Author: Jabejian Elizabeth

ADVOCATE OF RESIDENTS OF BUZAND UNDER ARREST

A1+
| 17:51:04 | 12-10-2005 | Social |

On October 11 Vahe Grigoryan, the advocate of the four families living
in Buzand street – Safaryans, Danielyans, Grigoryans and Vahanyans
was arrested. The Residents do not know the reason, but they are
convinced that the only fault of Vahe Grigoryan was that he defended
their interests.

The case of Safaryans and Danielyans has been sent to the European
Court of Human Rights, and the case of Vahanyans is to be heard in
the Court of Appeal on October 14. “They failed to fix the day of
the trial for a month, and when he was arrested, the day was fixed”,
Zohrap Vahanyan says.

The residents are complaining, “We were deprived of our last hope. The
arrest was only a means to make us still more desperate”.

According to our information, Vahe Grigoryan is charged with extortion.

FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway

The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one’s belief or religion
The right to join together and express one’s belief

================================================
Wednesday 12 October 2005
TURKEY: IS THERE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN TURKEY?

The European Union (EU) must make full religious freedom for all a core
demand in the EU membership negotiations with Turkey which have just
begun, argues Otmar Oehring of the German Catholic charity Missio
<; in
this personal commentary for Forum 18 News Service
<;. Dr Oehring also calls for people inside and
outside Turkey who believe in religious freedom for all to honestly and
openly raise the continuing obstructions to the religious life of Turkey’s
Muslim, Christian and other religious communities. He analyses the limited,
complex and changing state of religious freedom in the country. In
particular, he notes that Christians of all confessions, devout Muslim
women, Muslim minorities, and other minority religions face official
obstacles in practicing their faith and (in the case of non-Muslims)
strong social hostility.

TURKEY: IS THERE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN TURKEY?

By Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio
<;

Go to any mosque or church in Turkey and you will see people worshipping.
So clearly some religious freedom exists. Yet serious problems persist.
Religious communities are not allowed to organise themselves as they
choose. Individual religious freedom exists up to a point. For example,
you are entitled by law to change your religion and to have the change
recorded on your identity documents, but people who have done so have
faced hostility from fellow-citizens. As soon as a religious community
wants to organise itself, problems arise. This holds just as much for
Muslims as for communities of other faiths.

Although many Turks dislike the term “State Islam”, it has to be stated
that Islam is organised by the state. Sunnis who consider this an
unacceptable innovation are not allowed to organise. Although Sufi orders
exist, some even with a vast membership, they have been officially
forbidden banned since the 1920s.

The main problem religious communities identify is their lack of legal
status as religious communities. In the late Ottoman period some religious
minorities had legal status under the millet system, but the Islamic
community had no separate legal status as the state was considered to be
Islamic. But since the founding of the Turkish republic, any such status
has disappeared. Some Muslims are concerned about this lack of legal
status, especially minority Muslim groups within the dominant Sunni
majority, as well as the Alevis, Shias and the Sufi orders. But few
Muslims are prepared to voice their demands for legal status openly, for
fear of imprisonment, although in recent years the Alevis have become more
vocal. This has led to their gaining some recognition as associations,
though not as religious bodies.

Religious meetings and services without authorisation remain illegal,
though it remains unclear in law what constitutes legal and illegal
worship. The Ottoman millet system recognised some religious minorities
and the 1923 Lausanne Treaty spoke vaguely of religious minority rights
without naming them, but the Turkish authorities interpret this to exclude
communities such as the Roman Catholics, Syriac Orthodox and Lutherans,
even though these communities have found ways to function. Protestant
Christian churches functioning quietly in non-recognised buildings are
generally tolerated, but Muslims gathering outside an approved mosque are
viewed as a threat to the state and police will raid them.

It is not possible for most Protestant Christian churches to be recognised
as churches under current Turkish law. But in one bizarre case, a German
Christian church was recognised in Antalya, but only by calling itself a
“chapel” not a “church.” Most Evangelical Protestant churches in Turkey do
not meet in private homes, but in rented facilities such as office
buildings or other non-residential buildings. These can be fairly large.

The Law on Associations – adopted by Parliament in October 2004 – does not
allow the founding of associations with a religious purpose, so founding a
religious discussion group or even a religious freedom group is
impossible, even if some religious communities do try to register as
associations. Some Sufi orders and new Islamic movements have registered
as businesses, even with religious names.

However, the government has changed the building planning laws, replacing
the word “mosque” with “place of worship”. The government indicated to
Protestant churches that individuals cannot ask for buildings to be
designated as a place of worship, but individual congregations should try
to get recognition as a legal personality first (as a “Dernek” or society)
and then try to get their meeting place designated as a place of worship.
At least two Protestant churches are now trying this route.

There are currently two Protestant churches that are legally recognised by
the Turkish state, one of which is in Istanbul. It was recognised as a
“Vakf” (charitable foundation) several years ago, after a long court
battle, making it a legal entity. Several weeks ago, they finally had
their building officially designated as a place of worship. The second
example is the Protestant church in Diyarbakir, which has legal
recognition as a house of worship under the Ministry of Culture, as a
heritage site.

