Author: Garo Vardanian

On March 21 168.am– before and after the September wars. What has changed today and what has not changed, what is legally called “playing” on the public’s memory” published an article in response to Pashinyan’s warning or threat of a new catastrophic war in September, which continues.

And today RA Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan stated in a briefing with journalists that the month of September was said to be conditional, meaning shortly after the elections, and that such a perspective could be, Mirzoyan definitely agrees with his political leader.

«We are accused of saying that we are the party of peace, while what others say is so hopeless and dangerous that it will lead to war. This is so true and invulnerable that they come and tell us: well, don’t say that again, because we might not be so successful in the electoral competition.”

To the correct question: why did you decide that they are war forces, he responded briefly. “It is our political right. Do I see an element of blackmail there? No, I don’t. Why are we doing it, we are doing it well, it is our political proposal, and we are not breaking the law.”

In this case, the problem is not whether to break the law or not, let’s say it is a political competition, a pre-election political tactic, the question is: does Ararat Mirzoyan accept that the statement of the opposition or appeal can provoke a war? If so, then we can say that all the famous statements of Nikol Pashinyan before the 44-day war provoked the 44-day war, or at least brought it closer, and there was no shortage of them. Of course, here Ararat Mirzoyan can justify himself that the roots of that war are deep, as he did later.

“Our government did not bring the war, the war was a consequence. the most simplistic and naive step would be to say that this or that caused the war, the war was a consequence. Nowadays, it’s completely different. Yes, it happened in our time. but it is absurd to say that you brought the war. It is a consequence of 30 plus years, including staying within the framework of the wrong political thought, not understanding that the issue had to be resolved and could not be resolved otherwise, etc. RA Foreign Minister continued.

But this claim may also not withstand criticism, because on the one hand, Pashinyan decided to start the negotiations from scratch, on the other hand, he later admitted that it was clear to him from the beginning that “Artsakh will be part of Azerbaijan”, that the negotiations “were about that” from the very beginning.

But you don’t know why, this did not prevent Pashinyan from “evolutionary” regarding the status of Artsakh. make way and “convince” the public that this or that point of view is correct at the moment, which were not about recognizing Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan. In addition, if the 44-day war was the result of 30 years of negotiations, and let’s assume that Pashinyan did not start from scratch, why or why did the diplomacy of Pashinyan’s government fail, that the war started when the ceasefire regime was relatively maintained for two years?

What Aliyev said is the reason? he war days of 2020, early October, had said the following:

“Nikol Pashinyan said, “I have come with new ideas, I have erased everything that happened in the past, give me a chance and time.” I replied: OK. And what happened? After a year, he announced: “Karabakh is Armenia, and that’s it.” Well, let him say now: “Karabakh is Armenia, and that’s it»»:

It is essentially about elevator arrangements.

Can we say that Pashinyan broke the agreement, or at least deceived the public, if we take into account two post-war episodes in particular?

First, on November 29, 2020, Pashinyan on his Facebook of the post had allowed a remarkable wording in it, or rather, a confession.

“At any stage, including during the Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercises, I would go and say to the Turks: let’s resolve the issue without war, they would have said: give a specific schedule when I hand over the territories. If I signed, they would say, “Nikol traitor”, if I didn’t sign, the war would start.” And this despite the fact that one day before the war, through his family newspaper, he denied Turkey’s direct role in a possible war or conflict settlement.

Secondly, after the war, in April 2022, Nikol Pashinyan made another confession: could have “prevented the war and we would have been in the same situation without the casualties.” Of course, there is a question as to which situation happened as of November 9, 2020, or what was described in the handover of 7 regions or the 30-year negotiation packages, possibly the last one, because the words were said in the context of the previous negotiations.

In any case, how correct is Ararat Mirzoyan when he does not talk about the responsibility of their government, particularly in the context of the 44-day war, especially when several foreign ministers have changed after the change of power? After all, the war is waged by the state, why, apart from the army, are there no people responding from other institutions?

