No progress over most important issues in talks with Azerbaijan, says Armenia’s top security official

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 11:52, 9 May 2023

YEREVAN, MAY 9, ARMENPRESS. Armenia and Azerbaijan haven’t made progress around the most important issues in the negotiations, the Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia Armen Grigoryan said on Tuesday.

He said that these most important issues concern the acknowledgment of the 29,800 square kilometers of Armenia’s sovereign territory and creation of an international mechanism for Stepanakert-Baku talks and international guarantees.

“Today, we can’t even preserve elements of the 9 November trilateral statement, because, for example, Azerbaijan must not be present in the Lachin Corridor under this statement, but it is there at this moment. It’s highly important for us to have international guarantees or an institute of guarantors for resolving such issues. So that everyone adheres to all agreements,” Grigoryan said.

Speaking about the latest Armenia-Azerbaijan talks in Washington D.C., Grigoryan did not disclose details but said that some progress has been made, albeit not over the most fundamental issues.

Mentioning the upcoming talks in Brussels, he added that Armenia will try to bring the approaches closer to one another as much as possible and move forward.

Grigoryan also commented on Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu’s remarks on the Nemesis monument in Yerevan. He said that the Turkish FM’s comments are inappropriate. “This is Armenia’s internal affair, and no one has the right to interfere,” he said. Grigoryan reiterated that Armenia wants to normalize relations with Turkey without preconditions.

Armenpress: The Prime Minister arrives in Moscow on a working visit

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 20:56, 8 May 2023

YEREVAN, MAY 8, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan arrived in Moscow on a working visit at the invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin. At “Vnukovo-2” airport, the Prime Minister was met by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mikhail Galuzin, ARMENPRESS was informed from the Office of the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister will attend the events dedicated to the victory in the Great Patriotic War to be held on May 9.




Asbarez: From Ecstasy to Agony: How Armenia’s 2018 Revolution Led to the 2020 Karabakh War

The Lachin Corridor has been blockaded by Azerbaijan since Dec. 12, 2022


BY GERARD KHATCHADOURIAN

In 1789, the ancien regime in France was toppled by mobs driven by the aspiration of establishing a more just and egalitarian society. The French Revolution promised universal liberty and equality, abolished royal titles and sought to radically transform society. But the fledgling republic soon found itself in an existential struggle against an alliance of Europe’s monarchies. These entrenched monarchies, fearful of the rapid spread of revolutionary ideology and apprehensive of similar uprisings among their own citizens, launched aggressive wars in a bid to suppress the ideas of the revolution.

Similar events can be observed in Russia in 1917. When a Bolshevik coup toppled the 300-year-old Romanov dynasty, Russia’s former allies landed troops to aid the White Russians loyal to the Tsar and stop the communist revolution. They were partially driven by fear of more “red revolutions” sweeping across the continent. This historic phenomenon can be observed time and time again. Revolutionary states are inherently destabilizing, and increase security concerns with rival states. The shake up of the status quo and balance of power leads to a higher propensity of open hostility with neighbors[1].

Indeed it is no coincidence that after Armenia experienced its own democratic revolution in 2018, Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s longtime autocratic ruler, launched a war of aggression in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Meanwhile, Russia, led by its own entrenched elites and Armenia’s nominal ally sat on the sidelines and watched Armenia’s revolution flounder. Like the regimes in Europe in 1789 and 1917, these autocratic states had a vested interest in seeing the ideas of a revolution fail.

There is some debate about whether the 2018 protest movement constitutes a revolution. While some argue it was a “coup from the streets,” or a simple change of power, the technical criteria does not change the fact that Armenia’s new leaders were perceived by Azerbaijan’s and Russia’s ruling elites as destabilizing revolutionaries and a threat to their own governments.

Both these regimes feared that the revolution directly challenged their forms of government. Vladimir Putin sees burgeoning democracies in Russia’s sphere of influence as a threat to his regime. Europe is replete with examples of Putin funding anti-democratic forces. Notably, after Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, Putin sought to undermine Mikheil Saakashvili’s government by invading Georgia in 2008. Similarly, Putin saw Ukraine’s Orange Revolution as a direct challenge to his power and Russian forces invaded Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 in an effort to install a Russia friendly government on its border[2]. While Putin did not intervene on behalf of Serzh Sargysan, Russia’s elites were suspicious of Nikol Pashinyan’s intentions and his rapprochement with the West[3].

 The revolution in Armenia also brought fears of democratic contagion to Azerbaijan’s ruling elite. Azerbaijan had similar concerns in 2011 when protests inspired by the Arab Spring erupted in Baku[4]. Hundreds were arrested amid a wider crackdown on civil society. With Georgia experiencing the Rose Revolution in 2003 and Armenia having its revolution in 2018, Azerbaijan’s elites feared they would be the last domino to fall in the Caucasus. Aliyev went as far as to ask Pashinyan directly from refraining from talking about the revolution in Armenia, out of fear of the revolution spreading to Azerbaijan[5].

