Category: 2023

Eurasianet

Sept 7 2023

Relations between Armenia and its traditional strategic partner Russia are deteriorating fast. 

In the past week, Yerevan has boldly criticized Russia's "absolute indifference" to Azerbaijani "aggression" against Armenia and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has expressed regret over his country's near-total dependence on Moscow for its security as a "strategic mistake." 

And now Yerevan is sending a package of humanitarian aid to Ukraine for the first time since Russia's invasion.  

RFE/RL's Armenian service reported that the aid (whose precise nature and amount have not been announced) would be delivered by Anna Hakobyan, the prime minister's wife, as she attends the Ukraine-initiated Third Summit of first ladies and gentlemen in Kyiv. 

Armenia-Russia relations have been steadily worsening since September 2022, when Azerbaijani forces attacked Armenian territory and seized several square kilometers of land in clashes that left about 400 dead on both sides. 

Armenia is a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and has a bilateral defense agreement with Russia. But both Moscow and the CSTO refused to intervene on Armenia's behalf or condemn Azerbaijan's incursion (only a small CSTO monitoring mission was sent). A few months later Armenia refused to host a CSTO exercise and further downgraded its participation in the bloc. 

More recently, in an interview with the Italian newspaper La Repubblica on September 2, Prime Minister Pashinyan criticized the "failure" of Russian peacekeepers to protect Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, where they were have been deployed since the 2020 war with Azerbaijan. He also lamented Yerevan's "strategic mistake" of depending on Russia almost entirely for its security and mused about cooperating more extensively with the West. 

And that followed a statement by the Foreign Ministry three days earlier criticizing Russia's "absolute indifference" to what the ministry called Azerbaijan's acts of aggression, including the September 2022 incursion and the June 15, 2023 incident in which Azerbaijani troops advanced towards Armenia from the border checkpoint on the Lachin road, which connects Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

On September 5, Armenia's Defense Ministry announced that Armenian and U.S. troops would hold a 9-day drill later this month. The exercise will focus on "stabilization operations between conflicting parties during peacekeeping missions," the ministry said. 

Russia "cannot leave Armenia"

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov responded on September 7 by saying, "In this situation, it is certain that holding such exercises will not facilitate the stabilization of the situation – in any case, it will not facilitate the strengthening of an atmosphere of mutual trust in the region." 

Two days earlier Peskov rebuffed Pashinyan's remark in his La Repubblica interview that Russia was "leaving" the South Caucasus region. 

"Russia is an integral part of this region, so it can never go anywhere. Russia cannot leave Armenia," he said. 

Armenia currently hosts around 10,000 Russian troops, 5,000 of which are stationed at Gyumri's 102nd Russian military base. Others are stationed in Yerevan, including at Zvartnots International Airport. 

Russian border troops have long overseen the Armenia-Turkey and Armenia-Iran borders and have been deployed more recently to sections of the Azerbaijan border in response to tensions there.

An additional 2,000 Russian peacekeepers are stationed in the ethnic Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh region for a 5-year term set to expire in 2025. 

(Russia is also Armenia's biggest trade partner by far, and Yerevan's economic dependence on Moscow has only grown since the start of the Ukraine war.)

The Rome Statute 

On top of everything else, Prime Minister Pashinyan this week sent the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court to parliament for ratification, despite the objections that Russia has been expressing for months. 

Armenia's motivation is to be able to sue Azerbaijan in the ICC for its alleged abuses of Armenians. But ratifying the statute would mean, theoretically at least, that Armenia will be obliged to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he visits, as the court issued an arrest warrant for Putin in March over the abduction of Ukrainian children. 

Russia expressed "dissatisfaction" over Armenia's decision, demanding explanations for the move.

Tigran Grigoryan, the head of the Yerevan-based Regional Center for Democracy and Security think tank, says that Russia has levers to pressure Armenia into not ratifying the statute.

Grigoryan told Eurasianet that Russia may take action to "punish" Armenia as it did in April, banning dairy imports from Armenia after the latter's Constitutional Court approved the treaty. 

The analyst added that he doesn't expect any drastic changes in Armenia's foreign policy in the near future, nor any dramatic Russian moves against Armenia. 