Religious education remains tightly controlled. In law such education must
be carried out by the state, although in practice Christian churches –
Armenian Apostolic, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant – have been able to
provide catechetical training to their children on church premises. The
state turns a blind eye to this. But Koranic courses are different.
Officially they should take place only under the guidance of the state,
yet some 6,000 such courses are widely spoken of as existing
clandestinely. Many officials and police officers have good contacts with
them, while many senior officials and parliamentarians have been members
of Sufi orders which officially do not exist or are forbidden.

It is generally impossible to found higher education establishments for
Muslims, Christians and others. The Armenian Apostolic and the Greek
Orthodox seminaries were closed down in the 1970s and the government has
resisted all attempts to reopen them. Protestants cannot normally
establish Bible colleges. However, an Evangelical Bible college functions
in Selcuk; it is not government recognised and accredited, but it has been
providing theological training for several years. Christian clergy and
pastors mostly have to train abroad. Alevi Muslims do not tend to demand
religious colleges, as they are led not by imams but by elders who are
initiated by other elders.

The Law on Construction – which came into force into July 2003 – makes it
possible to “establish” places of worship. But the law – probably
deliberately – does not define if this means “build”, “rent” or “buy”.
Protestant churches face problems trying to build. Any community wishing
to build a place of worship officially can do so in an area with a minimum
number of adherents of their faith – but the state decides if the community
has enough members to get the land it needs. There is no authoritative
definition of how the law should be interpreted. The Justice Minister said
recently that religious communities intending to establish a place of
worship should apply, but how can religious communities apply if
officially they cannot exist?

Government officials do not want to acknowledge that Alevi Muslims cannot
officially establish places of worship. The government is building Sunni
mosques in many Alevi villages, but Alevis will not go to them. Instead
they meet openly for worship in cemevis (meeting houses), not only in
central Anatolia but even in Istanbul. The government stated in parliament
in 2004 that such Alevi cemevis are not to be considered as places of
worship. Although many of them still function unimpeded, some have been
closed down in recent years.

Conversion from one faith to another is possible, even from Islam, under
the law on personal status (though you cannot be listed officially as an
atheist or agnostic). If you convert from Islam you can change your faith
on your identity papers, but being Muslim on your identity card makes
day-to-day life easier. Christians, Baha’is or Jehovah’s Witnesses are
often unable to find employment, especially in rural areas. So many who
have converted from Islam to another faith prefer to leave their religious
designation on their identity papers unchanged. According to information
given by the Minister of State in charge of Religious Affairs this autumn,
during the last ten years fewer than 400 people officially converted to
Christianity and only about 10 to Judaism.

Islam is controlled by the Presidency of Religious Affairs, or Diyanet
<;, which is directed
from the Prime Minister’s office. This was deliberately established not as
a government ministry, as Turkey claims to be a secular state. Some Muslims
do object to this state control, especially those from newer groups, such
as the Nurcu movement, the Suleymanci, followers of Fethullah Gulen, and
members of Sufi orders.

Some religious communities can officially invite foreign religious
workers. The Catholics can under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty invite foreign
priests up to a certain number, though even then the government makes this
difficult, asking why the Church needs so many priests when there are so
few Catholics. It is more difficult for Protestant communities, as
officially they do not exist as religious communities. Foreign religious
workers who come to Turkey under some other guise can face problems, if
the government finds out about them. As long as the state does not have to
know about their activity they can function, but as soon as the state is
forced to take official notice of them, they can face problems. The
government knows about most, if not all, Protestant missionaries, because
these made a conscious decision to be open about what they are doing.
Occasionally they experience some problems but – with occasional
exceptions – the government merely monitors what they do, leaving them
otherwise undisturbed.

All religious communities are under state surveillance, with religious
minorities facing the closest scrutiny. Christian leaders know they are
listened in to and their telephones are tapped. The Ecumenical Patriarch
states that “walls have ears,” even when speaking within his own
Patriarchate in the Fener district of Istanbul. Police visit individual
Christian churches to ask who attends, which foreigners have visited, what
they discussed. They are particularly interested in which Turkish citizens
attend.

Are such visits a threat, or do the intelligence agencies just want to
know what is going on? When the police attend Catholic services in Ankara,
they say they are there to protect Christians. From my conversations with
church members, I’m sure this is not true.

When secularism was proclaimed as a guiding state principle in line with
French laïcité it was sincerely meant. Kemal Ataturk and his followers
aimed to crush Islam. Later on, officials understood that society was not
willing to follow this line. Slowly, Islam returned to schools and other
areas of life. Now Turkey is a Sunni Muslim state. All those whose mother
tongue is Turkish and are Sunni Muslims are considered Turks. Alevis,
Kurds, Christians and all other minorities are not considered Turks – they
are considered as foreigners.