The opposition in Azerbaijan frequently compared themselves to Armenia and were “jealous” of the outcome of the revolution, with a famous opposition journalist asking “Why is victory always on their side?”[6].  Aliyev feared that ordinary Azeris would want to emulate such an uprising to install a more democratic regime. Shortly after Sargsyan stepped down, Azerbaijan’s parliament took up a bill that would strengthen already-harsh penalties against illegal assemblies[7]. Aliyev feared that his own citizens would participate in uprisings and protests similar to those in 2011 and that would be fatal to his regime. From his perspective, it was essential that Pashinyan’s revolution be perceived as a failure.

Many revolutionary elites are poorly prepared for running a government[8].  They attempt to build a new regime by excluding experienced members of the existing government and replacing them with inexperienced members friendly with the revolution. They also take time to consolidate support amongst essential actors and fear a counterrevolution and the return of the old regime. In order to consolidate his revolution with average citizens, Pashinyan developed hawkish stances on Artsakh, publicly sparring with Aliyev on stage at the Munich Security Conference, and proclaiming, “Artsakh is Armenia” in Stepanakert. His public repudiation of the Madrid Principles, while popular at home, put further pressure on Aliyev to act. Pashinyan also chose a hawkish defense minister who proclaimed “new wars for new lands” as a direct threat to seize more territory from Azerbaijan[9]. These hawkish stances in effect took up one of the Sargysan administrations sources of legitimacy. Pashinyan essentially defanged the threat of counterrevolution in the name of protecting Artsakh by taking up the mantle of an Artsakh hawk. While this permanently damaged the negotiation process and increased chances of an armed conformation with Azerbaijan, it also helped Pashinyan consolidate support for his government by creating a “rally around the flag” effect.

Pashinyan also exaggerated the foreign threat to this revolution to further rally internal support. He took measures that further exacerbated the spiral of suspicion with Russia. He publicly challenged Russia by arresting the then head of the CSTO Yuri Khatchaturov and investigated Russian railroad companies. He also arrested Robert Kocharyan, a Putin ally, setting a dangerous example of a former head of state being arrested by a new regime, something unprecedented in the Russian sphere. Armenia also damaged relations by changing its United Nations votes to be a more critical of Russia[10]. Pashinyan also removed experienced members of the old regime from the bureaucracy, hurting the chances of Armenia and Russia understanding each other and seriously damaging relations. Experienced members of the old regime that stayed on such as President Armen Sargsyan had a strained relationship with Pashinyan.

Russia expressed its dissatisfaction with Pashinyan’s government multiple times. Putin did not visit Armenia until 2019 despite his frequent visits during the Sargysan administration,[11] and Putin made a point to wish his jailed ally Robert Kocharyan a happy birthday[12]. During the 2020 war, when Russia refused to provide the help Armenia needed, Pashinyan even offered to resign his government in exchange for more military aid, in essence acknowledging that his government’s rocky relationship with Russia may be the reason for the lack of support. 

Time was working both for and against the new Armenian government. Once power is consolidated, post-revolutionary states see a significant increase in defense capabilities[13]. They also tend to see a rapid rise in economic performance and an increase in prosperity for average citizens[14]. Aliyev knew that he had a short window to strike, before Pashinyan was able to consolidate his revolution and gain an advantage over Azerbaijan. Because of the disorder that followed the revolution internally in Armenia and with regard to relations with Russia, Azerbaijan decided that it was time to strike and strangle the revolution in the crib before it demonstrated success.

Armenian and Azeri soldiers engaged in a skirmish in July 2020[15]. Evidence suggests that Armenian troops took over abandoned Azeri positions and escalated the conflict by killing an Azeri general with a drone. As a response, a crowd of Azeris in Baku stormed the parliament building in protest, demanding that Aliyev take action against Armenia. This further heightened pressure on Aliyev to solve his Pashinyan problem. Aliyev who plays the role of a classic post-Soviet strongman also feared to be seen as the weaker party vis-a-vis Pashinyan.

Azerbaijan sought to delegitimize the Pashinyan government by launching a limited aims war that saw unexpected success. In September 2020, Azerbaijan attacked the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. The early days of the war saw a stalemate on the frontlines but Azeri troops were soon able to exploit a breakthrough in the south. During the war, Aliyev sought to personally embarrass Pashinyan and his government, claiming that the Armenian government “overestimated its global role.” In addresses to his country, Aliyev personally challenged Pashinyan, proclaiming “Ne odlu Pashinyan?” (what happened Pashinyan?) and calling Pashinyan “a stupid drunken clown.” Commentators noted that the attacks were of a personal nature, something notably absent during the Sargysan years.

