ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN FEUD HAS ITS DYNAMICS
Gulf News, UAE
June 20 2014
US withdrawal from Afghanistan, recent shale gas revolution and the
‘pivot to Asia’ add reasons why the South Caucasus will lose its
strategic significance for the US and the West in general
By Vilen Khlgatyan and Armen Sahakyan
With the recent developments happening in and around Ukraine, Svante
E. Cornell’s June 10 op-ed, ‘Why America must step up its role in
resolving Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict’ attempts to compare the
Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh in Armenian) conflict with Crimea. This
attempted comparison disregards important historical, geographic,
legal and political differences that exist between the two conflicts.
The Artsakh conflict has deep historical and legal roots with various
junctures along the way. The most recent phase of the conflict began in
February of 1988, when the citizens of the Armenian Soviet Socialist
Republic and Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) began peaceful
demonstrations to once again petition the Soviet authorities in Moscow
for re-unification of NKAO with the Armenian SSR. Tensions rose rapidly
after the anti-Armenian pogroms in the Azerbaijani cities of Baku
(the capital), Sumgait, Kirovabad and Maragha, among others.
The tensions eventually turned into a full-scale war that lasted
until 1994.
Shortly after the Russia-brokered ceasefire agreement (signed by the
representatives of Azerbaijan, Artsakh, and Armenia) came into force
in 1994, the OSCE Minsk Group began its operations with the task of
mediating the conflict. France, Russia and the US are the co-chairs of
the Minsk Group and work hand-in-hand attempting to help the parties
to the conflict reach a lasting peace agreement.
Moscow’s role (both under the USSR and the Russian Federation) in the
Artsakh conflict mediation is usually overemphasised. At the same
time, the genuine desire of the people of Artsakh Republic to live
in a state and society of their own choosing is often disregarded.
Although Russia has been active in the Artsakh peace process, their
motivation is not nearly as nefarious as Dr Cornell claims.
During the Artsakh-Azerbaijan war, Baku recruited Afghan Mujahideen and
Chechen insurgents to fight on its side, many of whom would end up in
Russia’s North Caucasus region in pursuit of jihad, thus presenting
a direct national security threat to Russia. Given its geographic
proximity and Russia’s own problems in its North Caucasus region,
Moscow could not and cannot disregard the Artsakh peace process.
The US has also been active in the mediation process of the Artsakh
conflict within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship,
which is the only agreed upon international format for the peace
talks. One notable example was the US-organised talks in Key West
in the summer of 2001, which was the closest the parties had ever
come to reaching a peace deal since the ceasefire agreement seven
years earlier.
A number of targeted public relations stunts have attempted to present
Azerbaijan as a model partner for the West. However, Azerbaijan’s
allegiance to western international order is dubious, especially
when it comes to democratic norms, rule of law and respect for human
rights. In recent times, experienced analysts of the South Caucasus
and government officials, such as Richard Kauzlarich, Thomas De Waal,
Eric Rubin and others have criticised Azerbaijan’s faulty human rights
track record, its attempt to lead on both the West and Russia and
its waning importance as a US ally.
Recent examples of Baku’s crackdown on critics both foreign and
domestic include: Criticism of the US Ambassador to Baku, Richard
Morningstar; criticism of OSCE Minsk Group US co-chairman James
Warlick; and government jailings of and crackdowns on representatives
of the National Democratic Institute, Radio Free Europe and other
organisations operating in Azerbaijan, etc.
Human Rights Watch periodically reports on egregious arrests of
bloggers and journalists, including the recent airport detainment of
prominent human rights defender Leyla Younus and her husband. Another
example is the extradition of Rauf Mirkadirov, a Turkey-based
Azerbaijani journalist, who, due to his critical stance against the
Baku regime, is now potentially facing a life-imprisonment based on
questionable espionage charges.
Another factor that presents a challenge to the premise that Azerbaijan
is a reliable western ally is its recent major arms acquisitions from
Russia, valued at $4 billion (Dh14.71 billion).
Moreover, the geopolitical significance of the country is blown out of
proportion. For instance, its gas supplies to Europe are negligible
in the larger picture (only 2 per cent of European Union demand)
and could not replace Russia’s volumes. And within the context of
improving relations between the West and Iran, Azerbaijan’s role will
likely shrink further. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the recent
shale gas revolution and the general “pivot to Asia” add additional
reasons why the South Caucasus will lose its strategic significance
for the US and the West in general.
A related aspect of Azerbaijan’s PR campaign has been to conflate the
Artsakh conflict with the separate issue of Armenia-Turkey bilateral
relations. This is yet another attempt at misdirection that some
observers have tried to make. Turkey and Azerbaijan are separate
states, with different ethnic identities, divergent strains of Islam,
and do not have identical national interests. It took Azerbaijani
threats of raising the price of natural gas it supplies to Turkey as
well as a fierce public diplomacy campaign to rally support among Turks
for their “little brother” Azerbaijan in order to place Turkey’s peace
protocols with Armenia in limbo. Several events, including the pardon
and promotion of the axe-murderer Ramil Safarov, the destruction of
Armenian cultural sites in Azerbaijan, the declaration by Azerbaijan’s
President Ilham Aliyev that “Armenians of the world” are the number
one enemy of Azerbaijan, the regular cross-border sniper shootings
on civilian populations and many other incidents are not properly
condemned by the US and other OSCE Minsk Group co-chair states.
Convincing Baku to remove the snipers from the line of contact (to
which they do not agree) and to establish an international monitoring
system for ceasefire violations (both of which Armenia and Artsakh have
repeatedly agreed to) would be a positive step forward and the US can
spearhead those initiatives within the Minsk Group co-chairmanship
framework. Reinstatement of the Artsakh Republic representation at
the negotiations table is also imperative, as no durable peace is
possible without the involvement of the people affected the most.
The US needs to play an active role in the mediation process, together
with the other co-chair countries. But a final agreement to end
the Artsakh conflict cannot be imposed from the outside and needs
to be reached by the three parties themselves exclusively through
peaceful means.
— Christian Science Monitor
Vilen Khlgatyan is vice-chairman of Political Developments Research
Centre (PDRC), a virtual think tank based in Yerevan, Armenia. Armen
Sahakyan is executive director of the Eurasian Research and Analysis
(ERA) Institute (Washington, D.C. branch) and an analyst of Eurasian
Affairs at PDRC.