​Armenia 2022​: ​Energy Policy Review

IEA

Armenia 2022: Energy Policy Review

Country report — March 2022

This is an extract, full report available as PDF download

This International Energy Agency (IEA) in-depth review of the energy policies of Armenia follows the same format as that used for the IEA peer reviews of member countries. This in-depth review of Armenia was conducted under the auspices of the EU4Energy programme, which is being implemented by the IEA and the European Union, along with the Energy Community and the Energy Charter.

Armenia depends on imports to meet much of its energy needs, particularly natural gas from the Russian Federation. It is one of the few ex-Soviet republics to avoid significant energy subsidies, and it is the only country in the Caucasus region to possess a nuclear power plant. In January 2021, the government approved a new Energy Sector Development Strategic Programme that sets the path for the sector’s transition through 2040.

Key government priorities include promoting maximum use of the country’s potential for renewable energy and energy efficiency; increasing power transmission links with Armenia’s neighbours; gradually liberalising the domestic electricity market; and maintaining and, possibly, increasing the role of nuclear power. This report assesses the energy sector and related challenges facing Armenia and proposes policy recommendations to improve sector governance, energy efficiency, and security of supply.

Executive summary

Armenia’s energy system depends primarily on natural gas, nuclear and hydroelectricity. Natural gas is by far the largest contributor to total energy supply (TES), as well as the main energy carrier in total final consumption (TFC). Since the transport sector depends primarily on natural gas, the importance of oil in the economy is relatively low. Apart from several large hydroelectric plants, the contribution of renewables to the energy mix is modest, although current policies aim for a substantial increase, especially solar photovoltaic (PV). Domestic energy production comes mainly from Armenia’s one Soviet-era nuclear power plant (Armenian Nuclear Power Plant [ANPP]) and from hydroelectricity. Since Armenia does not produce fossil fuels, all of the natural gas and oil products used in the country have to be imported. 

The Armenian government approved the Energy Sector Development Strategic Programme (hereinafter “Energy Strategy”) in January 2021, setting the path for the sector’s transition through 2040. The publication and approval of this strategic document are welcomed and should form a useful basis for Armenia’s future energy legislation. The 2021 Strategy replaces the government’s previous energy policy document, which dates from 2015.

According to the 2021 Strategy, the government’s priorities in the energy sector through 2040 are:

  • Maximum use of the country’s potential for renewable energy and energy efficiency;
  • Extending the life of the ANPP beyond 2026, as well as construction of a new nuclear power plant to replace it;
  • Construction of a “North-South Corridor” by increasing power transmission links between Armenia and Georgia and between Armenia and Iran; and
  • Gradual liberalisation of the domestic electricity market.

Energy governance

The principal bodies involved in energy sector governance in Armenia include the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure (MTAI), which is responsible for overall energy policy-making, the Ministry of Environment, the Public Service Regulatory Commission (PSRC) and the Committee on Nuclear Safety Regulation (ANRA). The Statistics Committee (ArmStat) is the main provider of energy-related data and statistics

In a recent government restructuring, the former Ministry of Energy Infrastructures and Natural Resources was integrated into the MTAI. The transfer and addition of the energy agenda to the already large portfolio of responsibilities of the MTAI risk placing existing resources under pressure and causing insufficient coordination among ministries and other governmental entities dealing with energy-related policies. This could negatively impact effective and timely implementation of several important programmes in the sector.

Regional market integration

Armenia has made considerable progress in enhancing regional market integration. The country has signed and ratified the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the EU that entered into force in March 2021 and includes a timetable for the approximation of Armenian laws and regulations to relevant EU laws over the next few years, and by 2029 at the latest. Armenia is also a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which aims to establish common EAEU gas and electricity markets by 2025. Implementing these ambitious objectives will require close cooperation and coordination between different institutions to achieve regulatory consistency and to eliminate potential contradictions and conflicts.

Liberalisation

Since the last IEA review in 2014/15, the government has taken decisive steps towards implementing a liberalised electricity market, with a launch in February 2022 (as this report was going to press) featuring a new wholesale market model, direct contracts, a balancing mechanism and long-term direct capacity contracts. Free and open trade, as well as cooperation among all energy market participants, as envisioned by these reforms, would help promote investments from the international community and strengthen regional integration.

Energy supply security

Armenia has a diverse generation mix that includes thermal, hydropower and nuclear. However, all of its thermal generation relies on gas, around 85% of which is imported from Russia. Furthermore, Armenia imports all of its nuclear fuel from Russia. Armenia therefore effectively relies on fuel imports from one country to produce nearly 70% of its electricity, raising concerns about the diversity of supply.

Energy data management and use

Armenia has adopted the international energy statistics methodology and standards and has released energy balances in the internationally comparable format since 2015. The cooperation of the national stakeholders to achieve this is to be commended. Unfortunately, however, compilation of the energy balance and GHG inventory does not receive funding from the state budget. Complementing and gradually replacing external funding with contributions from the state budget would ensure sustainability for these activities and help retain relevant trained human capacity.

Modelling

Modelling based on good-quality data is a key component of effective policy-making. Policies and measures contained within the Energy Strategy were based on modelling performed by a local research institute. However, staff turnover in this and other key research bodies is high, risking frequent institutional memory loss and lack of staff for establishing regular monitoring systems to follow up on policy developments. Moreover, modelling capabilities in the country rely heavily on financial and (in some cases) personnel support from international donors. These might tailor modelling assumptions and parameters to their own needs, making comparison among models difficult. Furthermore, economy-wide modelling has not been carried out, as significant energy users, such as industry and transport, have been omitted.