At the same time, he said, Russia is unlikely to help Armenia in case of military escalation with Azerbaijan, in particular since Moscow is now directly speaking of Karabakhi Armenians' need to accept Baku's rule over the disputed territory.

"Armenia has sharpened its rhetoric a bit regarding Russia because it seems that Russia has accepted Azerbaijan's position over the issues concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, which means that Armenia does not have anything to lose," Grigoryan said. "Russia's proposals are currently identical to Azerbaijan's proposals."

Mail Online, UK

Sept 7 2023

• Grigor Sargsyan turned savings of $350 into millions after recruiting players 
• More than 181 tennis players and 375 matches were involved, prosecutors said
• DailyMail.com provides all the latest international sports news 

By DANIEL MATTHEWS FOR DAILYMAIL.COM

An Armenian match fixer nicknamed the Maestro, who masterminded the biggest illegal betting ring in tennis, has said he is 'proud' of corrupting more than 180 players and paying them to throw hundreds of matches.

Over several years, Grigor Sargsyan, an Armenian immigrant in Belgium with no tennis background turned savings of $350 into millions. He supposedly considered himself the sport's 'Robin Hood' after building a web of players from around the world – believed to include some based in the United States – and convincing them to fix matches.

He was recently jailed for five years in Belgium after a SWAT team arrested him at his parent's house following an exhaustive investigation.

The tennis authorities issued a raft of lifetime bans and suspensions after Sargsyan's network was uncovered. It was described as 'one of the largest match-fixing files ever to surface in the world' but just ‘the tip of the iceberg.'

'(The) biggest in size, biggest in money, and biggest in number of matches fixed and number of players involved,' prosecutors said. 'More than 181 tennis players are involved; more than 375 matches are involved.' 

According to an investigation by the Washington Post, players, typically from the sport's lower rungs, agreed to throw points, games or sets for money. His network of associates would then profit by betting on the outcome.

Sometimes, it's claimed, both players in a match would be working for Sargsyan. His profits – which amounted to at least $9million in just two years – ended up in bank accounts linked to a man apparently working from behind bars in Armenia.

Sargsyan is believed to have worked on behalf of a transnational criminal syndicate based in Armenia. In tennis circles, he was known as the Maestro, Gregory, Greg, GG, TonTon and Ragnar, after the Viking warrior. 

While in prison, the fixer read Fyodor Dostoevsky’s 'Crime and Punishment'. 'Honestly, it made me proud,' he told The Post. 'It was my entire life,' the 33-year-old said.

Sargsyan reportedly targeted those who were struggling to afford the cost of life on the Futures and Challenger Tours. They included Younes Rachidi, who was found to have committed 135 match-fixing offenses in less than 10 months – a record. He was banned from the sport for life earlier this year but did not face criminal charges.

'It’s like doubling your money. It feels perfect, and no one knows,' Rachidi told the Post. 'You think: "That’s it?" The whole world is rose-colored.'

French player Yannick Thivant, who reached a career-high ranking of 590, reportedly received more than $50,000. He was one of four players taken into French custody in 2019. So far, none of them has been charged.

Sargsyan, whose family moved to Brussels when he was nine, was a 24-year law student when, in 2014, he fixed his first match.  

He persuaded a young player from Latin America to lose the second set of his match 6-0. It's said Sargsyan made nearly $4,000 and paid the player around $600. 'It was an incredible feeling,' he told the Post.

Soon, it's claimed, he was treating players at fancy restaurants, driving them around in his Jaguar. He bought one player's diamond engagement ring. He would occasionally overpay players, it's said.

All the while, Sargsyan lived a double life – even working alongside his parents at a delicatessen in a bid to avoid detection. 

Betting regulators now reportedly consider tennis 'the world's most manipulated sport'. Sargsyan 'put his finger on the weakness' when he realised anyone can gamble on thousands of obscure matches in sporting backwaters.

Since 2022, 40 players have been banned or suspended for match fixing.

They would deliberately double fault or miss easy shots; some athletes reportedly played Sargsyan off against other match fixers on the circuit.

Sebastian Rivera, a Chilean coach based in the United States, was accused of recruiting players for Sargsyan. He had got a job with Sean Bollettieri-Abdali, the son of iconic coach Nick Bollettieri, in California. 

