THE 2013 ELECTIONS: ARMENIA’S PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY AND GEOPOLITICAL FUTURE
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By Armen Ayvazyan | April 9, 2013 | 11:52 AM
2013 (RE)ELECTION RESULTS IN ARMENIA
Since regaining independence in 1991, Armenia’s presidential elections
have been marred by fraud, while the incumbent political authorities
have always reestablished themselves. Massive post-election protests
took place after the presidential elections in 1996, 2003, and 2008. In
2013, this unfortunate scenario was repeated once more. With over
58 percent of the votes, the incumbent, President Serzh Sargsyan,
was declared the winner, while Raffi Hovannisian, the leader of the
Heritage Party, received about 37 percent of the vote.
A novel feature of the 2013 elections was that they were
manipulated even before the formal start of the campaign: President
Sargsyan managed to coax and/or browbeat all major opposition political
parties into sitting out of the elections. Not only did the Prosperous
Armenia Party (PAP), the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF),
and the opposition bloc Armenian National Congress (ANC) refuse
to nominate or support any candidate, but they also relinquished
their organizational capabilities for monitoring the electoral
process. Moreover, these parties did not call for elections boycott per
se, even though, as a reason for their shocking inactivity, they cited
distrust in the existing democratic mechanisms for regime change. Since
1991, such behind-the-scenes horse trading between the government and
the oppositional political forces has been significantly responsible
for the loss of public trust in Armenia’s political institutions.
During President Sargsyan’s first term in office, corruption,
nepotism, and cronyism were rampant at all political and bureaucratic
levels. Sargsyan failed to encourage the independence of the judiciary
or the legislature, both of which continue to act as mere appendages
of the executive. He reinvented the Soviet methods of direct party
control over higher educational institutions and secondary schools: the
President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of the Parliament (all
members of the ruling Republican Party) have been “elected” heads of
the governing councils of major state universities. The pseudo student
councils are also run by the Republican youth, and approximately 90
percent of the secondary school principals are Republicans.
Sargsyan also pointedly blurred the distinction between the organs
of state and the current political administration. He consolidated
monopolistic control and actual censorship over Armenian main broadcast
media, including the state-funded public television H1 and other
popular Armenian TV channels. Therefore, the blatant deactivation of
the major political parties just ahead of the presidential elections
threatened to completely bring down the ostensibly democratic
political system of the Republic. However, this premeditated political
desolation produced a boomerang effect, landing Raffi Hovannissian,
until then a non-heavyweight politician, right back in the face of the
overconfident authorities. His emphasis on poverty, emigration, and
other long-standing social grievances, coupled with the fact that
he is a candidate thought to be relatively uninvolved in corrupt
acts was sufficient in mobilizing the existing anti-government
sentiment. Irrespective of where further developments could take
Armenia, Hovannissian’s success has already proved to be an important
democratic achievement that shook the foundations of Sargsyan’s
nascent authoritarianism.
This societal awakening has prompted previously unthought of mass
defiance against the government’s pressure to vote for the incumbent
as well as post-election protests throughout provinces in Armenia.
Large segments of the population have rejected the conduct of both
the poll and vote counting as profoundly fraudulent. They also
dismissed the “ratification” of the elections in the initial reports
of international monitoring missions. Citizen activist Lena Nazaryan
and her supporters effectively disrupted the press conference by the
observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), branding them as “political tourists,” who were “legitimizing
the fraudulent election.” Arthur Sakunts, a leading Western-backed
activist and recipient of the Freedom Defender Award, challenged US
President Barack Obama’s congratulations for Sargsyan’s reelection. He
claimed that Obama “has clearly got himself among those restricting
freedom and encouraging the restriction of freedom” and even questioned
the value of the award received from the US government. This acute
and wide-spread disappointment in Western attitude towards democracy
in Armenia is echoed by various Armenian-American civic groups and
activists who have closely followed the elections and held a series
of protest gatherings.
On the whole, the 2013 Armenian elections left the masses feeling
more alienated and disenfranchised with the president enjoying less
internal legitimacy and thus exposed to external pressures more than
ever. The hasty recognitions of the election results by Russia, the
United States, NATO, France, Iran, Turkey, and other international
actors signaled that the incumbent President is the preferred candidate
for the world and regional centers of power. Each of them has received
and expects to receive its share of political and economic concessions
from Sargsyan’s fragile regime. This unfortunate setting unfolds when
Armenia finds itself in the midst of an all-encompassing crisis.
A COUNTRY IN CRISIS
Between 2009 and 2011, some 250,000 Armenians became poor and currently
one-third of the population lives below the poverty line.
