WHO GETS IN: AND WHAT HAPPENS ONCE THEY’RE HERE
by Peter Skerry
The Weekly Standard
September 15, 2008 Monday
The New Case Against Immigration
Both Legal and Illegal
by Mark Krikorian
Sentinel, 304 pp., $25.95
The New Case Against Immigration lives up to its title. Mark Krikorian,
executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies, Washington’s
most respected restrictionist voice, has produced a radical but
constructively provocative case for the fundamental incompatibility of
mass immigration with mature modern societies. Arguing that America
has outgrown mass immigration, he mounts a frontal assault on all
its forms-legal as well as illegal, skilled as well as unskilled.
One does not have to agree with Krikorian to see that this is no
screed by a neo-Malthusian doomsayer, or nativist zealot. Neither
does it bear any trace of the outraged naivete that characterizes so
much restrictionist commentary. The grandson of Armenian immigrants,
Krikorian has produced a well-researched, policy savvy book whose
comprehensiveness and verve ought to embarrass Washington’s major
think tanks, which veer between narrowly technical and evasively
high-minded approaches to the topic.
At the core of Krikorian’s analysis is his refrain: "It’s not
the immigrants, it’s us." He explicitly rejects the view that
immigrants today, especially Hispanics, are unwilling or unable to
assimilate. Rather, he argues that they are not assimilating because
multicultural elites are encouraging them not to, through such
misguided policies as foreign-language ballots, bilingual education,
ethnic studies programs, and dual citizenship. He also emphasizes
how Spanish-language electronic media and easy air travel back home
similarly retard assimilation.
Yet these familiar points do not represent Krikorian’s strongest
suit. In fact, he ignores abundant evidence that, despite such
multicultural efforts, Hispanic immigrants and their children are
learning English and adopting American values. And while he correctly
highlights the potential problems posed by huge concentrations of
immigrants from one social, cultural, linguistic group (Hispanics),
Krikorian goes too far when he asserts that its largest component,
Mexican immigrants and their offspring, is "marginalized from the
American mainstream."
Nevertheless, Krikorian dismisses restrictionist nightmares about
Chicano radicals bringing about a reconquista by Mexico of territory
lost to the United States in 1848. Readily acknowledging "the genuine
American patriotism of millions of Hispanic citizens," he prudently
chooses not to obsess about Mexican flags at street demonstrations
and soccer games. "There will be no secession of the Southwest from
the Union," he concludes. Yet he does insist that the loyalty of
Hispanics "doesn’t change the fact that Mexico is already actively
involved in American domestic politics ostensibly on their behalf." He
argues persuasively that, while Americans are not paying attention,
Mexico is advancing its own national agenda based on its sense of
historical grievance, demanding for Mexican citizens in the United
States, and even for Mexican Americans, prerogatives and rights
that are not enjoyed by Mexico’s own foreign nationals, and even
naturalized citizens. Yet again, Krikorian pushes the point too
far when he concludes: "In a modern society there are two choices:
mass immigration accompanied by a progressive loss of sovereignty,
or protection of sovereignty through limits on immigration."
Similarly strained is Krikorian’s perspective on immigration and
national security. He is certainly correct to dismiss the foolish
rhetoric that "there’s no relationship between immigration and
terrorism." Usefully, he shows how Homeland Security is overwhelmed by
the monitoring of the entry and exit of millions of individuals every
year. Emphasizing the customer service mentality that seeks to keep
the traffic moving with minimal delays, he again stresses that the
problem is not immigrants, but us. Focusing on America’s failure to
grasp the full implications of today’s asymmetric warfare, he argues
that immigrant communities are potential staging areas for terrorists.
This is undoubtedly true, but is that the end of the story? For
example, he never considers the evidence that Muslim Americans can
be valuable assets in the struggle against Islamist terrorists.
