Asia Times
by James M. Dorsey
Deepening Chinese-Russian ties and Iranian dependence on China may
turn Syria into a crucial Belt and Road node
Mohammed Jarah and Ahmad Bustati’s warehouse in Damascus symbolized
China’s emergence as the largest supplier of industrial and consumer
goods to Syria on the eve of the Syrian civil war. The dilapidated
warehouse was stocked with everything from Chinese laser cutting
machines to plastic toys for children.
A decade of fighting dashed the two Syrian entrepreneurs’ hopes.
However, things seem to be looking up for businessmen like Jarah and
Bustati with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad having gained the upper
hand in the war and China seeing longer-term economic potential in
Syria as a regional node for the Belt and Road Initiative.
Syrian officials have sought to drive home China’s competitive
advantages and perceived interest in taking a lead in the
reconstruction of their country. “The Silk Road is not a silk road if
it does not pass through Syria, Iraq and Iran,” said Buthaina Shaaban,
Bashar al-Assad’s media adviser, referring to the BRI.
Chinese access to the Syrian Mediterranean Sea ports of Tartus and
Latakia is an attractive prospect for China’s multi-billion-dollar
infrastructure, telecommunications and energy-driven initiative that
seeks to link Eurasia to the People’s Republic. It would complement
Beijing’s footholds in Greece’s Piraeus and the Israeli harbors of
Haifa and Ashdod and echo Syria’s key position on the ancient Silk
Road.
Closely connected to Chinese interest in Syrian ports is the
exploration by China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd (CHEC) of the
possible upgrading of the deep seaport of Tripoli, Lebanon to allow it
to accommodate larger vessels. In contrast to Syrian ports, Tripoli
would grant China greater freedom of action because it would not have
to share control with Russia. Together with Syrian ports, Tripoli
would serve as an alternative to passage through the Suez Canal.
Russia appeared to be anticipating potential Chinese moves when it
last year negotiated with the Assad government an extension of its
access to military bases including what it describes as a “logistics
support facility of the Russian navy” in Tartus.
In the absence of making the agreement public, it remained unclear
what Russian intentions were. However, modernization of Tartus for
military purposes that would guarantee Russia a role in control of the
Eastern Mediterranean would have to involve upgrading it to be able to
accommodate all types of vessels, including aircraft carriers.
In a further move, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his
foreign and defense ministries in May to reach agreement with Syria on
an additional expansion of a 2015 accord that governs Russia’s naval
presence in Tartus and allows the Russian navy to base up to 11 ships
in the port for 49 years. Putin wants the life of the agreement to be
extended by an additional 25 years.
“From the coast of Syria, there is an opportunity to control not only
the eastern part, but the entire Mediterranean Sea,” said Captain 1st
Rank Anatoly Ivanov, a Moscow-based naval expert.
“The United States has in the Mediterranean Sea not only the ships of
its Sixth Fleet, but also an extensive ship repair base and training
centers of the Navy. For Russia, the Mediterranean Sea is much closer
not only geographically, but also geopolitically. Therefore, to use
the opportunity to establish (itself) more densely in Syria seems to
be a reasonable measure.”
Qingdao Haixi Heavy-Duty Machinery Co. has already sold Tripoli port
two 28-storey container cranes capable of lifting and transporting
more than 700 containers a day, while a container vessel belonging to
China’s state-owned COSCO Shipping Lines docked in Tripoli in December
2018, inaugurating a new maritime route between China and the
Mediterranean.
Major Chinese construction companies are also looking at building a
railroad that would connect Beirut and Tripoli in Lebanon to Homs and
Aleppo in Syria. China has suggested that Tripoli could become a
special economic zone within the BRI and serve as an important
trans-shipment point between the People’s Republic and Europe.
Adding to China’s expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean, COSCO
acquired in 2015 a 65% stake in Turkey’s Kumport Terminal on the
Ambarli coast of Istanbul. To round off the circle, Egypt’s navy last
year signed an agreement with China’s Hutchinson Ports to build a
terminal in Abu Qir, a port 23 kilometers northeast of Alexandria.
Chinese companies already operate Alexandria’s own port as well as
that of El Dekheila, 10 kilometers west of the city.
Trump warning
Chinese influence in at least 10 ports in six countries bordering the
Eastern Mediterranean – Israel, Greece, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, and
Syria – could complicate the US and NATO’s ability to maneuver in the
region.