According to the Armenian government, average monthly real consumption
of Armenia’s population decreased by 6.1 percent in 2011 as compared
to 2008. The economy’s slow recovery from a contraction of over
14 percent in 2009 (mainly due to the global economic crisis)
will be severely hampered by the continuing outflow of both human
and monetary capital, as well as by the sharp surge in current and
future external debt servicing: about US$418 million in 2013 and over
1.5 times more than in 2012. Armenia’s balance of payments is more and
more reliant on foreign credits. It is expected that the government
would acquire new international loans this year, most of which will
be unproductively spent on managing foreign debt, thus squandering
precious funds. In addition, the economic and transport blockade by
Turkey and Azerbaijan continues to suffocate the Armenian economy. The
net result is Armenia’s ever- growing economic and political dependence
on foreign powers.
On the geostrategic level, the attainment of reliable security
guarantees and, above all, defensible borders are central issues
for Armenia. After all, the Ottoman Turkish purpose in perpetrating
the Genocide of 1915-1923 was not so much to physically exterminate
the Armenians as it was to eliminate Armenia – a country, which had
all demographic, political, and cultural capacities to re-establish
an independent state. Since 1991, neither Turkey nor Azerbaijan
reconciled with the emergence of Armenian statehood even on the much
smaller territory of 42,000 square kilometers, where it is realized
as the Republic of Armenia (RoA) and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
(NKR). The Armenian-Azerbaijani war over the Armenian-populated
Nagorno-Karabakh in 1991-1994 was an organic extension of
Armenian-Turkish conflict of the beginning of the 20th century.
The current strategic objectives of both Turkey and Azerbaijan
converge on trying to eliminate the narrow “Armenian wedge” between
them, consisting of the NKR and the RoA’s southernmost province
which separates Azerbaijan proper from its exclave Nakhichevan and
Turkey. Therefore, the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh is not only
about the realization of self-determination right of its population,
but about the long-term security and minimally sufficient strategic
depth for Armenia. Recently, however, Azerbaijan’s newly found
military conceit , boosted by huge oil revenues and large acquisition
of offensive armaments as well as unequivocal Turkish backing,
have practically rendered the international negotiations over the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict redundant. Now the threat of a resumption
of war with Azerbaijan seems more real than ever.
In this unenviably difficult situation, it will be of utmost importance
for Armenia to somehow adjust to the opposing geopolitical agendas
of the dominant powers in the region – the Russian Federation and
the US-NATO-EU bloc.
RUSSIA’S NEO-BYZANTINE AGENDA: WEAKENING AN ALLY THROUGH INCORPORATION
Allied to Russia by the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation,
and Mutual Aid (1997) and as a member of both the Russian-led
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO), Armenia is the fulcrum for Russian
efforts to rebuild its clout in the post-Soviet Transcaucasia,
recently rechristened the South Caucasus (incidentally, both
designations are politically and geographically inaccurate, inasmuch
as Armenia and much of modern Georgia and Azerbaijan are not part
of the Caucasus). However, while Washington has gone out of its
way to strengthen its own ally in the region with Sahakashvili’s
Georgia, Russian policies toward Armenia have taken a different turn.
Russia did not strive to improve Armenia’s economy by direct
investment into its industrial sectors or infrastructure which
were shattered by the effects of the 1988 earthquake, the collapse of
the Soviet Union, 1991-1994 war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakhm,
and the economic blockade of Armenia by Turkey and Azerbaijan. In
a seemingly paradoxical move, between 2007 and December 2012, its
“Compatriots” state program lured some 26,000 Armenians to apply
to migrate into sparsely inhabited regions of Russia with contracts
guaranteeing work and a naturalization process of six months rather
than five years. The Armenian government, tight- cornered by domestic
critics and a severe demographic crisis – the post-Soviet exodus of
about a third of its population and the resultant low birthrate –
belatedly expressed its disapproval to this Russian project. Due to
Armenia’s economic depravity, large numbers are emigrating to Russia
and other countries without state-organized promotion.
This Russian position is manifestly unreasonable. The question is
whether this attitude toward Armenia represents an erratic and
inconsistent policy on the part of post-Soviet governments (who
have often been blamed by the Russian analysts for ignoring their
own geopolitical interests) or whether it is a calculated program
to weaken Armenia into complete submission and incorporation into
the newly-created trade and economic organizations under the Russian
umbrella, namely the Eurasian Union and Customs Union. Two indicators
in particular strongly suggest that the latter assumption is nearer
the mark.
