Armenian Foreign Minister’s Historic Visit to Türkiye Marks a New Chapter in Diplomacy

Feb 26 2024
Momen Zellmi

As the sun rises over the picturesque city of Antalya, a historic moment unfolds, signifying a potential thaw in the frosty relations between neighboring nations. Ararat Mirzoyan, Armenia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, is set to grace the Antalya Diplomacy Forum from March 1-3, marking a significant gesture of diplomacy towards Türkiye. This visit not only underscores a commitment to dialogue but also sends a powerful message of hope for a future where mutual understanding and cooperation can flourish.

In the labyrinth of international relations, the path towards reconciliation is often fraught with challenges and setbacks. However, Mirzoyan's decision to attend the Antalya Diplomacy Forum is a testament to the resilience of diplomatic efforts. This isn't the first time the Armenian Foreign Minister has participated in the forum, which speaks volumes about the ongoing commitment to engage in meaningful dialogue. The forum provides a unique platform for leaders from various countries to come together, discuss pressing global issues, and explore avenues for cooperation.

The significance of Mirzoyan's visit extends beyond the bilateral relations between Armenia and Türkiye. It unfolds against a backdrop of complex geopolitical dynamics, including recent remarks by Russian President Vladimir Putin on US relations and Russia's actions concerning Estonia's Prime Minister over Soviet monuments. These developments highlight the intricate web of international relations and the importance of diplomatic engagement in navigating these challenges. As countries grapple with their histories and seek to forge a path forward, the role of diplomacy in bridging divides and fostering peace becomes increasingly paramount.

While Mirzoyan's visit is a hopeful sign, it also underscores the myriad challenges that lie ahead. The journey towards normalizing relations between Armenia and Türkiye will require not only political will but also a deep commitment to addressing longstanding grievances and building mutual trust. The Antalya Diplomacy Forum offers a rare opportunity for open dialogue, which could pave the way for more substantive discussions in the future. However, the success of these diplomatic endeavors will ultimately depend on the willingness of both parties to engage in a process of genuine reconciliation and cooperation.

As the Antalya Diplomacy Forum draws near, the eyes of the world are on Antalya, watching as history is made. Mirzoyan's visit signifies a beacon of hope for a region long marred by conflict and division. In the intricate dance of diplomacy, every step forward is a victory, and this visit may very well mark the beginning of a new chapter in the relations between Armenia and Türkiye. The path forward is fraught with challenges, but the promise of peace and cooperation offers a compelling reason to persevere. As nations come together in the spirit of dialogue, the possibility of a brighter, more harmonious future emerges, reminding us all of the transformative power of diplomacy.

for consideration for Armenian News’s calendar of events

Language and Collective Identity
during Diaspora’s Formative Years
March 7, 2024
7:00 PM
St. Sarkis Apostolic Church
19300 Ford Road, Dearborn, MI 48128

Looking at public debates in the post-genocide Armenian literary
press of Boston, Paris, Beirut, and Aleppo, this presentation
gives an overview of the evolving discourse on language and its
intersection with the politics of identity. In placing the
discussion within the greater framework of her recent book Stateless
(2023), Chahinian will suggest that during the decades that
followed the genocide, language became the key marker of identity
around which competing ideologies of belonging emerged to shape
both nationalistic and transnational models of diaspora.

Talar Chahinian holds a Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from UCLA.
She lectures in the Program for Armenian Studies at UC Irvine,
where she is also Visiting Faculty in the Department of
Comparative Literature. She is the author of Stateless: The
Politics of the Armenian Language in Exile
(Syracuse
University Press, 2023) and co-editor of The Armenian Diaspora
and Stateless Power: Collective Identity in the Transnational
20th Century
(Bloomsbury Press, 2023). Furthermore, she
co-edits Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies.

