Category: 2023

                                   Oct 11 2023

Armenia is not even a player in the Game of Go on its own territory.

By David Davidian

This article proposes a hypothesis explaining events in the Caucasus and the greater region since the mid-2010s. No right or wrong, good or evil, is assumed, only interests.

Understanding any strategic geopolitical arena is daunting. Without critical understanding and information, the best one can hope for is a leading hypothesis to explain seemingly isolated events or possible outcomes from a series of events. The strategic geopolitical landscape is an intricate system with shifting levels of state interests.

Each microcosm possesses internal and external goals and objectives, yet they all remain profoundly interconnected, even to varying degrees. The interplay among these often seemingly conflicting forces results in complexity and unpredictability. Perceptions can be deceiving, and the dynamics are subject to constant change. Many aspects may seem enigmatic. 

In essence, the strategic environment closely resembles the chaos and complexity of interlinked physical systems. A strategic analyst must understand intimately the past and present and continually study the strategic environment. Navigating and succeeding in this complex realm requires a blend of art and science. One must look back at events with as unbiased an eye as possible, determine who benefited from each scenario, and connect what may appear to be mutually exclusive or disjoint events over time; the international arena is a bazaar governed by the law of the jungle.

A Hypothesis

Of interest is the disposition of the region of Nagorno-Karabakh (see the map above) relative to, at a minimum, Armenia, Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Israel. The region known as Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh in Armenian) was inhabited by an absolute Armenian majority for millennia. It wasn’t until the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the onset of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia, and the discovery of hydrocarbons along the Caspian Sea that the Armenian disposition of this rich agricultural region was challenged. For multiple reasons, in 1923, Nagorno-Karabakh was assigned to Soviet Azerbaijani jurisdiction by Joseph Stalin. A quick history can be read here. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, demands for Nagorno-Karabakh’s integration into the emerging Republic of Armenia resulted in a war between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces, known as the First Karabakh War. 1994, Armenians secured jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh, declaring itself a republic while never achieving international recognition.

Ever since 1994, Azerbaijan demanded the relinquishing of Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenian rule. Decades of negotiation were fruitless. As Azerbaijani oil production created wealth and corruption, it also procured expensive weapons of advanced technology — considerably more than Armenia. Azerbaijan engaged in a massive international lobbying effort given the moniker Caviar Diplomacy. Azerbaijan drew upon NATO military expertise in a “One Nation, Two States” alliance with Turkey.

Relations between Azerbaijan and Israel began warming early in the post-Soviet Azerbaijan era, with Azerbaijan supplying about 40% of Israel’s crude oil and, in return, Baku purchasing many billions of dollars of Israeli high-technology weaponry. Israel uses Azerbaijani territory as a forward intelligence platform against Iran.

Some have suggested that it was only a matter of time before Azerbaijan would feel comfortable enough to conquer Nagorno-Karabakh militarily. In September 2020, Azerbaijan launched a massive attack on Nagorno-Karabakh and, after 44 days, conquered most of the territory it considers its own. Three years later, in September of 2023, Azerbaijan began a military offensive under the ludicrous pretext of an anti-terrorist operation, which resulted in the forced exodus of nearly all of Nagorno-Karabakh’s 120,000 Armenian population, most escaping to Armenia.

To gain insight into these seemingly isolated events, one must consider the broader geopolitical forces at work that go beyond the South Caucasus. The South Caucasus is, in fact, not isolated and disjoint from the world arena; in fact, the scenarios we see unfolding are a direct reflection of the machinations in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the Far East.

