Author: Ani Kharatian

Armenia lost Nagorno-Karabakh, but the regional ambitions of Azerbaijan supported by Turkey may mean that the worst is not over for Yerevan.

Following the one-day war fought between Armenia and Azerbaijan on September 19, Turkey and Azerbaijan are now in full control of geopolitics in the South Caucasus. The focus of the emerging axis between Ankara and Baku had been to once and for all resolve the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Following 35 years of intermittent warfare, that objective has now been achieved, at the great expense of Armenia – and of Russia.

The self-styled Republic of Artsakh will soon cease to exist. Unilaterally established by ethnic Armenians in the autonomous Azeri province of Nagorno-Karabakh, it was the linchpin of Russian hegemony in the region. Playing both sides, the Kremlin ensured that it had the final say in regional developments. The one-day war produced two important results: all ethnic Armenians residing in Artsakh were forced to flee, and Azerbaijan is now in full control of its own, internationally recognized territory.

This fundamentally alters the security architecture in the geopolitically important South Caucasus region. As the scope for outside mediation will now be defined by Ankara and Baku, there will be no more outside “peace plans.”

Following the cease-fire agreement in 1994, Armenia assumed the role of protector for the Republic of Artsakh, and it retained control of those Azeri territories between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia proper that it had seized by military force. Although Artsakh was not formally recognized even by Yerevan, it represented a substantial de facto enlargement of the territory of Armenia.

Backed by Turkey, Azerbaijan executed its counteroffensive in three stages. The 44-day war in the fall of 2020 resulted in Baku regaining control over a large part of Nagorno-Karabakh and in a rout of the bulk of the Armenian forces from the surrounding areas. Russian intervention prevented a total collapse of the Armenian side, and 2,000 Russian peacekeepers were deployed to ensure continued free passage between Artsakh and Armenia. The second stage was a blockade that made life for the remaining Armenians inside Artsakh very difficult. The third and final stage was the assault on September 19, which ended in swift capitulation by the Armenian forces.

Turkey and Azerbaijan are the unequivocal winners. They will now be able to dictate the conditions for what will follow. The biggest loser in the short term is Armenia. With a population of 2.8 million, it has been forced to accept 100,000 refugees and it lives under the threat of an Azeri invasion. Although both sides have offered to recognize the territorial integrity of the other side, Baku maintains strategic ambiguity by referring to remaining Azeri exclaves inside Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan.”

Having long believed it was protected by Russia, Armenia has started currying favor with the West. It has not only reneged on a pledge to host drills of the Russian-led Common Security Treaty Organization. On October 3, it crossed the Rubicon by opting to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. That means that if President Vladimir Putin were to visit Armenia, he would risk being arrested. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov branded this move as “extremely hostile” and threatened there would be the “most negative consequences.” But the only consequence to date has been that Russian customs is making trouble for imports of Armenian brandy.

These moves indicate how much Russia has lost. Its peacekeepers are getting ready to leave Azerbaijan. They were subjected to intermittent shelling of their bases that destroyed equipment and the killing of several Russian soldiers, including a senior Russian commander. No escalation followed. The Kremlin is so dependent on its transport route to Iran that it was forced to accept this humiliation, or risk antagonizing Azerbaijan.

Russia has been informed that once its peacekeepers have left Azeri territory, they will not be welcome in Armenia, and it is likely that in addition it will be asked to vacate its remaining bases on Armenian territory.

Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Armenia was home to around 10,000 Russian troops. About half were stationed at the 102nd military base at Gyumri, the second-largest city in Armenia. Located near Turkey, it was the largest Russian military base abroad. Additional garrisons have been at Zvartnots airport and at Erebuni military base. Russian border guards have also patrolled the borders with Turkey and Iran. Given that many of these troops have been sent to the “meat grinder” in Ukraine, it is not clear how many are left. Yet, being called on to leave completely would be a major setback.

The immediate future will be marked by efforts to finalize a formal peace treaty. This process has long been pursued along two tracks, one with Russia and the other with the European Union and the United States. Now it is up to Azerbaijan to decide both the terms of a treaty and where it is to be signed. Given that the Armenian population has been displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh, and that both sides have offered to recognize the territorial integrity of the other, there is not much left to talk about. Yet, the outcome is shrouded in uncertainty.

On October 5, the two sides were to meet at Granada, Spain, together with French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and European Council President Charles Michel. Although Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan did show up, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev did not. In a clear snub to France, and to aspiring Western mediators, he hinted at dissatisfaction with President Macron’s pro-Armenian statements and talk about French arms sales.

