Author: Jagharian Tania

City News Service
November 25, 2004 Thursday
Armenian Telethon
GLENDALE
Armenia Fund Inc. is holding its annual Thanksgiving telethon, “Make
It Happen,” today to raise funds to complete the remaining 56 miles
of the North-South “Backbone” Highway in Karabakh, Armenia. Once
completed, the $25 million, 105-mile highway will link 150 towns and
villages and provide economic, trade and development opportunities.
Proceeds will also benefit continued assistance in the areas of
health care, education and infrastructure development in the Republic
of Armenia. The 12-hour event is being televised live from Glendale
throughout the United States, South America, the Middle East, Canada
and Armenia.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS ADVISORY BOARD
The Minority Rights and Cultural Rights Working Group Report
October 2004
The report which was updated and approved by the General Assembly on 1
October 2004 (signed by Working Group members on July 2003)
Presented to the Prime Ministry on 22 October 2004.
1) THE CONCEPT AND DEFINITION OF MINORITY IN THE WORLD
The concept of “minority” has been used in the world from the sixteenth
century down to the present day. When the form of government called
absolute monarchy was founded and when, approximately in the same
period, religious minorities came into being (Protestants in Catholic
monarchies and Catholics in Protestant monarchies), it became necessary
for these minorities to be mutually protected and only then did the
concept of minority emerge. After 1789, the concept of national minority
was to be added to that of religious minorities.
After the European states internally settled the question of protecting
these minorities, they turned outwards and engaged in efforts to protect
the non-Muslims within the Ottoman Empire and thereby to intervene in
Ottoman affairs. As a result, European countries came into conflict with
each other and this led to the emergence of the “Eastern Question”.
These international protection efforts started in the form of unilateral
edicts of protection (for example, the 1598 Edict of Nantes) and
bilateral treaties (for example, the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz), and
moved in the nineteenth century to the phase of multilateral treaties
(for example, the 1856 Treaty of Paris) and, finally, the foundation of
the League of Nations in 1920 ushered in the period of “minority
protection under the guarantee of an international organisation”. The
world continues to be in that phase, and the international mechanism of
minority protection is conducted under the umbrella of such
organisations as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European
Union and the OSCE.
2) THE CONCEPT OF MINORITY IN TURKEY, ITS DEFINITION AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
Ever since the period of the League of Nations, the concept of minority
has been defined on three criteria: ethnic, linguistic and religious.
However, in 1923 in Lausanne, Turkey refused to accept all three of
these criteria and managed to have it accepted that its non-Muslim
citizens alone constituted a minority and were therefore entitled to
international protection of minorities.
Nevertheless, as nearly eighty years have passed since then and the
concept, definition and rights of minorities have considerably developed
in the meantime across the world, Turkey is now faced with serious
difficulties. Moreover, since 1990, minority rights have further widened
and strengthened in terms of both space and quality.
These difficulties arise not only from the limited definition in the
Treaty of Lausanne. By some sort of reservation it makes to
international conventions to which it accede, Turkey asserts an even
narrower principle. In accordance with this “Statement of
Interpretation”, Turkey asserts in the international area the
restrictions imposed by the 1982 Constitution as well as those in the
Treaty of Lausanne and declares that the rights granted by conventions
to which it accedes shall not apply in Turkey if they extend to any
minorities other than those recognised in the Treaty of Lausanne or if
they are among the rights prohibited by the 1982 Constitution.
Turkey’s difficulties in this area can be summed up in two points:
1) This restrictive position of Turkey is increasingly at variance with
the current trend in the world. After the interpretation of the UN Human
Rights Committee in 1990ies, the trend is not asking a country whether
there are any minorities in that country but accepting that there are
minorities in that state if there are groups who “differ in ethnic,
linguistic or religious terms and consider such difference to be an
inseparable part of their identity”. However, it is up to the discretion
of the nation-state whether to recognise or not to recognise these as
minorities.
Here, we should immediately note that the European Union has no demand
whatsoever from Turkey to give minority status and rights to different
cultural groups. The only requirement is equal treatment to all citizens
of different cultures.
2) Turkey does not duly implement the Treaty of Lausanne, either, and
thus violates even some of the provisions of this founding treaty of its
own.
To start with, the rights granted to the non-Muslims are not fully
implemented. These rights are allowed only to the three great minorities
(namely, the Armenians, the Jews and the Greeks) and denied to other
non-Muslims (for example, the right of education in Article 40 for the
Syriacs), while the rights granted, albeit without international
protection, by Part III of the Treaty of Lausanne to people other than
these non-Muslims are effectively ignored by the State.
