THE SAFAROV PHENOMENON WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AZERBAIJANI POLITICS
Dr. Gayane Novikova
September 14, 2012
The extradition of Ramil Safarov from Hungary, his immediate pardon,
and his definition as a national hero are all developments that fit
neatly into the logic of Azerbaijan’s foreign and internal politics.
The reaction in Armenia to these immoral actions by Azerbaijani
authorities was also quite predictable: waves of protests and
indignation, suspension of diplomatic relations with Hungary,
toughening of the rhetoric emanating from Yerevan, and re-inclusion
of the question of recognizing the Nagorno Karabakh Republic’s
independence into the agenda of the Armenian Parliament. In addition,
a flow of comments on the possibility of resumption of military action
in the area of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict streamed from officials
of a variety states and international organizations.
Parallels to the events of August 2008, in the area of the “Georgian
conflicts” inevitably come to mind. Reciprocal provocations by all
parties to the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts, including
Russia, and a misunderstanding or neglect by the Georgian leadership
of messages from Washington, brought catastrophic consequences for
Georgia itself: the de facto independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia became de jure independence.
A simple question has crystallized: what has motivated the Azerbaijani
leadership to play the Safarov card? It must be emphasized at the
outset that the motivations of the Hungarian leadership were secondary:
it was driven by its own interests.
It should be recalled that the atrocious killing of an Armenian
officer (and the prevention of the murder of a second Armenian, also
a participant in the same NATO English-language course in Budapest)
met with a variety of responses in 2004. Thousands of Azerbaijanis
signed letters in support of the criminal, massive rallies occurred
in Baku, and a special bank account was opened to donate money to
support the “Safarov cause.” He also was named “man of the year” in
2005 (), and “a victim of
the 16-year war of Armenia against Azerbaijan, a victim of Armenian
terror, and of the indifference of international organizations to
the destiny of the Azerbaijani people” (
ety/39956.html). Wherever deprecatory statements emerged, they were
always introduced in a similar way: “Everyone needs to understand that
this happened in Europe. It is unacceptable under any circumstances
to kill a sleeping person with an axe in Europe… It is acceptable
to kill an officer of the enemy’s army in the front line during a
military operation, but not at a college in the center of peaceful
Europe. Safarov took a step in the wrong direction” (The Echo”
newspaper, No 19 (1500), Friday, Feb 2, 2007). Some well-known
journalists, including Ilya Fainzilberg from Day.az, invited readers
to think about the possible influence of this killing upon Azerbaijani
society: “The condemnation of Safarov’s action already intensified the
country’s social environment, and it can provoke further instability”
(). Safarov was receiving
birthday congratulations during his years of imprisonment even from
some members of Parliament.
After his sentence, discussions on the Safarov cause and his
extradition appeared periodically (once or twice every month) in the
Azerbaijani on-line media as direct reminders of “a victim of Armenian
aggression” and indirectly as confirmation of Azerbaijani authorities’
efforts on behalf of his rescue and return.
*****
What happened after the extradition of Safarov to Azerbaijan is a
clear political provocation of such magnitude that it may provoke
a resumption of full-scale military actions in the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict area. What is the purpose of the Azerbaijani leadership?
What is the target of its activity? To answer these questions it
is necessary briefly to analyze the processes directly influencing
developments in the conflict area, as well as the reaction and
motivations of the main external actors concerned.
The aggravation of the situation in the area of the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict is now occurring against the background of the civil war in
Syria, new waves of violence in Iraq, the hard-to-control situation
in the North Caucasus and the activation of terrorist organizations,
the increasingly overt Kurdish problem along the entire perimeter of
the Middle East, and the unresolved Iranian nuclear crisis. Last but
not least in this list of troubled spots is the growing contradiction
within the Euro zone. In medias res, none of the external actors is
interested in an escalation of tension in the South Caucasus, and
all have actually condemned the actions of the Azerbaijani authorities.