A few days later, the two sides were to meet at a summit meeting of the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), held in Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan. This time President Aliyev showed up, but in a clear snub to Russia, Prime Minister Pashinyan did not.

The likely venue is Georgia. In late 2021, it refused to take part in a 3+3 format, where the three regional powers Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were to meet with the three outside powers Iran, Russia and Turkey. Tbilisi argued that negotiations should be left to the three regional powers. On October 8, 2023, President Aliyev held a meeting in Tbilisi with Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili. On October 26, 2023, at the 4th Tbilisi Silk Road Forum in Tbilisi, prime ministers from regional powers Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, also in Tbilisi, met and Prime Minister Pashinyan proclaimed a peace deal would be signed “in the coming months.”

Given that Turkey is now emerging as a regional hegemon, the future will be shaped by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s strategic priorities in positioning Turkey as a regional energy hub and in securing its access to markets in Central Asia without passing through Iran. Both highlight relations with Azerbaijan, which in turn means that opening the Zangezur corridor to link Azerbaijan proper with its Nakhichevan exclave, crossing Armenian territory, becomes a Turkish priority.

President Erdogan has played a deliberately opaque game. First, he wanted a seamless corridor that would be beyond Armenian sovereignty. Next, he suggested that Armenian checkpoints would be accepted, and the latest is that a corridor may be drawn to Nakhchivan via Iran (pandering to Tehran’s strong objections to a pan-Turkic corridor). In mid-October, he suggested that “If Armenia honors its commitments, especially the opening of the Zangezur corridor, then Turkey will step-by-step normalize relations.”

What is quite clear is that Russia will have no further role to play. According to the trilateral agreement that was signed in 2020, envisioning an opening of Zangezur, it was stipulated that Russian border guards would be in control. In a recent statement, however, Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that “no third power should have control over any territory of Armenia.”

Georgia in contrast will play a vital role. Apart from being a possible venue for peace talks, it is of great strategic relevance to Russia. As the Ukrainian armed forces are pushing the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of its bases on Crimea, the Kremlin needs to find an alternative. Given that its port at Novorossiysk is too small, it is looking at a port in Abkhazia, which is a de facto Russian vassal state. While Georgia cries foul in public, the current government may play along.

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India has done something that no country in the world has done so far. Because so far many countries in the world have claimed that they have systems that can target multiple targets at the same time, but no one has shown it yet. However, for the first time, India has released a video of hitting 4 targets simultaneously with the Akash missile system.

The Akash weapon system was originally designed and developed by the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). This precision defense system in India has received orders from international customers. It is also regularly updated by DRDO scientists. This missile system was tested by India on December 12 at Surya Lanka Air Force Base.

Recently, the Philippines signed an agreement worth 375 million dollars with India to buy the BrahMos missile. China has a conflict with the Philippines on many issues, and is engaged in strengthening the defense system, in this situation it has also shown interest in the air defense system. At the same time, Egypt and Armenia have expressed their interest in purchasing the Akash defense system.

Akash is a short-range air-to-air missile system, which protects against air attacks. The Akash Weapon System (AWS) can engage multiple targets simultaneously in a group or independent mode. It has anti-counterfeiting (ECCM) facilities. The entire weapon system is optimized for mobile devices. Along with this there are 3 types of Akash, which range from 4.5 kilometers to 90 kilometers. It has the ability to easily shoot down helicopters, fighter jets, UAVs etc. Also, it automatically detects the target until it is killed.

Akash One has a range of 25 kilometers and can engage 4 targets simultaneously. In addition, the range of other species is 40 km. It can easily kill 12 targets. The extent of the third range is 90 km and is named Akash NG. If we talk about the NG variant, it has the power of 98 percent probability of killing. An Indian-made radar is installed on the NG, which can detect the enemy at a distance of 150 kilometers. Not only that, it is capable of killing 64 targets simultaneously.