One example of the former case is the so-called “1936 Declaration” and
one example of the latter case is the situation regarding Article 39/4
of the Treaty of Lausanne, which provides “all Turkish nationals” with
the right “to use any language they wish in commerce, in public and
private meetings and in all types of press and publication media”. In
other words, government offices are the only exception to that right. On
this subject, for example because nobody was allowed to make radio and
TV broadcasts in any language they wished, the third Package of
Harmonisation was adopted on 3 August 2002, but, since it was also not
implemented, it became necessary to adopt a seventh Package on 30 July
2003. At the end of November 2003, the Radio and Television High Board
has drafted a Regulation on this issue, but it also envisages
restrictions as to time and space.
However, if Article 39/4 of the Treaty of Lausanne was implemented, this
would automatically put an end to the troublesome controversies over the
issue of Kurdish broadcasting, which are unnecessarily wasting Turkey’s
time. Such a step would bring great benefits to Turkey in four respects:
1) It is certain that Turkey will soon have to abandon the “Statement of
Interpretation”, which has not been of benefit to Turkey, anyway. With
regard to the concept of national sovereignty, it is very important for
Turkey to do so voluntarily rather than as a result of EU pressure, and
this would be done by implementing the provisions of the Treaty of
Lausanne, which is Turkey’s own founding treaty.
2) It is inevitable that one day everyone will be able to make
broadcasts in any language. Instead of trying to pass new and
controversial laws in transition to that situation, the argument that
the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, which already have at least
constitutional effect, are being implemented would make life greatly
easier for the State.
3) It is obvious that, in order to avoid creation of minorities under
international protection, it is necessary to grant as wide freedoms are
possible to all citizens, and the Article in question refers to “all
Turkish nationals”.
4) There is no doubt that for the State in Turkey to treat its own
people more humanely would be greatly beneficial for “unity and
cohesion” in the country. A country of “compulsory citizens” is a weak
country. Making people happy and turning them into “voluntary citizens”
would strengthen the State itself. A citizen to be feared the least by
the State is a citizen whose rights it acknowledges.
3) RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE IN TURKEY
The legislation that concerns minorities and therefore cultural rights
in Turkey is more restrictive than the concept of minority and the
minority rights in the country. The main source of this is Article 3/1
of the Constitution: “The Turkish State, with its territory and nation,
is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.”
The State being an indivisible entity with its territory is a very
natural and undisputed point throughout the world. However, the concept
of the “indivisible entity of the nation” is quite perverse to a
Westerner although it comes natural to us. It implies that the nation is
monolithic, effectively denying the various sub identities that make up
the nation and therefore contravening the essence of democracy. In the
area of international human rights, the criteria used in the restriction
of rights include “national security” and “territorial integrity” but
not the “indivisible entity of the nation”. In cases brought to it, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) passes judgements of violation on
grounds that “asserting the existence of minorities in the country”
cannot be prevented.
In addition, it is entirely impossible to understand the phrase “Its
[the Turkish State’s] language is Turkish”. A State does not have a
language, but it has an official language, and citizens of that country
speak in various languages and broadcast in these languages in addition
to using that official language in their relations with the State. As a
matter of fact, in the 1961 Constitution this is expressed as: “The
official language is Turkish” (Article 3).
When the principle of the “indivisible integrity of the State with its
territory and nation”, which is repeated in countless articles of the
Constitution and laws, is interpreted in such a way as to reject sub
identities, the legislation in Turkey becomes legislation that tends to
assume that “recognition of sub identities” is meant to disturb the said
identity, and therefore to charge those who do so with “separatism and
subversion”. Important laws such as the Law for the Fight Against
Terrorism, the Law on the Duties and Powers of the Police, the Radio and
Television Law, the Law of Associations and the Law of Political Parties
heavily punish “creation of minorities by asserting the existence of
minorities based on ethnic and linguistic differences.”
When the Constitution is such, certain laws and regulations can bring
provisions which are not compatible at all with the way in which the
term “Turkish” was understood by Atatürk. For example, the “Regulation
Concerning Protection from Sabotage”, which was issued on 28 December
1988 and applied until 1991, included non-Muslim citizens of Turkey
within the category of people who could engage in acts of sabotage,
which consisted of “local foreigners (of Turkish nationality) within the
country and people of foreign race”. Article 24/1 of Law no. 625 on
Private Education Institutions, which concerns the appointment of
“Turkish chief deputy principals” to “private schools established by
foreigners”, is applied also to the schools for minority members who are
Turkish nationals. Moreover, Article 24/1 provides that this chief
deputy must be “of Turkish origin and Turkish nationality” and this
provision is still in force.