Some argue that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had reached an inflection point. The decades long dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan was never resolved and some say war was inevitable. However, it is worth noting that the front was relatively quiet since the 1994 ceasefire with only smaller skirmishes taking place in April 2016 and full-blown war never breaking out. War erupted only 2 years into Pashinyan’s government. Perhaps due to inexperience, Pashinyan’s government badly miscalculated its own capabilities and the ability for Azerbaijan to gain territory[16].

The 2020 Karabakh War can be seen as a direct consequence of Armenia’s 2018 revolution. The revolution led to a change in government and a shift in Armenia’s political landscape, with the rise of inexperienced leaders to the helm. Azerbaijan’s autocratic ruler, Ilham Aliyev, and Russia’s entrenched elites were both wary of the democratic contagion that might spread to their own countries. They viewed Pashinyan’s government as a threat to their own forms of government, saw its weakness and isolation and sought to strangle it.

Gerard Khatchadourian is a political analyst in Washington, D.C.


[1] Walt, S. M. (n.d.). Revolution and War.

[2] Person, R., & McFaul, M. (2022, April). What Putin Fears Most. Journal of Democracy.

[3] Smith-Park, L. (2018, May 2). CNN.

[4] Klomegah, K. (2011, April 12). Arab Spring knocks at Azerbaijan’s door. Al-Jazeera.

[5] It was not me who turned to Aliyev, but he turned to me with a request. Pashinyan uncovers some details. First Channel News. (2020, September 28). st1yle=”font-size:16px;margin:0px 0px 1.25em;padding:0px;border:0px;line-height:inherit;,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline”>[6] Manukyan, S. (2018, May 8). Reactions to Pashinyan’s Premiership. The Armenian Weekly.

[7] Adilgizi, L. (2018, April 27). Azerbaijan watches Armenian rebellion with jealousy and hope. Eurasianet. Retrieved from st1yle=”font-size:16px;margin:0px 0px 1.25em;padding:0px;border:0px;line-height:inherit;,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline”>[8] Walt, S. M. (n.d.). Revolution and War.

[9] Cornell, S. (2020, November 14). How Did Armenia So Badly Miscalculate Its War with Azerbaijan? The National Interest.

[10] Mejlumyan, A. (2019a, June 5). In nod to Georgia, Armenia changes UN vote. Eurasianet. st1yle=”font-size:16px;margin:0px 0px 1.25em;padding:0px;border:0px;line-height:inherit;,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline”>[11] Mejlumyan, A. (2019, October 2). In Armenia, Eurasian Union meets Velvet Revolution. Eurasianet. Retrieved from st1yle=”font-size:16px;margin:0px 0px 1.25em;padding:0px;border:0px;line-height:inherit;,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline”>[12] Putin‌ ‌wishes‌ ‌friend,‌ ‌ex-president‌ ‌of‌ ‌Armenia‌ ‌Kocharyan‌ ‌happy‌ ‌birthday‌ . JAM News. (2020, January 9). Retrieved from st1yle=”font-size:16px;margin:0px 0px 1.25em;padding:0px;border:0px;line-height:inherit;,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline”>[13] Carter, J., Bernhard, M., & Palmer, G. (2012). Social Revolution, the State, and War: How Revolutions Affect War-Making Capacity and Interstate War Outcomes. The Journal of Conflict Resolution.

[14] Acemoglu, D. (2014, May 20). Does democracy boost economic growth? World Economic Forum. Retrieved from st1yle=”font-size:16px;margin:0px 0px 1.25em;padding:0px;border:0px;line-height:inherit;,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline”>[15] Stronski, P. (n.d.). Behind the Flare-Up Along Armenia-Azerbaijan Border. Carnigie Endowment for International Peace.

[16] Cornell, S. (2020, November 14). How Did Armenia So Badly Miscalculate Its War with Azerbaijan? The National Interest.

Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Negotiations


U.S. Embassy in Armenia
May 8 2023
PRESS STATEMENT
ANTONY J. BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE
MAY 4, 2023
This week I hosted Azerbaijan Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov and Armenia Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan for bilateral peace negotiations at the George P. Schultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center. After an intensive and constructive series of bilateral and trilateral discussions, the parties made significant progress in addressing difficult issues. Both demonstrated a sincere commitment to normalizing relations and ending the long-standing conflict between their two countries.
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed in principle to certain terms and have a better understanding of one another’s positions on outstanding issues. I have proposed the Ministers to return to their capitals to share with their governments the perspective that, with additional goodwill, flexibility, and compromise, an agreement is within reach. They will continue to have the full support and engagement of the United States in their effort to secure a durable and sustainable peace.