By the way, does the current Minister of Foreign Affairs agree with the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defense and Security of the National Assembly Andranik Kocharyan that the July battles are a negotiation situation to change that harmed the negotiation process.

The same July battles, in the context of which Pashinyan made provocative statements and actions, and perhaps Ararat Mirzoyan thinks that, on the contrary, a serious plan of Azerbaijan failed in those days thanks to our army, which is not fully known.

Let’s not forget that thanks to the 3rd Army Corps in Tavush, we had serious positional improvements in 2019, the logical continuation of which may have been the July battles of 2020 in some sense, and in those days already today the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan It was an enthusiastic post doing

In particular, On August 19, 2019 he first wrote on his Facebook page that: “The security of the gas pipeline entering Armenia is ensured, Chinari cannot be shot at either.” then slightly edited the post: “The enemy has lost the once absolute positional advantage in Chinari sector.”

In the process of border demarcation in Tavush, will we not lose this success, which Mirzoyan recorded with enthusiasm?

Whoever, since the head of the foreign ministry spoke about the war as a consequence, can say what was the consequence of the Azerbaijani advances of 2021-2022, the famous battles of September and, why not, the depopulation of Artsakh in 2023, what was the document of the tripartite declaration of November 9, 2020: a ceasefire, a transitional solution to problems, or… Or what a consequence? is TRIPP, which in the Turkish-Azerbaijani conversation still remains “Zangezur Corridor”, regarding which Baku referred to the November 9 document.

By the way, during his pre-election tour of Yerevan yesterday, Pashinyan suddenly remembered November 9, 2020 of the document about, noting:

“The political elite in RA accused me of treason, but a woman told me that she was grateful that we signed the November 9 paper.”

Of course, maybe the opposition should have targeted the tripartite statement in a different logic, so that its more or less pro-Armenian points would be preserved, but Nikol Pashinyan should not forget that he was the first violator of that document, when he ordered the withdrawal of troops from Syunik a month after its signing, even though the parties were supposed to remain in the positions they occupied after the war. Moreover, before the document expired, the Lachin Corridor was closed and de-blocked, and then Artsakh was completely depopulated, and the Russian Federation was pushed out of the de-blocking process, about which there are several tripartite statements. be signed.

Let’s add to this that Davit Tonoyan, the former Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia, after the war had announced որ՝ “The tripartite document of November 9, 2020 referred to the deployment of more Russian peacekeeping forces.” In other words, it was a ceasefire document that was supposed to preserve and strengthen Pashinyan’s power, but it was a different matter that there were points in the ceasefire document that should not have been there or were not specific to the ceasefire document.

Returning to the possibility of a new war, let’s note one more fact. The annual report on the external risks of RA related to 2026 states: “In the long term, the so-called “Western Azerbaijan” and “return of Western Azerbaijanis” talks and accompanying actions promoted by Azerbaijan at the state level are a significantly negative and risky factor for peace building.”

Moreover, the Foreign Intelligence Service records that: After the Washington Declaration, Azerbaijan not only did not reduce, but also significantly intensified this propaganda, which creates significant risks for regional stability, security and long-term peace.

After the Washington Declaration, Azerbaijan not only did not reduce, but also significantly intensified this propaganda, which creates significant risks for regional stability, security and long-term peace.

In addition to this, the attention of the FSA was also drawn to the following:

“Although regional infrastructural and economic programs are not the only driving force for the institutionalization of peace, however, they have great potential, on the one hand, to raise the price of military escalation in the region; on the other hand, to offer the states of the region a strengthening of their own political and economic factor through involvement in these programs.”

In other words, both peace and escalation have a price, the question is which of the parties pays what price, and whether all parties pay a price, and the current authorities have entered into this. From this, the question arises: if the current government does not win, can we consider a possible new war as a result of negotiations that assume unilateral concessions and interests of Pashinyan’s government, following the example of Ararat Mirzoyan?

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