An improved approach could include enhancing the government’s own modelling capabilities and institutional learning capacity. The development of comprehensive energy system models demands sufficient and targeted allocations from the state budget, regardless of whether modelling is outsourced or capacities are developed within the ministry.

Exploration of modelling scenarios extending to 2050 and beyond will also be important for mapping pathways to reach Armenia’s climate goals under the Paris Agreement. Since the energy sector is the largest source of GHG emissions in Armenia, a resolute and consistent implementation of its National Programme on Energy Saving and Renewable Energy will prove essential for reaching its recently updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

Armenia is moving from a regulated, single-buyer model to a competitive power market, with a launch date set for February 2022. The careful preparation of this work over many years is to be commended. As part of the first stage of market reforms, the government plans to improve protection mechanisms for vulnerable customers. This and other improvements to consumer protection, such as a complaints mechanism with legal recourse, will help enable consumers to participate fully in the new market structure. The government also plans to improve the efficiency of tariffs, which are set by the independent regulator.

Armenia is making progress in further diversifying its power generation mix, particularly by aiming to build significant solar PV capacity. Armenia’s 2021 Energy Strategy calls for up to 1 000 MW of solar PV capacity by 2030, at which point grid-connected solar is expected to account for 15% of generation. However, this will be a significant amount of intermittent capacity relative to the country’s current total capacity and demand, and integrating it will require the System Operator to be in a position to respond immediately to sudden surges and shortfalls in supply. A number of upgrades to the grid and related information and control systems have been made in recent years that will help address these challenges. However, additional investments may be necessary, including to help develop the necessary workforce skills to manage intermittent renewables and demand-side response.

Armenia is aiming to expand interconnections with Georgia and Iran. This highlights the need to develop new market rules to enable increased cross-border trading. Armenia is working on such arrangements within the context of its CEPA agreement with the EU, as well as within the EAEU Common Electricity Market, currently under development. Developing these two processes in parallel is likely to require careful coordination.

Since the late 1990s, the EU and several other international partners have strongly encouraged the closure of Armenia’s WWER-400 nuclear reactor, a type that the EU views as particularly dangerous, further noting that the plant is located only 30 km from Yerevan, the capital city of 1 million people. The review team commends Armenia’s efforts to continuously improve nuclear safety measures to meet International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety goals for existing NPPs and its long-term cooperation in this regard with the IAEA, EU, Russia and other international partners.

Armenia’s natural gas sector remains a vertically integrated monopoly, operated and owned by Gazprom Armenia, a fully owned subsidiary of Russia’s Gazprom. There is currently no competition nor third-party access in the sector. However, according to the 2021 Energy Strategy, the Armenian government intends to review all gas-sector legislation by 2024, and as part of this will begin to develop a new Gas Law in 2022.

Armenia, along with other members of the EAEU, is planning to launch a common EAEU gas market in 2025. An agreement signed by EAEU members in 2019 commits Armenia to introducing third-party access, among other reforms aimed at facilitating cross-border gas trade; a final agreement on this is expected to be signed in 2022.

Around 85% of Armenia’s gas supply is procured from Russia via pipelines passing through Georgia. The remainder is imported from Iran, though Iranian gas is currently used only for the production of electricity at one power plant in a gas-for-electricity swap. Gas for domestic consumption is therefore fully sourced from Russia.

Potential security risks related to heavy reliance on a single source should also be seen in the light of Armenia’s large dependence on natural gas, which accounts for the largest share of the country’s total primary energy supply. Both the residential and road transport sectors rely on natural gas as their main fuel, though Armenia’s Energy Strategy aims to increase the use of electric vehicles in the latter.

Current efforts to substantially increase the size of the Abovyan gas storage facility will help increase supply security, for example in the case of a disruption of supplies via Georgia. Nevertheless, this facility, like all other gas infrastructure in the country, remains under the control of Armenia’s main gas supplier.

Residential heating is now dominated by small, individual gas boilers. Since such boilers do not require a license, there are no centralised records about their installation or efficiency. Given the large share of gas consumption currently represented by domestic heating and the lack of information about equipment employed, including possibilities for improving its efficiency, the government may wish to undertake a strategic review of this important consuming sector.

Armenia has no known oil reserves, no oil production and no refineries. As a result, it imports all of its oil products, both motor fuels and lubricants. The import and sale of oil products are privatised, and prices are unregulated.

Oil accounted for only 16% of Armenia’s TES in 2020, one of the lowest shares in the world. The share of oil in TFC has been on a declining trend since the early 2000s. No oil is used in power production, while natural gas is the fuel of choice for road transport, mainly since it is significantly cheaper than gasoline and diesel. Most of the country’s vehicle fleet can run on either gasoline or natural gas, thereby enhancing the country’s energy security by providing flexibility in fuel use.

Although Armenia imports oil products from more than 40 countries, over half comes from just one country, Russia. Armenia currently has no known emergency stocks of crude or oil products, though importers and sellers reportedly maintain some commercial stocks. Given the small share of oil in the country’s total energy consumption, however, the lack of strategic oil stocks arguably is not as great a risk for energy security as it would be for other countries. Due to Armenia’s high dependence on natural gas, it is probably more important to prioritise storage of natural gas, as Armenia appears to be doing with current efforts to expand the Abovyan gas storage facility. 