The furore over headscarves – a genuine concern to devout Muslim women –
was exploited as a political issue by Islamist parties, eager to
demonstrate their opposition to the military authorities which had banned
Islamic dress after the 1980 coup. Had there been no headscarf ban, there
would have been no problem. This point was illustrated by the case of a
non-political devout Muslim, Leyla Sahin. She was barred from wearing a
headscarf in Istanbul University in her fifth year of medical studies and
subsequently successfully completed medical studies at Vienna University
in Austria. This disturbing ban – which de jure bars devout Muslim women
from universities – is currently under consideration by a Grand Chamber of
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). (See
<; for more on this and other ECHR
cases.)

In rural Sunni areas women have always worn headscarves – though not the
type seen in Iran or Saudi Arabia – which some women have tried to wear in
towns. In some cases, supporters of the Refah (Welfare) party and others
have paid women to wear such scarves. Even nationalist politicians say
that if women are free to choose whether to wear a headscarf or not, many
who have worn them for political reasons would no longer wish to do so.

Societal opposition to minorities of all sorts does impact on religious
freedom. Such social pressure is felt most keenly among the poor. Members
of the urban middle class who convert from Islam to other faiths can
freely practise their new faith. In Izmir a Christian church exists where
many young converts of university background attend unchallenged. But
openly converting to and practising a non-Islamic faith is often
impossible in poor neighbourhoods. In former Armenian-populated areas of
Anatolia – where there are also people of Syriac descent – many families
changed their formal identification to Muslims, but did not convert in
reality. Their attempts to practise Christianity face enormous obstacles
unless they move to Istanbul or even to Ankara. Back in these towns and
villages are no Christian churches, so anyone wanting to meet for
Christian worship could be dragged off to the police or suffer beatings.

One former Interior Minister stated that Christians should only conduct
missionary activity among such people of Christian descent. He estimated
the numbers of such people at between 800,000 and three million people.

You have to be very courageous to set up a Protestant church in remote
areas, as pastor Ahmet Guvener found in Diyarbakir. Problems can come from
neighbours and from the authorities. Even if not working hand in hand,
neighbours and officials share the same hostility. They cannot understand
why anyone would convert to Christianity. People are not upset seeing old
Christian churches – Syriac Orthodox and other Christian churches have
always existed in Anatolia – but seeing a new Protestant church, even when
housed in a shop or private flat, arouses hostility.

Officials vary in their attitudes. The Kemalist bureaucracy follows
Ataturk’s secularist line and is against anything religious. There is a
nationalist, chauvinistic wing of officialdom which believes that anything
not Turkish is a threat to be countered. The security and intelligence
services, including the powerful military, are both Kemalist and
nationalist. Anyone considered not to be Turkish and not Sunni Muslim
faces problems. Even Sunni Muslim Kurds are excluded, while Alevi Kurds
are regarded as even worse.

It is very difficult to imagine that in the next decade or so Turkish
society will change to allow full religious freedom. To take one example,
for the change to be conceivable the chauvinistic content of primary and
secondary school education – constant praise of Ataturk, Turkey and all
things Turkish – will have to change. Unless this happens, it is very hard
to imagine Turkey evolving into an open society that is truly ready to
accept European Union (EU) human rights requirements. One non-religious
illustration of the lack of openness in Turkish society is the near
impossibility of free discussion of the genocide of 1.5 million Armenians
and Assyrians in the last years of the Ottoman empire, along with
continued official denial that the genocide took place.

Christian churches have welcomed the prospect of Turkish EU accession,
often due to their own communities’ experience and hopes. If negotiations
last for more than a few years some improvements for religious minorities
– including Islamic minorities – might be possible.

Sadly, there appears to be not enough interest among diplomats in Ankara
from EU member states – or in their foreign ministries back home – in
promoting religious freedom in Turkey. The EU has forced the Turkish
government to change the Law on Foundations. This law governs inter alia
community foundations (cemaat vak&#305;flar) that act as the owners of the
real estate of Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Jews, who are treated by
the government as minorities within the meaning of the Treaty of Lausanne
as well as some of the properties of the Chaldean Catholic, Syrian
Catholic and Syrian Orthodox Christians, who are not treated by the
government as minorities within the meaning of the Treaty of Lausanne. But
reforms will have to go much deeper for Turkey to meet the EU’s stated
‘Copenhagen criteria’ of being “a stable democracy, respecting human
rights, the rule of law, and the protection of minorities.” The EU must
make full religious freedom for all, including for Muslims, a core demand.

Full religious freedom would bring with it an increase in the influence of
Islam, which some think would endanger the western orientation of Turkey.
Possibly this is the reason that the EU has not pushed Turkey harder on
religious freedom. However, it is unwise to see the relationship with
Turkey through such “war-against-terror spectacles.” It is vital for the
future of Turkey that full religious freedom be a core demand, so that
Turkish democracy can be strengthened to the point that it can in
democratic ways cope with the hostility of some Islamic groups.

