17:23,
YEREVAN, 25 OCTOBER, ARMENPRESS. The Central Bank of Armenia informs “Armenpress” that today, 25 October, USD exchange rate stood at 476.48 drams. EUR exchange rate stood at 554.77 drams. Russian Ruble exchange rate stood at 6.75 drams. GBP exchange rate stood at 657.69 drams.
The Central Bank has set the following prices for precious metals.
Gold price stood at 27257.43 drams. Silver price stood at 371.18 drams. Platinum price stood at 15977.91 drams.
18:19,
YEREVAN, 25 OCTOBER, ARMENPRESS. In the framework of official visit to Cyprus the delegation headed by the President of the National Assembly of Armenia Alen Simonyan on October 25 met with the Minister of Defense of Cyprus Charalambos Petrides.
“During the meeting the sides noted the existence of mutual understanding and support between the two countries, particularly the effective cooperation in international structures on advancing the genocide prevention agenda was especially appreciated. Reference was made to the military-political dialogue between the defense ministries of Armenia and Cyprus, which is being implemented during meeting of bilateral and multilateral frameworks”, ARMENPRESS reports reads the message released by the National Assembly of Armenia.
Speaking about the Azerbaijani-Turkish military aggression against Artsakh Alen Simonyan expressed gratitude for the principled position of Cyprus and for supporting the people of Artsakh, highlighting the humanitarian and financial assistance of Cyprus to Armenians of Artsakh in 2020. The unanimously adopted resolution condemning the Azerbaijani aggression against Artsakh on October 9 was also mentioned.
The sided highlighted the effective implementation of opportunities in the format of Armenia-EU Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement.
Iran’s Roads and Transportation Agency has banned Iranian trucks from travelling to Nagorno Karabakh controlled by Armenians to avoid Azerbaijani protests.
In September tensions flared up between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan after Baku arrested two Iranian truck drivers, accusing them of going to Nagorno Karabakh that lies within its international borders.
The tensions led to military drills by each side and political mudslinging, including Iranian accusations that Azerbaijan allows an Israeli military and intelligence presence on its territory.
Iran has tried to remain neutral in the conflict between its two northern neighbors but is concerned of more Azerbaijani encroachments on Armenian territory after last year’s war in which Baku took back most of the territories it had lost to Armenia in the early 1990s.
The Agency has told transportation companies not to send trucks to the disputed region from Armenia, reminding them of a foreign ministry directive that entering the region from any point other than Azerbaijani border posts would violate the latter’s territorial integrity.
Most of Iran’s exports to Armenia travel along a road partly controlled by Azerbaijan. Tehran and Yerevan earlier agreed to widen and expand another route that would allow trucks to travel without hindrance.
A Council of Europe report on the humanitarian consequences of last year’s Nagorny Karabakh war has called for international organisations and the media to have “unimpeded access” to the territory. The council also said it was “appalled” by the conflict’s death toll, which included over 3,900 Armenian and 2,900 Azerbaijani military personnel killed or missing. It called for all remaining captives to be released and condemned the damage and destruction to cultural heritage on both sides. Paul Gavan, an Irish member of the parliament and the document’s rapporteur, described the challenges in researching the report and outlined potential next steps.
IWPR: The Assembly calls on both sides to provide the international community with access to Nagorny Karabakh. Why is this so crucial and what role can it play post war?
Paul Gavan: I think it is important to recognise that the people of Nagorny Karabakh do feel abandoned by the international community. The most frustrating thing about writing the report was that I could not access Karabakh. I do believe that international community can do more, and we have to gain access. Real pressure has to be increased to ensure that we have proper access, not just the Red Cross, not just the Russians, that we have proper access for humanitarian organisations like the Council of Europe, like the UN so that we can help people on the ground, and of course see what is actually happening.
Which side prevents access to Karabakh?
I was hoping that I would be able to get access from one side and leave from the other, but I have no cooperation from either side basically. In Armenia they told me to go via the Lachin corridor, but I can’t do that, because no international organisation recognises that as a legitimate way to go. I tried to find a compromise, and I have not got that from either side. The report would benefit hugely for me if I could have been there in Karabakh, it is a weaker report because I was not there.
You recognised in the document the existential threat that Armenians feel living in Karabakh. Many are already leaving; what should be done to prevent this depopulation and exodus of Armenians?