Armenia Wants to Become Operator in Iran’s Chabahar Port

TASNIM NEWS AGENCY
Iran – May 8 2023

The decree, which was posted on the government’s website, aims to organize a multimodal high-speed route for international cargo transportation via Armenia, Armenian News Agency ARKA reported.

The task force’s objectives include discussions and development of a new corridor for cargo transportation that will connect the countries of East Asia, India, and Iran with Europe through Georgia and the Black Sea, as an alternative to the North-South international transport corridor.

The task force, which will be led by the Armenian Minister of Economy, will report to the Prime Minister on a quarterly basis on the progress of the project, with final results due before November 1, 2023. The task force is also tasked to establish contacts and discuss technical and other issues with relevant departments of India, Georgia, and Iran.

In April, Yerevan hosted the first political consultations in trilateral format between the Foreign Ministries of Armenia, Iran, and India. The meeting discussed new economic, regional, and communication channels, as well as the prospects for deepening trilateral cooperation in various areas.

Last year, Arsen Avagyan, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Armenia to Iran, stated that the “North-South” highway would significantly reduce the distance between Iran and Georgia. After the completion of the construction of that highway, it will be possible to deliver cargo from Chabahar, Bandar Abbas, and other southern Iranian ports to the Georgian ports of the Black Sea within 2-3 days, further continuing the route to Europe.

​President of Armenia: ‘You need to live in peace with your neighbours’

VARSITY, UK
Cambridge Univ. Student Newspaper
May 8 2023

President of Armenia: ‘You need to live in peace with your neighbours’

HE Vahagn Khachaturyan on his presidency, Armenia’s conflict with Azerbaijan, and his will for peace.


by Sophie Denny

For someone whose country is currently in intensive peace talks with Azerbaijan, the President of Armenia is surprisingly relaxed as he sits across from me ahead of his Cambridge Union talk.

After assuming the presidency last year, Vahagn Khachaturyan stated he wanted to be a unifying figure. When asked whether he feels he’s achieved this in his first year as President, he takes a moment to think: “it’s very difficult to do”, he tells me; tensions with Armenia’s neighbours create difficulties both internally and externally, despite his desire to be unifying being “very great”. The ongoing dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan is over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, a conflict which lasted “for more than 30 years” and caused his predecessor, Armen Sarkissian, to resign because of his lack of influence in times of emergency. Khachaturyan, however, does not share this feeling, emphatically declaring: “if there is a law, I shall move by the law”. He evidently has no intention of overstepping his constitutional role, understanding that when you have such power “you should know your capacities and also the limits”.

“Corruption was more governing the country than the state institutions”

I begin to wonder if his commitment to ensuring that he stays firmly within the confines of his position is rooted in a desire to tackle Armenia’s history of systemic corruption, but he preempts me: “corruption was more governing the country than the state institutions”, he acknowledges. When questioned about how to resolve this, he replies: “It’s a very simple formula”. He makes it clear that confronting the issue requires the collaboration of the whole country; while the first steps focusing on governmental corruption have been successful, the President also says that the “citizenship must be supporters of combating corruption, not parties of corruption”. For a country fragmented by civil unrest, such as the anti-government protests following the 44-day war with Azerbaijan in Autumn 2020, the nationwide collaboration needed to tackle corruption is difficult to achieve.

Armenia’s ability to develop internally is reliant on peace with neighbouring nations. How will Armenia and Azerbaijan be able to reach a peaceful agreement? “You need to live in peace with your neighbours, regardless of all factors. Even if you hate each other … you should still live in peace, same as in life.”

“We don’t want the settlement of the issues in our region to become the occasion for another conflict”

Although we are relying on a translator to communicate, his tone is that of an astute, judicious politician ready to steer his country towards a truce: to me, his desire for conciliation is clear. “You should re-evaluate the balance of losing and winning”, he says, before joking that the “big Armenia” many still yearn for existed “about 2000 years ago”. Despite saying this with a laugh, his comment is a stark reminder of the importance of maintaining realistic expectations within peace discussions, with both sides needing to be prepared to compromise.

Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan are a matter of international interest, with the recent peace talks held in Washington D.C., and Khachaturyan is not afraid of addressing the elephant in the room: Russia’s influence in the region. “We don’t want the settlement of the issues in our region to become the occasion for another conflict between Russia and other countries”, he says carefully, demonstrating his awareness of the current volatility of the international stage. This makes it all the more important that their dispute should be resolved swiftly, although history suggests that this prospect will not be easily enacted.


I ask the President what he hopes to achieve during the rest of his presidency, and he chuckles. It was almost certain that his reply would be: “Most importantly, peace”. He is clearly tired of years of fighting.
“When I started, my daughter … was one month old. Now my youngest granddaughter is four years old and we still have this problem. I don’t want to leave this issue to the generation of my grandchildren. I want them to live in peace and friendship with their neighbours”. This moving sentiment shows dedication to achieving peace is derived from the powerful force of love. He understands both personally as well as politically that too many generations have suffered, and he is not prepared to let this continue. As our discussion comes to a close, his final statement is characteristic of the quietly compelling, wise remarks he has offered throughout: “It’s not always that speaking loudly brings you success.”