With so little apparent interest in pushing for full religious freedom
from within the EU, local religious communities within Turkey will have to
take the lead. They are starting to challenge the denial of their rights
through the courts. Protestant Christians have been doing this for almost
10 years, usually with success. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, however, has
failed to regain a former orphanage it ran on an island near Istanbul
through the High Court in Ankara. It is now taking the case to the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg, to which Turkey is
subject as a member of the Council of Europe. I believe this is the right
way for such communities to defend their rights and others are already
following. The Alevi Muslims have told the government that, if they
continue to be denied religious education in state schools to their
children according to their own teaching, they too will go to the ECHR.
Denial of legal status to religious communities is another possible ECHR
case.

The most important thing is to put religious freedom on the agenda and
talk openly of the problems with full knowledge of the nuances and
complexities of the situation.

It is important to challenge Turkey’s restrictions on religious freedom
using Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which Turkey
signed in 1954. This article guarantees “freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.” This should be the basis for all
discussion of religious freedom, not the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, with its
highly restrictive approach to religious freedom.

Turkish religious communities will have to speak more on the importance of
religious freedom to the outside world, though they will have to be wise in
the way they do this. Religious minority leaders are in a difficult
situation: they believe that they have to argue in favour of negotiations
on EU membership, however sceptical they might be about how ready Turkish
society is to make the necessary changes.

Foreign churches and religious communities should be talking to their own
governments, to press them to promote religious freedom in Turkey. They
will have to convince them they are not simply advocating greater rights
for their co-religionists but truly advocate religious freedom for all in
Turkey, including Muslims.

The big question remains: do the Turkish government and people have the
will to allow full religious freedom for all? The Turkish media speculates
that the current government might not be in favour of EU membership, but is
merely using this as a way to introduce domestic developments to achieve
Islamist aims. The suggestion put forward in the media is that, if
democracy develops, the military will be prevented from mounting a coup
and so there will no longer be any obstacle to Islamist aims.

Whether or not this media speculation reflects reality, all those who
believe in religious freedom in Turkey – both within the country and
abroad – must keep the issue on the domestic and international agenda –
and be honest about the continuing obstructions to religious life of
Turkey’s Muslim, Christian and other religious communities.

(END)

Dr Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office at Missio
<;, a
Catholic mission based in the German city of Aachen, contributed this
comment to Forum 18 News Service. Commentaries are personal views and do
not necessarily represent the views of F18News or Forum 18.

A printer-friendly map of Turkey is available at
<;Rootmap=turkey>

For a personal commentary on religious freedom under Islam, see
< gt;

For a personal commentary assessing western European “headscarf laws,” see
<;.
(END)

© Forum 18 News Service. All rights reserved. ISSN 1504-2855
You may reproduce or quote this article provided that credit is given to
F18News

Past and current Forum 18 information can be found at

ABSORPTION
By Husnu Mahalli (Aksam)

Turkish Press
Oct 11 2005

Press Review
AKSAM

Columnist Husnu Mahalli comments on relations between Turkey
and the European Union. A summary of his column is as follows:
“If Europeans can absorb Turkey and Turks, they will make Turkey
a European Union member. However, those who talk about Europe and
Europeans absorbing Turkey and Turks don’t talk about Turkey in
turn absorbing Europeans. For example, what about European countries’
hypocrisy and double standards? Let’s consider the Cyprus issue. The EU
previously prodded Turkey and Turkish Cypriots and last year claimed
that it would do what was necessary, but did it really do this? The
Greek Cypriots who rejected United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
Annan’s plan in the April 2004 referendum were made EU members and
the Turkish Cypriots who accepted it were left in the cold. What’s
more, the EU then started to put pressure on Turkey and asked it to
recognize Greek Cyprus. It stated in the negotiating framework that
recognizing Greek Cyprus or opening our ports and harbors initially
was a precondition for continuing of the membership process.

Now, let’s talk about the Armenian issue. The European Parliament
called on Turkey to recognize the so-called Armenian genocide and said
that otherwise this issue would influence the process of membership. It
should be remembered that when our membership talks end, our possible
EU membership will face a vote in the European Parliament. Therefore,
I attach great importance to the European Parliament’s voting on the
issue of genocide.

I wonder if Turkey, which previously absorbed the EU’s hypocrisy
concerning the Cyprus issue, will be able to absorb its stance on the
Armenian issue. What’s more, the same Europe condoned the Armenian
ASALA terrorist group killing nearly 40 Turkish diplomats in the early
1980s. These diplomats were killed in Paris, Brussels, Athens, Geneva,
Madrid, Vienna and other major EU capitals. If I’m not mistaken, none
of these murderers have been caught. Such a Europe forgot its own
guilt by association and now it wants Turkey to recognize the genocide.

The most important issue is that the EU is leaving the countries free
to choose the method they will choose for making Turkey an EU member.

