WikiLeaks: Islamic Radicalism In Azerbaijan
WASHINGTON DC. September 16, 2011: The WikiLeaks released a diplomatic
cable from the US Embassy in Baku to the US State Department dated
September 19, 2006. The report written by the US ambassador Anne Derse
analyses the strengthening role of the Islamic religion in Azerbaijan.
The report also sheds light on the role of Sheikh Ul Islam Allahshukur
Pashazade: `Pashazade, the head of the Caucasus Muslim Board and
Azerbaijan’s leading cleric, is also a long-standing GOAJ (government
of Azerbaijan -ed.) loyalist going back to the Soviet period, and the
consensus view of experts is that he has been successfully bought off.
(There are widespread allegations of kickback schemes within the
Sheikh’s apparatus.)’ Below is the full text of the diplomatic cable:
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 001367
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2016
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KDEM, KISL, IR, AJ
SUBJECT: THE CHANGING ROLE OF ISLAMIC RELIGIOSITY IN AZERBAIJAN
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (S/NF) Summary. Fifteen years after independence, Islamic
religiosity, while far from widespread, is on the rise in Azerbaijan.
This slow but steady growth of religious observance stems from two
factors: a natural rediscovery of Azerbaijan’s Muslim religious
heritage, and active proselytizing by Turkish, Iranian and Arab
groups. With GOAJ support, Turkish Sunni Islam, deemed more amenable
to state interests, has developed a network of schools and mosques
around Azerbaijan, but is not seen as a thriving religious tradition.
By contrast, the Salafist Sunni community, while still small, has
grown steadily in recent years, with Baku’s leading Sunni mosque
reportedly drawing several thousand to services. Azerbaijan remains an
overwhelmingly Shia country, but Iran’s influence on Shia believers is
countered by tight GOAJ control over official Shia institutions,
primarily through the Caucasus Muslim Board and the State Committee
for Work with Religious Associations. Iran’s influence is most active
in the small but growing network of unsanctioned, underground mosques
around the country, most publicly visible in Baku’s Juma Mosque
community and its high-profile Imam, Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, who is widely
believed to receive financial support from Iran. Over the longer term,
the role of Islam in Azerbaijan as a political and social force, will
depend in large measure on how the Government states and delivers on
its promise of building an equitable, democratic, free market society.
Septels will examine the role of political Islam in Azerbaijan and the
potential implications for U.S. interests. End Summary.
RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE ON THE RISE
2. (C) Fifteen years after Azerbaijan’s independence from the Soviet
Union, religious experts and scholars agree that Islamic religiosity,
while far from widespread, is on the rise in Azerbaijan. Hard numbers
are difficult to come by, but anecdotal evidence, including interviews
with contacts and first-hand observations support this assessment.
Young people are fasting during Ramadan in increasing numbers and
women wearing headscarves are increasingly visible in the streets of
Baku. Two factors have contributed to this slow but steady increase in
religious observance. The first is the end of atheistic Soviet rule in
this historically Muslim culture. While the GOAJ is steadfastly
oriented toward the West, the revitalization of Azerbaijan’s national
identity has necessarily meant a rediscovery of its faith. The second
driver of Islam’s growth has been the directed efforts of foreign
actors, specifically Turkey, Iran and the Arab states to actively
proselytize their versions of Islam.
EARLY ON TURKISH ISLAM RECEIVES GOAJ SUPPORT
Qafqaz University
3. (C) In the 1990s President Heydar Aliyev promoted the growth of
Turkish Sunni Islam in historically Shiite Azerbaijan because he found
it more amenable to the state’s interests. According to Azerbaijani
religious scholar Nariman Gasimoglu, Aliyev viewed Turkish Sunni Islam
as a means of arresting the growing 1990s influence of Iranian Shiite
conservatism. With the assent of the Azerbaijani Government, starting
in the early 1990s the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs built
mosques throughout Azerbaijan and launched a network of schools as
well as a theology faculty at Baku State University. Turkey’s Youth
Development Fund also opened madrassas in northern Azerbaijan with
GOAJ support.
4. (C) In the 1990s, Turkey’s Fatulleh Gulen movement opened several
schools under the rubric of Cag Ogretim Isletmeleri, a private Turkish
company reportedly connected to (the influential) Minister of
Emergency situations Kemaladdin Heydarov. With GOAJ endorsement, the
Gulen movement founded between 15 and 20 private high schools as well
as the well known Qafqaz university. Religious scholars tell us that
the GOAJ views Turkish Islam’s influence in Azerbaijan as a
counterweight to Sunni Salafism and conservative Shiite Islam.
Although statistics are difficult to find, the consensus view of
religious scholars is that Turkish Sunni Islamic community is stable,
open, and not growing much when compared with the Salafist and Shiite
communities.