Chinese Foreign Minister to visit Germany, France and Norway

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 12:44, 8 May 2023

YEREVAN, MAY 8, ARMENPRESS. Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang will visit Germany, France and Norway from May 8 to 12.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry announced the visit on May 8.

“At the invitation of German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna and Norwegian Foreign Minister Anniken Huitfeldt, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang will pay a visit to Germany, France and Norway from May 8 to 12,” Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin said in a .

Turkish intel agency MIT uses journalism to mask undercover agents, assets and informants

May 1 2023

Turkish intelligence agency MIT has been using journalism as a cover to infiltrate and collect intelligence in other countries, dispatching its agents and assets as reporters to engage in spying, several sources familiar with the modus operandi of MIT told Nordic Monitor.

“Mostly it was reporters who worked for state news agency Anadolu and Turkish Radio and Television [Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu, TRT] who were tapped as assets by MIT,” said one source who had served in a senior position in Turkish military intelligence. The source, who spoke anonymously for fear of repercussions from the Turkish government, said these reporters regularly filed reports and coordinated their work with their handlers.

Yahya Bostan, the news coordinator for Anadolu, is one of those who work for Turkish intelligence. He had previously worked as news coordinator for TRT News for four years between 2017 and 2021. Before moving to the state-funded media, he was employed by the Sabah newspaper, owned by the Turkish president’s family. Bostan often writes articles praising MIT in his weekly column for the Islamist Yeni Şafak daily.

Bostan was red flagged during a 2011-2014 terrorism probe into Iran’s Quds Force network in Turkey and listed as a suspect by prosecutors. He was put under surveillance and his phones were tapped by prosecutors who secured court warrants to determine Bostan’s clandestine connections. The investigation revealed he was regularly in contact with several high-profile Quds Force operatives. Prosecutors also discovered he was coordinating his activities with Nuh Yılmaz, a senior MIT official known for his anti-Israel and pro-mullah regime views who had worked for an Iranian-funded Turkish publication in the 1990s. The Quds Force probe was killed by the government of then-prime minister and current president Recep Tayyip Erdogan in February 2014 after it exposed a number of senior officials’ links to Quds Force cells.

 

Judge’s warrant authorizing the wiretapping of Yahya Bostan’s phone in the IRGC Quds Force probe: 

“Assets in the opposition media are quite valuable in helping the intelligence agency run its influence campaign to shape the national debate around certain issues effectively,” said another source who asked that his name to be withheld for security reasons. The perceived opposition journalists run fewer risks for triggering red flags during clandestine work, the source underlined.

Documentary evidence and leaks in recent years revealed by Nordic Monitor have confirmed what the sources described, presenting a distinguishable pattern of this modus operandi.

Using journalism as a cover in overseas operations to gather intelligence is perhaps more valuable for the agency than using it for domestic operations in Turkey, where it has more resources and assets in friendly territory. Journalists’ access to foreign government institutions and officials as well as people and entities in the nongovernmental corporate and nonprofit sectors provides a valuable avenue for gathering intelligence for MIT.

 

Secret document filed by Turkish prosecutor Adem Özcan asking the the court to authorize a wiretap for Quds Force suspect Yahya Bostan: 

In many cases, press credentials were used to mask clandestine operations that would otherwise run the risk of exposure and trigger closer scrutiny by host countries’ intelligence services. In some cases journalists who want to register in host countries or with international organizations are required to provide credentials from Turkish embassy press sections, which come in handy for managing and coordinating MIT’s operations.

In one recent case, a MIT agent was caught in Ukraine in 2019 when he was posing as a journalist to monitor the extradition proceedings of Nuri Gökhan Bozkır, an ex-military officer and arms smuggler who provided arms to jihadists in Syria on behalf of the Erdogan government. During a hearing at an Ankara court on February 12, 2023 , Bozkır related how an intelligence officer showed up to a hearing in Kiev in 2019. When court officials questioned the agent’s credentials, he claimed to be a Turkish journalist but was later found to be an intelligence officer and was escorted from the courtroom.

In some cases, MIT also positions its agents as press attachés at Turkish embassies, with the foreign ministry providing them with diplomatic credentials. Swiss prosecutors exposed one such situation in 2018 when they issued an arrest warrant for Hacı Mehmet Gani, who worked as press attaché at the Turkish embassy in Bern. Gani and Hakan Kamil Yerge, second secretary at the embassy, were accused of orchestrating a plot to kidnap a businessman who was a critic of the Turkish president. The supposed diplomats fled Switzerland before the arrest warrants were served.