The fact that non-Muslim citizens were recorded in the book of
“foreigners” until the 1940s, that such citizens were taxed more heavily
than Muslims under the Wealth Tax Law of 1942 by implementing a list “G”
(the initial letter of the Turkish word for “non-Muslim”) which was not
in the Law, and that admission into military schools and even civilian
institutions was subject to the condition of “being a Turkish national
and a member of the Turkish race” until the 1950s, all this is not
simply a thing of the past. Even today, one does not encounter any
non-Muslim officials in state institutions, including especially the
Turkish Armed Forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Police and
the National Intelligence Agency, excluding universities. These are
practices which seriously prevent Turkey from achieving the position it
deserves in the twenty-first century and which damage national unity
within the country, because they reflect the usage of the term “Turk” in
the context of race and even religion.
4) RELEVANT COURT JUDGEMENTS IN TURKEY
The Constitutional Court and Decisions for the Banning (Closing) of
Political Parties
With such legislation, the Constitutional Court often adopts decisions
to ban political parties.
Nevertheless, it is also true that the Constitutional Court, while
making interpretations, ignores certain fundamental concepts of law and
thus causes further damage to democracy in Turkey.
For example, in its decision to ban the DEP in June 1994, while stating
that “it would not be meaningful to turn unlimited rights into limited
rights and being part of the nation into being a member of a minority”,
the Court ignored the distinction between “negative/individual rights”
(equal rights granted to all citizens) and “positive/group rights”
(additional rights granted only to disadvantaged citizens). Moreover,
that statement by the Court is such as to regard citizens who belong to
the majority as first-class and those who belong to a minority as
second-class.
Again for example, in its decision to ban the TEP, the Constitutional
Court first stated that it was possible to speak of the existence of
different identities but maintained its former position by immediately
adding afterwards that the assertion of different identities would lead
to “a tendency to break away from the whole in the course of time”
(Decision banning the TEP, Case: 1979/1, Decision Number: 1980/1).
This attitude stems from a fear that recognition of the existence of
people from different ethnic, religious, cultural, etc. backgrounds in
Turkey would result in the fragmentation of the State.
Relevant Judgements by the Court of Cassation and the Council of State
Unfortunately, some citizens in Turkey are perceived as “foreigners”. In
addition to such a mistake being made among ordinary people, it is
observed that the Court of Cassation also made (and even insisted on)
this serious mistake in its judgements on the so-called “1936
Declaration” concerning non-Muslim foundations.
As a matter of fact, in a judgement delivered in 1974, the Court of
Cassation General Assembly of Civil Law Departments stated that
“.foreigners are prohibited from acquiring property in Turkey” and thus
decided that the Balýklý Greek Hospital Foundation, which is a
non-Muslim Turkish establishment, was not entitled to acquire property.
After the defence lawyers pointed to this mistake, the same Assembly now
stated “It is indeed mistaken to refer in our judgement of approval to
‘the laws prohibiting foreigners from acquiring property in Turkey’
given the fact that the defendant foundation was established by Turkish
citizens”, but added: “Therefore, it is now decided that the phrase in
question should be removed from the judgement by way of correction, but
otherwise. the appeal should be rejected” (The General Assembly of Civil
Law Departments, Case: 1971/2-820, Judgement: 1974/505, Date: 8 May
1974). In other words, the Court of Cassation effectively insisted on
its mistake. However, such mistakes are highly damaging to the concept
of nation and bring discredit to Turkey in the international area.
Although this question of the “1936 Declaration” was corrected in the
fourth Package of EU Harmonisation which was adopted on 2 January 2003,
the injustice still continues in practice. As a matter of fact, it
became necessary to deal with the same issue in the sixth Package of
Harmonisation which was adopted on 19 June 2003. In practical terms, no
result has yet been achieved.
Finally, although the 1936 Declaration has been abolished, it is simply
grave that the Treasury, in the legal action it brought in February 2003
against the Surp Haç Armenian High School Foundation, based its claims
on a decision of the “Minorities Sub-Committee at the Ministry of
Internal Affairs”. When it is a question of property owned by citizens
whose religion happens to differ from the majority religion, reference
is made to such a sub-committee, which is not part of the legal order of
the State. It is probably difficult to find a more striking example of
ethnic and religious discrimination.