It should not be happening, I agree with you. People have the right to live in their homeland. It applies equally, by the way, to Azerbaijanis. That is why one of the important points I make is that we need to see -at least in the short term – some kind of demilitarised zone operating across that border, particularly across Karabakh, to try to give some level of reassurance to the people living there.
You were critical about atrocities on both sides. What was the most worrying violence in your mind?
I singled out the trophy park [a park in Baku displaying militaries trophies from the 2020 war], and when I met a senior aide to President [Ilham] Aliev, I said exactly the same to him – that the Baku trophy park sends all the wrong messages. I am very clear in relation to that. There has to be the means of moving forward here, and what I was trying to do in my report is to suggest concrete actions that could help. I mentioned prisoner release, mine maps… those mine maps have to be released, and to be honest I don’t believe that Armenia does not have any more to hand over. The issue of border tension is the one that worries me most, and I think the idea to demilitarise the zone around the border is something that both sides and indeed the international community should work towards.
I also singled out the fact that Council of Europe bodies have highlighted in particular the problems of hate speech in Azerbaijan. There are problems on both sides and I have got a huge dossier from the Azeris in relation to hate speech episodes on the Armenian side in social media. Awful stuff, but I think the difference is it seems to be tolerated, and at some degree, propagated at state level in Azerbaijan, and this… has to be called out.
Many in Armenia were disturbed with an amendment which added the Azerbaijani name Ghazanchi to the description of the Armenian Ghazanchetsots church in Shushi. How does this comply with your previous references to cultural heritage?
When I was referring to areas I would use both Armenian and Azerbaijan [terms], I am not replacing one with the other, I would say Stepanakert/Khankendi. You know how important language is, and I am going to unintentionally offend someone every time. The simple reason I adopted this amendment was not to replace the name, but to say, here is how the Armenians are calling it, and here is how the Azerbaijanis are calling it.
My point is to try to be as inclusive in the report as I can, I am not suggesting that one name is better than the other…Who I am to say that he is wrong and somebody else is right? My job here is not to judge, but simply to be inclusive.
The resolution seems to believe that there might be an opening of trade corridors . How is it possible, considering the recent war and the involvement of Turkey, which is a clear reminder for Armenians of the 1915 genocide?
I can understand why would you say that. In the report I clearly said that Turkey had a role, I clearly called out that they were involved in recruiting mercenaries, so I have no illusions about the challenges that Armenia face in that respect.
It strikes me that ultimately Armenia and Azerbaijan are going to have to work things out as neighbours. And I would have thought trade might not be a bad way to start. Our peace process in Northern Ireland did not start until there was dialogue, and you won’t convince me that there are not some people of goodwill on the other side.
Speaking to a small group of reporters on Oct. 12, Sarkissian noted that Armenia and the Vatican are both “small states with a large nation.”
Pope Francis meets with Catholicos Karekin II, the leader of the Armenian Apostolic Church, on Oct. 16, 2021. (photo: Vatican Media. / Vatican Media)
VATICAN CITY — The signing of a memorandum of understanding on cultural cooperation between Armenia and the Holy See on Oct. 11 was the culmination of a week in which contacts between the world’s oldest Christian nation and the Vatican intensified both on a religious and pastoral level.
The signing of the memorandum occurred during the Armenian President Armen Sarkissian’s visit to the Vatican, which included a meeting with Pope Francis and a bilateral meeting with the Vatican Secretariat of State.
Armenian religious leaders also took part in meetings at the Vatican. Catholicos Karekin II, head of the Armenian Apostolic Church (Armenia’s national church), had an audience on Oct. 16 with Pope Francis, who visited Armenia in 2016.
The Catholicos brought with him Arman Tatoyan, the Human Rights Defender of Armenia and author of reports denouncing the loss of Christian heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Nagorno-Karabakh is an enclave within Azerbaijan with an Armenian majority that asserted its independence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The First Nagorno-Karabakh War, waged from 1988 to 1994, claimed an estimated 20,000 lives.
The territory, known as Artsakh in Armenian, was at the center of a 40-day conflict last year that led to a painful ceasefire agreement for Armenia. As a result, several Armenian monasteries found themselves isolated.