Bollettieri Sr coached Andre Agassi, Venus and Serena Williams and Boris Becker. Rivera tasked with training some of the program’s best prospects. There is no suggestion of any wrongdoing on either he or his son's part.

US authorities questioned Rivera, but the case ended there. Eight tennis players living in the US were named by Belgian authorities as appearing to be part of Sargsyan’s network. 

The web began to close on Sargsyan after Egyptian player Karim Hossam aroused suspicion and was asked to hand over his phone to tennis match-fixing investigators. Hossam was later banned for life but did not face criminal charges.

Iran International

Sept 7 2023

Benzinga

Sept 7 2023

• Luis Moreno Ocampo, ex-prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, tells Congressional Human Rights Commission that Azerbaijan's blockade of disputed enclave is a genocide and the US is at risk of complicity
• US should compel Azerbaijan to end blockade immediately, Ocampo says

MONTROSE, Calif., Sept. 7, 2023 /PRNewswire/ — The Center for Truth and Justice welcomed Luis Moreno Ocampo's call on the United States to demand an end to Azerbaijan's blockade of the Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. Ocampo, the first prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, said that the blockade is a genocide and cautioned that the United States risks complicity through inaction.

In a testimony Wednesday before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ocampo said that "there is a reasonable basis to believe that Azerbaijan's blockade of the Lachin Corridor constitutes genocide under Article II c) of the Convention" – and that the US, as a convention signatory, must do what it can to end it.

"The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is desperate, with Azerbaijan trying to starve the population to force it to flee," said Maggie Arutyunyan, a member of the leadership of the California-based Center for Truth and Justice (CFTJ). "We hope Ocampo's testimony finally compels the United States and other states to move decisively to end this atrocity."

The disputed Armenian-populated enclave, known to Armenians as Artsakh, ended up in Azerbaijan when the Soviet Union collapsed, but has since then operated as a self-governing entity. Azerbaijan seized much of the territory in a 2020 war that killed thousands of Armenians, and what remains of it is connected to the outside world by an access road known as the Lachin Corridor. 

On December 12, 2022, Azerbaijan started blocking that road, and since June 15 all passage has been impeded, cutting off food and other supplies. At least one resident has died of starvation, and witnesses say basic supplies including baby formula are running out.

In his testimony, Ocampo said that the US, as a party to the Genocide Convention, "undertook the duty 'to prevent and to punish'" genocide, and "accepted that under Article III e) complicity in genocide is punishable." Alluding to ongoing Western-sponsored peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, he said that "US involvement in a negotiation that includes a party, Azerbaijan, which is committing genocide could be characterized as complicity in genocide."

"The duty to prevent does not require the US to intervene militarily in Azerbaijan but rather to use all available means as circumstances permit to have a deterrent effect on Azerbaijan," he said. "The US should openly inform the Azerbaijan government that without the immediate and unconditional removal of the Lachin Corridor blockade, the US would consider Azerbaijan to be committing genocide.

Last month Ocampo issued a report finding that the blockade constitutes a case of genocide. Two weeks ago the first UN Advisor on Genocide, Juan Mendez, also affirmed in a report that Azerbaijan's lack of compliance with a February order by the International Court of Justice to stop its blockade of food and humanitarian assistance to the 120,000 Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh is an "early warning" of genocide. The issue has also been recently discussed at the UN Security Council.

The CFTJ is a group of attorneys dedicated to collecting testimonial evidence of war crimes, is renewing its call on world powers to intervene to end the genocide facing Nagorno-Karabakh.

ABOUT THE CFTJ:
CFTJ is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, established in November 2020 in response to the Nagorno-Karabakh war. We are a group of lawyers overseeing the collection of firsthand testimonial evidence from war survivors via in-depth, recorded interviews. We run two law clinics, one in Armenia and one in Nagorno-Karabakh, which are the first of their kind.

MEDIA CONTACT:
Maggie Arutyunyan at 1(818)749-8185
[email protected]

SOURCE Center for Truth & JusticeThe disputed Armenian-populated enclave, known to Armenians as Artsakh, ended up in Azerbaijan when the Soviet Union collapsed, but has since then operated as a self-governing entity. Azerbaijan seized much of the territory in a 2020 war that killed thousands of Armenians, and what remains of it is connected to the outside world by an access road known as the Lachin Corridor. 