As for the administrative judiciary, the Second Administrative Court of
Istanbul referred to a Turkish citizen of Greek-Orthodox origin as a
“citizen of the Republic of Turkey with foreign affiliation” (Case:
1995/1271, Judgement: 1996/552, Date: 17 April 1996). Moreover, when
this very interesting term, which was the basis of the Court’s
judgement, was brought to the attention of the Twelfth Department of the
Council of State, it was not regarded as a valid ground for appeal, and
the Department unanimously upheld the judgement of the local court
(Case: 1997/2217, Judgement:1997/4256, Date: 24 December 1997).
5) FOUNDATIONS OF THE SITUATION IN TURKEY
It is clear that the question of minorities, which we discuss here, is
considered from a very narrow and very mistaken viewpoint in Turkey. The
fundamental reasons for this viewpoint may be summarised as follows:
1) Instead of keeping track of developments in the world with regard to
the minority concept and law, Turkey is stuck with 1923 and moreover
interprets the Treaty of Lausanne incorrectly/deficiently.
2) Recognising the different identity of a minority and granting
minority rights are considered to be the same. However, the former
implies an objective situation while the latter is a matter of
discretion for the State.
3) It is thought that “internal self-determination”, which means
democracy, is the same as “external self-determination”, which means
fragmentation, and consequently the recognition of different identities
is held to be the same as the territorial fragmentation of the State.
4) Oneness and unity with respect to nation are considered to be the
same and it is not realised that the former is gradually destroying the
latter.
5) While speaking of the Turks as a nation, it is not realised that the
term “Turkish” also denotes an ethnic group.
These facts have two causes, one of which is theoretical and the other
historical/political.
The Theoretical Cause: The Relationship between the Super identity and
Sub identities in the Republic of Turkey
While replacing the Ottoman Empire after it collapsed, the Republic of
Turkey completely inherited the sub identities that existed within it
(the various ethnic, religious and other groups). However, while the
super identity in the Empire (the identity accorded by the State to its
citizens) was “Ottoman”, it emerged as “Turk” in the Republic of Turkey.
Thus, one of the sub identities was determined as the super identity.
This super identity tends to define the citizen with race and even with
religion. For example, when “our kinsfolk abroad” are mentioned, people
of ethnic Turkish origin are meant. In addition, it is clear that one
must also be a “Muslim” in order to be considered a “Turk” because our
non-Muslim compatriots are referred to not as “Turks” but simply as
“citizens”. In Turkey, nobody uses the word “Turk” when talking about,
say, a Greek or Jewish citizen because they are talking about a
non-Muslim citizen. Regrettable examples of this in state practices are
sufficiently given above.
The Historical and Political Cause: The Sèvres Syndrome
It is known that in the early 1990s Turkey suffered from a “Sèvres
Syndrome” that the country was about to disintegrate. It is disturbing,
and weakening the nation, that such an argument is still put forward and
even turned into paranoia. Those who argue that a Pontus State will be
founded in the Eastern Black Sea region, that Turkey is governed by the
Converts, or that the Phanar Patriarchate seeks to establish a
Vatican-like state in Istanbul, are trying to create such an atmosphere
of paranoia.
This atmosphere results in interpreting even the most innocent demands
for identity in Turkey as a desire to divide Turkey and wants to
immediately suppress them. This situation also invites interventions by
the major Western countries because it is contrary to democracy, which
Turkey has willingly agreed to implement effectively in order to join
the EU. Delaying of democracy in one’s own country through such paranoia
is not a service to Turkey. In particular, when it is a question of
reforms to be introduced concerning the use of Kurdish, there is
immediately talk about the fragmentation of Turkey, it is said that this
will give new life to terrorism, and efforts are made to prevent all
types of reform in such an atmosphere of paranoia. And those who do so
fail to see that some circles could again be led into perceiving
terrorism as the only option if reforms are hindered.
Nevertheless, the process of preparations for EU membership has brought
the question of minority rights in Turkey into a very positive process
despite everything. This process is a direct extension of the legal
reforms that Kemalism introduced in the 1920s and 1930s by “revolution
from above” to modernise the country.
Just as violent reactions from below emerged to this Kemalist revolution
from above in those years, reactions are arising today to these Packages
of Harmonisation. The mentality that feeds on the “Sèvres Paranoia” is
fiercely resisting the reforms.
CONCLUSION
Anatolia, which has been home to very different cultures for many
centuries, is also a cradle of great cultural and historical wealth.
Following the Ottoman period with its concept of Islamic brotherhood and
with a variety of identities, considerable steps were taken to create a
homogenous nation with a single culture in Turkey. However, the
different identities and cultures have continued to exist as a rich
mosaic on the territories of Anatolia.