The contribution of renewable energy sources (RES) to energy consumption in Armenia averaged about 11% during 2015-2020 (measured by the sustainable development goal indicator 7.2). This mostly consists of hydroelectricity.

Most of Armenia’s hydropower generation comes from two sets of large plants. However, the construction of small hydropower plants (SHPPs) has been significant over the past two decades, responding to attractive feed-in tariffs and other support. However, growth in SHPP construction has slowed in recent years, due to stricter siting rules established in response to growing concerns over ecological impacts.

Solar photovoltaic capacity is currently low but is expected to become the major source of new RES growth, due to support mechanisms but also to falling costs worldwide for solar PV equipment.

Although several prospective sites for wind farms have been identified, most are in remote, high-altitude locations, reducing their cost-competitiveness vis-à-vis other RES, particularly solar.

The 2021 Energy Strategy considers maximum use of the country’s renewable energy potential to be a key policy priority. The Armenian government expects solar PV capacity to reach 100 MW by 2024 and 1 000 MW by 2030, and at that point to account for at least 15% of total generation. Some increase in wind is also expected.

Experience elsewhere has shown that large increases in intermittent RES need to be accompanied by measures to ensure their technical and economic integration so that the system and market are able to efficiently respond to rapid increases and decreases in production. Such measures could include taking full advantage of smart metering to institute differentiated tariff levels that recognise the locational, temporal and technological value of decentralised renewable power installations, as well as reinforcements to networks and training of network personnel.

One of the main reasons the government is promoting renewable energy in its 2021 Energy Strategy is energy security. Renewables have the potential to reduce Armenia’s dependence on natural gas, all of which is imported, as well as dependence on the country’s Soviet-era nuclear power plant.

There are several potential medium-sized hydropower sites in the country that have been studied for several decades. Such plants might not only help reduce dependence on imported gas and nuclear energy, but also help integrate the expected large increase in variable renewables in the system.

Experience in other countries has shown that pumped storage can also be a useful mechanism for quickly responding to changes in the supply-demand balance that can occur as the system share of renewables increases. According to several past studies, there may be significant potential for developing additional pumped-storage capacity in the country.

The government of Armenia has repeatedly affirmed the importance of energy efficiency for its economic development. The first comprehensive legislation on energy efficiency was adopted in 2004 as part of a law on Energy Saving and Renewable Energy, followed in 2007 by a National Programme on Energy Savings and Renewable Energy. A National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) was adopted in 2010 and updated in 2017. Mandatory energy efficiency requirements for newly constructed residential multi-apartment buildings, mandatory energy audits for buildings constructed with state funds, and the definition of labelling requirements for energy-saving devices and equipment feature among the rules adopted as part of these plans and policies.

The government of Armenia is developing a new National Programme on Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, scheduled for adoption at the end of 2021. This will be based in part on an assessment of the level of implementation of the 2007 National Programme on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy.

Armenia has also started to implement the energy efficiency provisions of the EU-Armenia CEPA. This includes requirements to approximate key EU laws on energy efficiency, such as the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) and the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD). In parallel, Armenia is due to implement a range of separate standards for energy-using technologies as part of its membership of the EAEU.

Armenia faces constraints in terms of energy efficiency governance. The merging of the former Ministry of Energy into the new MTAI has resulted in a significant reduction in both administrative staff and capacity to support energy efficiency policies and measures. In addition, the Ministry of Urban Development, which is responsible for key energy efficiency measures, has been downgraded to a State Committee with reduced capacity and staff levels. Armenia also does not have a dedicated energy agency to coordinate energy efficiency policy development and implementation across relevant ministries and departments. Compounding capacity challenges are energy end-use data quality and availability issues that impact policy formulation, implementation and monitoring. There is also limited technical capacity to implement key legislative provisions.

Governance and capacity constraints are also expected to create challenges with respect to the simultaneous implementation of the CEPA and alignment with EAEU standards. While these standards are complementary, they constitute two separate reporting regimes and require dedicated resources for their effective administration. Nonetheless, Armenia has made progress in terms of aligning with EU legislation and norms, having already adopted more than 50% of the provisions of the EPBD, for example, at least in terms of approximating headline provisions of this directive into national law. Progress has also been made in the realm of appliances and equipment, with the adoption of the A-to-G labelling scheme in line with the EU Ecodesign Directive and Energy Labelling Directive for a range of energy-using devices such as refrigerators and washing machines. Based on training sessions and surveys conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Armenia is also making steady progress in phasing out inefficient technologies, notably with respect to lighting.

Despite progress on the efficiency of individual building technologies, significant potential remains in the buildings sector. As Armenia’s largest energy-consuming sector, buildings account for around 40% of electricity demand and over 25% of gas demand. Significant efficiency potential exists, particularly in home heating.

No energy efficiency policies currently exist in the industrial sector, such as minimum energy performance requirements for industrial motors or tax breaks to incentivise the adoption of energy management systems.

Except for tax breaks for electric vehicles, Armenia has not adopted any energy efficiency provisions in the transport sector, such as fuel economy standards for passenger vehicles. However, as part of the CEPA provisions, Armenia is expected to approximate EU standards for transport efficiency between 2026 and 2030.