On the home front, MIT has aggressively been pursuing a public information campaign to impact the domestic agenda and create a narrative that would best serve the Islamist government of President Erdogan as well as its militant, neo-nationalist allies. During the two decades of Erdogan’s rule, MIT has taken this operation using journalism as a cover to a new level by overhauling what used to be a low-key press section and turning it into part of a psychological and influence operation (PSYOP) department, recruiting many reporters, photographers and social media influencers.

There is no single program at the agency that coordinates all the agents, assets and informants in media outlets. Instead, multiple departments at MIT have their own group of journalists to handle. Due to compartmentalization and separation on a strictly need-to-know basis at the agency, handlers of journalists for one department may not know which journalists work for another department. The entire picture of who’s who and who works for which department that uses undercover agents in the media is only for the eyes of the MIT chief, Hakan Fidan, an Erdogan confidant.

Only a fraction of MIT agents and assets have been exposed in recent years, and their identities were revealed thanks to court documents, leaks and whistleblowers. It represents only the tip of the iceberg and does not truly reveal the extent and depth of MIT operations in the journalism field.

Perhaps the most notorious case is that of Hayri Birler, who had worked for the Hürriyet. Milliyet and Turkish Daily News (later renamed the Hürriyet Daily News) dailies in Ankara in the 1980s and 1990s. He had been a MIT agent and worked undercover as a journalist for years before he was ordered to leave the media and serve as regional director for the agency in Turkey’s Diyarbakır province. He is now retired.

Nuh Yılmaz is another MIT agent who had worked in the US and Turkey as a journalist before he was appointed head of the agency’s press department in 2013. Yılmaz, a protégé of Fidan, was later promoted to the counterespionage department and plays an instrumental role in influence operations on behalf of the agency.

Yılmaz runs a number of agents, assets and informants in traditional Turkish media outlets as well as online news websites, some of which are obscure and serve to muddy the waters by floating conspiracy theories. The leaked emails of President Erdogan’s son-in-law Berat Albayrak revealed in 2016 that MIT was feeding information to his agents planted in the Sabah daily, owned by Erdogan’s family. Emails from 2012 showed that Abdurrahman Şimşek, Ferhat Ünlü and Nazif Karaman were in the loop and receiving information from the agency.

At the direction of the agency, this trio wrote a book in December 2018 on the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was assassinated by Saudi government operatives at the Saudi Consulate General in Istanbul on October 2, 2018. The information surrounding the murder was provided by MIT, which had bugged the consulate before sending Khashoggi and his Turkish fiancée there as part of the Erdogan government’s move to gain leverage over Saudi Arabia.

Ünlü wrote several books promoting MIT and how the agency has successfully completed espionage operations under Fidan. For several years now, Şimşek has been working with a team of MIT agents in hunting down investigative journalists who fled Turkey to escape wrongful imprisonment by the Erdogan regime. The secret photos, home addresses and daily routines of journalists in the US and Europe, apparently obtained as part of long-running surveillance programs, were published in the Sabah daily by Şimşek and his colleagues in the spy agency.

Another exposure of a MIT agent was made in 2011, when prosecutors investigated a series of terrorist attacks in Istanbul. The police detained dozens of people who were connected to the attacks. One of the detainees was a Turkish photojournalist named Mustafa Özer, who had long been working for Agence France-Presse (AFP). During police questioning Özer revealed his MIT identity and detailed the clandestine infiltration and intelligence-gathering operations he and MIT agents were involved in. He even revealed how MIT directed him to set up a fake news website to make the operations appear to be legitimate journalistic activity.

Hande Fırat, the Hürriyet daily’s Ankara bureau chief and anchor of a debate program on CNN Türk, is a MIT operative whose frequent visits to MIT headquarters were exposed in court records and reported on by Nordic Monitor. Her role in a 2016 coup attempt with a staged interview of Erdogan on FaceTime was revealed to be part of a false flag operation planned by the intelligence agency.

Fatih Altaylı, a TV host and editor-in-chief of the HaberTürk daily, has been revealed to be on MIT’s payroll for a long time. The revelation was made by Mehmet Eymür, a retired MIT official who served in senior positions in the agency’s special bureau and counterterrorism and operations departments for many years. According to him, Altaylı was recruited for his links to leftist groups and was regularly invited to MIT headquarters for debriefings and to receive new instructions.

“Altaylı was the number one agent of the MIT Istanbul Regional Directorate when I worked for the agency. He approached the agency [for recruitment] by revealing that he had special relations with some terrorist organizations,” Eymür said. The journalist was using the code name Siyah (Black), according to the intelligence agency’s records.