After Ukraine’s Western-inspired 2004 Orange Revolution and 2014 Euromaidan Revolutions, it soon became clear that Russia needed a non-enemy in Turkey; Moscow knew things would begin militarily in Ukraine given the failure of the Minsk Agreements. These agreements foresaw autonomy for eastern Ukraine’s Russian-speaking citizens. In reaction, Russia annexed Crimea as Ukrainian forces shelled these Russian-speaking eastern regions. To complicate relations, in 2015, the Turks shot down a Russian SU-25 over Northwestern Syria. After a short period of tension, however, relations began to warm between Russia and Turkey, especially after Russian President Vladimir Putin warned Turkish President Erdogan of an impending 2016 coup in Turkey moments before it began. Work resumed on the Rosatom’s Akkuyu Nuclear Plant, and by May 2017, construction began on the Turkstream gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey. Turkey eventually purchased a Russian S400 antiaircraft system, much to the dismay of the US and NATO. What might Turkey have asked from Russia in return, or what may Russia have offered Turkey? We may never know, but we can speculate by looking back in time. Given the right circumstances, Turkish President Erdogan could have hinted to Putin (or vice versa) that the Nagorno-Karabakh question needs to be addressed in Azerbaijan’s favor, Armenia being a thorn in everybody’s side, including the US.

For many reasons, Armenia’s second president, Kocharyan, and third president (and twice prime minister, Sargsyan) would not agree to place any part of Nagorno-Karabakh under Azerbaijani jurisdiction. This situation changed in 2018 when Nikol Pashinyan became prime minister. The show stopper was when pro-Moscow Sargsyan got up and left the stage in resignation, a surprising event that appeared to be an ominous portent. 

Nikol Pashinyan, on the other hand, generally followed the footsteps of Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who championed a brotherhood between states at the expense of self-defense with Nagorno-Karabakh, a “monkey on the back” of Armenia. Neither had a national strategy or economic policy in detail. Indirectly, during his campaign and later tenure as prime minister, Pashinyan increasingly expressed more anti-Russian sentiment, leading many to speculate that he was a Western puppet. A question that might have been asked in Moscow is, could Pashinyan and his hand-picked government structure deliver Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan without losing a single Russian soldier? Such a conflict directed by the Turkish military could guarantee predictability against any immediate loss of Russian interests. Pashinyan could even appear to ‘give a good fight’ against Azerbaijani forces. From Moscow’s perspective, why not use Pashinyan and facilitate (don’t send weapons and ignore the CSTO alliance) a defeat of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh?

Even worse, Pashinyan appeared to be setting up the conditions that would lead to a defeat of Nagorno-Karabakh. An example includes Pashinyan’s changing Directors of Armenia’s National Security Service five times since 2018. It may now be a moot point if Pashinyan was intent on delivering Nagorno-Karabakh or if his government and military were not being run by the best and brightest, with Armenia (and Artsakh) outmaneuvered strategically and militarily.

Was Pashinyan told that to be considered welcome into the Western fold, Nagorno-Karabakh must be released? Perhaps Pashinyan was played by Moscow and Washington – delivering Nagorno-Karabakh and allowing free-reign of Western NGOs throughout Armenia. We don’t know, but we do know that Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s interests were fully served by the forced expulsion of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh in late September 2023. This expulsion was a tactical blow to Russia, losing its raison d’etre for its peacekeeping bases on what Azerbaijan considers its territory. Russia lost an immediate lever of influence against Azerbaijan.

With an increasing anti-Russia sentiment expressed by Pashinyan and his government, shunning CSTO military events, blaming Russia for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, a small military exercise with US soldiers in Armenia, making claims that Moscow pays rent for their use of a Russian base in Gyumri, Armenia, ratifying the Rome Statute, and with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov claiming Armenia’s government is a “temporary administration,” time will only tell if Russia wishes to upgrade its presence in the Southern Caucasus by a mild coup in Armenia replacing Pashinyan’s government with a clear pro-Moscow one. Such a coup will most likely take place at a peak in Western interest in Armenia, enacting maximum defeat for such efforts.

Again, all this is just conjecture; many unknown puzzle pieces still need to be included. It is interesting to note who has gained what in this international horse-trading. These four events have already happened.

– Azerbaijan conquered all of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is now absent of Armenians. It owes a lot to Turkey, who commanded the 2020 military operation against Nagorno-Karabakh.

– Russia facilitated an engineered defeat of Nagorno-Karabakh, perhaps as an element of quid pro quo with Turkey and Azerbaijan. What will Russia receive in exchange, even though Moscow may not have envisioned the eventual exodus of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians?

– Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s demand for a sovereign corridor through Southern Armenia, connecting rump Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhichevan, has been superseded by a similar corridor through Iran. Thus, just south of Armenia’s border with Iran, this corridor will now be co-sponsored by a NATO ally, Turkey. The US doesn’t want Russia controlling any corridor through Armenia. Was the Iran route a contingency against any eventual Russian-controlled route across Armenia?

– Israel expanded its existing covert bases in Azerbaijan used against Iran on conquered Nagorno-Karabakh territory. 

What might remain? A pro-Moscow government in Armenia can fulfill Russian interests, the final move in this Game of Go. We will likely not see tanks in the streets of Armenia’s capital, Yerevan. Pressure towards ousting the Pashinyan government can be applied by an Azerbaijani military buildup on Armenia’s borders – something that is not supposed to happen in a “brotherhood between states.” Russia has many other levels of strategic influence in Armenia, and not just limited to gas, electricity, transportation, and control of remittances into Armenia from Russia.

The West won’t attempt to project its military power in the region; it cannot and will not place soldiers in Armenia. In any case, Turkey is NATO’s representative in the region. The EU is going through the motions to fill the perception of a power vacuum developing in Armenia – until it comes time for Russia’s regional interests to be satisfied.

Two items to watch that can indicate an active Russian recovery in the Southern Caucasus region include:

1) Further success in the Republic of Georgia’s continued attempts to find common ground with Moscow, as China is seriously interested in Georgian Black Sea ports. The potential upside for Georgia may be too high to ignore, considering Tbilisi seems to have realized that EU ascendancy and NATO membership are empty words.

2)  If Ruben Vardanyan, the former state minister of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh, who was arrested last month by Azerbaijan, slowly becomes a hero in the Russian media, this may be a sign of his ascension to a pro-Moscow government in Armenia. He may be one of many who could be in such a position.

One needs a strategy to play the Game of Go.

Yerevan, Armenia

Author: David Davidian – Lecturer at the American University of Armenia. He has spent over a decade in technical intelligence analysis at major high technology firms. He resides in Yerevan, Armenia.

 

Modern Diplomacy

Oct 14 2023

“Recognition of Artsakh’s independence,” emphatically read the central banner at the rally in support of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, on September 30 in Athens. The rally was organized by the Armenian National Committee and symbolically took place in front of the European Commission Representation in Greece. However, the self-declared Republic of Artsakh (also referred to as Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh), until recently a de facto independent Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan, is currently far from receiving any form of recognition. In fact, it will formally cease to exist after December 31, 2023, as Azerbaijan has already taken control of its territory.

Artsakh’s government made the painful decision to dissolve itself following a one-day Azeri offensive in mid-September, during which Yerevan refused pleas for assistance, fearing it could lead to an all-out war. This attack came after a nine-month blockade by Azerbaijan, which significantly restricted the flow of essential supplies to the enclave, leaving the local population exhausted.

Currently, almost the entire 120,000 Armenian population has fled Nagorno-Karabakh due to fear of brutalities and persecution under Azeri rule, with Yerevan calling the exodus of Karabakh Armenians an act of “ethnic cleansing” by Baku. At the moment, it remains unclear whether Azerbaijan will ever allow them to return and live safely in the region. This mass exodus marked the final chapter of a tragedy for Karabakh Armenians that began in 2020 when Azerbaijan initiated a 44-day war, resulting in the capture of the majority of Artsakh and its effective isolation from Armenia. The war resulted in the loss of over 3,800 Armenians and 2,900 Azerbaijanis.

“My grandmother was from Shushi (city in Nagorno-Karabakh), she left with her family over 100 years ago. History repeats itself and it’s tragic. The whole world is responsible, the West, Russia, Europe and the US.” said Maria Sarkiseva, a protester draped in an Armenian flag.     

Ohan, a Canadian-Armenian protester who happened to be in Greece on vacation, also expressed his frustration with the world’s lack of interest in the plight of Karabakh Armenians.

“There is another massacre happening against Armenians in the 21^st century and the whole world, including the European Union, is silent about this whole situation, nobody cares. Neither the West nor the East is helping us; we are very disappointed with the policy of the whole world. Only God can help us,” he said.  