That policy, which was very natural in the 1920s and 1930s when the
Kemalist revolution was made, is now outdated as a requirement of
Atatürk’s own thesis of “Contemporary Civilisation”. Today, contemporary
civilisation is not the Europe of the 1920s and 1930s but the Europe of
the 2000s. Now, it is essential to review the existing concept of
citizenship and to adopt the multi-identity, multi-cultural, democratic,
free and pluralistic social model of contemporary Europe.
Accordingly, it is necessary to define the political and legal status of
free, independent individuals who can easily use their creative
capacities and cultural rights and who are conscious of their rights and
obligations. This definition, which is sought to be made in a piecemeal
fashion through the EU Harmonisation Laws, is possible by screening all
of our laws and putting into practice the principles of:
a- The right to personal freedoms,
b- The right to enjoy freely economic and social opportunities,
c- The right to participate in government, and
d- The right to cultural pluralism.
In the context of implementing these principles:
1) The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey and all related laws must
be rewritten to give them a liberal, pluralistic and democratic content
and with the participation of all organisations of civil society.
2) Guarantees must be provided for the rights of people with a different
identity and culture to protect and develop their identities (such as
the rights of publication, self-expression and education) based on equal
citizenship.
3) The central government and local governments must be made transparent
and democratic, based on public participation and control.
4) International conventions and basic instruments that include the
universal norms of human rights and freedoms, particularly the Framework
Convention of the Council of Europe, must be signed, ratified and
implemented without reservation. From now, no reservations or statements
of interpretation that would mean a denial of the sub identities in
Turkey must be made to international conventions.

Des Arméniens s’inquiètent de la Turquie dans l’UE après une rixe à Valence
Agence France Presse
28 novembre 2004 dimanche 3:21 PM GMT
PARIS 28 nov 2004
Le Conseil de coordination des organisations arméniennes de France
(CCOAF) a estimé que “l’agression raciste” dont ont été victimes
samedi à Valence des jeunes Français d’origine arménienne illustrait
les “risques” d’une entrée de la Turquie dans l’Union européenne
(UE).
“Cette agression préméditée qui intervient au coeur de la France à
trois semaines du sommet du 17 décembre à Bruxelles où les chefs
d’Etat devront décider de l’ouverture des négociations pour
l’adhésion turque représente un avant-goût, hélas, des risques liés à
l’entrée d’une Turquie négationniste du génocide arménien en Europe”,
a déclaré le CCOAF dans un communiqué reçu dimanche.
“Nous demandons au président de la République de se faire le relais
le 17 décembre à Bruxelles de l’avis de l’ensemble des forces
politiques françaises qui considère qu’une Turquie négationniste n’a
pas sa place dans l’Europe”, poursuit le texte.
L’organisation demande également aux pouvoirs publics “de faire
diligence pour que les auteurs de ces agressions soient traduits
devant les tribunaux” et s’interroge : “les fils des rescapés du
génocide arménien sont-ils toujours en sécurité dans leur pays
d’adoption?”.
Une rixe, qualifiée par des organisations arméniennes d'”agression
raciste”, a opposé samedi à Valence des membres de ces associations
militant contre une entrée de la Turquie dans l’UE à des jeunes
d’origine turque, a-t-on appris auprès de la police et
d’associations.
La police a indiqué que cette “rixe sur la voie publique” avait fait
quatre blessés légers et n’avait donné lieu à aucune arrestation.
Le président de la coordination des organisations arméniennes de
Drôme-Ardèche Robert Tafankejian, qui faisait signer une pétition
contre l’adhésion de la Turquie à l’Union européenne dans le centre
de Valence avec quatre autres personnes, a indiqué à l’AFP qu’une
vingtaine de jeunes d’origine turque les avait agressés.
–Boundary_(ID_EsKBKkS6H3xxabgfCCpGgw)–

VAHAGN DADRIAN AND STEPHEN FEINSTEIN REBUT GENOCIDE DENIAL IN TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT
Azg/arm
27 Nov 04
The following letter was published in the November 19, 2004 issue of the
Times Literary Supplement
Armenia in history
Sir, – The seemingly persistent attempts of Norman Stone from Ankara’s
Bilkent University to question the historical reality of the Armenian
genocide during the First World War are dismaying indeed (Letters,
October 15, November 5). A cursory examination of his use of source
materials may in part explain the nature of the problem. Professor
Stone insists, for example, that the provinces of Ardahan, Kars
and Batum “were not ceded to Turkey”. In the text of the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk, however, Article Four, paragraph iii, reads: “Russia
will do all within her power to insure the immediate evacuation of
the provinces of eastern Anatolia . . . . The districts of Ardahan,
Kars, and Batum will without delay be cleared of Russian troops
. . . “. This can be interpreted only as Russia ceding control over
these areas (Jane Degras, ed, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy,
Volume One, 1917â~@~S24; 1951, p53).