SALAFIST ISLAM MAKING INROADS
Abu Bekr Mosque in Baku
5. (C) One of Azerbaijan’s most well respected young Sunni leaders,
Yashar Gurbanov, highlighted the small but growing Salafist community
in Baku and the regions. Gurbanov’s own background is a telling lesson
in the community’s expansion. Born in the northern Azerbaijani town of
Zagatala, Gurbanov attended Azerbaijan Economic University. After
graduating in 2001, Gurbanov joined a small number of his classmates
who decided to further their religious studies. Gurbanov said he
became interested in Islamic theology largely because of the influx of
Turkish and then Arabic and Iranian missionaries who rushed into the
country after independence. Gurbanov enrolled in the Islamic
University of Medina, at the behest of the Sunni Imam of a Zagatala
mosque well known to Gurbanov and his peers. In Medina, Gurbanov said
he developed a strong grasp of Islamic history and theology and the
life of the Prophet Mohammed which he brought back to Azerbaijan.
6. (C) Today, Gurbanov, a high-profile academic, teaches religious
philosophy at Azerbaijan International University and delivers regular
lectures at Baku’s leading Sunni Mosque, Abu Bakr. Gurbanov blames the
GOAJ for labeling all Salafis as “terrorist Wahabbists” hell-bent on
overthrowing the state. He rejects the notion that Salafists are
Wahabbists calling this a “common misconception” by the ill-informed.
Salafism, Gurbanov contends, is a peaceful, puritanical form of
orthodox Sunni Islam and should not be associated with Wahabbism, a
later aggressive form of Sunni Islam or with Al Qaeda “hypocrisy”
which “violates the sanctity of Islam.” An articulate spokesman for
his community, Gurbanov added that it was especially important for
Salafism in Azerbaijan to be apolitical given society and government’s
sensitivity toward Islamic radicalism. He added that because true
Salafism is non-violent and inward-looking, piety manifests itself in
increased religious observance, forms of dress and, for men, having a
beard. This in turn contributes to the social perception that
Salafists are different, Wahabbists, and therefore more threatening.
Gurbanov himself has hosted many television specials on religion,
which he said brought him to the attention of the head of the Caucasus
Muslim Board Sheikh Pashazade, whom he praised.
BAKU’S ABU BAKR MOSQUE
7. (C) Gurbanov’s comments square with the observations of most
scholars we talked to about the central role of the Abu Bakr mosque
community to Sunni Islam in Azerbaijan. Abu Bakr is perhaps the most
visible sign of the growth of the Sunni community. Salafist
supporters, detractors and GOAJ officials tell us that attendance at
Friday prayers regularly reaches 5000 – 7000 participants. During 2005
religious holidays, over 10,000 people are reported to have attended
Abu Bakr’s services resulting in the closure of several blocks around
the mosque in central Baku. (Even if these figures are exaggerated,
the Abu Bakr community would still be the largest in Baku.) Abu Bakr
was built in 1997 by the Azerbaijani branch of a Kuwaiti charity. The
mosque is run by Imam Gamet Suleymanov, a young, confident preacher
educated, like Gurbanov, in Saudi Arabia in Islamic theology and law.
Suleymanov, who has at times been heavily criticized by the
authorities, told the press in a recent interview, “I am not a
Wahabbite” and went on to explain that the large number of attendees
at his sermons indicated a rediscovery of faithfulness and nothing
more.
8. (C) Local experts report that the Abu Bakr community is comprised
of two basic groups, an educated secular-appearing elite, and the
working class. The educated elites who attend Abu Bakr do so for the
spiritual guidance of an educated, Sunni leader, Gamet Suleymanov.
According to one expert, these persons are often professionals, they
do not grow beards and dress according to conventional dress codes but
they have found the simplicity and piety of Suleymanov’s message
appealing in a society overwhelmed by corruption. The second group,
the working poor, a large majority of the Azerbaijani population
presently disenfranchised from the country’s oil wealth, find the
Salafist message to be one of hopefulness. Yet the message remains
reportedly apolitical, according to sources who have heard his
lectures, as Suleymanov reportedly stays away from overt criticism of
the Azerbaijani political leadership and the West. However, scholars
and human rights activists who follow Islam tell us that criticism of
the U.S. and the Aliyev regime is growing in other, less public Sunni
and Shiite quarters.
9. (C) Beyond Baku’s growing Sunni community, Sunni communities are
strong in northern Azerbaijan along the Dagestani border. Gurbanov
told us that the north central city of Zagatala (his hometown) is
today a center of Sunni Islam. Travelling in the regions, Poloff
observed that there are active Sunni Salafist communities in
Azerbaijan’s northeastern towns, such Khachmaz, Khudet and Gusar. The
GOAJ periodically shuts down Sunni mosques and madrassas in this
region, declaring them unregistered Wahabbist entities. Noting the
increase in the size of the Sunni community, Gurbanov claimed that
Azerbaijan was nearing a 50-50 Shia-Sunni split, not the 65 – 35
Shia-Sunni ratio that GOAJ officials report.
IRANIAN IMPACT ON SHIAS UNCLEAR
10. (C) According to conventional wisdom, Iran strongly influences the
development of Shiite Islam in Azerbaijan. However, on closer
inspection, Iran’s role in Azerbaijan’s religious life is less clear
cut. A Shiite majority country, most Azerbaijanis who attend religious
services do so at state-controlled mosques falling under the
jurisdiction of Sheikh Allahshukur Pashazade. Pashazade, the head of
the Caucasus Muslim Board and Azerbaijan’s leading cleric, is also a
long-standing GOAJ loyalist going back to the Soviet period, and the
consensus view of experts is that he has been successfully bought off.