Armenian scholars have denounced what they describe as a “cultural genocide” in the region, highlighting what they say is a decades-long, systematic campaign of destruction of Christian heritage.
Azerbaijan, meanwhile, insists that the region belonged to the ancient state of Caucasian Albania before it became Armenian. Officials also point to the destruction of Islamic buildings during recent conflicts.
The Vatican’s “Armenian week” focused on both the protection of Christian heritage and the fate of prisoners of war, which remains uncertain.
An agreement signed by President Sarkissian with the Pontifical Council for Culture is part of an important diplomatic effort.
For Sarkissian, relations between Armenia and the Holy See are “good, but they could be better.” By “better,” he means that there could be a joint cultural commitment, perhaps with exchanges of artworks between the Vatican Museums and Armenian institutions.
Speaking to a small group of reporters on Oct. 12, Sarkissian noted that Armenia and the Vatican are both “small states with a large nation.”
The nation of Armenia, the first to proclaim itself Christian in 301 AD, has links all over the world due to a diaspora driven by the genocide of 1915 (still not recognized as such by countries including Turkey). The Medz Yeghern (“Great Evil Crime”), as it is known in Armenia, remains an open wound.
The “nation” of the Vatican comprises Catholics worldwide. And the Armenian president, a physicist by training and coiner of the concept of “quantum politics,” thinks precisely in terms of cooperation between small states placed on the sidelines of history.
The president developed these themes in his meeting with Pope Francis, and later with the Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Piero Parolin and “foreign minister” Archbishop Paul Gallagher.
In addition to the threat to Christian heritage, there is also concern for Armenian soldiers who remain prisoners of war in Azerbaijani prisons.
“We don’t even have the numbers of how many are imprisoned, and we can’t even see the faces of the prisoners,” Sarkissian said.
The president did not divulge the details of his conversation with the pope, which remains confidential. But he underlined that the Holy See, and in particular Pope Francis, has a soft power that should not be underestimated.
The president said that the memorandum of understanding would “allow joint research to be carried out on issues of historical interest.”
“We hope it will contribute to further intensifying cooperation between Armenia and the Holy See in the fields of culture, science, archeology, and other sectors, as well as the partnership between the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Catholic Church of Rome,” he commented.
In his meeting with Pope Francis, Karekin II touched on similar topics.
The head of the Church to which around 92% of Armenia’s three million-strong population belong told CNA that the recent conflict saw “military attacks, but also attacks that targeted civilians, using modern and prohibited weapons.”
The Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin — the Armenian Apostolic Church’s equivalent of the Vatican — recently created a department to ensure the preservation of Christian heritage.
“With this office, we want to disseminate information with the international public and ensure that these things no longer happen,” said Karekin II.
“But we also want to disprove some of the Azerbaijani narratives, which argue that those churches belong to the region’s Albanian-Caucasian heritage.”
The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has thus moved from a military to a more cultural level. This is demonstrated by the Armenian authorities’ commitment to the issue.
In September, Armenia made a formal complaint against Azerbaijan at the International Court of Justice in The Hague. In addition, Tatoyan has written a report highlighting the situation of prisoners of war, which he personally presented to the pope last week.
It is no coincidence that Karekin II brought Tatoyan with him. His presence served to give depth and substance to the Armenian denunciations. At the same time, the president’s visit was aimed at raising diplomatic relations to a yet higher level.
The already hostile relationship between Armenia’s Human Rights Defender Arman Tatoyan and the Pashinyan administration has deepened in recent weeks with both Tatoyan and government authorities openly trading barbs.
On 22 October, Tatoyan repeated his assertion that the Azerbaijani military was carrying out ‘active engineering work’ and building fortifications on the territory in the eastern Armenian province of Gegharkunik.
The claim was immediately followed by a statement from the Ministry of Defence refuting Tatoyan’ assertion and stating that the ‘engineering work’ was carried out ‘not in the territory of Armenia, but ‘next to it’. The Ministry also called on Tatoyan to refrain from spreading ‘unverified information’.
That same day, in an interview with RusArminfo, Armen Grigoryan, Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, stated that Tatoyan has never been ‘unbiased’ in his position as Human Rights Defender. He also accused Tatoyan of repeatedly ‘speaking against the revolution’ — referencing the 2018 revolution that deposed then-Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan and the long-ruling Republican Party, bringing Nikol Pashinyan to power.