Stone likewise keeps insisting that, according to “the transcript
of the German court case”, the Naim-Andonian documents were
“discarded”. But on more careful reading he may recognize the critical
difference between a conscious decision not to question the central
message of the documents, on the one hand, and a decision to “discard”
them, on the other. (Tessa Hofmann, Der Völkermord an den Armeniern
vor Gericht: Der Prozess Talaat Pasha, 1985).
Moreover, Robert Kempner, a prominent German jurist who served as
Deputy to Justice Jackson – the chief American prosecutor at the
Nuremberg Trials, and who as a young law student had attended the
Talaat Pasha murder trial in Berlin, in a noted law journal identified
the jury’s verdict as a recognition and condemnation of the “gross
human rights violations caused by a government, especially genocide
perpetrated against the Armenians” (“Sixty Years Ago – A German Jury
Trial: The Genocide of the Armenians” [in German], Recht und Politik,
Volume Three, 1980, p167).
Professor Stone persists in questioning the veracity of the 1939
statement, “Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the
Armenians?”, attributed to Hitler, by discounting evidence that is
compelling. After some meticulous research, the author Edouard Calic
established the fact that, already eight years earlier, Hitler twice
had spoken in the same sense (Unmasked: Two confidential interviews
with Hitler in 1931, 1971, p154).
Perhaps the most authoritative validation in this respect issues
from University of North Carolina’s Gerhard L. Weinberg. Following
his extensive research in the archives of the British Foreign Office
and the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich in 1968 and
1971, Professor Weinberg, in his book The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s
Germany, and subsequently in the New York Times (“Hitler’s Remark
on Armenians Reported in 1939”, June 18, 1985), gave credence to
the authenticity of the document containing Hitler’s statement. He
found it in the secret notes Admiral Canaris, the head of German
counter-intelligence, had taken during Hitler’s August 22, 1939,
speech, delivered to the German generals in Obersalzberg. As to
Professor Heath Lowry, Stone’s principal source for disputing
much of the Armenian genocide, he, Lowry, characterizes American
Ambassador Morgenthau’s “wartime dispatches and written reports . . .
submitted to the US State Department” as “the real”, i.e. authentic
material – as compared to his subsequently published book (The Story
behind Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, Istanbul, 1990, p. 91).
Well, here is then “a proper account” Stone stipulated as a condition
for conceding the Armenian genocide. In a nine-page “Private and
Confidential” letter Morgenthau sent to the US Secretary of State
Robert Lansing on November 18, 1915, he wrote, “I am firmly convinced
that this is the greatest crime of all ages . . . . The war was
a great opportunity to put into effect their long cherished plan
of exterminating the Armenian race . . . ” (US National Archives,
R.G.59.876.00/798 1/2, pp7…8).
All this casts in stark relief Norman Stone’s purported “neutrality”
on the subject. Should he need to overcome this, he might obtain
special inspiration from the 126 Holocaust scholars, including the
Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel, who at the thirtieth anniversary of
the Scholars’ Conference on the Holocaust and the Churches held
in Philadelphia, issued a declaration. That statement, published
in the June 8, 2000, issue of the New York Times, and subsequently
in the Jerusalem Post, declared that: “The Armenian genocide is an
Incontestable historical Fact”.
By Vahagn Dadrian and Stephen Feinstein, Center for Holocaust and
Genocide Studies, University of Minnesota
–Boundary_(ID_zmDSdxqjNtncQnBL+tKp/A)–
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Azeri paper slams OSCE mediators for not condemning Armenia as aggressor
Zerkalo, Baku
25 Nov 04
Excerpt from R. Mirgadirov and M. Yasaroglu report by Azerbaijani
newspaper Zerkalo on 25 November headlined “The stances of Armenia
and the co-chairs coincide” and subheaded “Both are against discussing
the Karabakh problem outside the OSCE Minsk Group”
The 59th session of the UN General Assembly in New York discussed
the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan on 24 November.
[Passage omitted: debates in the UN on Azerbaijan’s draft proposal
on the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict]
In essence, Armenian officials do not even try to hide their concern
regarding the discussion of the Karabakh issue outside the OSCE Minsk
Group. The vice-speaker of the Armenian parliament, Tigran Torosyan,
was rather outspoken on this issue when he presented the outcomes of
the 17 November Paris session of the PACE [Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe] political committee. He said that there are
no obstacles to including the Karabakh issue in the agenda of the
PACE winter session.