On December 12, 2022, Azerbaijan started blocking that road, and since June 15 all passage has been impeded, cutting off food and other supplies. At least one resident has died of starvation, and witnesses say basic supplies including baby formula are running out.

In his testimony, Ocampo said that the US, as a party to the Genocide Convention, "undertook the duty 'to prevent and to punish'" genocide, and "accepted that under Article III e) complicity in genocide is punishable." Alluding to ongoing Western-sponsored peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, he said that "US involvement in a negotiation that includes a party, Azerbaijan, which is committing genocide could be characterized as complicity in genocide."

"The duty to prevent does not require the US to intervene militarily in Azerbaijan but rather to use all available means as circumstances permit to have a deterrent effect on Azerbaijan," he said. "The US should openly inform the Azerbaijan government that without the immediate and unconditional removal of the Lachin Corridor blockade, the US would consider Azerbaijan to be committing genocide.

Last month Ocampo issued a report finding that the blockade constitutes a case of genocide. Two weeks ago the first UN Advisor on Genocide, Juan Mendez, also affirmed in a report that Azerbaijan's lack of compliance with a February order by the International Court of Justice to stop its blockade of food and humanitarian assistance to the 120,000 Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh is an "early warning" of genocide. The issue has also been recently discussed at the UN Security Council.

The CFTJ is a group of attorneys dedicated to collecting testimonial evidence of war crimes, is renewing its call on world powers to intervene to end the genocide facing Nagorno-Karabakh.

ABOUT THE CFTJ:
CFTJ is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, established in November 2020 in response to the Nagorno-Karabakh war. We are a group of lawyers overseeing the collection of firsthand testimonial evidence from war survivors via in-depth, recorded interviews. We run two law clinics, one in Armenia and one in Nagorno-Karabakh, which are the first of their kind.

MEDIA CONTACT:
Maggie Arutyunyan at 1(818)749-8185
[email protected]

SOURCE Center for Truth & Justice

https://www.benzinga.com/pressreleases/23/09/n34316798/center-for-truth-and-justice-welcomes-ocampos-congressional-testimony-on-nagorno-karabakh-genocide 

Sept 7 2023

Russia has voiced its concerns regarding Armenia’s plans to conduct a joint military exercise with the United States, with many interpreting this exercise as the latest indication of the former Soviet republic moving away from Moscow.

On September 6, Armenia announced its plans to host a joint military drill with the United States next week. The exercise, Eagle Partner 2023, is scheduled from September 11 to September 20 at Armenia’s Zar training center. 

Following this development, Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov conveyed to reporters that the news regarding Armenia’s intention to hold a joint military exercise with the United States is “alarming.”

He further said that Moscow will thoroughly analyze and monitor the situation. 

“When it comes to the drills — of course, it causes concern, especially in the current situation. Therefore, we will deeply analyze this news and monitor the situation,” Peskov said. 

According to the Armenian defense ministry, the Eagle Partner 2023 exercises enhance cooperation and compatibility between Armenian and US military forces, particularly in international peacekeeping missions.

The Ministry pointed out that units preparing for international peacekeeping operations often engage in comparable joint exercises and training activities in partner nations as part of the preparations for peacekeeping missions.

A US military spokesperson said 85 American soldiers and 175 Armenian personnel are slated to participate in the upcoming military exercises. 

The American contingent, which includes members from the Kansas National Guard, known for its two-decade-long training partnership with Armenia, would be equipped with rifles but would refrain from using heavy weaponry during the exercises.

Additionally, on September 4, Gunther Fehlinger, the European Committee for NATO Enlargement Chair, called on Armenia to consider becoming a part of the North Atlantic Alliance. 

Subsequently, on the same day, Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan responded that Armenia had been actively collaborating with NATO across multiple formats and was ready to continue this process. 

Nevertheless, the development poses a considerable concern for Russia, which is expected to raise eyebrows and potentially ignite significant irritation within the Russian government.

Russia and Armenia find themselves in a contentious situation regarding a 2,000-strong Russian peacekeeping contingent assigned to oversee the Lachin corridor.

This corridor serves as the vital link between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, a region that witnessed a conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, leading to a ceasefire brokered by Russia in 2020. 