First, Moscow vigorously pursues the Russian-language education
in Armenia at the expense of the Armenian language. In 2010, in
clear violation of the constitutional status of Armenian as the
country’s sole official language, the Law on Language (1993) was
loosened to allow foreign -language instruction in public schools and
universities. Because of the existing teaching cadres and traditions,
this “amendment” promoted mostly Russian-language instruction. At
the time it was widely believed that this legal allowance was made
to meet the Russian demands.
Moscow also sold advanced weaponry to Armenia’s rival, Azerbaijan,
including two surface-to-air missile systems of S-300 PMU2 Favorite
type, which is a more advanced version of S-300 PS that was delivered
to Armenia. This move, besides generating a crisis of confidence in
Armenia about the credibility of Russian security commitments, speaks
volumes about Moscow’s stance vis-a-vis its traditional Armenian
ally. The Kremlin strategists suspect that Armenia’s oligarchic
elite, concerned with its own financial fortune, could easily switch
camps and embrace the West’s patronage. Dwindling Armenia’s human
resources to the point where the nation would not be capable of
resisting Azerbaijani aggression alone and could survive only as a de
facto Russian province seems to be the most realistic, if seemingly
conspiratorial, explanation for Russia’s strategy regarding Armenia.
Nagorno-Karabakh then could, again, become a bargaining chip between
Moscow and Baku. Meanwhile, the Armenian migrants in Russia could be
used as an additional means by which to attach Armenia to its former
imperial master. Evidently, Moscow does not believe that under current
geopolitical conditions it would be far more beneficial for Russia
to help Armenia become a strong ally than for it to remain a weak
client state.
It is of considerable interest to observe that these Russian
strategies strikingly remind one of the millennium-old Byzantine
policies towards Armenia. Precisely a thousand years ago, the
Byzantine Empire, undermined Armenia politically, militarily,
and demographically; this both compelled and attracted hundreds of
thousands of Armenians, especially their military elite, to migrate
to its remote western regions. Subsequently, a debilitated Armenia
was devoured by the Empire. However, as a consequence, the Byzantines
shouldered the burden of defending Armenia’s southern and eastern
frontiers, hitherto effectively held by the established Armenian
military, which was by now significantly demoralized and partly
removed from the operational zone. Yet, this soft destruction of an
ally as a successful buffer state proved to be a strategic mistake of
disastrous proportions: soon after, the Empire was forced to surrender
Armenia to the Seljuk Turks, forever forsaking its former political
and military clout in the region.
One can presume that the Russians think big: they are planning to
widen their sphere of influence over the entirety of Armenia. But
their miscalculation could bring a depleted and drained Armenia to
a complete demographic and political collapse, resulting in Russian
and European loss.
THE WEST’S NEO-OTTOMON AGENDA: PUSHING TURKEY’S VICTIM INTO
CAPITULATION
In a far cry from its declared commitment to promote democratic
principles and the rule of law, the US-NATO-EU alliance is first
and foremost aiming to achieve – through strategic submission of
Armenia’s foreign policy to its geopolitical agenda in the ring of
former southern Soviet republics – the following specific objectives:
the containment of Russia, the political isolation of Iran, and an
unrestricted access through Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and then
across the Caspian Sea for the transport of hydrocarbon reserves
of Central Asia. This agenda, however, is subtly attuned to the
dangerous projections of a hegemonic-minded Turkey – an increasingly
unpredictable NATO ally in the region.
Turkey brings into the general Western plan its neo-Ottoman and
pan-Turkic expansionary visions, designed to gain preeminence in the
region. One of Ankara’s undeclared objectives is to nullify Armenia’s
conceivable demands of justice and reparations for the immense damage
inflicted on the Armenian nation by the Genocide.
Since the early 1990s, Turkey has sought to economically strangle the
infant Armenian state, or, if at all possible, militarily destroy it
through the intercession of Azerbaijan.
The West’s unwillingness to confront the essentially genocidal
strategic objectives of the Turkish-Azerbaijani bloc regarding
Armenia has been exemplified by inaction in a number of remarkable
cases. The reluctance to acknowledge the rights of the Armenian nation
to restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation has sent wrong signals
to both Turkey and Azerbaijan, encouraging their unending hostility to
Armenia and undermining chances for a sustainable reconciliation. The
West’s acquiescence to Turkey’s twenty year-old economic blockade
of Armenia, a development contrary to international law, has cost
Armenia billions of dollars.
Azerbaijan’s publicly threatening military aggression is notably
promoted by the West’s refusal to recognize the legitimacy of
self-proclaimed independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, even
though the NKR possesses all historical, political, demographic,
legal, and moral credentials for seceding from Azerbaijan.