As part of this, countries will vote on the agreement concerning Turkey
in their parliaments or bring it to referendums. Right now there
are 25 EU members. If we add in Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, that
makes 28. Now I wonder how many of these 28 parliaments will accept
Turkey’s membership. Let’s not forget that if even one turns us down,
Turkey won’t get in the EU. The same holds for the referendums. All
the publics of EU member states have always said in polls that they’re
against Turkey’s EU membership and everybody has their own grounds
for this. Austrians can’t forget the Siege of Vienna and the Greeks
still remember the conquest of Istanbul.

However, all of Europe remembers the Ottoman Empire. If you consider
economic and political interests and calculations, you can see how
difficult the situation is. So we can see at least 25 parliaments of
EU countries among the 28 member states would certainly reject our
EU membership.”

AZERI PUNDITS DOWNPLAY EU WARNING OVER TIES WITH TURKISH CYPRUS
by R. Azar

Zerkalo, Azerbaijan
Oct 7 2005

Another ultimatum from the European Union

If Azerbaijan does not change its position on Cyprus, the EU will
only accept Armenia and Georgia

Relations with Northern Cyprus may prolong Azerbaijan’s joining the
European Union’s [EU] New Neighbourhood Policy, the Trend news agency
has quoted EU Commissioner for foreign relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner
as telling the Radio Liberty.

“The EU only recognizes the independence of the Republic of Cyprus.

But this republic is protesting against Baku’s contacts with Lefkosa
and flights from Azerbaijan to Northern Cyprus,” she said.

Addressing the foreign relations committee of the European Parliament
in Brussels, Ferrero-Waldner said she had informed Azerbaijan that
if the country did not change its position, the EU would only accept
Armenia and Georgia. She expressed her hope that Azerbaijan would
resolve this issue. “But this will take a few weeks,” she said.

The head of the information department of the Azerbaijani Foreign
Ministry, Tahir Tagizada, said that Baku’s policy is directed at
preventing the crisis in both the Turkish and Greek communities of
Cyprus. Tagizada said that he had not received any official information
concerning cooperation with the EU within the framework of the New
Neighbourhood Policy.

“Azerbaijan is ready to take steps under the approved action plan. As
for the flights, this is a commercial initiative and has nothing to
do with the government’s foreign policy,” Tagizada said.

Political pundit Vafa Quluzada said that Azerbaijan pursued a right
policy towards the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC]. He
added that Azerbaijan had established bilateral relations with Finland,
Great Britain, France and other EU member states although it was not
a member of the union.

“The EU has closed the door on the TRNC and does not want other
countries to cooperate with it. Baku is on the right track. The EU
can never influence Azerbaijan in this issue,” Quluzada said.

Another political pundit Zardust Alizada said that on the one hand,
Azerbaijan wants to be accepted to the EU and on the other hand,
it goes against the principles of this organization.

“However, despite the statement of the EU official, I do not think that
the EU will take any dangerous step against Azerbaijan,” Alizada said.

Western analysts believe that Azerbaijan, as part of the South
Caucasus, is of great importance to the EU. Therefore, stability in
Azerbaijan, which goes through a democratic election, means stability
in Europe. Azerbaijan’s participation in the EU’s policy ensures
the supremacy of the law and the development of democracy. From this
viewpoint, our laws should be brought into conformity with European
standards.

But further development of relations between Azerbaijan and the EU
will largely depend on the course of the forthcoming parliamentary
election in our country. The EU calls on Baku to make a concerted
effort to ensure that the election is in line with international
norms. Brussels believes that the EU’s tough position may put an end
to the views that democracy has several varieties in the West and
these varieties must be the way it wants.

NPR : Orhan Pamuk: Turkey’s Controversial Faulkner
php?storyId=4954114

Day to Day, October 11, 2005 . In his native Turkey, Orhan Pamuk is
considered the of contemporary fiction. His novels cover topics from
Euro-Turkish conflicts during the Renaissance to love, politics and
exile. His latest book is Istanbul: Memories and the City, a memoir
about growing up in Istanbul. Frank Browning talks with the writer in
Istanbul about his relationship to the ever-changing city and his
controversial opinions on Turkey’s history.

*Order a text transcript of this story*
<;

ATAMIAN WINS ARMENIAN BY-ELECTIONS
By Georges der Partogh in Nicosia

AZG Armenian Daily #182
11/10/2005

Diaspora

Cardiologist Vahakn Atamian who won Sunday’s (October 9) by-election
for the Armenian Representative in the Cyprus Parliament, pledged
that he will act as representative of all members of the 3.000 member
Armenian community in the island republic, and strive to meet his
pr-e-election commitments which centers on saving the Melkonian
Educational Institute arbitrary shut down by the New York based
central board of the AGBU (Armenian General Benevolent Union).

“The most important problems facing our community right now are
the Melkonian, the ancient Armenian cemetery, and our historic and
religious monuments which have been under Turkish military occupation
since 1974 and are in deplorable conditions,” Atamian said after
his victory.