Tatoyan was appointed by a Republican Party-led parliament in 2016 for a 6-year term. Grigoryan claimed that as Tatoyan’s tenure as Human Rights Defender is coming to an end it is ‘obvious’ that he is seeking to start a ‘political career’.
The relationship between Armenia’s Human Rights Defender and the Pashinyan administration soured in the wake of Armenia’s defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Tatoyan has been particularly critical of government actions in the wake of Azerbaijani troops crossing Armenia internationally recognised border this past spring.
[Read more Border crisis between Armenia and Azerbaijan continues]
Tatoyan also caused consternation in the government for his criticism of violent rhetoric used during the 2021 snap parliamentary election campaign by both ruling authorities — including Nikol Pashinyan specifically — and the opposition.
In April of this year, the Armenian government proposed abolishing a provision in the Armenian Constitution that stipulated that the office of the Human Rights Defender cannot receive less funding in any given year than the amount it had received the previous year. The measure has not yet been voted on in parliament.
Tatoyan condemned the move as ‘discrimination’ that would ‘abolish’ the independence of the office, by making it vulnerable to financial pressure from the authorities.
The government denied any political motives behind the bill.
In March, a month before the draft constitutional amendment was announced, Tatoyan also accused the ruling authorities of no longer inviting him to weekly government briefings.
Pashinyan’s spokesperson Mane Gevorgyan replied to the accusation by claiming that Tatoyan had not been attending the briefings ‘for a while’ and had instead sent employees of the Human Rights Defender’s Office in his stead — and that even more recently, his office had sent no one at all.
In a statement, Tatoyan’s office stressed that invitations to government sessions are a right rather than an obligation of the Human Rights Defender.
‘For objective reasons, the Human Rights Defender was unable to personally attend several government sessions due to a sharp increase in the amount of work and complaints, frequent trips to the Syunik and Gegharkunik provinces, which are necessary to draw up reports for international organisations’, the statement reads.
Jewish News Syndicate By Eran Lerman Oct. 21, 2021 [The implications of Iranian pressure on Baku extend well beyond the southern Caucasus, but Israel must tread carefully in this complex region.] October 21, 2021 / Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security) The extensive Iranian military maneuvers near Azerbaijan’s borders at the end of September were designed to intimidate the leadership in Baku, to deter it from curbing Iran’s illegal trade with Armenia and to force Azerbaijan to downgrade the country’s strategic relationship with Israel. In response, Israel should be careful not to make any commitments that cannot be fulfilled. However, Israel should alert Russia and others of the consequences to Iran of such threatening behavior. The roots of Azeri-Iranian tensions Iran’s hostility towards Azerbaijan began long before the latest crisis erupted. The tensions go back to the latter’s emergence as an independent nation (after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991) and the fear in Tehran that this might revive Azeri nationalism within Iran’s borders. This fear was (and to some extent still is) fed by memories of the period during and immediately after World War Two, when Iran was carved into British and Soviet occupation zones. The Soviets turned Iran’s northern regions into two autonomous Marxist national republics—one Azeri and the other Kurdish. The Soviet Union hoped to enshrine their independence (as Soviet dependencies) even after the war ended. It was only when the Truman administration sternly warned Stalin (backed by its nuclear monopoly, at the time) of the consequences that Stalin backed down and retreated from Iran. A significant part of Iran’s population (often estimated at above 20 percent) has Azeri roots (as does Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei). In northwestern Iran there are still occasional expressions of separatist sentiment, salient enough to warrant close surveillance and repression by the Iranian authorities. Moreover, in the first round of the war over the Nagorno Karabakh province (or Artzach, as the Armenians call it), Tehran supported Armenian Christian forces against the Azeris. The latter are Muslims, and indeed some 60 percent or more of them are Shi’ites. However, their tolerant and liberal interpretation of Islam does not sit well with that of the mullah-based regime in Iran. The Azeris lost a significant part of their territory in the first Nagorno-Karabakh war against Armenia. This was a war for control of a province largely populated by Armenians but annexed in the Soviet era to Azerbaijan. The struggle began even before the Soviet collapse and escalated into full-scale confrontation in 1993-1994. Following their defeat, Azeri leadership under Gaidar Aliev (father of the current president) turned to Israel for help. This resulted in a well-established relationship (although Azerbaijan has yet to open an embassy in Israel). After the second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, in which the tables were turned, much was made of Israel’s role (alongside that of Turkey) in changing the balance