This commentary was prepared by Mr Anri Stepanyan for the seventh issue of the Armenia Election Monitor 2026.
The upcoming elections that the Republic of Armenia will be facing next month will likely be one of the most decisive political moments for the country in the past decade. Ever since the Velvet Revolution in 2018, the country has undergone numerous internal and external processes that have significantly impacted its stance in the region, in the international arena, and the lives of its citizens. Much of this has been due to the change of regime in 2018, from the old-fashioned conservatives to the current ruling party and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who are commonly framed as “pro-Western”. The importance of the upcoming elections lies in the fundamentally different approaches of these two sides regarding the direction in which they want to steer Armenia.
The background:
The conservative bloc mainly consists of two parties, each associated with a different oligarch: Samvel Karapetyan of Strong Armenia and Robert Kocharyan of the Armenia Alliance. Both are in favor of continued alliance and cooperation with Russia, both reportedly receive Moscow’s support in the upcoming elections, and both made their fortunes through trade or business ties with Russia.
To this day, Russia remains one of Armenia’s largest trading partners, supplying most of Armenia’s wheat, natural gas, and a significant share of its petroleum products. Armenia exports to Russia alcohol, agricultural products, and, in recent years, has also served as a transit and re-export hub for certain Western-manufactured goods following sanctions imposed on Russia after 2022. All of this provides Armenia with a relatively stable income and stable prices for petroleum and food. Such co-operation is not surprising considering that both countries are members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Trade Zone.
Furthermore, the economy is not the only leverage Russia holds over Armenia. Moscow provided Yerevan with military equipment throughout the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It also established a military presence in Nagorno-Karabakh with the official reason stating: “it is necessary for the protection of the ethnic Armenians living there”. However, this security framework collapsed during the final conflict in September 2023, resulting in the involuntary displacement of approximately 120,000 ethnic Armenians from Karabakh to Armenia. This has led to an increased level of mistrust in Armenia, as Russia did not intervene to support it during the conflict, despite commitments to do so.
Despite this, both countries remain members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which continues to impact Armenia’s internal political landscape and Russia’s influence in the country, especially considering the continued existence of a Russian military base near Armenia’s second-largest city, Gyumri. All of this continues to provide Moscow with significant leverage in its bilateral relations with Armenia, making it possible to spread the Russian agenda within Armenian society and influence the country’s political direction as part of broader hybrid tactics.
The current ruling party of Nikol Pashinyan, Civil Contract, has taken a different approach. Instead of predominantly relying on Russia as previous governments did, they are attempting to diversify Armenia’s external relations and political partnerships. Over the past few years, Armenia has achieved its first major non-Russian bilateral military deal through the acquisition of Indian military technology beginning in 2022. The government has also established stronger ties with the European Union, particularly following the signing of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2017. EU–Armenia relations have increasingly deepened politically and institutionally, with both sides expressing a strong commitment to closer cooperation.
This process accelerated in 2024–2025, as the European Parliament acknowledged Armenia’s potential eligibility for EU membership, while domestic support for European integration grew through public initiatives and legislative action. This was followed by the formal endorsement of the goal of EU accession through the adoption of the EU Integration Act, demonstrating the government’s strategic shift toward closer alignment with the European Union despite pressure from Russia.
The government also managed to secure a regional connectivity agreement together with Azerbaijan, backed by the United States, through the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) initiative. The project aims to create a transport route through Armenia’s southern Syunik region connecting mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan, which could positively impact regional connectivity, trade potential, and Armenian–Azerbaijani relations after more than three decades of conflict. According to their official statements and agenda, Pashinyan’s party has pursued these initiatives in order to create a more diverse and peaceful political environment for the country.
The electoral methods and campaigns:
Both conservative factions are using relatively similar methods in their campaigns, which can broadly be divided into three categories. The first is the “blame game”, where they frame Nikol Pashinyan as a traitor to the Armenian people who not only lost the war in 2020 but also betrayed the Armenians of Karabakh in 2023 by refusing to re-enter the conflict.
The second aspect is the utilization of their assets both within the country and abroad. One example is the alleged purchasing of votes through distributing funds to ethnic Armenians living in Russia and Georgia’s Samtskhe-Javakheti region, where there is a large Armenian population. The criteria are relatively simple: the individual must possess dual citizenship, one of which is Armenian citizenship. On election day, they are transported to Armenia to vote for one of the opposition parties, with the aim of steering the elections in the opposition’s favor.
Finally, there is the spread of fear. As mentioned previously, Pashinyan is viewed by many as a pro-Western leader. The conservative narrative suggests that the West is not a trustworthy ally and would not support Armenia in the event of future armed conflict, unlike Russia, which they portray as a historical ally and neighbor. These narratives strongly align with the broader information flow within Russia itself.
Pashinyan’s own campaign strategy remains somewhat unclear. He appears to be taking a more grounded, door-to-door approach, presenting himself as a man of the people. However, this currently faces significant backlash from parts of society. Many continue to view him negatively because of the events mentioned above, particularly the outcome of the Karabakh conflicts and the arrival of approximately 120,000 displaced Armenians from Karabakh, many of whom hold strong anti-Pashinyan sentiments. Additionally, his official statements regarding Karabakh — framing the conflict as an unwise and ultimately suicidal war — remain deeply controversial within Armenian society. He has stated that the war should never have started in the first place. Unsurprisingly, this remains an extremely sensitive topic within society, as the wounds of more than three decades of conflict are still fresh, and many people have lost family members, friends, or loved ones in the war.
Possible outcomes:
Briefly discussing the potential outcomes of the upcoming elections, in the case of a Civil Contract victory, Armenia will likely continue its current course of diversifying its international relations and establishing new partnerships with both Western and Eastern actors, resulting in the country moving further away from Russian influence.
In the case of a conservative victory, there is a strong possibility that many of the initiatives and achievements of Pashinyan’s government over the past eight years could be reversed, bringing Armenia back into a stronger Russian sphere of influence. There is also a potential risk of renewed conflict over the Karabakh issue, as such instability would likely continue to serve as a powerful instrument of leverage for Russia over both the Armenian state and society.
Source: Mr Anri Stepanyan is a graduate of the Advanced Master’s in International Relations and Diplomacy at Leiden University and a Research Assistant at PMMG, focusing on geopolitical analysis, political forecasting, and qualitative research in international affairs. Check out PMMG here.