression against the sovereign territory of Armenia from May 2021 to September 13, 2022 was doubly painful because our security allies left us alone, preferring to remain in the status of a passive observer or offering the status of an active observer as an alternative,” Pashinyan said.

Talk that pro-European forces might come to power in Armenia intensified during the 2018 Velvet Revolution. Then everyone remembered that the leader of the movement, opposition politician Pashinyan, made statements about the need to leave the Eurasian Economic Union, operating under the auspices of Russia.

But when he got to power, Pashinyan changed his rhetoric and first of all declared that Yerevan was not going to leave any integration structures, and even more so, he was not striving for a political reverse. But these were only words, the political observer Arman Abovyan believes:

“It is enough just to study the composition of the so-called youth wing of the revolutionaries in 2018. They were quite active in the public arena. These are the same people who once organized anti-Russian actions in front of the Russian embassy. Even in the current government there are such people.”

In the top leadership of the country, there are indeed so-called “pronounced Westerners” who, until 2018, harshly criticized Moscow’s policy towards Armenia. The most prominent figure among them is Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan.

At the same time, having come to power, Nikol Pashinyan and the team constantly declared their desire to bring relations with Moscow to a qualitatively new level. The leaders of the two countries met regularly, and it seemed that Armenia and Russia were satisfied with each other’s relations.

At the initial stage of his premiership, Pashinyan really did not think about changing his foreign policy course, political scientist Ruben Mehrabyan is sure:

“In 2018, there was an illusion that there was even an opportunity to build qualitatively new relations, to deepen ties with Russia. And the new democratic authorities of Armenia are able to do this. But life has shown that it was not only an illusion. It was a dangerous illusion. And now there is no stone left unturned from this illusion.”

After the 2020 war, Russia appeared to have established “one-man hegemony in the South Caucasus region” that was only marginally disturbed by Turkey’s presence. But after the Ukrainian events, Moscow began to rapidly lose ground.

On September 13, 2022, the largest escalation since the war took place on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. A few days later, Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi arrived in Armenia, and world media reported that it was thanks to Washington that the September clashes were stopped. This, perhaps, was a turning point in the post-war cycle of the Karabakh settlement.

The situation worsened every time Armenia and Azerbaijan clashed at the border, and Russia remained silent. All this has led to Washington and Brussels becoming the main moderators in the negotiation process.

“At the behest of circumstances, Armenia is still reconsidering its relations with Russia. This is first. Secondly, Armenia has fixed its commonality with the interests, values and goals of the European Union and considers the EU as a promising partner. However, Armenia does not have a final solution to generalize this picture. Because Armenia continues to be a member of structures that are contrary to the state interests and security of Armenia,” political scientist Ruben Mehrabyan describes the current state of affairs.

In parallel with this, the realities were changing in Nagorno-Karabakh. Last December, Azerbaijanis who called themselves environmental activists blocked the Lachin corridor. And Russia actually did not take any effective measures to unblock it. Then Baku went further and, with the tacit consent of the Russian peacekeepers, established a checkpoint in the Lachin corridor. Thus, the road is now effectively not controlled by Russia, as the 2020 tripartite statement suggests.

The further Azerbaijan went and the longer Moscow was silent, the weaker became Yerevan’s negotiating positions. Military escalations on the border have become a way of putting pressure on the Armenian authorities. All this led to the fact that Nikol Pashinyan publicly stated and then confirmed Yerevan’s official position in the negotiations – Armenia is ready to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan:

“A peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan will become real if both countries clearly, without ambiguity, recognize each other’s territorial integrity and undertake not to present territorial claims to each other today and ever. Now I want to confirm that the Republic of Armenia fully recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and we expect Azerbaijan to do the same by recognizing the entire territory of the Armenian SSR as the Republic of Armenia.”

A superficial analysis of the situation may give the impression that Armenia is forced to take such a step. But this is a more thoughtful and long-term policy, Arman Abovyan believes. Its goal is to change the vector in foreign policy:

“This government is the executor for those geopolitical centers whose main goal is to oust the eastern vector from the region of the South Caucasus: Russia, Iran and partly China.”

Experts voice the version that the end result of this process should be the opening of the border with Turkey through concessions on the Karabakh issue. If this happens, Armenia will receive the shortest communication to Europe, which can significantly expand the possibilities for cooperation between Yerevan and Brussels.

In what direction should Armenia move in foreign policy. This is perhaps one of the most significant discourses on the Armenian political agenda. If a few years ago the vast majority of the country’s population approved of the policy of the authorities to deepen cooperation with Moscow, the war of 2020 and subsequent events have changed the opinion of society. Now only 35 percent of the population considers Russia a friendly country, while before the war this figure was over 50 percent. For comparison, France is considered friendly by 45 percent.

Another important question that the Armenian analytical community is trying to answer is why Russia is pursuing such a policy towards Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. And experts associate the main answer to this question with the Ukrainian crisis.