In recent months, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has become more critical of the Russian peacekeeping presence, particularly their alleged failure to ensure unrestricted access along a corridor connecting Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh. 

This criticism underscores the growing tensions between Armenia and Russia in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Recently, Pashinyan expressed dissatisfaction with Russia’s handling of the corridor, suggesting that Moscow might either lack the ability or the willingness to manage it effectively. 

The Armenian government contends that Azerbaijan has blocked access to the corridor and imposed a blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in a humanitarian crisis in towns inhabited by Armenians.

Furthermore, in a significant shift in foreign policy, Pashinyan also said that Armenia’s longstanding reliance on Russia as its security guarantor had been a “strategic mistake.” This admission reflects a shift away from Armenia’s traditional alliance with Russia.

Adding to the complexities, Pashinyan’s wife visited Kyiv to participate in a meeting of first ladies and gentlemen and to provide humanitarian assistance. 

Early this year, Armenia declined to host military exercises conducted by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). 

Russia maintains a permanent military base in Armenia, part of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. 

On its part, the Kremlin has reiterated its commitment to fulfilling obligations towards Armenia, with Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov emphasizing that Russia has no intentions of withdrawing its support.

“Russia is an integral part of this region,” he said. “Russia plays a consistent, vital role in stabilizing the situation in this region … and we will continue to play this role.”

The tensions between Baku and Yerevan have markedly intensified, with both sides leveling allegations of cross-border attacks against each other.

West Invites Armenia To Join NATO; Russia Concerned With Growing Alliance, Military Drills With The US

Sept 7 2023

Devin Haas

Five years after Armenia’s pro-European colour revolution, disappointment with Russia as an economic and security partner is higher than ever. Nonetheless, European Union accession remains unlikely anytime soon. 

Armenia may officially remain in the Kremlin-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), despite prime minister Nikol Pashinyan’s threat this May to withdraw from the alliance, but its leaders and public are anything but quiet about their dissatisfaction with the allies that have repeatedly let them down. 

“Armenia’s security architecture was 99.999 per cent linked to Russia, including when it came to the procurement of arms and ammunition,” Pashinyan (pictured above with French President Emmanuel Macron) said in an interview published on September 3.

“But today we see that Russia itself is in need of weapons, arms and ammunition (for the war in Ukraine) and in this situation it’s understandable that even if it wishes so, the Russian Federation cannot meet Armenia’s security needs.” 

“This example should demonstrate to us that dependence on just one partner in security matters is a strategic mistake,” he added. 

---

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Many Armenians feel betrayed that Moscow and the CSTO failed to provide more support during the 2020 Karabakh War with Azerbaijan and declined to come to Armenia’s defence after an Azerbaijani incursion into the territory of Armenia-proper in September 2022 left almost 300 dead. Between 2011 and 2020, Russia was the largest supplier of arms to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

A poll taken by the International Republican Institute (IRI) this spring found that more Armenians viewed France and Iran as important security partners than Russia. France, Iran and the United States—all home to large Armenian diasporas—were viewed as the top three “most important political partners for Armenia” by 75, 67 and 52 per cent of respondents respectively, while Russia was fourth on the list with 50 per cent.  

While the IRI’s 2019 survey found 93 per cent of Armenians considered relations with Russia to be “good”, with only six per cent of respondents viewing them as “bad,” only 50 per cent still considered relations “good” this spring and 49 per cent viewed them as “bad.” 

The EU Neighbours East project’s annual public opinion survey in 2022 found that more Armenians trust the European Union than any other international organisation—55 per cent compared to only 45 per cent for the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and 35 per cent for the CSTO. 

Armenia has been gradually deepening ties with the West since its pro-European 2018 colour revolution, and the last year has seen a rapid acceleration in the deterioration of its security ties with Russia—despite still hosting Russian troops and theoretically depending on Russian peacekeepers to enforce the ceasefire that ended the 2020 war. 

Since last September’s escalation with Azerbaijan, Armenia has taken a host of concrete actions to distance itself from the CSTO.  

At a November CSTO summit in Yerevan, Pashinyan refused to sign a declaration and a document on joint measures to provide assistance to Armenia. He justified his decision by citing the lack of a “clear political assessment” by the alliance of Azerbaijan’s offensive two months prior.  