He called upon the entire Armenian community to join him in the
struggle to find solution to the serious problems of the community
and said that he would be running for election to a full five year
term in next May’s parliamentary elections. “I shall stand again in
order to complete the work which I am about to start”, he added.

Atamian, who is also the chairman of the Nareg Armenian Elementary
School in Nicosia, Larnaca and Limassol, has already had meetings
with political party leaders here and will take his oath of office
in Parliament on Thursday.

“As I declared in my pre-election campaign I shall also start
meetings with our own church and political party factions, starting
with Catholicos Aram of the House of Cilicia, because I believe
that our daily life is very much centered around the church and
the school. Here I pledge that I shall spare no efforts in order to
achieve the continuation of the Melkonian. For that I shall need the
full support of all walks of Cyprus-Armenian life irrespective of
political beliefs.”

Atamian, 48, is himself a graduate of the Melkonian and served on
the board of management for many years. The Melkonian was the major
issue throughout the by-election and is expected to remain so in the
general elections of May 2006.

Chief Returning Officer Lazaros Savvides, announcing the election
results, said there were 1.928 registered voters of which 1.538 cast
their ballots.

There were 1.478 valid votes, Atamian received a total of 769 votes
or 52.03 percent, and succeeds Bedros Kalaydjian who passed away on
September 1st at the age of 71. He was supported as an independent
candidate, by the AGBU Clubs of Nicosia, Larnaca and Limassol, the
Ramgavar Liberal Democratic Party, the Hentchag Nor Seround as well
as Armenian left-wingers and the Sanoutz Mioutyoun Melkonian Alumni
Association.

Candidates Dr. Antranig Ashdjian and businessman Parsegh Zartarian
received 649 votes (43.91 percent) and 60 votes (4.06 percent)
respectively.

Both independent candidates, Ashdjian was backed by dashnaktsutyoun
while Zartarian only had his family to support him.

The three minority religious groups in Cyprus, namely Maronites,
Armenians and Latins, belonging to the Greek Cypriot community under
the terms of the 1959 constitution, elect a representative each to
the House and deal with educational and religious matters.

SONGS OF MOURNING AND CELEBRATION

The Australian, Australia
Oct 11 2005

Martin Ball
October 11, 2005

Diamanda Galas: Defixiones
Hamer Hall. October 7.

Jon Rose: Pannikin
Fairfax Studio. October 8.

Victoria Hanna: Ancient Hebrew Rap
Spiegeltent. October 9.

DIAMANDA Galas is a serious performer and she sings about serious
subjects, typically pain, suffering and death. Mostly she sings about
victims: victims of AIDS, of torture, of depression, of injustice.

In Defixiones: Orders from the Dead, Galas sings about the victims
of genocide, specifically the massacres of Armenians, Assyrians and
Greeks in the early 20th century. Her texts are poems and laments

in various languages, and she draws on musical forms from the cultures
of victims and perpetrators.

The title Defixiones refers to the engraved “curse tablets”
laid on graves throughout the eastern Mediterranean to discourage
desecration. So, in telling these stories, Galas is in a sense voicing
the victims’ curses on their murderers, much like the Erinyes of Greek
mythology, who harried criminals with the memory of their crimes. At
this level, Defixiones is a pointedly historical and political work,
determined not to forget the victims of the massacres or their
perpetrators, the nationalist Turks.

The accompanying booklet thoughtfully prints the texts in original
and translation but, with the auditorium in complete darkness,
it is impossible to follow and the songs all blend into one long,
wailing lament.

Galas pursues an intense and uncompromising aesthetic, but the lack of
irony in her performance inevitably exposes her to the possibility of
postmodern parody. So the gothic stage setting with opulent candelabra
and burning incense seems like the backdrop to a Hammer horror film.

More disturbingly, Galas’s flowing robes and electronically distorted
voice suggest an incarnation of Darth Vader.

These unintentional connections are unfortunate because the subject
matter is so important. But when art takes itself too seriously,
it risks becoming caricature.

ISRAELI singer Victoria Hanna treats language and symbols in an
entirely different way. She combines ancient Hebrew texts with
a thoroughly modern musical aesthetic, and is not scared to draw
attention to the possibility of parody.

Backed by a band of guitar, viola, drums and sampler, her show is
part rap and groove, part performance poetry, and a big dose of
mystical indulgence.

Hanna draws extensively from the Song of Songs, and from the
Kabbalistic text The Book of Creation. She explores the symbology of
letters and numbers, and the sounds of the Hebrew letters.

But just when this is becoming way too esoteric, Hanna remembers to
entertain the audience in other ways. She takes on an archetypal Eve
role with a bowl of apples, stuffing them down her dress and munching
them into the microphone. She morphs out of her blue cape into a red
cocktail dress.

It’s a bit all over the shop but, unlike Galas, whose monolithic work
admits only a single interpretation, Hanna’s trippy poetics let you
take what you want, even if it may be nothing at all.