Armenia demonstrated its commitment to fulfil its obligations to the Paris Climate Agreement by ratifying the treaty in February 2017. It also ratified the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, thereby establishing the Protocol’s second commitment period. The acknowledgement of climate action as an important policy issue is also reflected in the creation of a Climate Change Policy Department within the Ministry of Environment, albeit with limited resources at the time of this review.

In April 2021, the Armenian government approved an updated NDC for 2021-2030, setting an economy-wide target for a 40% reduction of GHG emissions by 2030 (compared to the base year 1990). With this absolute emissions reduction target the government departed from the previous disputed concept of a per-capita carbon budget and aligned its NDC implementation period with that of most other countries, enhancing comparability and reporting transparency.

As a non-Annex I Party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate change (UNFCCC), Armenia submitted its Fourth National Communication (NC4) in 2020 and its Third Biennial Update Report (BUR3) in 2021. These provide improved transparency in Armenia’s national inventory of anthropogenic GHG emissions by sources, consistent with Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reporting guidelines. They also include assessments of the climate change mitigation potential in the energy sector based on official statistical data, highlighting the role of renewable energy and energy efficiency measures.

The latest data in the BUR3 show that the energy sector is by far the largest source of GHG emissions, with a total share of 67%. This includes fuel combustion in energy generation and transport. It further includes fugitive methane emissions from the natural gas system, which form 23% of energy sector emissions. Despite monitoring and response mechanisms in place, technical losses in the transmission and distribution systems, respectively, are reportedly 3.5% and 1.2%, resulting in a high share of methane emissions in the overall energy-related GHG emissions.

Assessments in the NC4 and BUR3 show that expansion of renewable energy resources and demand-side measures would have a significant impact on energy-related GHG mitigation.

Although emissions from the industrial sector currently trail those from the residential and transport sectors, industry’s share is projected to grow significantly over the coming decades. With the European Commission’s proposal to introduce a carbon border adjustment mechanism, the government of Armenia is assessing the implications for the country’s exporting industries and exploring policy options for a carbon-pricing or emissions trading system. Aside from facilitating future trade with the EU, the introduction of such a mechanism could prove a significant incentive for increased energy efficiency in energy-intensive industries.

The prevalence of ageing hydropower plants and the development of new SHPPs reportedly are affecting natural river flows and putting a strain on biodiversity. These problems may be amplified in the medium term, since climate change has started already to affect Armenia with a significant decrease in precipitation. The government acknowledges these issues and plans to address them in the revamp of the national water resources management strategy.

Armenian researchers in the energy sector, as in other sectors, face challenges that include low levels of state funding, lack of structures for cooperation among research institutes, universities and industry, and requirements for university professors to teach a large number of hours in order to receive a full salary. Despite the challenges, Armenia ranked 61st out of 131 countries in the 2020 Global Innovation Index.

The EU’s Horizon Europe Policy Support programme undertook a review of Armenia’s research sector in 2019. The main findings included a need to increase overall funding while prioritising the large number of subject areas covered, based on relevance for the country’s social and economic development, among other criteria. While various government policy documents suggest that energy is a priority area for the country’s development, this has yet to be fully translated into support for research in this area.

Given the lack of state funding, the main institutions involved in energy-related research and development in Armenia are primarily self-financed, with most funding coming from project-based contracts with international organisations. Such funding is helpful for supporting and building local expertise, including attracting young researchers to the field. However, donor support, if significantly greater than the government’s own funding contribution, risks research that focuses on donor priorities, and which may not be sustainable. Ideally, donor support should supplement a reliable baseload of government funding for research.


The government of Armenia should:

Overall energy policy

  • Increase resources and improve capabilities to enable the parallel implementation of CEPA and EAEU policies and measures. In particular, the government needs to be in a position to ensure regulatory consistency and legal certainty when approximating Armenian legislation to EU energy legislation, while at the same time setting up a common market for electricity and gas with EAEU member countries.
  • Enhance the government’s own modelling capability, dedicating a regular modelling budget to ensure consistency and comparability, and to avoid the loss of institutional memory. Work in this area should encompass the whole economy, and extend the time horizon at least to 2050 in order to chart net-zero pathways.
  • Continue the government’s considerable efforts to transition to a liberalised, competitive electricity market by reducing technical, economic and administrative barriers, and consider a similar path for gas.

Electricity

  • Enhance the electricity management system and workforce skills necessary to integrate the country’s ambitious target for renewables in the electricity grid while maintaining the reliability of the system and considering climate change goals.
  • Continue the programme to renovate the transmission network, including the development of new interconnections with Iran and Georgia, and implementation of regulatory instruments enabling access rules for cross-border transmission service, free trade and transparent exchange of information.

Nuclear energy

  • Make the necessary investments to ensure that the ANPP is compliant with international safety standards, in particular those concerned with emergency preparedness in the event of a nuclear accident.
  • Continue close coordination with the IAEA, EU and other relevant international organisations on nuclear safety issues and legal aspects, and in particular ensure that continued use of the ANPP (and any future nuclear power plant) meet relevant international safety standards and are governed by legal instruments aligned with international practice.
  • Maintain efforts in the development of a long-term national strategy for radioactive waste management. Such a strategy should be consistent with existing nuclear development plans and envision the creation of a sustainable funding mechanism for decommissioning and waste management activities (including final waste disposal), while addressing existing funding gaps.

Gas

  • Aim to further diversify supply sources of natural gas, including within the framework of the emerging common market for gas in the EAEU.