This degrading scenario stemming from the West has emboldened
Azerbaijan’s well-documented destruction of thousands of irreplaceable
medieval monuments of Armenian and European cultural heritage in the
province of Nakhijevan during the 2000s and the racially-motivated
murder of an Armenian officer at the NATO-organized courses in Budapest
in 2004 by an Azerbaijani colleague, as well as his subsequent
premature release by a NATO-member Hungary to Azerbaijan, where
the murderer was immediately pardoned, promoted in military rank,
and glorified by Ilham Aliyev’s regime in 2012.
The convergence of irrational set of strategic interests of the West
and Turkey was best demonstrated by the imposition of the now ill-fated
Turkish-Armenian “reconciliation process” and the highly unpopular and
still unratified, Protocols between Turkey and Armenia, shortly after
President Sargsyan came to power in 2008. The Protocols recognized the
borders between Armenia and Turkey “without any preconditions,” which
simply meant a dishonest and dangerous endorsing of the consequences
of the Genocide on Armenia permanently.
In full accordance with Turkey’s long-standing position, the
two governments have agreed to sidestep all “historical issues”
(including Genocide) by appointing a “historical commission” to discuss
them. No Turkish acknowledgment of the Genocide preceded the possible
diplomatic opening between the two countries. This was like allowing
an unrepentant Nazi Germany to call for a “historical commission” to
debate the Holocaust – an outrageous prospect that President Sargsyan
actually agreed upon to possibly alleviate his low legitimacy, but
simultaneously undermining the country externally.
The West’s long-standing cynical indifference to the security
needs of genocide-stricken Armenia, not to mention the derisory
economic assistance, pushes it towards integration with Russia. The
West constantly refuses to provide effective security guarantees to
Armenia. What is offered to Armenia is only advancement in political
and economic relations with the European Union through the so-called
Eastern Partnership (EaP), which is seen as a provisional stage to
the final accession to the EU.
RUSSIAN-WESTERN GEOPOLITICAL GAME: A LOSE-LOSE SITUATION
The former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton vowed “to figure
out effective ways to slow down or prevent” Russian efforts to
create Customs Union and Eurasian Union describing them as “a
move to re-Sovietize the region.” At the same time, Russia has
voiced opposition to the Eastern Partnership particularly Armenia’s
participation. Clearly, the West and Russia have specific and largely
opposing expectations from Armenia, thus severely limiting president
Sargsyan’s maneuvering capacity
In a rapidly changing world, this rivalry between the West and
Russia could render them both as losers: without a strong and viable
Armenia, an Islamic Turkey can emerge as the sole and unruly winner
of this short-sighted brinkmanship. Ominously, such a prospect evokes
another historical parallel, when in the seventh century the Arab
Islamic armies brought catastrophe upon both the Byzantine Empire and
Sassanid Persia , after these two regional super-powers had worn each
other down in the never-ending military conflicts which were fought,
incidentally, in and around Armenia.
This tense regional atmosphere between Russia and the West as well as
the intransigence of Azerbaijan are unfavorable factors for reaching
any sustainable agreement on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, mediated
jointly by Russia, America, and France as Co-Chairs of the OSCE
Minsk Group. Undoubtedly, the low internal legitimacy of president
Sargsyan is an additional factor that may affect crucial issues on
the negotiating table. Nagorno-Karabakh remains the most sensitive
issue of Armenian politics.
The geopolitical frictions in the region are generally not conducive
to the democratic process in Armenia, since neither of the mentioned
foreign powers intends to see a genuinely democratic regime which
could act independently, on the basis of national interests, rather
than according to their zero-sum regional agendas. Nevertheless,
the majority of Armenians want change, while the Sargsyan, through
his two-decade-long career of heading the highest state posts (as
chief of defense and national security establishments, Prime Minister,
and a one-term president) has amply demonstrated that he is inflicted
with substantial limitations in providing much needed socio-economic
and political reforms. Therefore, social change can hardly ensue
during Sargsyan’s presidency. Moreover, no great power appears to be
interested in such progress. On the other hand, thanks to the newly
emerged Armenian protest movement, Sargsyan’s authoritarian leanings
may be regulated effectively.
DR. ARMEN AYVAZYAN (Aivazian) is the founding director of the
ARARAT Center for Strategic Research. From 1992 to 1994, he worked
as Assistant to the President of Armenia, Adviser to the Foreign
Minister of Armenia, and Acting Head of the Armenian Delegation to
the Conference (now Organization) on Security and Cooperation in
Europe in Vienna, Austria.
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