Free admission
Light refreshments will be served
For more information contact Gerald Ottenbreit Jr, 313-593-5181
The University of Michigan-Dearborn does not necessarily endorse
the speaker’s views
-- 
**********************************
Gerald E. Ottenbreit Jr.
Research Assistant
Armenian Research Center
University of Michigan-Dearborn
4901 Evergreen Rd.
Dearborn, MI 48128-2406

313-593-5181
**********************************

Armenia says ‘froze’ participation in Moscow-led security bloc

The Hindu, India
Feb 23 2024

09:04 pm | Updated 09:06 pm IST – Yerevan

AFP

Armenia has suspended its participation in a Russia-led security bloc, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said in an interview published on Friday, Yerevan's latest step to distance itself from Moscow.

Russia and Armenia have traditionally been allies but relations soured last year when Russian peacekeepers did not intervene to stop Azerbaijan taking control of Nagorno-Karabakh from the Armenian separatists who ran the enclave.

"In practice, we have frozen our participation in this organisation," Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told the France 24 channel, referring to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).

The bloc, a defence pact, is led by Russia and comprises several former Soviet republics.

AFP

Armenia has suspended its participation in a Russia-led security bloc, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said in an interview published on Friday, Yerevan's latest step to distance itself from Moscow.

Russia and Armenia have traditionally been allies but relations soured last year when Russian peacekeepers did not intervene to stop Azerbaijan taking control of Nagorno-Karabakh from the Armenian separatists who ran the enclave.

"In practice, we have frozen our participation in this organisation," Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told the France 24 channel, referring to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).

The bloc, a defence pact, is led by Russia and comprises several former Soviet republics.

Armenia boycotted a CSTO summit at the end of last year.

"We believe that the CSTO did not fulfil its objectives vis-a-vis Armenia in 2021 and 2022," Pashinyan said in the interview.

He also accused Moscow of leading a "coordinated propaganda campaign" against him and his government.

The Kremlin said on Friday it had not received official confirmation that Armenia was leaving the CSTO.

"We intend to contact our Armenian colleagues to clarify its statements on CSTO," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told Russian news agencies.

In September, Azerbaijani forces retook control of Nagorno-Karabakh in a 24-hour offensive that ended three decades of Armenian separatist rule over the enclave.

In a sign of its ambition for new security guarantees, Yerevan is seeking to rely more on its Western partners — mainly on France and the United States — than on Russia.

Moscow has for decades been the main moderator of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh but has been bogged down by its two-year Ukraine offensive.

Armenia formally joined the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the start of February, despite Moscow warning the small Caucasus country against the move.

It is now obliged to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he sets foot on Armenian territory under an ICC arrest warrant issued for the Russian leader in March 2023.


Foreign Minister Mirzoyan commends EU Monitoring Mission for enhancing bilateral relations and regional stability

 18:55,

YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 21, ARMENPRESS. Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ararat Mirzoyan, has underscored the contribution of the EU monitoring mission in Armenia both in strengthening bilateral relations with the European Union and in promoting regional stability.

''While we look into prospects of further deepening Armenia-EU partnership & more ambitious agenda, happy to mark 1st anniversary of the EU Mission in Armenia.

We appreciate mutually beneficial cooperation & contribution of the mission both to enhancing bilateral ties & promoting stability in South Caucasus,’’ Armenian Foreign Minister said in a post on X on the occasion of the  first anniversary of the EU Mission in Armenia.

Podcast | Against shame culture: virginity tests and sex education in Armenia

Feb 16 2024
Last week, a bill on domestic violence passed its first hearing in Armenia’s parliament. The changes would classify virginity tests, a controversial practice meant to determine whether a person’s hymen is intact, as a form of domestic violence.

This week, we speak to Ani Jilosian of the Women’s Support Centre about what these amendments could mean and to Tereza Panchoyan, or Girlunmuted, an Instagram blogger, about attitudes towards sex in Armenia and the importance of better sex education.

Read more:

  • Talking about sex: an unspoken topic in Armenia
  • Imprisoned in their own homes: the Armenian women escaping psychological abuse

Listen to the Podcast at 

MS: Will There Be Any ‘Syunik Corridor’?