BY way of contrast to these two singers with their foreign languages
and obscure texts, Jon Rose’s Pannikin project offered a much more
naturalistic representation of sound and meaning in the everyday world.

Pannikin is a collection of the sort of grassroots music-making that
doesn’t usually make it into mainstream artistic consciousness. There
is Auntie Roseina Boston playing the gum leaf, Leslie Clark making
tunes by clicking his fingers, and Michael Greene, who can whistle
and hum two tunes at the same time.

Then there are the sounds of country life, with auctioneer John
Traeger going 90 to the dozen, Ashley Brophy cracking whips and a
whole orchestra of chainsaws ripping up the atmosphere. It’s a great
reminder that, at the end of the day, music is really just sound and
rhythm, the rest is merely art.

CIS INTERPARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY COMMISSIONS’ SITTINGS TAKE PLACE IN YEREVAN ON OCTOBER 5

Noyan Tapan News Agency, Armenia
Oct 6 2005

YEREVAN, OCTOBER 6, NOYAN TAPAN. NT was informed from the RA National
Assembly PR Department that the sittings of the Standing Commission
on Science and Education and the Standing Commission on Economic and
Financial Issues of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly (IA) were
held on October 5 in Yerevan. Mikhail Krotov, Secretary General of
the IA Council, said the drafts discussed will be put on the agenda
of the Assembly’s plenary session to be held in Saint Petersburg on
November 18.

The first sitting of the Standing Commission on Science and Education
covered the moral and legal aspects of biomedical studies conducted
in CIS member states. The sitting was in essence the international
conference’s first part attended by representatives of international
organizations conducting research in the field, as well as by European
and US experts. The speakers addressed the international legislation on
genetic studies and underlined the necessity to create an appropriate
legislative field in CIS member states.

In his speech, Maurisio Salvi of the European Commission discussed
issues of genetic tests, which, in his words, are of great significance
for further development of science. They are interesting from the
political point of view as well: the science on life and biotechnology
is of paticular strategical importance to Europe and ranks second on
the list of priorities after high technoligies. It was noted that the
democratic society must ensure that it will not be used for immoral
purposes or in violation of basic human rights. The creation of a gene
bank, according to M. Salvi, requires the citizen’s consent and should
be done in conditions of confidentiality and human rights protection.

Organizational issues and model laws of CIS countries were discussed
at the second sitting of the Commission.

The Commission made positive conclusions about the model bills
on innovation activities and on status of educational worker. The
discussion of the bill on nonstate higher educational institutions
was postponed on the grounds that the sphere is successfully regulated
by the Law on Education in some of the CIS member states.

Issues related to humanitarian cooperation and scientific and
educational integration were discussed by the Commission as well.

Positive decisions on the model bills on the state reserve and on
bankruptcy of banks were taken at the sitting of the CIS IA Standing
Commission on Economic and Financial Issues. The issue of applying
model laws in economy and the financial sector of the CIS IA member
states was also on the agenda. The participants indicated that model
laws encourage exchange of experience, and no need “to invent a new
bicycle” arises every time. The regular sitting of the Commission
will be held in February-March 2006 in Saint Petersburg.

ARMENIAN SPEAKER SCORING MORE POINTS WITH TRADEMARK POPULISM
By Emil Danielyan

Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
Jamestown Foundation
Oct 6 2005

Armenia’s ambitious parliament speaker, Artur Baghdasarian, has
solidified his positions this week by exploiting an issue that
touches a raw nerve in Armenian society and is a major ingredient of
his populist discourse. Baghdasarian, who is seen as one of President
Robert Kocharian’s potential successors, appears to have succeeded in
forcing the government to start compensating Armenian citizens whose
Soviet-era savings bank deposits were wiped out by hyperinflation of
the early 1990s.

Local commentators note the fact that he owes the tactical victory to
Kocharian. Some have even suggested that the 36-year-old politician
now stands a better chance in the unfolding tussle for the Armenian
presidency.

Armenia boasted one of the highest per-capita rates of bank
savings among the 15 Soviet republics. But what had for decades been
accumulated by the population effectively evaporated in the economic
chaos that followed the Soviet collapse. The depreciation of the bank
deposits made transition to the market economy particularly painful for
hundreds of thousands of Armenians. Many of them — especially elderly
people mired in poverty – remain embittered by the enormous loss.

And there has been no lack of politicians keen to capitalize on their
fury. Baghdasarian has been the most successful of them. Compensation
of the former deposit holders was a key campaign promise of his
Orinats Yerkir (Country of Law) party in the run-up to Armenia’s last
parliamentary election held in May 2003. The tactic proved highly
effective, with Orinats Yerkir now having the second-largest faction
in the National Assembly and three ministers in Prime Minister Andranik
Markarian’s cabinet.

That Orinats Yerkir’s vague promise is unrealistic became evident
early last year when the party introduced a bill that calls for an
equivalent of $83 million to be paid to the former deposit holders
within the next ten years. The sum pales in comparison with billions
of Soviet rubles that Armenians used to have on their bank accounts.