While protesters decried the entire global community’s lack of response, Yerevan has mainly focused its criticism on Russia. Recently, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Moscow bears responsibility for what is happening to Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. After the 2020 war, Russia deployed 2,000 peacekeepers to the region with the task of protecting the Armenian population. Nevertheless, during the recent Azerbaijani offensive, their assistance was limited to providing shelter to the Armenians at their base and helping with evacuations.

In response to the criticism, Russia pointed out that Prime Minister Pashinyan recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan during an EU-brokered meeting with Azeri President Ilham Aliyev last October in Prague. Moscow argued that this recognition limited its ability to intervene. However, according to Tigran Mkrtchyan, the Ambassador of Armenia in Greece, Cyprus, and Albania, whom your author met at the Armenian embassy in Athens, Russia’s claims were not accurate. Mkrtchyan noted that Russia had committed “to ensure the security of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh” under the 2020 ceasefire statement.

“The issue is not about whether Nagorno-Karabakh is recognized as part of Azerbaijan or not. The issue was and remains the security and safety of the Karabakh Armenians and (their) possible status,”stated Mkrtchyan, who explained that the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh has already impacted Armenian-Russian relations.

“This claim that Armenia recognized or Armenia did not recognize is absolutely irrelevant. Your (Russia’s) obligation was to make sure the safety is guaranteed in that area and you failed to guarantee that safety,” he added.

Prime Minister Pashinyan has also criticized the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) the Russian-led security alliance of which Armenia is a member. Despite the CSTO having a collective defense clause similar to NATO, it was not activated during the Azerbaijani offensive. Although ambassador Mkrtchyan stated that he could not excludethe possibility of Armenia leaving the CSTO, which “has not responded to the security needs of Armenia,” he made clear that this discussion has not happened yet on a government level, but it is widely taking place in Armenian society.

“Reviewing or revising our membership, I cannot elaborate on that right now, but I wouldn’t be surprised if it was done in the future. On the other hand, that doesn’t mean that Armenia is going to join another security alliance,” he said, adding that CSTO did not react when in 2020 Azerbaijan captured around 150 sq km of Armenian territory that it still occupies to this day.

Lately, Armenia has been making efforts to come closer to the West. In September, it conducted joint military exercises with the United States in its territory and agreed to increase military cooperation with France. Most notably, it ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which has issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin. This decision drew harsh condemnation from Moscow, which stated that the ratification “will have the most negative consequences for bilateral relations.”

The ambassador admitted that the ratification of the Rome Statute has indeed created “a certain nervousness in Russia,”but he emphasized that Armenia’s cooperation with the West is not aimed towards Moscow and that Yerevan “does not want to play on the geopolitical differences between Russia and the West.” He underlined that Armenia’s strategy was to be “as self-sufficient as possible and not depend on any single country or any single alliance.”

“Maybe somebody in Russia sees this as something negative, that Armenia is cooperating with the West. Armenia’s cooperation with the European Union, with the United States, with Western countries is not at the cost of Armenia’s cooperation with Russia,” explained Mkrtchyan. He further highlighted that through cooperation with Western institutions, Armenia is aiming to become more democratic, stronger and more self-reliant.

However, while Yerevan has taken some steps toward closer cooperation with the West, Western countries have been cautious in their approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to avoid upsetting Baku. Notably, the statement after last week’s meeting in Granada between Prime Minister Pashinyan, French President Macron, German Chancellor Shultz and EU Council President Michel did not contain any criticism of Azerbaijan’s actions. In recent years, and especially following the war in Ukraine, Baku has emerged as an increasingly vital natural gas supplier to the EU. Last July, the two sides finalized a new gas agreement with the goal of doubling natural gas deliveries by 2027.

At the moment, there is a growing sense of disappointment in Armenia due to the West’s reluctance to discuss imposing sanctions against Baku over what Yerevan considers the “ethnic cleansing” of the Karabakh Armenians. According to Mkrtchyan, sanctions are the “number one issue,” and he called on the European Union and the United States to take a more “assertive” stance and sanction Azerbaijan.