of power. This, in turn, fed Iranian suspicion and resentment, which also is based on Iran’s interpretation of the Israeli operational intelligence presence in Azerbaijan in recent years. Iran’s campaign of intimidation The Iranian military’s large-scale exercise last month near the border with Azerbaijan was perceived in Baku as an act of intimidation, and this was confirmed by the statements coming out of Iran. Tehran cast doubt on Aliyev’s political maturity (as compared with his late, highly experienced father); muttered darkly about “foreign influences” in Baku; and openly threatened to attack if such “influences” (i.e., the Israeli presence in Azerbaijan) persist. Adding to the sense of crisis was the recent decision by Azerbaijan to end the smuggling of oil from Iran to Armenia in falsely identified vehicles, activity which violates Western sanctions against Iran. This may well have been interpreted in Tehran as a provocation, possibly instigated by “external influences”—and thus as one more reason to bring pressure to bear on Baku. However, this alone is insufficient reason for such dramatic measures by Iran. The overt flexing of Iran’s muscles is indeed part of a broader pattern. Iran engages widely in violence by proxy, via the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza. Occasionally it also acts directly, as in this case. As tensions rise over Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran apparently hopes to intimidate countries in the region and warn them against offering any assistance to Israel and other forces aligned against the Iranian regime. Ultimately, Iran seeks to frustrate what they suspect to be Israel’s plans and to deter Israeli leadership from acting against Iran. Thus, the implications of Iranian pressure on Azerbaijan extend well beyond the confines of the southern Caucasus. It adds to a growing list of points of friction where the Iranian regime is overtly seeking to test the limits of international, Western and ultimately Israeli (and Arab) responses. What can be done? Israel must tread carefully in this complex region, where ancient hatreds often dominate. Overt statements should be avoided. While the existing understandings with the Azeri government should be upheld and discreet intelligence sharing should continue, it would be unwise for Israel to make any commitments that cannot be realized, and which may exacerbate regional tensions. At the same time, at the diplomatic level and as part of a broader discussion on Iran’s intentions and actions, Israel cannot ignore the Iranian pattern of intimidation. This should be one of the focal points in Israel’s ongoing effort to alert the U.S. administration and its Western allies to the escalating danger inherent in leaving Iranian actions unanswered. Moreover, the West is not the only relevant interlocutor. Russia, with which Israel has open and effective channels of communication, may have its own issues with the Azeri leadership. Russia is not likely to view with equanimity a foreign power threatening military action against any part of what the Russians refer to as the “near abroad” (meaning, the former Soviet space). Nor will Turkey, which offered Azerbaijan active support in the war of 2020, accept Iranian aggressive behavior. With all necessary caution, this is a point to be raised in the context of Turkey’s attempt to patch up relations with key Arab players who share Israel’s concerns about Iran. Ultimately, Iran is unlikely to risk a confrontation with a well-armed neighbor, in difficult terrain and with unforeseeable consequences. But the way Tehran now uses military intimidation, as well as terror by proxy and other means of threatening regional players, must become a factor in the formulation of Western policy towards Iran in this decisive period. * IDF Col. (res) Eram Lerman is vice president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies. He was deputy director for foreign policy and international affairs at the National Security Council in the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office. He held senior posts in IDF Military Intelligence for more than 20 years and teaches in the Middle East Studies program at Shalem College in Jerusalem. This article was first published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies.
In practice, some of the main roads to justice pass through The Hague.
On the one hand, The Hague is synonymous with key instruments of international humanitarian law. These include the 1899 Hague Conventions with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War, the 1907 Hague Regulations annexed to the 1899 Conventions and the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.
On the other hand, The Hague is where the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was established in 1945, where the onetime International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993 and where the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 2002.
To my frustration, however, the 1899 Hague Conventions, the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1954 Convention have all been flouted in Turkish-occupied Famagusta and in so many other parts of Cyprus. Just as frustratingly, Turkey, the main perpetrator of injustice in Cyprus, has tried to block the road to justice via The Hague.
Unlike Cyprus and 72 other states, Turkey has failed to make any declaration recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) established in The Hague in 1945.