Renewable energy

  • In connection with ambitious plans for the introduction of solar and wind energy, develop and implement mechanisms for technical and economic integration of variable renewable energy sources, in order to ensure the power system’s secure and cost-effective operation.

Energy efficiency

  • Develop a detailed strategy, including implementation and enforcement mechanisms, to improve the energy efficiency of the building stock, with a particular focus on residential buildings, leveraging work already begun in this area.
  • In tandem with efforts to improve building energy efficiency, develop a national strategy on heating, including improved data collection on heating technologies used by households as well as an assessment of the potential for greater use of district heating networks as an alternative to individual gas boilers.

Energy, the environment and climate change

  • Continue to consider the trade-offs between GHG emissions reduction and potentially damaging environmental impacts when developing hydropower, particularly SHPPs.

Energy research, development and innovation

  • Formulate an Energy Research, Development and Innovation Strategy, including the setting of clear priorities within thematic areas and applied research, to ensure that priorities are linked with those of the national energy strategy adopted in January 2021.

AW: Creative residency in Brussels opens to artists from Armenia

Creative Armenia and the Boghossian Foundation are pleased to announce the 2022 edition of the East-West Residency, a one-month creative residency at the cultural haven of the Villa Empain in Brussels. 

In August 2022, three cutting-edge artists from Armenia will head to the Villa to meet their European counterparts, explore and create in Brussels, bring Armenian culture to the European art scene, and return to Armenia to pursue their new creations.

“We are proud of Armenia’s extraordinary artists,” said Garin Hovannisian, founding director of Creative Armenia. “And we are delighted to be encouraging a new season of their creation and collaboration in Europe.”

Already in its fourth year, East-West Residency is the first-ever residency for Armenian artists in Europe. Previous residents include art director and calligrapher Ruben Malayan, art historian and curator Vigen Galstyan, filmmaker and producer Ophelia Harutyunyan, dancer and choreographer Rima Pipoyan, and writer and lecturer Tigran Amiryan.

“The Villa is once again pleased to open its doors to Armenia,” said Louma Salamé, general director of the Boghossian Foundation. “We look forward to welcoming the 2022 East-West Residents in Brussels very soon.”

The applications for the 2022 East-West Residency are now open for all artists and creators residing in Armenia. Applications are due by April 15, 2022.

The East-West Residency is a collaboration of Creative Armenia and the Boghossian Foundation, which entered into a partnership in 2018. Creative Armenia is a global arts foundation for the Armenian people that discovers, develops, and champions innovative talents across the arts. The Boghossian Foundation was created in 1992 by Robert Boghossian and his two sons, Jean and Albert, jewelers of Armenian origin, with the primary objective of contributing to development and education.




Azerbaijani MPs arrive in Yerevan

ARM INFO
Feb 21 2022
Naira Badalian

ArmInfo. Azerbaijani MPs have  arrived in Armenia to participate in a meeting of the Euronest  Parliamentary Assembly, Maria Karapetyan of the Civil Contract  parliamentary faction, who heads the Armenian delegation to Euronest,  told reporters.  

According to earlier reports, two Azerbaijani MPs accompanied by an  attendant were to arrive in Armenia’s capital to participate in the  meetings of the Bureau and Committees of the Euronest Parliamentary  Assembly. MEPs and MPs from the Eastern Partnership member-states  will participate as well.     

Armenian MPs have not yet had any contacts with their Azerbaijani  counterparts. Ms Karapetyan reported that Armenian and Azerbaijani  MPs can have contacts in the formats of the meetings they attend on  various occasions. 

“When we go to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Vienna we can see  representatives of different national delegations. The same is here.  It is an event of importance for our country, as we are hosting the 

Assembly in rotation,” she said. 

She called for showing restraint in speech and in addressing  sensitive topics. Formal contacts with the Azerbaijani MPs is her  duty as a member of Armenia’s ruling party, Ms Karapetyan said.  The  Azerbaijani MPs are not planned to talks to journalists.

Armenpress: Armenia, Artsakh Ombudsmen issue statement on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of the Sumgait massacres

Armenia, Artsakh Ombudsmen issue statement on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of the Sumgait massacres

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Ombudsmen of Armenia and Artsakh Kristine Grigoryan and Gegham Stepanyan issue statement on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of the Sumgait massacres. As reports Armenpress statement runs as follows:

“The February 20, 1998 decision of the Council of People’s Deputies of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to combat through peaceful means for the right to life of the Armenians of Artsakh, and their right to live free in dignity and security in their own homeland, few days later found its response in the city of Sumgait, located in the distance of 27 kms from Baku. On February 27-29, at the direct provocation of the Azerbaijani authorities and organized by them, the Armenian population of the city was subjected to torture, mutilation, arson of people (both alive or after death), gang rape, while their property was destroyed and looted.

As a result of the massacres committed on the grounds of nationality the rights of the 20.000 Armenian residents of Sumgait, to life, to be free from torture and discrimination, to freedom and security, to private property, to fair trial, other rights were directly and irrevocably threatened. 

Although the Sumgait massacres were documented by the relevant Soviet authorities, the perpetrators and the organizers of the crime have not been brought to justice.