“In less than a week, 100,000 people moved out. And even now, nobody is seriously discussing about sanctions against Azerbaijan. War crimes have been committed, ethnic cleansing, bordering on genocide has been committed. And even now there are still uncertainties (about) whether to impose sanctions,”stated Mkrtchyan, adding that this is a failure of international order. 

“Gas deals or oil deals should not keep the EU from imposing sanctions. It’s silly to argue that if they impose sanctions, the Azeris will finish the gas deal because the biggest benefactor of the gas deal is Azerbaijan,” he explained.  Furthermore, Mkrtchyan emphasized that “Armenia is a European country,” and although he admitted that membership in the EU is not yet an official policy goal, he said that it could become one in the future.

Nevertheless, in order for Armenia to achieve its goal for self-dependence, there must be peace and normalization of relations with Azerbaijan, which means that Yerevan is currently walking on thin ice, as there is no guarantee that this will happen in the near future. If Baku refuses to allow the return of expelled Armenians to Nagorno-Karabakh or begins to threaten Armenia’s territorial integrity, tensions between the two sides may reignite. This will probably compel Yerevan to once again seek Moscow’s assistance, which will likely come at a high cost, considering the deteriorating relationship between the two countries. Russia has been using the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for decades as a means to exert control over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, acting as a guarantor of the balance of power through weapons sales. Russian officials have openly acknowledged this strategy.

At the moment, Yerevan cannot count on the West to play a decisive role in the event of a new conflict with Baku, as no NATO country maintains a permanent military presence in the Caucasus except for Turkey, which is Azerbaijan’s closest ally. Additionally, Europe’s reliance on Azeri gas, especially amidst the conflict in Ukraine, makes it difficult to envision the EU or the United States imposing sanctions on Azerbaijan any time soon. On the other hand, while Moscow may appear to have lost some of its influence over Baku and Yerevan, it retains a significant military presence in the region, with 2,000 peacekeepers stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh and around 10,000 soldiers across various bases in Armenia.

Regarding the possibility of lasting peace, the initial signs are not encouraging. Last week, President Aliyev withdrew from an EU-brokered meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan aimed at normalizing relations. In his rejection, he criticized France for planning to sell weapons to Armenia, which he said could lead to “new conflict.” At the same time, he and Turkish President Erdogan have repeatedly called for the creation of the “Zangezur” corridor within Armenian territory, a position that is a red line for Yerevan.

Moreover, there are still a lot of open issues between the two countries concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. “There are still a lot of issues that need to be settled,” acknowledged Mkrtchyan , elaborating that those include the right of the Armenian refugees to return to Nagorno-Karabakh, their property rights, as well as an examination of potential war crimes committed against them by Azerbaijan and possible sanctions.

https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/10/14/after-losing-nagorno-karabakh-armenia-embarks-on-a-challenging-journey-between-russia-and-the-west/

Oct 14 2023

On Thursday, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, began a visit to China with the aim of defending the bloc’s “risk reduction” strategy towards its first trading partner and laying the foundations for holding a summit this year.

Borrell’s visit, which was postponed twice this year, is scheduled to continue until Saturday, during which he will discuss a range of issues, including bilateral relations, international issues, and trade.

Borrell began his visit, on Thursday, with “interesting talks in Shanghai with European companies about economic and trade challenges,” he wrote on the “X” platform.

“We have to meet these challenges,” Borrell said. Because neither we nor China can ignore the other party’s market.”

On Friday, Borrell will hold talks with Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

European Energy Commissioner Cadre Simson during a conference in Beijing on Thursday (EPA)

Borrell wrote on “X” that “this visit is important to discuss relations between the European Union and China and major regional and global challenges with government authorities, university professors and representatives of the business community.”

The European Union stated that this visit, which is part of a series of high-level dialogues with Beijing, “is supposed to lead to a European-Chinese summit during the year.”

No “disengagement”

Sino-European relations have witnessed tension since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Beijing, which calls for respect for the territorial integrity of all countries, refrained from condemning Moscow’s attack.