In March, when Yerevan would normally have chosen the CSTO’s new deputy secretary general, it renounced its right to take part in the bloc’s leadership rotation.  

That same month, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Russian president Vladimir Putin for his alleged role in war crimes in Ukraine, and one week later, Armenia’s constitutional court cleared the ratification of the ICC treaty. If approved, it would compel Armenian authorities to arrest Putin, should he ever visit.  

Even though accepting ICC jurisdiction would be as much about gaining new legal tools to hold Azerbaijan accountable as thumbing it to Putin, Moscow has reacted with stern warnings of “extremely negative” consequences for Yerevan.  

Nonetheless, Pashinyan’s government formally requested the ratification of the ICC treaty by parliament on September 1. In a symbolic move, the Armenian envoy to the CSTO was recalled on September 5 and reassigned to the Netherlands, where the ICC is headquartered.  

Most shocking of all, despite refusing to host a CSTO military exercise on its territory this January, Armenia announced on September 6 that it will hold a joint exercise with American troops from September 10 to 11 called “Eagle Partner 2023”.  

The snub came a day after Armenia decided it would provide humanitarian assistance to Ukraine for the first time since Russia’s invasion in February 2022. Pashinyan’s wife, Anna Hakobian, will personally deliver the aid to Kyiv.  

Armenia scores on democracy indices are comparable to several EU candidates. In Freedom House’s Nations in Transit 2023 report, Armenia scored 35 out of 100, just below EU candidates Moldova at 37 and Ukraine at 39 and above prospective candidate Georgia at 34. Armenia was the only country assessed in the report with improvements on more than one democracy indicator.  

However, Armenia is yet to apply for EU membership and would face unique challenges in its accession process. Armenia— along with Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—was set to sign an Association Agreement that included a free trade agreement with the EU at the 2013 Eastern Partnership summit, but then-prime minister Serzh Sargsyan abruptly backed out in favour of joining the EEU, likely under pressure from Russia. The EEU’s own terms are incompatible with a free-trade agreement with the EU. 

However, in 2017, Armenia and the EU agreed to a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement covering issues from human rights and rule of law to mining and tourism. In 2021, Armenia finalised an agreement to join the European Common Aviation Area. 

But before it would be able to pursue full EU membership, Armenia will almost certainly have to withdraw from both the CSTO and EEU. That could potentially expose Armenia to a decades-long period of economic and security limbo as it pursues the lengthy and arduous process of joining the EU with access to neither the EEU nor EU’s single markets and is on the receiving end of Moscow’s ire without other meaningful security guarantees.  

If, as Pashinyan says, it is a “strategic mistake” to choose “just one partner in security matters”, trying to simultaneously balance the support of France, the United States, Iran, India, and—to some extent—Russia also has its risks.

https://emerging-europe.com/news/let-down-by-moscow-armenia-looks-to-the-west/ 

Sept 6 2023

Geopolitical crises are sometimes very complicated indeed. The 19th-century British Prime Minister, Viscount Palmerston, wryly acknowledged this when asked about the cause of a labyrinthine dispute that almost triggered a major war in the 1860s. 

“Only three men in Europe have ever understood it. One was Prince Albert, who is dead. The second was a German professor who became mad. I am the third and I have forgotten,” he said. 

The South Caucasus can feel a little like this at times, with overlapping claims and trans-generational arguments about land and ownership. 

While the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh has sometimes seemed like this to outsiders, it has recently become much starker; both more alarming and more dangerous. 

The enclave’s substantial Armenian minority of around 120,000 is now besieged by the Azeri forces that won back control in 2020. They have effectively cut off food and medical supplies. Pregnant women now lose their babies because they lack help, while others faint while waiting in food queues. Temperatures are rising, armies are on the move, intense gunfire is exchanged and a new war is threatened. 

There are two major root causes. The first is Russian ambiguity, caused in part by the Kremlin’s focus on its unsuccessful war against Ukraine, and in part by its own uncertainty as to which of the two countries it supports. The second, linked, phenomenon is Azeri military superiority, which has given the Baku government of President Ilham Aliyev a sense that there will be no better time to move against its long-time Armenian rival and grab what it likes. 

The mood in both capitals, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh, is now somber. Little has been achieved on the diplomatic front. Several attempts to hold direct discussions between Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian community have failed. 