The United States is coming closer to the conclusion of a very
tense presidential race. National Security Council Spokesman
T. Vietor was among the first to comment upon recent developments
in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. His comment on August 31, 2012,
was focused upon the possibility of the resumption of war. Noting the
negative influence of Azerbaijan’s pardon of the convicted murderer,
the White House representative made the following statement:
“President Obama is deeply concerned by today’s announcement that
the President of Azerbaijan has pardoned Ramil Safarov following
his return from Hungary. Safarov confessed to the murder of Armenian
Army officer Gurgen Margaryan in Budapest in 2004, and was serving a
life sentence in Hungary for this brutal crime. We are communicating
to Azerbaijani authorities our disappointment about the decision to
pardon Safarov. This action is contrary to ongoing efforts to reduce
regional tensions and promote reconciliation. The United States is
also requesting an explanation from Hungary regarding its decision
to transfer Safarov to Azerbaijan.” Furthermore, the US Department of
State demanded on September 11 that Azerbaijan fulfill its obligations
to Hungary as concern to the conditions of Safarov’s extradition.
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated during his
visit to Baku on September 7 that he was “deeply concerned by the
Azerbaijani decision to pardon Ramil Safarov. The act he committed
in 2004 was a crime which should not be glorified, as this damages
trust and does not contribute to the peace process.” Other European
institutions offered similar statements and the European Parliament
discussed this issue at its September 10-13 session.
Russia and Turkey have found themselves in quite complicated
situations. Currently Russia – taking into account the importance of
its relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan – cannot allow itself
to take a clear and unambiguous stand in regard to the resolution
of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict; as a whole, the status quo in the
area of the conflict suits its interests. However, developments in
the bilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani and Armenian-Hungarian relations
allow Russia to criticize European states and structures for their
inability to influence positively the resolution of the conflicts
in the South Caucasus, and for their provoking of further escalation
as a result of poorly thought-out steps and actions. In turn, it is
possible that Russia will use the “Safarov factor” to push Armenia
into the Eurasian Union.
The status quo in the South Caucasus suits Turkey as well; however,
its reasons are different from those of Russia. Developments in the
Middle East have significantly complicated Turkey’s attempts to play
the role of a stabilizing regional power. The failure of its announced
foreign policy – “zero problems with the neighbors” – is obvious. Thus,
Turkey needs to improve its position in the area with the support of
two regional states: Azerbaijan and Israel.
Indeed, and in spite of existing tensions and contradictions among
these three states, they have strong common strategic interests and
specific links:
– Turkey and Israel are interested in Azerbaijani energy sources;
– Azerbaijan and Turkey are interested in Israeli armament supplies
and maintenance contracts;
– Azerbaijan and Israel seek to utilize the geographical location of
Turkey and its membership in NATO on behalf of their interests.
It is possible to judge Turkey’s role in the “Savarov cause” through
information in the European and Azerbaijani press. In particular, on
August 23, 2012, Reuters reported, citing an unnamed source close to
Hungary’s Economy Ministry, that “Azerbaijan could lend Hungary 2-3
billion Euros by buying a specially-issued sovereign bond denominated
in Turkish lira, as Hungary looks to tap potential new markets for
debt financing.”
(
ijan_about_sovereign_issuepaper). It is worth mentioning that Safarov,
immediately after arriving in Baku stated that he always felt Turkey’s
support.
*****
However, all of these considerations in respect to the regional actors
constitute only the background playing field; the significant actors
are Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the current stage of the game the
Nagorno Karabakh Republic moves to a secondary plane.