Brussels is seeking to reconcile its determination to reduce its dependence on the Asian giant, especially on the economic level, and maintain strong ties with the world’s second economic power in areas such as trade, climate and human rights.

The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced that the European Union wants to “reduce risks” with China, but not to “disengage,” which means reducing relations further.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin announced on Wednesday that “China is satisfied with the visit of High Representative Borrell,” which “will give new impetus to the two parties’ joint efforts to meet global challenges and maintain peace and stability in the world.”

The Chinese spokesman said, during a routine press conference: “In light of the instability of the international situation and the increasing global challenges, only solidarity and cooperation will allow the international community to confront them better… China and Europe, as two major global powers, two major markets, and two great civilizations, have broad common interests.” .

dispute

Von der Leyen, who made an official visit to China in April, announced last month the opening of a European investigation into the Beijing authorities’ support and assistance to national electric car companies.

She justified this measure by the need to defend European industry against cars sold at “artificially low prices,” as she said, in global markets.

China denounced the investigation, stressing that it would harm its trade relations with the European Union, and stressed: “This is just protectionism.”

China began using electric motors in cars a long time ago, and has surpassed Europe in this field, especially in technology related to batteries.

Its manufacturers are relying on the huge domestic market, the largest in the world, to conquer Europe.

In early October, the Union revealed a list of strategic areas that should be better defended against competing countries such as China, at the forefront of which is artificial intelligence.

During his visit, Borrell will also address the war in Ukraine, at a time when China confirms its neutral position, which is criticized by the European Union.

France 24

Oct 14 2023

Armenia's President Vahagn Khachaturyan has signed the ratification of the Rome Statute, recognising the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) despite Russian warnings, a statement said Saturday. 

Khachaturyan's office published the statement saying he signed the treaty "retroactively recognising the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court by the Republic of Armenia." 

Armenian lawmakers voted in favour of the joining the ICC earlier this month. 

The move has angered Moscow, as The Hague-based court issued an arrest warrant for President Vladimir Putin over the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. 

ICC members are expected to make the arrest should Putin set foot on their territory. 

Khachaturyan signed the ratification after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan skipped a summit attended by Putin in Kyrgyzstan this week. 

Armenia says joining the ICC would allow it to investigate what it calls war crimes by Azerbaijan after Baku's offensive to retake Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Relations between Moscow and Yerevan have soured since Baku's military operation, during which Russian peacekeepers did not intervene.

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20231014-armenian-president-signs-ratification-of-icc-membership-despite-moscow-s-ire

Associated Press

Oct 14 2023

YEREVAN, Armenia (AP) — Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan approved the parliament’s decision to join the International Criminal Court in a move that has further strained the country’s ties with its old ally Russia.

Last week, Armenia’s parliament voted to join the ICC by ratifying the Rome Statute that created the tribunal.

Countries that have signed and ratified the Rome Statute are bound to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was indicted for war crimes connected to the deportation of children from Ukraine, if he sets foot on their soil.

Moscow last month called Yerevan’s decision an “unfriendly step,” and the Russian Foreign Ministry summoned Armenia’s ambassador. Armenia later sought to assure Russia that Putin would not be arrested if he entered the country.

Armenian officials have argued the move has nothing to do with Russia and was prompted by what they call Azerbaijan’s aggression against the country.

Lawmakers voted to ratify the Rome Statute by a vote of 60-22. The decision comes into force 60 days after the ratification, according to Armenian lawmakers.

Armenia had started the process of joining the tribunal more than 20 years ago, but in 2004 the Constitutional Court ruled that the Rome Statute contradicted the country’s constitution at the time, putting the process on pause. The constitution has been amended twice since then. In March, the Constitutional Court ruled that the obligations for signatories outlined by the Rome Statute are in line with the existing constitution.

Armenia’s envoy on international legal matters, Yegishe Kirakosyan, said Yerevan decided to resume the process of joining the ICC because of Azerbaijan’s alleged moves against Armenia. Last month, Azerbaijan routed the ethnic Armenian separatist forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and recaptured the enclave.

https://apnews.com/article/armenia-icc-russia-putin-26612df6d4687d0fd7137144aff3ef9c