Krikorian is on more solid footing when addressing the demographic
implications of immigration. He points out that because immigrants only
slightly increase America’s fertility rate, they reduce the average age
of the population minimally. So immigrants won’t solve America’s Social
Security problems. Nevertheless, they do contribute significantly to
overall population growth, which he regards as too high to sustain
Americans’ present quality of life: "The real population question
for Americans is not whether a Malthusian catastrophe awaits us but
rather what kind of life we will bequeath to our grandchildren."
Krikorian is particularly deft when analyzing the impact of immigration
on government spending. He lays out the data demonstrating conclusively
that immigrants are a net fiscal burden, now and in the foreseeable
future, especially at the state and local levels. As have others,
he points out that one-fourth of those without health insurance
are immigrants. But digging deeper, he points out that most of the
growth in the uninsured is traceable to immigrants. He invokes Milton
Friedman’s observation that "you can’t have free immigration and a
welfare state." But unlike many free-marketeers and libertarians,
he rejects the notion that immigration can be used to undermine the
welfare state. Self-conscious realist that he is, Krikorian sees that
Americans lack the political will to deny social welfare benefits to
immigrants and their children, pointing to failed efforts to do so amid
welfare reform during the 1990s. As he concludes, "Walling immigrants
off from government benefits once we’ve let them in is a fantasy."
Most compelling is Krikorian’s analysis of the economic impact of
immigration. Drawing on the research of economist George Borjas
and others, he demonstrates that immigrants represent an increasing
proportion of the poor, and that the income gap between immigrants
and natives has been widening, while the children of immigrants have
been making gains relative to their parents but earning less than
other Americans. One result is increased competition at the bottom of
the labor market between immigrants and unskilled American workers,
especially African Americans-though Krikorian is careful to note that
this is hardly the only problem confronting poor blacks. Finally, he
argues that the huge influx of unskilled immigrants is discouraging
investment in innovative technologies that increase productivity.
Reading Krikorian’s uncompromising critique, one cannot help but
wonder what drastic policy recommendations will follow. Yet his
actual proposals fall far short of his radical views. Relying on a
"zero-based budgeting" approach to the question of how many legal
immigrants to admit annually, he comes up with 400,000-less than
half the approximately one million we have been admitting in recent
years. To achieve this, he would limit family-based admittances
to spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens, excluding parents,
adult siblings, and the adult children of legal residents and citizens.
To support his "pro-immigrant policy of low immigration," he urges
increased funding for immigration services, including expanded
English-language instruction and the establishment of immigrant welcome
centers. As for the 12 million or more illegals here, he rejects mass
deportations but also opposes any kind of amnesty, proposing instead
"attrition through enforcement"-that is, rigorous application of
existing immigration laws, especially in the nation’s interior. Over
time, he maintains, illegals here would leave and subsequent newcomers
would be discouraged from coming.
None of these recommendations will pass muster with immigration
advocates or their sympathizers-or with rabid restrictionists,
for that matter. But the main problem with Krikorian’s proposals
is that they fly in the face of his own analysis. If immigration
is fundamentally at odds with contemporary America-weakening the
nation fiscally and economically, squeezing the most vulnerable of
our citizens, and threatening our sovereignty-then surely 400,000
immigrants a year is still too many.
Krikorian identifies himself as a conservative addressing "Americans in
the patriotic mainstream, liberal and conservative." But his approach
might be more aptly described as a curious blend of populism and
technocratic policy-wonkery. On the populist side, he articulates
a defense of "the revealed preferences" and "natural" choices of
millions of ordinary Americans whose freely made decisions are
being "artificially" controverted by their government’s immigration
policy. He sees immigration overwhelming the stable or slow population
growth resulting from "the reproductive free market" in which Americans
have opted for small families. And while he does not defend suburban
sprawl when driven by increased population pressures from immigrants,
he does insofar as it results from choices made available to Americans
by technology and affluence.
Up to a point, this stance is prudent, even admirable. Too many
Americans today feel besieged by immigrants, while their grievances
are ignored or smugly dismissed by elites. But surely Krikorian pushes
his populist perspective too far when he opposes skilled immigration
on the grounds that it would hurt the earnings of college-educated
Americans. This is a concern, to be sure; but he never explains why
such relatively well-off Americans should be shielded from competitive
global labor markets.
In Krikorian’s view, America’s immigration policy is a vast social
engineering project overseen by transnational elites insulated from
popular pressure. In the one faint echo here of Lou Dobbs, Krikorian
invokes the specter of a remote, out-of-touch government that makes
contemporary America sound like pre-revolutionary Russia. Yet while
elites have behaved irresponsibly, they have not simply foisted mass
immigration on the American people. Krikorian underestimates the extent
to which immigration is tied to our understanding of ourselves as a
nation. This self-image is rooted in history and ideology, but also
embedded in the fabric of daily life. In this regard it is telling
that he never addresses the perspective, most elegantly put forward by
MIT economist Michael Piore, that far from being a threat to modern
societies, immigrants are essential-not merely because they work for
less, but because their flexibility and drive overcome the rigidities
and constraints arising from affluence and entitlement.
At some level, Krikorian must understand this-hence, his goal of
400,000 immigrants annually. Yet rather than articulate a broad
rationale capable of sustaining responses to the inevitable demands
for fewer (or more) immigrants, he arrives at this number with the
spare logic of an accountant. Such is the curious nature of Krikorian’s
technocratic populism, which is extremely well informed about policy
details, but tone-deaf and too reactive to sustain a new direction
for U.S. immigration policy.
For example, Krikorian holds up Japan as a low-migration society from
which the United States has much to learn. Arguing that America’s
reliance on low-skilled immigrants retards innovation, he points
admiringly to Japan’s advances in robotics. Yet he fails to consider
the myriad ways in which Japan’s antipathy to immigrants and foreigners
reflects a way of life quite antithetical to fundamental American
values. Certainly those millions of freedom-loving, patriotic Americans
feeling squeezed by immigrants are not going to be drawn to Japan as
any kind of model.
Similarly cramped is Krikorian’s reasoning about illegals. He
rejects mass roundups and deportations because of the fiscal cost,
the economic disruption, the ability of immigrants’ rights attorneys
to derail such efforts, and the pervasive media presence that would
broadcast the inevitable missteps. Completely missing is any suggestion
that mass deportations might be unfair to a significant number of
people. Krikorian simply fails to consider that immigrants who live
and raise families here might, over time, come to have claims on this
society. These are complicated and emotional questions, too often
pushed toward a predictable open-borders conclusion by advocates and
their sympathizers. Nevertheless, these are more wrenching dilemmas
for many Americans than Krikorian’s cold logic allows.
Finally, Krikorian proposes a limit of 50,000 humanitarian admittances
(refugees, asylum-seekers, and others) per year-about half what we
have typically been accepting, at least before 9/11. The problem
is not that the figure seems too low or too rigid, but once again,
that it is too narrowly arrived at. Krikorian seems to have opted for
this number because it was the target set by the Refugee Act of 1980,
not because it somehow speaks to the larger question of why a nation
like the United States accepts refugees. Nor does he offer any broader
exploration of how doing so might be central to American ideals or
responsibilities as the most powerful nation on earth. Indeed, he
does not even acknowledge these dimensions of America’s refugee policy.
These days the New York Times clearly believes that immigration policy
can be reformed on the basis of the genuinely wrenching personal
tragedies that it features almost daily. Serious analysts might well
react in frustration. Yet melodrama and moralism must not be permitted
to obscure the moral underpinnings of this nation’s immigration
policy. In this regard, the limitations of Krikorian’s perspective
are clear. Still, those who reject his perspective would do well to
provide as sober and reasoned an articulation of their own position.
Peter Skerry teaches political science at Boston College and is
a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution and the Kenan
Institute for Ethics at Duke.