This was one reason that the Trump administration warned Israel that
Chinese involvement in Haifa, where the Chinese have built their own
pier, could jeopardize continued use of the port by the US Sixth
Fleet.
Informing US thinking is China’s Military Strategy white paper,
published in 2015, that emphasizes the “strategic requirement of
offshore waters defense and open seas.” It raises the specter of
Chinese-managed or owned ports in the Eastern Mediterranean serving
the People’s Republic’s economic and commercial, as well as military
interests.
The Chinese sway over multiple ports in the Eastern Mediterranean
could also encourage Turkey to bolster its grip on the energy-rich
waters in violation of international law. Turkish military support for
the internationally-recognized Libyan Government of National Accord
produced a maritime agreement between the two entities that created an
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean favoring
expansive Turkish claims.
China’s interest in Mediterranean ports is part of a larger effort to
integrate the Middle East into the maritime leg of the Belt and Road
that also includes the Gulf, the Arabian Sea with the Pakistani port
of Gwadar as its focal point, and the Red Sea with the establishment
of the People’s Republic’s first military outpost in Djibouti.
The integration is further advanced by Chinese investment in ports and
logistics facilities in among others Dubai and Oman, as well as
industrial parks linked to maritime infrastructure. China’s moves have
been embraced by Gulf states, several of which have incorporated them
in long-term plans to diversify and streamline their economies.
Qi Qianjin, China’s ambassador in Damascus, spelled out China’s
interest in Syria when he stressed in 2018, in a statement to the
People’s Republic’s state-run news agency Xinhua as well as in a
letter, his country’s intent to expand its economic, political, and
military footprint in the region.
“I think it’s about time to focus all efforts on the development and
reconstruction of Syria, and I think China will play a bigger role in
this process by providing more aid to the Syrian people and the Syrian
government,” Qi said during a visit to a hospital in the Syrian
capital.
Donations in recent years of at least US$44 million to Syria for
humanitarian purposes back up Qi’s statements.
In a letter written in August 2019, the ambassador focused, among
other things, on the development of Syrian railways and seaports. The
letter was published a month after Chinese President Xi Jinping
promised to lend $20 billion to Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Jordan for
reconstruction and economic development.
Circumventing sanctions
Few doubt that China, even prior to the coronavirus pandemic and its
devastating economic fallout, is best positioned to be a key, if not
the key player, in post-war reconstruction of Syria, which is
estimated to require between $250 and $400 billion in investment.
This is even more the case as other potential funders – the United
States, Europe, Russia and the Gulf Cooperation Council states – will
either refuse to work with the government of Assad or be consumed with
fighting a domestic and global recession and substantial loss of
revenues in the wake of the pandemic.
Moreover, in opposition to Western states, China on six occasions
backed Russian vetoes in the United Nations Security Council that
blocked condemnations of the Syrian government and its backers, Russia
and Iran, calls for ceasefires, and the sanctioning of alleged war
criminals.
One of China’s comparative advantages in heavily sanctioned Syria is
the experience it garnered in circumventing US and United Nations
sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea.
China further benefits from alternative institutions that it built –
like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization – that it either controls or in which it has
considerable influence.
That has not stopped the US Justice Department from accusing Chinese
telecommunications giant Huawei of operating in Syria in violation of
US sanctions. The department is seeking the extradition from Canada of
Meng Wanzhou, the company’s chief financial officer and daughter of
its founder. Meng was detained in Canada at the request of the United
States.
Seemingly oblivious to the risk of being targeted by the long arm of
US justice, some 200 Chinese companies in 2018 and 58 in 2019, active
in sectors such as telecommunications, oil and gas, and
transportation, attended the Damascus International Fair where they
discussed deals ranging from car manufacturing to development of
mobile hospitals.
The participation of China National Heavy Duty Truck Company
highlighted Chinese interest in the Syrian automotive sector. Syria
could also prove to be a lucrative market for Chinese military
exports.
Assad could well see Chinese interest as a way of loosening Moscow and
Tehran’s grip on his country despite Russian and Iranian efforts to
reap the benefits of their boots-on-the-ground support for his
government by winning lucrative reconstruction contracts.
China has so far refrained from responding in any real way to Syrian
urging to kickstart reconstruction of critical national infrastructure
even before remaining rebel strongholds in the country are
reconquered. It has, however, exploited commercial opportunity.