Geopolitical crises are sometimes very complicated indeed. The 19th-century British Prime Minister, Viscount Palmerston, wryly acknowledged this when asked about the cause of a labyrinthine dispute that almost triggered a major war in the 1860s. 

“Only three men in Europe have ever understood it. One was Prince Albert, who is dead. The second was a German professor who became mad. I am the third and I have forgotten,” he said. 

The South Caucasus can feel a little like this at times, with overlapping claims and trans-generational arguments about land and ownership. 

While the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh has sometimes seemed like this to outsiders, it has recently become much starker; both more alarming and more dangerous. 

The enclave’s substantial Armenian minority of around 120,000 is now besieged by the Azeri forces that won back control in 2020. They have effectively cut off food and medical supplies. Pregnant women now lose their babies because they lack help, while others faint while waiting in food queues. Temperatures are rising, armies are on the move, intense gunfire is exchanged and a new war is threatened. 

There are two major root causes. The first is Russian ambiguity, caused in part by the Kremlin’s focus on its unsuccessful war against Ukraine, and in part by its own uncertainty as to which of the two countries it supports. The second, linked, phenomenon is Azeri military superiority, which has given the Baku government of President Ilham Aliyev a sense that there will be no better time to move against its long-time Armenian rival and grab what it likes. 

The mood in both capitals, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh, is now somber. Little has been achieved on the diplomatic front. Several attempts to hold direct discussions between Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian community have failed. 

The Azeris deny there is a siege at all, and say they will supply the items needed by the Armenian population. Armenians see this as a precursor to ethnic cleansing.  

A parallel negotiation has been underway. An initiative led by the European Union (EU) and supported by the US, seeks convincing mechanisms to ensure the rights of Karabakh Armenians. Moscow-led efforts meanwhile, have essentially pushed for a statement of rights enshrined in Azeri law. 

The true aims of the participants are less obvious, particularly Russia’s. Since its all-out war in Ukraine began, the Kremlin’s behavior in the South Caucasus has been puzzling. Although Moscow is doing very little diplomatically, it appears to hope that no one else does very much either. And while it wants to keep a leading position as the key mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a position it traditionally enjoyed, it has become increasingly partial toward the Azeris.  

Moscow has made little mention of the plight of the Karabakh Armenians, beyond statements indicating that it is essentially Armenia’s own fault. It also accuses Yerevan of altering the conditions under which Russian peacekeepers were sent to the troubled area in November 2020. Weeks before that decision, as fighting raged and 5,000 troops on both sides died, the Kremlin had refused Armenia’s appeals for help under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and their mutual Friendship Treaty. 

Armenia was angry then, and has become even more so since. In a series of political moves and statements, it has questioned the point of its relationship with Russia. Thus on September 4, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan used an interview with the Italian daily La Repubblica, to criticize Russia and state that relying on the Kremlin’s security pledges was “a strategic mistake.”  

With relations at a historic low, the ties that bind the two old allies are fraying. The Armenians have threatened to leave CSTO, and have recalled the country’s permanent representative to the organization. Armenia refused to join CSTO exercises in Belarus this month and instead announced its troops would drill with the US military. And just in case the Kremlin was failing to get the message, it sent the premier’s wife to personally deliver humanitarian aid to Ukraine, its first such shipment. 

Russia appears to seek a closer relationship with oil-rich Azerbaijan. The EU has growing influence and interests in the country given its expanding energy links with Azerbaijan, something that worries the Kremlin. Azerbaijan is also a key player in Russia’s ambitions to develop the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) down to Iran to develop ties with that regime and improve routes for sanctions-busting. 

This all plays well with the regime of President Aliyev, who runs a profoundly repressive domestic regime, and now sees opportunities aplenty on his borders.  

He will need to be careful. Russia may switch policy if it can ever untangle itself from Ukraine, and an angry and resentful Armenia may simply bide its time before seeking to reverse the results of the 2020 war. 

Meanwhile, the clock is ticking and Armenians are going hungry. Too often there is a temptation to resolve intricate geopolitical issues with the imagined simplicities of war.  

Francis Harris is the Managing Editor at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.)

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

https://cepa.org/article/nerves-fray-as-south-caucasus-siege-worsens/ 

News.am, Armenia

Sept 7 2023