It was clear that the proposed compensation would be largely
symbolic. At the same time $83 million is a lot of money by current
Armenian standards and is comparable to the cash-strapped Armenian
government’s annual spending on social security or health care.

The government, backed by the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, was quick to point out that the Orinats Yerkir scheme
would therefore be a serious waste of scarce public resources. Not
surprisingly, Markarian’s Republican Party (HHK), the biggest
parliamentary force, blocked the Orinats Yerkir bill. Opposition
lawmakers added to Baghdasarian’s embarrassment last December when they
forced a high-profile parliament debate on the issue and challenged him
to honor his pledge. Kocharian had to give the speaker a face-saving
cop-out the next month, forming an ad hoc commission tasked with
looking into possibilities of deposit compensation.

The commission never made public any reports and was thought to have
buried the matter until an October 1 meeting between Kocharian and
leaders of Orinats Yerkir, the HHK, and the third party represented in
his government, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. The meeting was
followed by the Orinats Yerkir bill’s inclusion on the parliamentary
agenda. Baghdasarian said on October 4 that the move was part of
a deal cut by Kocharian and his coalition allies. “I hope that the
political agreement will be honored by the Republican Party and other
political forces that joined this initiative,” he told reporters.

What that agreement specifically means is not clear, however. Some HHK
leaders have hinted that Baghdasarian’s bill will not even be debated
on the parliament floor. Markarian, for his part, announced on October
5 that his government’s draft budget for next year would earmark only
$2.2 million for compensating the poorest deposit holders. But even
this meager sum would allow Baghdasarian to claim that he has remained
true to his word. The Armenian speaker will also tell voters that his
efforts to achieve a more far-reaching solution were blocked by more
powerful government factions.

The key question here is why Kocharian decided to revive the issue
at this juncture. Some analysts say he is keen to woo impoverished
voters ahead of the November 27 referendum on his package of amendments
to the Armenian constitution. Others believe that Kocharian, who is
obliged to resign after completing his second term in office in 2008,
made it clear that he continues to view Baghdasarian as one of his
possible successors. Defense Minister Serge Sarkisian, Kocharian’s
most powerful lieutenant, has been regarded as the top candidate for
that role until now. But the Armenian press speculates periodically
that relations between the two Karabakh-born men are not as cordial
as is widely assumed. The Yerevan daily Haykakan Zhamanak suggested
that the “drastic change” in the Armenian president’s position on
the Soviet-era savings deposits was “not only in favor of Artur
Baghdasarian but also against Serge Sarkisian.”

For Kocharian, a good thing about the young speaker is that he is
arguably the most electable member of the ruling regime. (Sarkisian
is a far more divisive figure not least because of his grip on
lucrative sectors of the Armenian economy and involvement in vote
rigging.) Baghdasarian knows how to make the most of his strongest
weapon, populism, in a country where civic consciousness has
experienced a serious decline over the past decade. His party also
boasts the most effective grassroots structure, cannily targeting
specific groups of the population such as schoolteachers, doctors,
and even disabled persons. For many of them, it is tempting to ignore
the fact that Orinats Yerkir is an increasingly important component
of Armenia’s leadership.

(Aravot, October 6; Haykakan Zhamanak, October 5; RFE/RL Armenia
Report, October 3-4; Armenian Public Television, October 2)

US “TIRED OF KOSOVO”

B92, Yugoslavia
Oct 5 2005

BELGRADE, WASHINGTON — Wednesday – The US administration is tired
of dealing with the situation in Kosovo and wants to hand it over
completely to the European Union, US Balkans analyst Nicholas Gvozdev
has said.

Gvozdev told The Voice of America that stumbling block is that the EU,
with its 25 member countries, has problems in making decisions and
already has its hands full with issues such as the further enlargement
of the union.

Even though Kosovo status discussions may begin shortly, Gvozdev said
that they could last years, comparing the situation to the apparently
never-ending Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

“The possibility that the discussions will begin soon does not mean
that momentum for a rapid solution exists. The insistence of some
people in Washington on the independence of Kosovo minimizes the
possibility for upholding the territorial integrity of countries such
as Iraq and Georgia, while calling for decentralization could weaken
the Dayton Agreement for keeping Bosnia-Herzegovina unified.” Gvozdev
said.

Gvozdev compares the situation in Kosovo to Nagorn-Karabagh, over
which Armenia and Azerbaijan have been in status talks for fifteen
years. The situation in this region has come to a stand-still, despite
various talks of independence, decentralization and united countries.

Asked who he thinks will be responsible for having the last say in
Kosovo, Gvozdev said that the EU is more likely than the US to be
the key player in the eventual solution.

“The US is looking to detach itself from participating in finding
peaceful solutions for various global situations. In addition, Kosovo
and the Balkans are a part of Europe, and the European Union should
take care of these problems, because it has more shared interests;
trade, migration, borders, visas, etc.” Gvozdev said.

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