The vast majority of Syrian exports go to China and Chinese goods are
ubiquitous in Syrian markets. Hama, Syria’s most important industrial
region after the collapse of manufacturing in Aleppo and Damascus as a
result of the war, is awash with Chinese-made car parts, machine tools
and equipment for the automobile, motorcycle, and shoe industry.
Multiple delegations of Chinese investors and businessmen have visited
Syria in recent years. In 2018, China hosted its First Trade Fair on
Syrian Reconstruction Projects with some 1,000 Chinese companies in
attendance and pledged $2 billion for the construction of industrial
parks.
Uyghurs in wings
Assad’s ability to regain control of most of Syria, with the exception
of the rebel-held northern region of Idlib, created not only economic
opportunity but also heightened already existing Chinese security
concerns.
As Syrian government forces rolled back rebel fighters, China feared
that their battle-hardened Uyghur and Central Asian contingent would
gravitate towards Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan from where it
would be easier to target China.
The presence of Uyghur fighters in Syria was one driver for a brutal
crackdown on Turkic Muslims in China’s troubled north-western province
of Xinjiang. It also persuaded China to step up border security
cooperation with Tajikistan and Afghanistan, where militants of the
Uyghur jihadist Turkistan Islamic Party, an al-Qaeda-affiliated group,
allegedly fight alongside the Taliban.
The Uyghur presence in Syria prompted China to consider sending
Chinese troops to join the fight for Idlib in violation of its foreign
and defense policy principles. China ultimately dropped the idea,
which would have amounted to the People’s Republic’s first military
intervention in recent memory beyond its borders.
Repeated unconfirmed media reports have, however, suggested that China
has been sharing intelligence with Syria and has been sending military
advisers for the past four years to help in the fight against Uyghur
militants.
The discussion about an intervention followed a pledge in 2016 by Rear
Admiral Guan Youfei of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to
increase military cooperation with the Syrian government.
Two years later, a Syrian state-controlled newspaper, Al Watan, quoted
Qi, the Chinese ambassador, and China’s military attaché, Wong Roy
Chang, as saying that China wanted to contribute “in some way” to
Syrian military campaign against the rebels in Idlib. The PLAN took
nine days to deny Chinese interest in getting involved in the
fighting, calling the report a “misunderstanding.”
While supportive of efforts to negotiate an end to the Syrian war,
China has studiously avoided taking a leading role. Its sole
initiative to shape the outcome of the conflict was a four-point plan
that never gained significant traction.
China’s dilemma in Idlib lies partially in sensitivity to Turkish
opposition to an all-out assault on Idlib. Turkey fears that it would
likely spark a renewed refugee exodus and concern that Chinese
involvement in an assault could whip up pro-Uyghur sentiments in
Turkey despite growing anti-refugee sentiment in the country.
Turkey has long supported Uyghur rights and has frequently turned a
blind eye to Uyghur militants.
An Uighur dressed in a Turkish military uniform and sporting an
automatic weapon, claiming in a video clip posted on Twitter that he
was fighting in the northern Syrian district of Afrin alongside
Turkish-backed rebels, advised Han Chinese residents of China’s
troubled north-western province of Xinjiang to leave the area.
“Listen you dog bastards, do you see this? We will triumph! We will
kill you all. Listen up Chinese civilians, get out of our East
Turkestan. I am warning you. We shall return, and we will be
victorious,” the Uyghur said.
Beyond its hesitancy of becoming embroiled in the Syrian war, China,
despite its consistent backing of the Syrian government as a secular
bulwark against Islamic extremism, feared that greater involvement in
Syria could jeopardize its successful efforts to remain aloof in the
conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran that influenced multiple
disputes in the Middle East.
That fear has receded with states in the GCC ending their
long-standing support for anti-Assad rebels and cozying up to the
Syrian leader in an effort to counter Iranian and Turkish influence.
Chinese aloofness also shielded it from entering into direct
competition with Russia and Iran in the post-war reconstruction phase.
Deepening Chinese-Russian ties in the wake of the pandemic and
perceived greater Iranian dependence on China may allow for a divvying
up of the pie in ways that turn Syria into an important Belt and Road
node.
Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and a senior fellow
at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies in Singapore. He is also an adjunct senior
research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East
Institute and co-director of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute
of Fan Culture in Germany