Suren Sargsyan

Last week, Ilham Aliyev won the presidential elections held in Azerbaijan. The victory was given to him quite easily, without any upheaval and he will continue his presidency in the following years. Now, nothing prevents Aliyev from continuing his aggressive actions against Armenia. In particular, he will try to bring to life the so-called “Syunik Corridor” (or “Zangezur Corridor”) project.

This is a project that the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem had in mind since the collapse of the USSR and, no matter what the official statements are now, it is hard to believe that the two countries have changed their geopolitical priorities. Turkey needs this corridor for its aspirations to unite and lead the Turkic world, and Azerbaijan needs to provide a direct connection with Nakhichevan. At the same time, the implementation of this project is also necessary for Russia, because the settlement of Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations will mean that it will no longer make sense for Russia to have a military presence in Artsakh (there are no Armenians there but there are Russian troops still there) or on the territory of Armenia against Turkey (the Russian military base in Gyumri). Therefore, Russia needs this project if it is to ensure the security of the corridor, routes and communications, as well as its physical military presence on the ground. Actually, an agreement about the implementation of this project was reached with the statement of November 9, 2020 and it can be assumed that the Armenian authorities have given their consent to the project verbally, despite the fact that this statement is just a piece of paper.

When we talk about outside players, we also need to talk about those who will oppose this project. It is important to understand Iran’s position and it is unequivocally negative. Iran will not want to lose its regional transit position, and at the same time it will not want to lose or reshape its external border with Armenia which provides it an exit to Georgia, the Black Sea, etc. Yet another player is the United States, which opposes this project because Washington’s number one priority is to contain Russia, and with the implementation of this project, Washington will not be able to push Russia out of the South Caucasus region.

It is also important to understand which player is ready for what kind of actions to implement or to oppose the project. It is natural that the problem should be solved militarily so that the Armenian authorities can justify what happened in their own country and the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem will also give Russia a solid opportunity to move its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh to Syunik and deploy them right there in Syunik as the only security guarantor of Armenians.

In this scenario, everything may seem too logical. But there is also another important factor, which is adroitly chosen timing. Timing is crucial. It could happen when there is a tense pre-election or post-election processes in the USA and no one in Washington is particularly interested in what is happening in the South Caucasus – just as it happened during the 2020 elections.

Of course, this is not the only scenario for developments, but at the moment it seems the most possible one, to which Armenia cannot be an obstacle. But here, Iran and the United States, which surprisingly have common interests on this issue, can hinder Azerbaijan’s plans.

Armenia, Pashinyan pushes for new constitution, opposition screams foul


Feb 15 2024


15/02/2024 -  Onnik James Krikorian

In recent weeks, Yerevan has been awash with claims that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is seeking to make monumental changes to the country’s constitution ahead of a potential agreement to normalise relations with Azerbaijan. Though constitutional reform has been policy for all successive administrations, on January 19, while visiting the Ministry of Justice, Pashinyan made it clear that he would like changes to extend well beyond that.

“[…] the Republic of Armenia needs a new Constitution”, Pashinyan said. “Not constitutional amendments but a new constitution”.

On January 23, the Ministry of Justice submitted a reform plan recommending that the current system of rule by a “stable" or “majority” system of governance should be transformed into a minority model to make it less likely for one party to monopolise power. In particular, however, the constitution “should make the country more competitive in the new geopolitical environment”.

The Armenian opposition reacted harshly, interpreting his words as confirmation of Yerevan being ready to make more concessions to Baku in order to sign a long-delayed peace deal. In particular, those critics believe that the government intends to remove a controversial preamble to the existing constitution that refers to the 1990 Declaration of Independence.

The declaration mentions a 1989 joint decision on the “Reunification of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh”. In August last year, Pashinyan had already fuelled such speculation by noting that the declaration contained a “confrontational narrative with[in] the regional environment that [has] kept us in constant conflicts with our neighbours”.

Speaking on 24 January, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan confirmed Baku had raised concerns with the preamble and other legislation. Discussion would likely be part of talks, he confessed, but on February 1 Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev warned that failure to change the constitution could prevent any agreement.