He said that the Nagornyy Karabakh resolution which was passed at
the emergency session of the PACE political committee contained some
points which were unfavourable and had to be changed. In particular,
they include a sentence which turns the previous call to the
Azerbaijani authorities to establish ties with Nagornyy Karabakh’s
political leadership into a call to establish ties between the two
communities. In this connection, the head of Armenia’s PACE delegation
said it is important to conduct active work in this regard.
So, it is time to answer the question why Armenia would lose out if the
Karabakh conflict is discussed outside the framework of the OSCE Minsk
Group. It is very simple. The OSCE, including the Minsk Group which it
has created, is tackling the practical aspects of settling the Karabakh
conflict on the basis of the mandate, or more precisely, the four UN
Security Council resolutions on the issue. The co-chairs of the OSCE,
namely Russia, America and France, have long and well forgotten about
the basic demands of those resolutions and are in effect engaged in
“creative activities” by proposing various solutions to the conflict.
But the most important point is that since the Minsk Group is a
temporarily created OSCE structure to act as a mediator to resolve the
Karabakh conflict, it is unable to give an internationally recognized
political and legal assessment of the actions of the sides to the
conflict.
This situation absolutely suits Armenia. When proposing various
solutions to the conflict, the OSCE co-chairs always hint that
Azerbaijan will at any rate have to make major concessions, considering
the “current realities”, that is to put it simply, the occupation of
a chunk of Azerbaijani territory by Armenia. They did not even hold
the fact of the occupation of an independent state against Armenia.
Now, with a cease-fire regime which is more than 10 years old, when
the Karabakh conflict is discussed in organizations outside the reach
of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, it becomes necessary to answer the
foremost question: who has occupied 16 per cent of Azerbaijan, which
is in itself a flagrant violation of international legal norms? And
every time, regardless of sympathies or antipathies, the international
community has to unequivocally reply – Armenia! Consequently, this
results in the condemnation by the international community – be it the
UN or PACE – of the fact of aggression against a sovereign state and of
the occupation of its territories with all the ensuing ramifications.
Incidentally, such a course of events does not suit the interests of
the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs. A clear definition by the international
community of the fact of aggression and occupation of territories
by Armenia deprives the co-chairs, who have their own geopolitical
interests in the region, of the room for manoeuvre. Because in
this case it will become difficult to “pressure” the victim of the
aggression and demand that in order to resolve the conflict it make
concessions that would go against its sovereignty.

Fight against terrorism
Baku Sun, Azerbaijan
Nov 26 2004
BAKU (AP) – Azerbaijan is stepping up the fight against terrorism
by tracking down terrorist organizations and their sponsors, the
country’s defense minister said Thursday. During the past six years,
authorities have exposed six branches of charity foundations believed
to be financing terrorists, Defense Minister Ramil Usubov said at a
NATO Parliamentary Assembly seminar.
The organizations have been shut and 43 people associated with them
have been expelled from the country, Usubov added.
Meanwhile, in the last five years, authorities have detained 30 people
connected with the Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Army of the Caucasus
terrorist organizations, he said. Twenty members of rebel groups have
been tried in courts.Usubov also said that Azerbaijan has detained
and extradited to Russia 14 rebels believed to have organized various
terrorist attacks.
He stressed that one of Azerbaijan’s main problems was illegal
migration, which fuels drugs and weapons trafficking, as well as
human trafficking and the smuggling of goods across borders.
The three-day seminar was supposed to have been attended by two
Armenian lawmakers, but they failed to show up at the last minute.
The Armenian deputies decided not to attend because their letter
to the heads of the Azerbaijani parliament and NATO Parliamentary
Assembly with a request to guarantee security of the Armenian
deputies had been left unanswered, said Mher Shakhgeldian, head of
the Armenian parliament’s commission for defense matters.Previous
visits to Baku by Armenian officials resulted in protests staged by
activists of Nagorno-Karabakh – an ethnic Armenian enclave disputed
by both countries.
Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan is a NATO member, but both former
Soviet republics participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program.

UN General Assembly starts discussions on Upper Garabagh
Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
Nov 24 2004
The UN General Assembly launched discussions on Upper Garabagh
on Tuesday.
Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov stated that the OSCE
Minsk Group is working toward the Upper Garabagh conflict resolution
and stressed Armenia’s unlawful policy of settlement in the occupied
Azeri lands.
“750,000 Azerbaijanis have been driven out of their homes in Upper
Garabagh as a result of ethnic cleansing amidst the ongoing talks
between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Besides, the mass settlement of people
in the occupied lands of Azerbaijan continues and we are well aware
of this.”