Tuncay Özkan, a former journalist who is now a lawmaker from the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), is another MIT agent who had for a long time used journalism as a cover. Thanks to his special ties to the agency, Özkan had quickly gone from being a reporter involved in clandestine operations in the 2000s, even running afoul of the criminal justice system, to being the owner of a TV network. Özkan is believed to be one of the Trojan horses in the opposition bloc who maintains close ties with his handler, Şenkal Atasagun, a former head of the intel agency and currently chief advisor to far-right leader Devlet Bahçeli.

A book he wrote titled “Mit’in Gizli Tarihi” (The Secret History of MIT), which was published in 2010, was a special project contracted by MIT to promote the agency.

Mehmet Faraç, who had worked for the leftist, nationalist Cumhuriyet daily until 2010, is reportedly another journalist who works for the intel agency. His links to the agency were revealed during the Ergenekon trials between 2009 and 2012 and were confirmed in November 2021 by Akın Atalay, the former chairman of the board at Cumhuriyet. He currently works for the far-right Yeniçağ news outlet.

The revelations made by two senior MIT officials, Erhan Pekçetin and Aydın Günel, who were captured by the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Iraq’s Kurdish city of Sulaymaniyah on August 4, 2017, also provided insight into journalists who work for the agency. Pekçetin was head of the department responsible for ethnic and separatist groups operating outside of Turkey’s borders, while Günel used to manage the human resources department at MIT, responsible for developing human intelligence in the field and bringing in new recruits and informants.

The two said MIT expanded its operations in media outlets after Fidan became the country’s top spy and transferred Yılmaz to the agency, which irritated career intelligence officials. Yılmaz had no intelligence background and had been red flagged for having worked for a radical, Iranian-funded publication in the 1990s as well as for his ties to the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakfı, or IHH), a jihadist charity organization with links to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

 

Nevertheless, with support from Fidan and the government, Yılmaz was put in charge of running assets in Turkish media outlets. MIT officials also confirmed Fırat’s frequent visits to intelligence headquarters for briefings and debriefings.

According to MIT officials who had been exposed, Çetiner Çetin, a journalist working for Habertürk, and Cem Küçük, who works for the Türkiye newspaper and often appears as a commentator on Turkish TV, are also connected to the intelligence agency.

Unfortunately, there is no oversight of the intelligence agency by the Turkish parliament, and a committee established to oversee of the agency was rendered ineffective and has rarely convened in recent years. The opposition has also failed to raise the use of journalism as a cover for agents on various platforms, largely remaining silent about the revelations in recent years.

Turkish intelligence enjoys broad immunity under amended Turkish law thanks to the Erdogan government and acts with impunity even if it’s breaking existing laws. Erdogan protected Fidan in 2012 when prosecutors discovered that criminals who were terrorizing the streets of Istanbul were on the MIT payroll. In 2014, when MIT agents were busted near the Turkish-Syrian border while illegally trafficking arms for jihadist groups in Syria, Erdogan intervened again to kill the investigation.

https://nordicmonitor.com/2023/05/turkish-intelligence-agency-mit-uses-journalism-to-mask-undercover-agents-assets-and-informants/





India, Iran, and Armenia: Trilateral Cooperation and Geopolitics of Trade Routes

May 7 2023
ADITI BHADURI


Recently, on 20 April, the first trilateral political consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Republic of India were held. The meeting took place in the Armenian capital of Yerevan. The delegations were headed by Mnatsakan Safaryan, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia, Seyed Rasoul Mousavi, the Assistant of the Foreign Minister of Iran, Head of the Regional General Department of South Asia and J P Singh, the Joint Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs of India.

“During the meeting, the sides particularly discussed economic issues and regional communication channels and outlined the prospects of deepening cultural and people-to-people contacts as well as trilateral cooperation in various fields. The sides agreed to continue consultations in a trilateral format,” a statement by the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said.

Economic issues and regional communication channels are key to this trilateral cooperation, which has been in the making for a while and is inevitable. The meeting also came soon after tensions erupted between Iran and Azerbaijan, Armenia’s arch-enemy when the latter arrested some men on charges of espionage for Iran.

India has been, in recent years, deepening its ties with Armenia, with which it already had ancient, civilizational ties. More recently, it has been supplying weapons to Armenia, as the latter found itself embroiled in military conflict with Azerbaijan over the contested territory of Nagorny-Karabakh, while Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey increased cooperation, including in the military sphere with Pakistan.

However, India’s cooperation with Iran and Armenia, both of whom share a common border, are important for its connectivity ambitions too, and much of the trilateral cooperation will undoubtedly be focused on that.

Since its victory over Armenia in the 2020 Karabakh war, Azerbaijan has been making, albeit indirectly, irredentist claims on lands that it believed historically belonged to it. Some of these are in Northern Iran, also known as Southern Azerbaijan. The war also resulted in some bordering areas of friendly Armenia now becoming part of Iran’s border with Azerbaijan. A year later, Baku conducted military drills on its territory together with Turkey and Pakistan. Iran is also wary of Israeli presence on Azerbaijan’s territory, though for India Israel is a close friend.