The anti-Armenian massacres of Sumgait instigated a series of crimes against humanity committed by Azerbaijan- a practice which continues to this day. Within the context of this consistent policy during the period of 1988-1991, thousands of Armenians were killed, while another 500,000 thousand were forcibly displaced from the cities of Gandzak (Kirovabad), Baku, and other cities in Azerbaijan, as well as in the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

Aiming to forcibly suppress the right to self-determination of the population of Artsakh, and to annihilate them, Azerbaijan  launched a war against the Armenian population lasted 1991-1994, during which the  vivid evidence of the genocidal actions of the Azerbaijani authorities is the massacre of the Armenian population in the village of Maragha in the region of Martakert in April 1992, as a result of which more than 50 peaceful civilians were killed and  Armenians were completely annihilated from the village. 

The Republic of Azerbaijan fully inherited, further improved the policy of Armenophobia of Soviet Azerbaijan, aimed at the forceful displacement of Armenians from Artsakh, and the annihilation of the Armenian people in its cradle. The practice of glorifying murders purely on ethnic grounds, which was instigated with the Sumgait massacres, became the signature of the Azerbaijani authorities. As a result, the region “was enriched” with “heroes” such as Ramil Safarov, Mubariz Ibrahimov, and others who were taking revenge against the civilian population during the April war of 2016 and were beheading and dismembering Armenian servicemen in the style of terrorist organizations, and as a result were encouraged at the highest levels of the Azerbaijani state. 

The Armenophobia disseminated in the Azerbaijani society by their authorities over the years got its worst manifestation during the September 2020 war unleashed by Azerbaijani against Artsakh, during which the peaceful civilians, kindergartens, schools and hospitals became the primary targets of Azerbaijani army. 

The war crimes committed by Azerbaijan during the 44-day aggression, the gross violations of international humanitarian law and human rights are documented in the reports of the Human Rights Defenders of Armenia and Artsakh, in the reports of several human rights organizations, and have been raised by the representatives of various international organizations.  

Impunity breads and perpetrates new crimes based on ethnic hatred.

The Armenophobia of the Azerbaijani authorities does not bypass Armenian cultural and religious heritage: An attempt is made to apply the methodology of complete displacement of Armenians and the destruction of the medieval Armenian heritage of Nakhichevan in the regions of Artsakh that have fallen under Azerbaijani control. A working group has even been officially set up with the clear aim of destroying Armenian religious, historical and cultural monuments and falsifying their identities.

Armenophobia, the evidence of which is growing daily, is being implemented by the authorities of Baku as a method to form the collective identity of the Azerbaijani population. However, history has repeatedly demonstrated that an identity based on hatred on ethnic and national ground firstly destroys its bearers, it threatens the normal, peaceful and secure life of the people of the region and disrupts the development and progress of societies. 

As a first step  to quit this policy, we call on the Azerbaijani authorities to show political will, to assess with credibility the anti-Armenian massacres in Sumgait, Gandzak (Kirovabad), Baku, and other places, and to refrain from a policy of denial; to bring to justice those who committed violations during and after the 44-day war against the civilian population, and those who committed and organized the torture and mutilations of captured and killed Armenian servicemen, to release immediately the Armenian POWs and other captives still held in Azerbaijan, and to stop the acts of vandalism committed against the Armenian historical and cultural heritage of Artsakh. 

We call on the international community to give a proper legal assessment of the violence committed in Sumgait in February 1988, based on fundamental principles of international law and international norms, as well as take effective measures to assess and stop the continued policy of Armenophobia in Azerbaijan.

We pay tribute to the memory of the innocent victims of the massacres of  Sumgait and other  settlements, and stress that impunity for commitment of human rights violations and crimes leads to new and more heinous crimes.”

Vardan Voskanyan comments on occupied territories law passed by Artsakh parliament

panorama.am
Armenia – Feb 19 2022


Armenian expert on Iran Vardan Voskanyan, who heads the Chair of Iranian Studies of the Faculty of Oriental Studies at the Yerevan State University (YSU), has reacted to the passage of a law on the Azerbaijani-occupied territories of Artsakh by the country’s parliament on Friday.

“According to the law adopted unanimously in the Artsakh parliament, the Baku dictatorial regime and its armed bashi-bazouks are occupants,” he wrote on Telegram on Friday.

“As for how to deal with the occupants, there can only be one agenda: to exert all efforts and energy towards their weakening, expulsion or destruction, ruling out any cooperation with them, since cooperation with the enemy occupants can only be called ‘collaborationism’,” Voskanyan said.

​Sarky Mouradian Dies: Armenian Writer-Director & TV Host Was 90

DEADLINE
Feb 14 2022

Sarky Mouradian Dies: Armenian Writer-Director & TV Host Was 90

By Erik Pedersen

Sarky Mouradian, an Armenian writer-director who also hosted a U.S. TV series in which he interviewed celebrity countrymen, has died. He was 90.

The Armenian Film Society said he died February 10 in Los Angeles, where he’d been based for decades.

“The passing of Sarky Mouradian is a huge loss, not just for the Armenian community but for the film community at large. ,” the group said in a statement. “Mr. Mouradian was a pioneer in more ways than one and was prolific up until his passing at the age of 90. The Armenian community will remember him for his incredible contributions to film and television.”

Born on November 15, 1931, in Beirut, Mouradian began performing music at the age of 16. In 1955, he moved to Boston to continue his education in music then relocated to Los Angeles in 1960 to pursue his passion for film. There he attended the Theater of Arts and began working in the industry.