Furthermore, unlike Cyprus and 122 other states, Turkey has not become a state party to the 1998 Rome Statute which established the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague in 2002; Turkey has not even signed the Statute.
As for the UN Security Council, despite establishing the ICTY in The Hague, it has failed to create any similar international criminal tribunal in either The Hague or elsewhere to deal with the countless unpunished international crimes committed in Cyprus.
It was in this climate of impunity that I have undertaken voluntary work to repatriate some of the thousands of icons, frescoes and other cultural artefacts which have been looted and illegally exported from the occupied area of Cyprus before being “sold” on the international market. This work has exposed me to a timeless truth: if law enforcement officers have the will to enforce the law through the courts, it is possible to provide a measure of justice to my homeland, even if this is limited to the retrieval and return of stolen artefacts.
During his tenure, Chrysostomos I, the late Archbishop of the autocephalous Greek Orthodox Christian Church of Cyprus, trusted me enough to supply me with the very best lawyers worldwide to work as advisors. Together, we ensured that the repatriation of cultural artefacts followed civil litigation, criminal proceedings or an appropriate method of alternative dispute resolution but NEVER through the purchase of looted items.
An example of a successful outcome is the one brought about by the protracted Lans case in the Netherlands. The case eventually resulted in the Dutch authorities recovering four 16th Century icons taken from the wooden iconostasis of the Monastery of Antiphonitis in Turkish-occupied Kyrenia District. The four icons were duly returned to Cyprus with the happy news announced during an international conference organized in September 2013 by Walk of Truth, the not-for-profit foundation instituted by me in The Hague. As a gesture of respect for my work, the Peace Palace in The Hague was made available for this purpose.
For me, this was a bitter-sweet moment. I was, of course, honored to have my work recognized by a conference held in the Peace Palace. In the words of the Carnegie Foundation, its custodian, the Peace Palace is not only “the worldwide icon” of the notion of “Peace through Law”. The Peace Palace is also a “temple of peace” which houses the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the ICJ. Nevertheless, despite the recovery of four icons, my home country of Cyprus and birthplace of Famagusta continued – and continues – to face ongoing injustice. Indeed, in 2014, just a few months after the conference held in The Hague, the injustice deepened when Prime Minister Erdogan transformed himself into President Erdogan and, in that way, tightened his authoritarian hold over Turkey and the Turkish-occupied north of Cyprus. Since 2014, the cruelties inflicted by the Erdogan regime have worsened and the injustice has deepened even more.
Unsurprisingly, Turkey has gone to great lengths to obstruct almost every road to justice in The Hague. On 30 September 2021, I was given a fresh reminder of this when the ICJ in The Hague issued a press release confirming that the ICJ, “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations”, would “hold public hearings in the case concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia) on Monday 18 and Tuesday 19 October 2021, at the Peace Palace in The Hague, the seat of the Court.”
The International Criminal Court building in The Hague, Netherlands
At the heart of this new case is the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), to which Azerbaijan and Armenia are state parties. Article 1.1 of the CERD defines “racial discrimination” as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.”
Under Article 2.1(a) of the CERD, every state party “undertakes to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions and to ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national and local, shall act in conformity with this obligation”.
When, in 1974, I and so many other citizens of Cyprus were forced out of our homes and thereby stripped of our human dignity, were we persecuted because of our national or ethnic origin? After 1974, were we de facto excluded from our homes for the same discriminatory reason? In other words, did we become – and do remain – the victims of discrimination and inequality caused by blatant violations of the CERD for which Turkey is responsible and for which Turkey should be held to account? If so, should the CERD be enforced so that every one of us can claim our legal rights, including those guaranteed by Article 5 such as the right “to freedom of movement and residence within the border of the State”, the right “to own property alone as well as in association with others” and the right “to inherit”?
Since 1974, these and so many other questions should have been referred to one or more courts in The Hague. Yet, even in relation to the CERD, the road to The Hague has been blocked by Turkey. Whereas Cyprus signed the CERD in 1965 and became a state party in 1967, Turkey signed in 1972 but did not ratify until 2002. Crucially, when Turkey ratified the CERD, it did so subject to an unusual “declaration” which Cyprus, Sweden and the UK interpreted as a “reservation”.
