TURKEY AND THE WESTERN QUESTION
Polina Slavcheva
Sofia Echo, Bulgaria
Sept 25 2006
The Director of Programmes of the Institute for Regional and
International Studies Marin Lessenski comments on Turkey’s cooling
toward the EU and the US:
UNEASY RELATIONS: EU Commissioner Olli Rehn, left, and Turkish
and Austrian foreign ministers Abdullah Gull and Ursula Plassnik in
Vienna. Turkey may be steadily moving away from the West and pursuing
alternative policies, specialists say.Turkey has been steadily moving
away from the West in recent years and pursuing its own policy that
some experts refer to as Eurasian, and the Transatlantic public opinion
survey of 12 European countries and the US showed that Turkish people
approve that. The downward trend in Turkey-US relations was there
since the Iraqi war, when Turkey denied American troops access to its
territory. Americans were then mad at Turkey, to say the least, and
further frictions followed when Turkey warmed to Syria and Iran. Turkey
has recently also developed a security co-operation with Iran. And
this year, the US named Iran security threat number one. Turkey also
managed to antagonise Israel and the powerful Israeli lobby in the US
after prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan referred to Israel’s policy
as state terrorism. There is another thing that concerns Bulgaria
also. Turkey opposes US policy in the Black Sea region and south
Caucasus by not allowing the Nato navy to enter the Black Sea region at
a time when the US wants to expand the Nato anti-terrorist operation
from the eastern Mediterranean to the Black Sea. (There is another
dimension to Turkey-US relations): Whenever Turkey’s relations with
the US deteriorate its relations with its eastern neighbours improve. I
mean Iran and especially Russia. The Turkey-Russian partnership started
several years ago. Russia is the second trading partner of Turkey
after Germany and its energy resources are the primary vehicles of
Turkish economy. There are many cases when their interests coincide,
especially in the Black Sea region and the south Caucasus. They also
share many concerns about the EU. But the most important thing is
that they pursue independent Eurasian policies. For centuries, the
Russian and Turkish empires have been enemies, and now they are very
good friends. The US, of course, does not like this.
Will this friendship weigh down heavier than that with the EU?
It could become an alternative if Turkey at some point decides that
the West has offended it too much. If the EU and Turkey decide on a
strategic partnership now, it could benefit both sides. Their relations
now are very emotional. Turkey is offended by the EU because it put
its negotiations off for too long. Its candidate status was agreed to
in 1999 and negotiations started in 2005. For six years, the Turkish
had enough time to think they were offended.
And the EU sometimes pushes Turkey too much.
Wouldn’t having bad relations with the US make Turkey a better friend
of the EU?
These are separate things. Currently, the Turkish secular establishment
is angry both at the US for its policies, because they see US influence
in the Middle East as something bad for Turkey, and at the EU, because
they think that it supplies double standards; and that central and
eastern European states were tolerated because they were Christian.
Will the Pope’s statement give fuel to this idea?
Absolutely; along with the revival of the issue of Christianity in
the EU constitution, which German chancellor Angela Merkel recently
brought up. There is something very wrong in Turkey’s understanding of
accession. The acquis is not negotiable, and Turkey is negotiating it.
Is Turkey slipping from the hands of the EU? Turkish novelist Eli
Shafak, who wrote about the plight of Armenians, has said that court
cases like hers attempt to stop Turkey’s accession.
I don’t think Turkey will recognise the genocide soon. And since
this is a condition of EU membership, Turkey will probably halt
negotiations. Turkey would do that whenever they think negotiations
don’t fit their national interest. They will not enter the EU at any
price. EU Commissioner Olli Rehn is trying to avert a train wreck, as
he said, by moving the Cyprus issue for next year. He will probably put
the question before the European Court, and until they take a decision
there will be another year for negotiations. Of course, neither side
wants to stop the process completely. By accepting Turkey, the EU would
become a powerful geopolitical player, especially in the Middle East
(ME). But Turkey also has a colonial past in the region. So there
would be ME concerns that Turkey would want to re-establish their
empire, which is why Turkey did not send troops to Iraq, at least not
officially. They sent troops to Kurdistan in north Iraq because the
Iraqis didn’t want their former colonial master to claim lands like
Kirkuk, which is populated by Turkmen as well. It is the same with
Lebanon. The pros and cons should be estimated carefully.
What goes on in Turkish intellectual circles regarding the EU?
There is a rift. On the one hand, you have the secular establishment
of the bureaucracy and the military that we can conditionally call the
Ankara circle. They think some EU demands threaten Turkish national
security. And those demands include the rights of minorities because
Kurdish terrorism is on the surge in Turkey – there were several
blasts in summer resorts. So, this establishment is sceptic toward EU
accession, even if it was educated in Western universities and speaks
several Western languages. The other circle is more liberal. We can
conditionally call them the Istanbul circle. They are more ready
to accept demands for democratisation, claims to recognise Cyprus,
and discussions on sensitive issues. But we should not forget that
the Justice and Development Party now in power does not have good
relations with any of the two sides.