However, Azerbaijan’s pro-Pakistan position on Kashmir complements Turkey’s belligerence on Kashmir. For instance, last year on 27 October an event hosted by Pakistan’s embassy in Baku to commemorate “Kashmir Black Day”, was attended by members of Azerbaijan’s parliament as well as officials from its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both India and Iran are wary of Baku’s newfound belligerence.

However, more importantly, it is the politics of the international trade routes that have been a major driving force behind the trilateral alliance. A common threat for all three would be the Zangezur Corridor which Azerbaijan has been insisting on since the time it won the Second Karabakh war.

But what is the Zangezur Corridor?

The Zangezur Corridor is a land corridor that Azerbaijan envisages would connect it to the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan in western Armenia and onward to Turkey without Armenian border control over it. It cuts through Armenia’s southernmost province of Syuni which borders Iran’s Azeri province in the north. Armenians explain they are not against any land corridor as connectivity is critical for countries like it. However, since it runs through Armenian territory, it should be subject to Armenian control.

For both Azerbaijan and Turkey, this land corridor without Armenian control would open up routes to Central Asia, fan pan-Turkism, and would give Azerbaijan control over the borders with Iran which it can then cut off at will, cutting Iran completely off from northern route, rendering the 7,200-km long International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)  – a multimodal trade route which connects India to the Russian Federation through Iran – useless, or put it at the will of Azerbaijan-Turkey combine.

In 2021 in a joint press conference together with Turkish President Reccep Tayyip Erdogan Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev said that “Both Turkey and Azerbaijan will take necessary steps for the realization of the Zangezur Corridor” which would “unite the entire Turkic world.”

Most Armenians as well as Iran see the corridor as a joint Azerbaijan-Turkey project.

This is also why Iran is against the corridor. Since the 2020 Karabakh war, while Iran cheered for Azerbaijan, it has also been warning against any changes to Armenia’s international borders – effectively any change in Iran’s borders with Armenia, which gives it land access to Russia, the Black Sea and beyond through the territory of a friendly country. In a recent article the former Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kamal Kharazi, now Director of Iran’s Strategic Council of Foreign Relations, made a stark warning against the Zangezur Corridor, in the model that Azerbaijan envisages, which Iran sees as a NATO-created Turan (pan-Turkic) corridor.

Reporting on the 20 April meeting the Iranian media also referred to trade routes and underscored Iran’s antipathy to the Zangezur Corridor.

For India, this is also bad tidings. In case Azerbaijan gets its way with the corridor, Indian access would be subject to its will, and it can cut off access anytime. It is a scenario all parties would like to preempt.

This is why perhaps both Iran and India have, for a while, been mulling having the International North South Transit Corridor run through Armenia and not through Azerbaijan, as earlier envisaged. In 2021, India invited Armenia too, along with its traditional partners, to the virtual meeting to mark Chabahar Day, even as it pitched for connecting the Chabahar port to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port which connects to the INSTC.

Soon after, the Indian Ambassador to Iran, Gaddam Dharmendra announced that India was planning to connect the Chabahar port, which India is investing in, on Iran’s eastern coast and the Indian Ocean with Eurasia and Helsinki through the INSTC which would run through the territory of Armenia.

Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization, Alireza Peymanpak, announced not long after: “Two alternative Iran-Eurasia transit routes will replace Azerbaijan’s route. First opens in a month via Armenia after [the] end of repair work, and the second via sea by purchasing and renting vessels.”

For all three countries, therefore, trilateral cooperation is imperative to keep communication and trade routes open. This would mean, first and foremost, to ensure Armenia’s territorial integrity. Azerbaijan, strategic thinkers converge, is acting not only in its own interest but largely also fulfilling the Turkish agenda. Turkey’s military inroads into South Asia are already substantial. With Azerbaijan is closely allied with both Pakistan and China, trilateral Indian, Iranian, and Armenian cooperation is inevitable. 

(Aditi Bhaduri is a journalist and political analyst. She tweets @aditijan. This is an opinion piece. The views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)


Artsakh Armenians continue protest on Stepanakert-Shushi road

NEWS.am
Armenia – May 6 2023

A group of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) Armenians continue their protest on the Stepanakert-Shushi roadway, the Artsakh Public TV reports.

The young activists of the “NO to the ethnic cleansing in Artsakh” movement started an indefinite protest on May 2, setting up tents on the road.

They demand the removal of the Azerbaijani checkpoint from the Lachin Corridor, the only road in and out of Artsakh.

A public discussion was also held at the protest site. The activists stress that they are not going to end the protest until their demands are met.