Below is the Turkish “declaration”, as published by the UN:
“The Republic of Turkey declares that it will implement the provisions of this Convention only to the States Parties with which it has diplomatic relations. The Republic of Turkey declares that this Convention is ratified exclusively with regard to the national territory where the Constitution and the legal and administrative order of the Republic of Turkey are applied. The Republic of Turkey does not consider itself bound by Article 22 of this Convention [under which ‘Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement’]. The explicit consent of the Republic of Turkey is necessary in each individual case before any dispute to which the Republic of Turkey is party concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention may be referred to the International Court of Justice.”
It is not difficult to see through this “declaration”. It has clearly been designed to achieve three dubious aims. One is to prevent Turkey from having to apply the CERD to Cyprus, with which it has not had any diplomatic relations since 1974. The second is to prevent Turkey from having to apply the CERD to the Turkish-occupied north of Cyprus. The third is to give Turkey a veto in response to any attempt to use the CERD as the basis of legal proceedings in the ICJ in The Hague. The end result is yet more discrimination, inequality and injustice.
In view of the above, I respectfully call upon the Government of Cyprus, the EU and the UN to answer the questions I have raised above. I also call upon each of them to answer a number of additional questions. What has each done to push Turkey into complying fully with the CERD? What has each done to protect my rights – and those of so many other victims of discrimination – under the CERD? What has each done to hold Turkey to account for its multiple ongoing violations of the CERD? What has each done to unblock – or to find a way around – the road to justice in The Hague? Put another way, what has each done to fulfil the vision of Erasmus by ensuring that justice “restrains bloodshed, punishes guilt, defends possessions and keeps people safe from oppression”?
I end with a personal plea addressed to the Prime Minister of my adopted country, the Netherlands, which has given me so much over the years.
Dear Prime Minister Mark Rutte,
Will you and the Government of the Netherlands please request the Government of Cyprus, the EU and the UN to answer the questions I have raised above? Will you please take all other necessary steps to champion the twin causes of peace and justice – for the sake of Cyprus, Europe and the whole of humanity? And will you please sponsor any necessary changes to Dutch legislation to enable these noble causes to be achieved in practice? If so, you will honor the memory of Erasmus and enhance the good name of my adopted city, The Hague, where I live so happily as a Dutch national with my family.
Yours sincerely
Tasoula Hadjitofi
Tasoula Hadjitofi is a human rights advocate and cultural campaigner whose expertise is cultural heritage preservation. She’s the founding president of the Walk of Truth and the author of the 2017 book “The Icon Hunter”.
TEHRAN – Two Iranian trade delegations have visited Armenia over the past month to explore avenues of mutual cooperation in various areas including plastic, polymers, agriculture, and foodstuff with Armenian counterparts, Iran’s commercial attaché in Yerevan announced.
“During their visit, the delegations examined the export potentials and barriers to trade cooperation between the two countries,” IRNA quoted Akbar Godari as saying on Friday.
According to the official, one of the mentioned delegations was comprised of businessmen and traders active in the polymer and plastics industry while the other one was mainly focused on agriculture and foodstuff areas.
During their visit, the polymer and plastics delegation met with the Iranian Ambassador to Yerevan, Abbas Badakhshan Zohuri, to discuss geopolitical issues, the importance of the Armenian market, the country’s trade-related laws and regulations, as well as issues related to mutual coproduction, Godari said.
“Chairman of Iran-Armenia Joint Chamber of Commerce Hervik Yarijanian, in a meeting with the Iranian delegation, emphasized the development of trade between the two countries and noted that the existing obstacles are hindering the growth and development of mutual exports and trade,” he added.
One of the requests of the businessmen in the meeting with Yarijanian was to exchange trade delegations while holding exhibitions in Iran, Godari said.
The agriculture and foodstuff delegation also met with the Iranian ambassador in Yerevan and also held talks with Yarijanian.
During their visit, they also visited some of Armenia’s major markets and held B2B meetings with their Armenian counterparts.
Earlier, Yarijanian had said that Iran-Armenia trade has fluctuated up to $500 million in recent years.
“By launching Moghri free zone in Armenia, next to the Aras free zone in Iran, the volume of exchanges between the two countries can be increased,” he stressed.
According to the official, the trade between the two countries can be increased to over $1.2 billion in less than a year.
EF/MA