The Minister said that four resolutions adopted by the UN Security
Council on unconditional withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from
the occupied lands of Azerbaijan remains a basis for the conflict
resolution.
Azerbaijan’s observance to the ceasefire over the last 10 years shows
that Baku gives priority to a peaceful settlement, Mammadyarov added.
The UN General Assembly is expected to vote on a resolution on Upper
Garabagh after the discussions complete.*

EU official comments on financial assistance to Egypt, Palestinians
MENA news agency
24 Nov 04
Cairo, 24 November: Director of Resources and Information at the
Directorate of External Relations of the European Commission David
Lipman underlined the importance of media cooperation between the
European Union and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership countries.
At a press conference held at the EU commission premises in Cairo,
Lipman explained that the European Union has chosen Egypt to be among
other capitals in which the EU will celerabte the 10th anniversary of
Barclona process which embodies the birth of the Euro-Mediterranean
cooperation. He said a number of ministers from the European Union
and Egypt, besides businessmen and representatives of Egyptian and
European universities would take part in the celebrations.
Lipman said the EU has allocated 15bn euros for the Euro-Mediterranean
partners from the year 2007 to 2013 with the aim of boosting
cooperation programmes between the EU and the Euro-Med partners
in addition to backing the Euro-Mediterranean neighbourliness
policy. The countries to benefit from such sums – all Barcelona
process participants, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldovia, as well as
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – have to enjoy democratic practices
and observe human rights, according to Lipman.
He said the EU will determine the size of assistance to Egypt by the
end of the coming year. The EU official said the EU has earmarked
600m euros in grants to Egypt within the framework of agreements
signed between Egypt and the EU.
He said the EU would discuss with the Egyptian government implementing
a working plan in 2005 whereby Egypt’s needs would be assessed as part
of the 15bn euros set aside by the EU for the Euro-Med partnership
countries.
Lipman, who wrapped up on Wednesday 24 November a visit to Egypt, where
a forum of information officials of Euro-Mediterranean partnership
countries was held in Cairo, said the EU will focus in the coming
years on supporting the policy of good neighbourliness so as to
activate movement of commodities, capital and individuals among
Euro-Mediterranean partners.
Responding to a question on EU help to the Palestinian National
Authority, Lipman noted that the EU was the biggest donating party
to the PA both financially and politically. He said the EU gives the
PA approximately 200m euros annually, and is ready to cooperate with
the Authority if head of the PLO Executive Committee Mahmud Abbas
succeeds deceased Palestinian President Yasir Arafat.
As regards projects being financed by the EU in Egypt, Lipman said the
EU is closely monitoring work in such projects and how the Egyptian
people get the maximum benefit from them. He explained that the EU aid
programmes were mainly trageting the fields of education and health.
The European Commission has presented the Ministry of Education in
Egypt with 10,000 computers, the official said, asserting that the EU
aimed to place Egypt atop its list of priorities to render successful
the political, economic and administrative reform plans in the country.

Former Soviet republics’ relationships with their former master
The Associated Press
November 24, 2004, Wednesday, BC cycle
A breakdown of which former Soviet republics enjoy generally warm
official ties with Russia and which have a chillier relationship:
WARM TIES: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine.
CHILLIER: Georgia, Azerbaijan.
CHANGEABLE: Uzbekistan.

‘Azerbaijan could solve problems if it deals only with Upper Garabagh’ – President
Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
Nov 23 2004
Baku, November 22, AssA-Irada — Azerbaijan supports adoption of
a new United Nations resolution on the Upper Garabagh conflict,
President Aliyev told journalists on Monday.
“We do not intend to confine ourselves to discussions at the UN and
want a new resolution to be passed.”
The wording of a resolution that Azerbaijan insisted on during the
discussions at the UN session is ready, the President said.
The Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan is engaged in intense consultations
on the issue and talks with some countries. It is for this reason that
Armenia is trying to impede adoption of the resolution by all means,
he said.
Aliyev pointed out that such statements by Armenia as “if the
resolution is passed, Azerbaijan will have to negotiate with Upper
Garabagh” are laughable.
“Azerbaijan could solve problems differently if it negotiates only
with Upper Garabagh”, Aliyev said.
“If Azerbaijan deals only with Upper Garabagh, it could solve problems
differently and faster. If Armenia wants the negotiations to be held
with Upper Garabagh, it must abandon the issue, withdraw its forces
from the occupied lands and stop financing Upper Garabagh from its
budget.”