Sarky Mouradian, left, interviews Charles Aznavour on ‘Armenian Timeline’Armenian Television via YouTube

He wrote and directed such films as Sons of Sassoun (1973), Tears of Happiness (1975), Promise of Love (1978) and Alicia (2002). Mouradian also successfully adapted Franz Werfel’s 1933 novel The Forty Days of Musa Dagh into a feature film in 1982, after numerous unsuccessful attempts by filmmakers raning from Louis B. Mayer to Sylvester Stallone, the Armenian Film Society. The adaptation repeatedly was objected to by the Turkish government.

Known as “the Godfather of Armenian Television in the U.S,” Mouradian established one of the first Armenian TV shows in Los Angeles in 1978. Armenian Timeline featured interviews with various Armenian celebrity performers and politicians.

He continued his work in cultural preservation and documentation on YouTube, archiving decades of footage while producing original episodes of his popular show up until his passing.

In 2016, he was awarded a gold medal by the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Armenia.

FP: Russia Belongs at the Center of Europe

By Anatol Lieven, a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

Vladimir Putin speaks during a press conference on the second day of the G8 summit venue of Lough Erne on June 18, 2013 in Enniskillen, Northern Ireland. WPA POOL /GETTY IMAGES

The Western attempt to expel Russia from Europe has failed. That there was such an attempt was always implicit in the strategy of seeking to admit every European country but Russia into NATO and the European Union. In this context, the NATO slogan “A Europe Whole and Free” is an explicit statement that Russia is not part of Europe.

But as French President Emmanuel Macron has reminded us, Russia is part of Europe and is simply too big, too powerful, and too invested in its immediate neighborhood to be excluded from the European security order. A continued strategy along these lines will lead to repeated Russian attempts to force its way back in. At best, this will lead to repeated and very damaging crises; at worst, to war.

A structure needs to be created that can defend the interests of NATO and the EU while at the same time accommodating vital Russian interests and preserving peace. The solution lies in a modernized version of what was once called the “Concert of Europe.”

The current security order has reached its limit. Until 2007-2008, the expansion of the EU and NATO appeared to have proceeded flawlessly, with the admission of all the former Soviet satellites in Central Europe and the Balkans, as well as the Baltic states. Russia was unhappy with NATO expansion but did not actively oppose it. Then, however, both NATO and the EU received decisive checks, through their own overreach.

At the NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, in 2008, the United States and its allies, though denied an immediate Membership Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia because of the opposition of France and Germany, procured a promise of those countries’ eventual membership. Seen from Moscow, this created the prospect that NATO would include countries with territorial disputes (and in the case of Georgia, frozen conflicts) with Russia; that (as in the Baltic states) NATO would give cover to moves to harm the position of local Russian minorities; and that NATO would expel Russia from its naval base at Sevastopol and from the southern Caucasus.

Later that year, the Russo-Georgian War should have sounded the death knell of further NATO expansion, for it demonstrated beyond doubt both the acute dangers of territorial disputes in the former USSR and that in the last resort Russia would fight to defend its vital interests in the region, and the West would not fight. This is being demonstrated again today by the repeated and categorical statements from Washington and Brussels that there is no question of sending troops to defend Ukraine; and if NATO will not fight for Ukraine, then it cannot admit Ukraine as an ally. It is as simple as that.

The rise of China is the other factor that makes the exclusion of Russia unviable. For this project was developed at a time when Russia was at its weakest in almost 400 years and when China’s colossal growth had only just begun. This allowed the West possibilities that today have diminished enormously, if as seems likely China is prepared to strengthen Russia against Western economic sanctions.

The EU too has reached the limit of its expansion eastward. On the one hand, there is Ukraine’s size (44 million people), corruption, political dysfunction, and poverty (GDP per capita that’s one-third of Russia’s). Perhaps more importantly, EU expansion to eastern Europe no longer looks like the unconditional success story that it did a decade ago.

Romania, Bulgaria, and other states remain deeply corrupt and in many ways still ex-communist. Poland and Hungary have developed dominant strains of chauvinist and quasi-authoritarian populism that place them at odds with what were supposed to be the core values of the EU—and that in some respects bring them closer ideologically to the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin. After this experience, there is no chance that the EU will admit a country like Ukraine in any foreseeable future.

An acknowledgment of these obvious truths (which are acknowledged in private by the overwhelming majority of Western officials and experts) should open the way to thinking about a new European security architecture that would incorporate NATO and the EU while reducing the hostility between these organizations and Russia. We should aim at the creation of this new system as part of the solution to the present crisis, and in order to avoid new ones.

This requires a return to a more traditional way of thinking about international politics. For a key problem of the West’s approach to Russia since the end of the Cold War is that it has demanded that Russia observe the internal rules of behavior of the EU and NATO without offering EU and NATO membership (something that is in any case impossible for multiple reasons).

In recent years and in the wider world, the U.S. establishment by contrast has loudly announced “the return of great-power politics”—and this is true enough as far as it goes. Certainly the idea of a monolithic “rules-based global order,” in which liberal internationalism acts as a thin cover for U.S. primacy, is now dead.

The problem is that most members of the U.S. establishment have become so wedded to belief in both the necessity and the righteousness of U.S. global primacy that they can see relations with other great powers only in confrontational and zero-sum terms. Rivalry, of course, there will inevitably be; but if we are to avoid future disasters, we need to find a way of managing relations so as to keep this rivalry within bounds, establish certain genuine common rules, prevent conflict, and work toward the solution of common problems. To achieve this, we need to seek lessons further back in diplomatic history.

The essential elements of a new, reasonably consensual pan-European order should be the following: a traditional nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), by which both sides pledge not to attack the other militarily. As a matter of fact, neither side has any intention of doing so, and to put this on paper would reduce mutual paranoia and the ability of establishments on both sides to feed this paranoia for their own domestic purposes.

Full diplomatic relations should be established or reestablished between NATO and the CSTO and between the EU and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. On the basis of this, intensive negotiations should be launched to achieve two goals: new arms control agreements in Europe, starting with nuclear missiles, and economic arrangements that would allow nonmembers of the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union to trade freely with both blocs, rather than forcing on them a mutually exclusive choice of trading partners.

When it comes to the avoidance and solution of conflicts, however, institutions involving all European countries are too large and too rigid to be of much use. The Russian establishment has also decided—not without reason—that these are simply excuses for Western countries to agree to a common position and then present it to Russia as a fait accompli. The need is for a regular, frequent, but much smaller and less formal meeting place for the countries that really count in European security: the United States, France, Germany, and Russia (plus the United Kingdom, if it survives as one state and emerges from its post-Brexit bewilderment).

Such a European security council would have three goals: firstly, the avoidance of new conflicts through early consultation about impending crises; secondly, the solution of existing conflicts on the basis of common standards of realism—in other words, who actually controls the territory in question and will continue to do so; and thirdly, democracy—the will of the majority of the local population, expressed through internationally supervised referendums (a proposal put forward by Thomas Graham).

Finally, a European security council could lay the basis for security cooperation outside Europe. Here, the present situation is nothing short of tragicomic. In Afghanistan, the United States, NATO, the EU, Russia, and the CSTO have an identical vital interest: to prevent that country from becoming a base for international Islamist terrorism and revolution. And for all the greater complexity of the situation, this is also true in the end of the fight against the Islamic State and its allies in the Middle East and western Africa.

Among the other benefits of such a new consultative institution would therefore be to remind both the West and Russia that while Russian and NATO soldiers have never killed each other and do not want to, there are other forces out there that have killed many thousands of Americans, Russians, and West Europeans, would gladly kill us all if they could find the means to do so, and see no moral difference whatsoever between what they see as Western and Eastern infidel imperialism.

Anatol Lieven is a senior fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and the author of Pakistan: A Hard Country. His most recent book, Climate Change and the Nation State, is appearing in an updated paperback edition in September 2021.

Armenia lawmaker defies EU’s €2b pledge for Azerbaijan

Feb 8 2022

PanARMENIAN.Net – Lawmaker from Armenia’s ruling Civil Contract party Sona Ghazaryan has slammed the European Union’s €2b financial assistance package for Azerbaijan.

Ghazaryan ‘s comments came just days after Azerbaijan announced plans to erase Armenian traces from medieval churches in Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh).

“I’d like to tell the international community that this policy pursued by Azerbaijan is a challenge to the decision of the UN International Court of Justice on the application of urgent measures, adopted on December 7, 2021,” Ghazaryan said.

“I would especially like to remind our partners in the European Union that they are in fact sending $2.1 billion to a country that stands out not only for its authoritarian regime, but also for its policy of vandalism against its neighbors and the destruction of our historical and cultural monuments.”

Concerns about the preservation of cultural sites in Nagorno-Karabakh are made all the more urgent by the Azerbaijani government’s history of systemically destroying indigenous Armenian heritage—acts of both warfare and historical revisionism. The Azerbaijani government has secretly destroyed a striking number of cultural and religious artifacts in the late 20th century. Within Nakhichevan alone, a historically Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani forces destroyed at least 89 medieval churches, 5,840 khachkars (Armenian cross stones) and 22,000 historical tombstones between 1997 and 2006.

Air pollution exceeds safety limits in Yerevan

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Armenia – Feb 4 2022

The concentration of pollutants in the air of downtown Yerevan exceeded safety limits from January 20 to February 1, according to data released by the Hydrometeorology and Monitoring Center of Armenia’s Ministry of Environment on Thursday.

Meanwhile, air pollution exceeded safety limits in Nor Nork district of the capital on 24-25 January and in Shengavit district – on 20-23 January.

The air quality monitoring revealed that the concentration of nitrogen oxide and sulphur dioxide was within the accepted norms in the city during this period.

A separate monitoring carried out on 17-31 January revealed that air pollution in the towns of Alaverdi and Hrazdan also exceeded safe levels on 18 January and 21 January, respectively. 

Austrian FM supports OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship format

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 13:25, 2 February, 2022

YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 2, ARMENPRESS. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Federal Minister for European and International Affairs of the Republic of Austria Alexander Schallenberg discussed the bilateral relations and the regional, international developments during their private meeting in Yerevan.

The Armenian FM shared his information about the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, the situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the Armenian-Turkish dialogue with his Austrian counterpart.

“I must praise the fact that Mr Schallenberg , definitely, welcomes and supports the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship format and the efforts of the Co-Chairs aimed at the settlement of the still unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict, as well as expresses his support to the solution of all existing humanitarian problems, such as the issue of the Armenian prisoners of war and the preservation of and access to the cultural monuments”, the Armenian FM told reporters today.

The Austrian FM arrived in Armenia on a working visit on February 2. He is scheduled to meet also with Armenia’s Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament.