Category: 2022

WPR
By Iyad Dakka
Feb. 23, 2022
As the threat of war between Russia and Ukraine looms ever larger,
Turkey finds itself between a rock and a hard place. It does not want
to antagonize Russia, with which it shares strategically vital
interests, but it also needs to show its support for Ukraine and its
NATO allies in the face of the greatest threat to European security in
the post-Cold War era. This has forced Turkey to walk a finely
calibrated diplomatic tightrope over the past month.
During his visit to Kyiv on Feb. 3, Turkish President Recep Tayiip
Erdogan proclaimed his support for Ukrainian sovereignty, reiterated
his opposition to the annexation of Crimea and signed a landmark free
trade agreement to signal Turkey’s commitment to the long-term
relationship with Ukraine. This was balanced, however, with an offer
to defuse the situation by convening a trilateral summit with Russian
President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in
Ankara or Istanbul. Erdogan continues to press this proposal with
Putin.
The urgency and importance of Erdogan’s diplomatic overtures are
understandable. Ankara has sunk its economic teeth into Ukraine and
could end up being one of the main economic losers if Russia invades.
In 2021, Turkey became the largest foreign investor in Ukraine, with
investments in excess of $4 billion. There are currently over 700
Turkish companies operating on the ground. In the past five years,
Turkish exports to Ukraine have nearly doubled to $2.6 billion, while
imports have risen sharply from $2.8 billion to $4.4 billion.
Bilateral cooperation is moving particularly quickly in the defense
and aerospace sectors. Since 2019, Kyiv has acquired an estimated
dozen Bayraktar drones, Turkey’s flagship military export at the
moment. The Ukrainian navy has also ordered two MILGEM Ava-class
corvettes, which will be jointly produced on Turkish and Ukrainian
soil. The two sides have already signed an agreement to build training
and maintenance facilities for Turkish drones in Ukraine, and they
have followed this up by signing an agreement for the joint production
of next-generation drones that will leverage Turkish avionic and
Ukrainian jet-engine technology.
Turkey understands full well that regime-change in Ukraine would put
these investments and strategic commercial relationships at risk. But
despite the flurry of diplomacy, Turkey’s room for maneuverability is
somewhat limited, and its diplomatic influence in resolving this
crisis is likely to be modest. There are a few reasons for this.
First, what Russia ultimately wants from Ukraine can only truly be
provided by the United States and major European powers. Washington,
Paris, Berlin and London are the only players that can work with
Russia to establish a new European security architecture. And Russia
is unlikely to provide Ankara any free diplomatic wins when it views
Turkey as a peripheral player in this crisis. Reports that Erdogan
wanted to mediate have been circulating for almost a month. When asked
if it had anything further to add such a potential meeting, the
Kremlin seemed rather blasé about the idea, simply stating it had no
details to share. One would think that if Russia felt Turkey’s good
offices were instrumental to achieving even some of its objectives,
this meeting would have already happened.
Second, the balance of interests in this crisis overwhelmingly tips
toward Russia. Put another way, despite Turkey’s economic interests,
Ukraine is not, and will not become, a national security red line for
Ankara. By contrast, the Kremlin views a potential NATO-allied Ukraine
as an unacceptable outcome that must be prevented at all costs. The
cold and hard facts are that Russia will go to war to ensure Ukraine
doesn’t ever join NATO, whereas Turkey could live with a Ukraine under
Russian domination if it ultimately had to. This is the quiet part
that the Turks won’t say out loud anytime soon.
Finally, there is a structural imbalance of power in the Black Sea
region that heavily favors Moscow. The Turkish fleet in the Black Sea
is relatively modest, and this imbalance has further tilted in favor
of Russia since its annexation of Crimea in 2014, which allowed Moscow
to expand its anti-access/area denial zone in the area. And while
Turkey would like its NATO partners and Ukraine to help counterbalance
Russian hegemony in the area, Ankara wants this to be managed smartly
and carefully. The Turks do not want any regional security deals
between Russia and NATO to undermine the 1936 Montreux Convention—a
historic treaty that grants Turkey full sovereignty over the Bosphorus
and Dardanelles straits while governing the flow of merchant and
military vessels into the Black Sea. Echoing these concerns at the
NATO ministerial meeting last week, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi
Akar stated that the Montreux Convention had brought  “balance,
stability and security in the Black Sea. ... We have explained and
continue to explain on every occasion that this is of vital
importance.”
Of course, none of this means Turkey and Russia will not continue to
engage on Ukraine. Despite viewing Ankara as a peripheral diplomatic
actor in this crisis, Russia does have things to discuss. For example,
it wants the Turks to slow or stop advanced weapons transfers to the
Ukrainians, including Bayraktar drones. The Kremlin would also welcome
Turkish pressure on NATO from the inside, particularly when it comes
to further socializing the West to Russia’s long-term security
interests. These things alone will entice the Russians to keep the
lines of engagement open with Ankara and will, on the surface at
least, ensure that Erdogan is never given a hard “no” when it comes to
his offers to mediate.
For Turkey, the diplomatic efforts are worth pursuing regardless of
their prospects for success. Ankara sees an opportunity to recalibrate
its reputation as a stabilizing regional power, after a decade of
being accused of reckless militaristic adventurism in Syria, Libya and
the Eastern Mediterranean. There is also a domestic play at stake for
Erdogan. At a time when the Turkish economy is reeling under the
weight of inflation, and with an eye to the 2023 presidential
elections, the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, wants to
leverage the crisis to bolster Erdogan’s image as a wise and capable
leader. Erdogan’s AKP party spokesperson made this clear when he
claimed, “The most important countries of the world are able to put
forward an approach that can address one side of this crisis. But our
president is putting out diplomacy that appeals to both sides of the
crisis."
But most important, perhaps, is the possibility that Erdogan and Putin
might make things work despite all odds. They have, after all,
perfected the art of “transactional geopolitics”—the ability to make
micro-deals even when they disagree on the big picture. This way of
doing business has held up relatively well in various geopolitical
theatres, from Syria and Libya to the Caucasus. This potentially
explains why Turkey allows its companies to trade with Crimea and
Abkhazia, despite its official position in support of the territorial
integrity of Ukraine and Georgia, respectively. There’s very little
reason to expect that Ukraine will change the name of the game between
Ankara and Moscow.
*
Iyad Dakka is a fellow with the Centre for Modern Turkish Studies at
Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
in Ottawa, Canada.