Azerbaijani authorities are pursuing several goals, each of which
must be perceived as implying several constituent aims. The major
goal is to demonstrate to Azerbaijani society that the government,
and Azerbaijan as a strong sovereign state, is capable of defending
its interests and that the “father of the nation” is concerned about
“his children” and keeps his word: the “hero” returned home after only
eight years of imprisonment. Because this event must be acknowledged
as the single achievement by Azerbaijani diplomacy in recent years,
it of necessity had to be proclaimed as a great victory. Indeed, the
triumphal return of Safarov forced the ever-diminishing Azerbaijani
secular opposition to remain silent and visibly decreased its
already low hope of achieving success in the forthcoming presidential
election. According to widespread commentary on Azerbaijani Internet
forums, Ilham Aliyev’s polling numbers will grow – and this is an
important pre-election development, even for an authoritarian ruler.
The second component part is related to the slow-moving process of
pre-recognition of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic: two American states,
Rhode Island and Massachusetts, have adopted resolutions calling
for President Obama and Congress to recognize the NKR. There are
also discussions by experts at leading research centers in the US
and Europe on the necessity to seek avenues of cooperation with NKR
elected authorities. In the light of the absence of visible shifts
and achievements within the frameworks of the OSCE Minsk Group,
these trends constitute a threat to the Azerbaijani leadership.
The third component part is aimed against Armenia: Azerbaijan intends
to demonstrate that it can – if necessary – ignore international
opinion and defend its national interests to the end. It is
obvious that the pardon of a murderer will not provoke a sharp
negative reaction by the international community (such as one that
would introduce sanctions against Azerbaijan or its exclusion from
international programs). Any action aimed to condemn Azerbaijan will
be framed by a declaration of “deep concern” in respect to possible
negative developments in the area of the conflict. However, all of the
recent developments possess a further seek to test Armenia’s reaction.
Demarche related to Safarov sought to provoke the Armenian side to
engage in dangerous actions, such as a unilateral recognition by
Armenia of NKR independence – an action, that would contribute to a
further aggravation of tensions. (It is worth mentioning that calls
to recognize the NKR, which echo throughout the Armenian Parliament
after every escalation of tension in the area of the conflict,
devalue recognition as constituting an important, deliberate,
and serious step in the relationship between the two Armenian state
entities: the Republic of Armenia and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic.)
If this occurs, any negotiations on behalf of a peaceful resolution
of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict will become meaningless; instead,
war will become the only means to resolve the conflict. It should also
be noted that Azerbaijan over the last several years has attempted to
change the negotiation format, not least in order to ensure Turkey’s
participation in it.
Several questions now come together. Does Azerbaijan need a war? The
answer is more and more evident: the war will diminish tensions inside
Azerbaijan and direct waves of social discontent externally – toward
Armenia and the NKR. It will also neutralize temporarily a growing
Islamist opposition that, against the background of the Arab awakening,
begins gradually to threaten the Aliyev regime. Is the international
environment favorable for a resumption of war by Azerbaijan? Yes,
it is. Against the backdrop of developments throughout the Middle
East and North Africa and serious internal difficulties in all of the
three concerned world powers (the USA, Europe and Russia), the next
“small” Caucasus war will become a focus of international attention
for a few days only.
What, then, restrains Azerbaijan from a further escalation of the
conflict? There are several factors: the established political-military
balance in the region, comprehension by the Azerbaijani leaders that
the level of losses will be very high, and the strong probability
that Azerbaijani oil and gas pipelines will be destroyed by the
Armenian side.
Nonetheless, for all of the reasons noted above, Azerbaijan’s major
agenda has now become apparent: to provoke Armenia into dangerous
actions, including a withdrawal from the negotiation process.
Azerbaijan’s clear intentions have been revealed by the “Safarov
phenomenon.”
Dr. Gayane Novikova, Founder and Director of Center for Strategic
Analysis, Yerevan, Armenia; Visiting Scholar at the Davis Center for
Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
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http://www.day.az/news/society/41685.html
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http://www.lse.co.uk/macroeconomicNews.asp?ArticleCode=yj58o68bx381y9h&ArticleHeadline=Hungary_in_talks_with_Azerba