Yerevan is quick to point out that constitutional reform has long been planned. Pashinyan gained power in 2018 when Serzh Sargsyan attempted to retain power past his two-term limit presidency by becoming prime minister under a constitution reformed three years earlier. Pashinyan attempted to reform the constitution in April 2020, but was prevented from doing so by the pandemic, the 44-day war and snap elections held post-conflict.

Since last year, however, the opposition has also accused Pashinyan of seeking to usher in a ‘fourth republic’ to distance himself from the third, the post-Soviet Republic of Armenia formed in 1991. On February 1, in an interview with Armenian Public Radio, he did not deny such claims. Critics have claimed that could extend to changing state symbols.

Last year, for example, Pashinyan took exception with the some of the current symbols on the country’s coat of arms, and especially the depiction of Mount Ararat in neighbouring Turkey. This year, National Assembly President Alen Simonyan also suggested changing the anthem, something that he has advocated for since 2019, almost a year after Pashinyan’s 2018 Velvet Revolution.

In 2004, Georgia had also changed its state symbols following the Rose Revolution in 2003. This included the flag, coat of arms and national anthem.

The opposition claims that the electorate would reject such changes, especially if the it believed that pressure from Baku was behind them, and possibly even from Ankara. But there are other potential obstacles too. For a referendum to pass, not only should over 50% of voters agree, but turnout should exceed 25% of the country’s electorate.

Even if Armenians were to accept the changes, given the low voter turnout in last year’s Yerevan’s municipal elections, that could prove a tall order. According to others, including Pashinyan ally Aram Sargsyan – brother of the late Defence and Prime Minister assassinated in the parliamentary shootings of 27 October 1999, holding a referendum alongside snap-elections could be a possible solution.

This matches other rumours suggesting that early parliamentary elections could be held given Pashinyan’s falling ratings. Though the opposition is hardly popular, government support could drop even lower by 2026 when the next elections are scheduled.

"As far as I understand […], they will hold the referendum this fall at the latest, and I have no doubts that it will be held on the same day as fresh parliamentary elections", Sargsyan told RFE/RL’s Armenia Service last week. "I think they wouldn't mind […] this spring [but] organising a constitutional referendum takes a lot of time".

Armenian government plans to buy former French president’s Paris mansion for embassy

 11:16,

YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 15, ARMENPRESS. The Armenian government plans to buy a €23,000,000 building in Paris which was once the private mansion of the late ex-President of France Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. The building will house the Armenian embassy in France.

The mansion is located in the 16th arrondissement of Paris.

The decision on approving the purchase is included in the February 15 Cabinet meeting agenda.

In accordance with an agreement between the government and the seller, the government must pay 10% of the total amount as a prepayment. The Cabinet meeting’s item is on approving the provision of 2,3 million euros for the prepayment.

Armenpress: 7 Turkish citizens received refugee status in Armenia in 2023

 09:44, 9 February 2024

YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 9, ARMENPRESS. 8,761 persons, including 3,658 citizens of CIS states and 266 citizens of EU states, were granted residency status in Armenia in 2023, according to official data published by the Statistical Committee.

5,073 of the 8,761 people received temporary residency status. The remaining 3,274 and 414 received permanent and special residency status respectively.

Most of the residency status recipients are citizens of Russia and India (3,350 and 2,035 respectively). 2,137 citizens of Russia and 41 citizens of India received permanent residency status.

Another 370 foreigners applied for asylum in Armenia in the second half of 2023.

193 of them (citizens of 14 different countries and 1 stateless person) received refugee status (94 Ukrainian citizens, 28 Haitian citizens, 17 Iraqi citizens, 16 Syrian citizens, 11 Iranian citizens, 7 Turkish citizens and 6 Yemeni citizens).  Most of them are aged between 35 and 64. Most of the asylum seekers were citizens of Iraq (109), Ukraine (91), Iran (57), Egypt (42), Russia (13) and Turkey (9).

In the same period, authorities revoked refugee status of 35 persons. 98 asylum applications by 187 persons were suspended.