After the closure of borders with European countries and Western sanctions, Russia became heavily dependent on Turkey and even Azerbaijan for communications and hydrocarbon exports. It is Türkiye that is now the main and main route of export and import for Russia. In such a situation, Moscow simply cannot afford to “offend” Ankara and Baku and not yield to them on the issues of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

Understanding these realities should lead to a renewal of Armenia’s foreign policy, political scientist Gurgen Simonyan is sure:

“It is time to express a clear position and leave the military-political union of the CSTO. As a result of the military aggression in 2020, the expectations that we had from Russia in the context of bilateral agreements, and not only from Russia, but also from the CSTO, to put it mildly, did not satisfy us. If not to say that they dealt a serious blow to our national security.”

Armenia is also dissatisfied with the fact that Russia does not supply weapons purchased from it earlier, for which, by the way, it was paid. In this situation, Yerevan significantly intensified contacts with India, as well as France. That is, the country intends to change, at least diversify, the vector of military-technical cooperation.

Will Yerevan be able to build a new security architecture in conditions of severe turbulence? And, most importantly, what are the consequences of this process? Questions that are still open. One thing is clear – Yerevan has already begun to review relations with Moscow for the first time since independence.

https://jam-news.net/crisis-in-relations-between-armenia-and-russia/ 

Restoration completed on Armenian cemetery in Masjed Soleiman

Suren Karakhanian
 TEHRAN TIMES 

TEHRAN – A restoration project on a centuries-old Armenian cemetery in the ancient city of Masjed Soleiman, in southwestern Khuzestan province, has come to an end, an archeologist has said.

 The graveyard dates back to the period of oil exploration and belongs to the Armenians who inhabited the region during that era, Ziba Salehi explained on Sunday. 

The project involved repairing the cemetery walls and organizing the gravestones, she added. 

Masjed Soleiman was the site of the first oil well in Iran and the Middle East.

Khuzestan is home to three UNESCO World Heritage sites of Susa, Tchogha Zanbil, and Shushtar Historical Hydraulic System, yet it is a region of raw beauty that its visitors could spend weeks exploring. The province is also a cradle for handicrafts and arts whose crafters inherited from their preceding generations.

Lying at the head of the Persian Gulf and bordering Iraq on the west, Khuzestan was settled about 6000 BC by a people with affinities to the Sumerians, who came from the Zagros Mountains region. Urban centers appeared there contemporaneously with the first cities in Mesopotamia in the 4th millennium. Khuzestan, according to Encyclopedia Britannica, came to constitute the heart of the Elamite kingdom, with Susa as its capital. 

ABU/AM 

Armenia still the target of Azerbaijani hate speech – European Commission against Racism and Intolerance

Bedik Zaminian

 13:29, 21 June 2023

YEREVAN, JUNE 21, ARMENPRESS. Azerbaijan continues to propagate racist stereotypes and perpetuate animosities, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) said in its 6th report on Azerbaijan.

It said that public discourse in Azerbaijan has been marked by the use of inflammatory rhetoric in public statements by politicians, including at the highest political level, and other public figures, as well as by the wide dissemination of hateful and dehumanising content against Armenia.

The report stated that discriminatory language in Azerbaijani school textbooks against Armenians exists.

“In this context, ECRI is deeply concerned that the use of hate speech linked to the long-lasting conflict and confrontations with neighbouring country Armenia, has been observed among young people in and outside schools and could eventually provide a breeding ground for further hostilities,” the ECRI said in the report.

The commission also addressed the infamous “Trophy Park” in Baku.

“The opening of the Baku Trophy Park in April 2021, where Armenian military equipment and personnel were portrayed very negatively, also raised a lot of criticism. ECRI shares the grave concerns expressed by other international bodies, including the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe and the CERD about the language of “aggression” and regular resort to adversarial narratives that propagates racist stereotypes and perpetuates animosities.”

“ECRI has received numerous reports with graphic accounts of violence against Armenians, including wilful killings or the extensive destruction of their property during and after the 2020 armed conflict and confrontations in and around Nagorno-Karabakh,” it added.

Deputy FM meets European Parliament delegation, highlights EU efforts for stabilizing regional security situation

Ani Kharatian

 13:55, 21 June 2023

YEREVAN, JUNE 21, ARMENPRESS. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vahan Kostanyan held a meeting on June 20 with the delegation of European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defense (SEDE) led by Chair Nathalie Loiseau.

Kostanyan commended the European Parliament’s principled position in issues of primary importance for Armenia and thanked the MEPs for their pro-Armenian activities, the foreign ministry said in a readout.

The Deputy Foreign Minister and the Members of the European Parliament discussed a broad circle of issues related to the Armenia-EU cooperation agenda. Kostanyan attached great importance to the deployment of the EU mission in Armenia (EUMA) and EU’s efforts aimed at stabilizing the security situation in the region.

In the context of the discussed issues, Deputy FM Kostanyan comprehensively presented the latest developments around the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization process and addressing the guarantees of rights and security of the people of Nagorno Karabakh. At the request of the visiting delegation, he also touched upon the steps aimed at the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations.