HOW WILL OBAMA’S PRESIDENCY AFFECT TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY?
By Cenap Cakmak
Today’s Zaman
Feb 20 2009
Turkey
Newly elected US President Barack Obama may have a structural impact
upon Turkish foreign policy if, as he promised in his campaign, he
promotes a multilateral world, complying with international law and
relying on negotiations and peaceful means rather than coercion in
resolving global problems.
This impact may go beyond isolated issues, including Cyprus, Armenian
genocide claims and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorism, and
be rather determinative and comprehensive. Obama’s presidency may
resolve the dilemma that Turkish foreign policy has had to deal with
since the 1980s with respect to its Westernization policy. This may
further help Turkey expand the boundaries of its foreign policy and
create fertile ground for Turkish foreign policy makers where foreign
policy decisions will be made smoothly.
Even though it is possible that bilateral relations between Turkey
and the US might have trouble with respect to the Cyprus problem
and Armenian genocide issue during Obama’s term in office, Turkey’s
cooperation with the US and the EU in transatlantic relations and
actions by the UN will make great contributions to Turkish foreign
policy. Obama’s foreign policy design, which places greater emphasis
on cooperation and negotiation rather than reliance on coercion,
may alleviate the tension caused by Turkey’s ambivalence between its
Western-oriented policy and its eagerness to preserve the status quo
for the sake of protecting its territorial integrity and maintaining
security.
Turkish foreign policy tradition
Although it may be problematic to make generalizations about some
visible principles governing Turkish foreign policy, it is yet possible
to argue that at least two basic principles and goals have remained
top-priority items on the agendas of Turkish foreign policy makers
since the foundation of the republic. Preservation of the status
quo — for security reasons and maintaining territorial integrity —
and Westernization have remained the primary goals of this policy —
though they have taken different forms and been expressed in different
discourses.
In the aftermath of the War of Independence, Turkish foreign policy
makers, who assumed that the international order established by the
Treaty of Versailles would not be consented to by the defeated powers
in World War I and that it was not based on a solid ground, set a goal
by which they would seek to ensure the preservation of the status
quo in the region surrounding Turkey. This goal is best articulated
in a famous motto of Ataturk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey:
"Peace at home, peace in the world." This motto delivers a message
indicating that Turkey was satisfied with what it had after the
fulfillment of the National Covenant (Misak-ı Milli) and that it
was expecting consent and respect from the international community
for these gains.
Westernization also emerged as another primary foreign policy objective
of the young republic. To this end, Turkey maintained ties with
France and Britain despite having fought the War of Independence
against an alliance involving these two as belligerents. In the
postwar period, Ataturk stressed that these countries were not
their enemies any longer, also noting the new state’s desire to be
part of the Western world. Because he believed that the Versailles
order would collapse someday, Ataturk held that Turkey should align
with countries like Britain and France, which favored the status quo,
instead of revisionist actors like Germany and Italy when the collapse
process starts. This was exactly what Turkish foreign policy makers
did during World War II. Turkey abided by its primary foreign policy
goals before and during the war, and for this reason, it signed a
trilateral alliance deal with France and Britain.
Turkey’s preferences in the postwar period were also influenced
by the emphases upon preservation of the status quo as well as
Westernization. While Germany and Italy were the major threats to the
status quo before World War II, the Soviet Union emerged as a big
power in the aftermath of the war and expressed its ambitions over
Turkish territories. In such a delicate environment, Turkey fulfilled
its two foreign policy objectives by joining Western political and
military alliances. For the first time, the US took its place within
the framework of Turkey’s Westernization policy after the war.
Turkey’s Western orientation became more visible in the aftermath
of World War II when the Soviet Union expressed its determination
to have the status quo in Anatolia changed. Soviet discontent with
the established regime in the Turkish Straits — the Bosporus and
the Dardanelles — and with Turkey’s eastern border was perceived by
Turkish policy makers as a threat that would potentially undermine
the strength of the Turkish state and lead to the breakup of the
territorial status quo.
In consideration of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, the Turkish
foreign policy establishment sought to align with Western powers,
the US being the leading one; despite initial reluctance, the US
decided to serve as a balancing power against the Soviet Union. For the
sake of preserving its territorial integrity and the geostrategic and
geographic status quo, Turkey expressed eagerness to gain membership in
NATO and other Western institutions, including the Council of Europe,
the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Western European Union
(WEU). All these Westernization moves were aimed at securing the
territorial integrity of Turkey.
The primary motive for Turkey’s eagerness to take part in Western
institutions during this period was the Western orientation of Turkish
foreign policy. The political administration did not hold great
expectations about economic benefits from integration with the West;
the probable economic gains to be incurred from membership in the
EEC were not even considered. Likewise, the Council of Europe, set
up to promote democratization and create a common European platform
where regional problems and disputes might be settled, was not an
organization that would appeal to Turkey because of its agenda and
goals; what made the council attractive to Turkey was the fact that
it was a Western institution.
Turkey’s strong interest in Western institutions was, therefore, driven
by the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union and a growing fear
of partition. The Turkish foreign policy establishment expressed its
preference for Western institutions in order to address its security
concerns and preserve the status quo in its geography. In this way,
the two major foreign policy goals were reconciled; therefore, no
tension or dilemma was experienced between these goals during the
Cold War era. Turkey observed and honored both objectives by staying
in Western political and military institutions.
Tension caused in 1990s by changes in Turkish foreign policy
Turkey’s policy of Westernization and particularly its relations with
the European Community (EC) were shaped by rather technical issues
up until the 1980s; likewise, its bilateral relations with the US
were determined by its performance in acting its role within the
famous American policy of containment; for this reason, no serious
problems were ever experienced during this period of stability
and smoothness. No threat of partition or violation of territorial
integrity was perceived by Turkish foreign policy makers until the
end of the Cold War period. However, problems have erupted since
the 1980s mostly because the EC started turning into a political
organization that put a strong emphasis on human rights and the
recognition of minorities.
At this point, Turkish foreign policy makers faced a great dilemma
between participating in Western institutions and securing Turkey’s
territorial integrity via preserving the status quo. They were
particularly ambivalent because Turkish foreign policy’s Western
orientation, for the first time, proved to be inadequate to sustain
the territorial integrity of the country. In other words, the two
basic goals and targets of Turkish foreign policy, Westernization
and preservation of the status quo, were no longer reconcilable,
and they did not overlap. Turkey’s role as an important actor in
the perpetuation of the policy of containment was over, and this
created a new environment where Turkish-American relations had to be
reshaped. For the European Union, Turkey’s role as a strategic and
military power was no longer very important. The EU’s interest in
Turkey was now driven by its ability to serve as political leverage
to enable a great transformation in this country. All these facts
were now telling Turkey that it could not rely on its indispensable
role within the Western alliance as an asset that would ensure the
protection of its territorial integrity.
While bilateral relations between Turkey and the US were smooth
during the Clinton presidency, the Bush era was troublesome for both
the EU and Turkey. Serious disagreements were observed between the
EU and the US during this period where transatlantic relations were
seriously harmed. This also negatively affected Turkey’s Western
orientation because the EU and the US were representing different
values and promoting opposite foreign policy designs.
American foreign policy in the aftermath of the notorious Sept. 11
incidents, designed by neoconservatives who relied on a unilateral
style suggesting the use of coercion in the settlement of disputes,
put Turkey in a delicate position in which it had to make a choice with
respect to its Westernization policy. At this point, the EU and the
US did not play roles that complemented each other; for this reason,
US support for Turkey’s membership in the EU did not mean anything;
besides, Turkey could not trust the US for its security and the
preservation of the status quo any longer.
Obama presidency and elimination of Turkey’s ambivalence
In the event that Obama keeps his promises and really implements the
foreign policy he has declared, multilateralism will replace Bush’s
unilateral style, and cooperation in global platforms, including
transatlantic relations, will become more visible. This will mean
that the EU and the US will work together again to deal with global
problems. Such cooperation will also address Turkey’s ambivalence
and remove the tension in its foreign policy caused by the opposing
tendencies of these two great powers. In the new era, Turkey will
not have to make a choice between the EU, which promotes legality and
human rights, and the US, which places greater emphasis on coercion. In
short, the EU and the US will act together, and this will address the
question of what party Turkey must talk to in addressing its problems.
During Obama’s term in office, preservation of the status quo —
protection of Turkey’s territorial integrity — will be easier under
the multilateral foreign policy design that he has pledged. Turkey,
which has carried out its relations with the US in reliance on
bilateral talks and contact, will have a greater opportunity in the
new era to come up with lasting and rational solutions to its problems
on multilateral platforms and initiatives, including the UN Security
Council and NATO, where the US will also be a participant.
[*] Dr. Cenap Cakmak is an instructor at Mugla University and a senior
researcher at the Wise Men Center for Strategic Research (BÄ°LGESAM).