(There are widespread allegations of kickback schemes within the
Sheikh’s apparatus.) GOAJ officials also tell us that they write the
sermons for many of Pashazade’s mosques, ensuring that these Imams
preach a pro-government line.
11. (S/NF) Iranian influence is believed to be strongest in the
network of unofficial mosques and Shiite religious communities that
are outside of Pashazade’s control. We do not know how many
“underground” mosques exist or the size of these communities, but
locals tell us that there is a small (in contrast with Abu Bakr) but
growing network of Shiite communities, most frequented by younger
Azerbaijanis. They also are believed to receive funding and support
from a range of Iranian Government and charitable organizations. Most
prominent among these is the Juma mosque community led by Imam Ilgar
Ibrahimoglu. The GOAJ evicted Ibrahimoglu’s community from its Baku
mosque in 2004 ostensibly because of its lack of legal registration.
Ibrahimoglu, a charismatic leader who studied in Iran for several
years, is known for his anti-corruption, anti-government rhetoric that
draws a community of several hundred worshippers.
Haji Ilgar Ibrahimoglu
12. (C) Ibrahimoglu, however, plays a dual role in civil society
because he is an outspoken human rights and democracy advocate –
making him something of an anomaly in the ease with which he moves
between conservative Shiite religiosity and Western democracy
rhetoric. Ibrahimoglu openly campaigned on behalf of opposition party
political candidates in Azerbaijan’s 2005 parliamentary elections
drawing the GOAJ’s attention and ire. (Shortly after the parliamentary
elections, the GOAJ announced that Parliament would seek to amend the
Law on Religious Freedoms to prohibit political activities by
religious leaders.) Credible human rights activists who know
Ibrahimoglu well also quietly tell us that he receives financial
support from Iranian sources. Scholars claim that Ibrahimoglu only
emerged as a high profile leader of the unofficial Shiite community
when the Iranian Cultural Attach in Baku, Haji Nijat (son-in-law of
the chairman of Iran’s supreme council) stepped aside from his
leadership role in the community.
13. (C) Iranian influence is also widely felt in the village of
Nardaran, 25 kilometers north of Baku. Nardaran is home to an
independent-minded, pro-Iranian Shiite community generally viewed as
out of step with mainstream society. Construction of Nardaran’s
principal mosque is believed to have been financed by an Iranian
charity. The Nardaran community was also among the only to protest the
publication of the Danish caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed earlier
this year, and more recently the Israeli-Hizbullah conflict in
Lebanon, burning Israeli and American flags.
14. (C) Religious scholars also report that Iranian religious
proselytizing is quite active in southern Azerbaijan, where experts
tell us Iranian charities sponsor unofficial communities and religious
festivals. GOAJ officials by contrast claim that they have
successfully arrested Iranian influence in the south by expelling
mullahs, and closing Iranian-sponsored madrassas over the past five
years. The Government may be having some success at curbing Iran’s
religious influence. The leading Shiite official Imam in the southern
city of Lenkoran states that his goal was to protect the community
from Iranian religious incroachment. As proof of his success, the
Imam, a young charismatic community leader appointed by Sheikh
Pashazade, points to a large madrassah he operates where students
study a modified liberal arts curriculum alongside Shiite theology
courses. Later on, visiting the Imam’s three primary mosques in
Lenkoran, it was apparent that this young, pro-government cleric was
very popular with the community, drawing warm welcomes from the public
on the street.
THE STATE COMMITTEE: AZERBAIJAN’S DIYANET
15. (C) In addition to the state control licensed through Sheikh
Ul-Islam Pashazade, the GOAJ created the State Committee for Work with
Religious Associations (SCWRA) in 2001, along the lines of Turkey’s
Directorate for Religious Affairs. The Committee’s first chairman,
Rafiq Aliyev, used his authority to regulate the registration,
licensing and operations of any religious group operating in the
country. Aliyev, who often clashed with the Sheikh over his efforts to
micromanage the Sheikh’s officially sanctioned Shiite community, was
dismissed in June 2006. Aliyev’s successor, a long-standing
presidential aide, Hidayat Orujov, quickly started a public
rapprochement with the Sheikh. Orujov also publicly reaffirmed the
GOAJ line on radicalism telling reporters August 28 that the mission
of the State Committee was to prevent the spread of religious
extremism and stop groups from “destabilizing Azerbaijan.”
COMMENT
16. (C) Religion clearly is taking on an increasingly important role
in Azerbaijan. The political impact of religious observance in
Azerbaijan is less clear. Public expectations of Ilham Aliyev’s
ability to deliver on his promise of a Westernized, equitable,
democratic, free market society are very high. Over the long term, the
role of Islam as a political and social force will depend in large
measure on the Government’s ability to deliver on these promises. The
GOAJ is acutely aware of religion’s potential in society; the real
question is whether the GOAJ can balance legitimate religious freedom
issues with what it perceives as a growing security threat. DERSE
(Azerireport)