In 2020, the Indian government approved the export of the Akash missile, after which 9 countries expressed their interest in purchasing it. Akash Technology is developed by DRDO and fully developed by Bharat Dynamics Limited. Bharat Dynamics Limited’s order book confirms that Akash will soon be delivered to Armenia. Until now, Armenia used to buy 94 percent of its weapons from Russia, but after the war in Ukraine, Russia refused to supply arms to Armenia. After that Armenia negotiated an arms deal with the Indian government. Until now, Armenia uses the Russian-made Pichora 125. However, he is currently upgrading his air defenses.

https://irshadgul.com/indias-akash-missile-system-can-destroy-not-4-but-64-targets-simultaneously-the-akash-missile-system-of-india-the-air-force-of-armenia-the-philippines-armenia-ig-news/

On September 19 and 20, the armed forces of Azerbaijan advanced on Nagorno-Karabakh, ending, within 24 hours, a so-called “frozen” conflict, the origins of which hearken back to 1988.[1] The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over this mountainous territory in 1992–94, and the subsequent stalemate, punctuated by several flashes of violence, led to over 30,000 casualties on both sides and the forced internal migration of over a million Azerbaijanis. The recent flight of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia has put additional stress on that country. While such conflicts rarely end quickly and neatly—it will take decades to tie up loose threads—there are already some lessons we can learn from the conflict.

Lessons from the Conflict

Multilateral efforts to resolve conflict are important. They conveyed to the leaders of the conflicting parties that the world and regional powers were watching and would hold them accountable. A negotiated resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was added to various governments’ foreign policy goals. Regular visits to the conflicting parties served to discourage or delay any military planning. The groups of leaders and officials from the conflicting parties in Nagorno-Karabakh were relatively small and challenged with many issues at the same time, so whenever they had to deal with special negotiators from the U.S., Russia, France, and other countries, they had to put down what they were doing at the time.

The interest and involvement of several countries in the region ensured that the conflict would not fade away and be forgotten; this is a feature of human behavior often referred to as “compassion fatigue.” Consider the fact that, as of this article’s publication, over 50 conflicts are currently active in the world—and that number doesn’t consider non-state conflicts. Counting those, the number is well over 80. Most of these are in Africa, and coverage of them in the mainstream media is rare.[2] In the U.S., what should have been an obscure conflict occasionally received press coverage so that Americans beyond just the Armenian diaspora knew about it. Public interest tends to have an impact on whether governments make an issue a priority or not.

“Frozen” conflicts can flash at any moment. This is true especially if mediators are distracted. Back in the late 1990s, there was a view that someday, Azerbaijan would probably retake the Nagorno-Karabakh region by force with a modern, appropriately sized army purchased with oil money. This concern was allayed by the sense that the conflict would have to be resolved before oil from the region could get out to Western markets, something that seemed distant. That sense of distance fell apart when the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was opened in 2006.[3] Once the oil started flowing, Azerbaijan’s financial situation improved, and, not surprisingly, the country started working on building up its military capabilities. Seventeen years later, it found itself in a position to try to retake Nagorno-Karabakh militarily. It helped that it not only had the means but had the space, in the sense that Russia and the U.S. were focused on Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine. What was considered by many experts a “frozen” conflict suddenly became hot, and then ended even more suddenly. The military resolution of the situation also reminds us that seemingly endless conflicts can actually end. Nagorno-Karabakh has gone the way of Tamil Tiger-occupied Sri Lanka, a conflict which also appeared irresolvable until 2009.[4]

Money talks, and who your friends are matters. Azerbaijan slowly built up its army with the intent of taking back Armenian-occupied areas surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and the region itself. Azerbaijan’s defense spending grew dramatically starting in 2004, from $144 million in 2003 to $1.2 billion in 2008. In January 2009, Azerbaijan claimed it would increase its defense spending to $2.3 billion. It could do that because its economy was growing at an unprecedented rate. Smart spending is as important as being able to outspend your opponent. While Azerbaijan’s armed forces decreased in terms of personnel from 2007 to 2019, its quality increased significantly, primarily due to assistance received from Turkey and Israel, but also the U.S. 

                                          Azerbaijan Armed Forces
                                    2007[5]                       2019[6]
Army:                          85,000                         56,000
Air Force:                   8,000                            8,500
Navy:                          2,000                            2,500
Total personnel:       95,000                          67,000

In a war of attrition, numbers are significant, but in this case, the capabilities edge on the Azerbaijan side—largely due to training, military exercises, and technological force multipliers—proved to be the winning factor, even as it was on the offense and had to fight uphill. Turkey has been heavily involved in the modernization of Azerbaijan’s military since 1992, and it started providing Azerbaijan more robust professional military education and access to joint training and exercises in 2010.[7] Israel also played a key role in Azerbaijan’s military modernization. In 2012, Azerbaijan purchased $1.6 billion worth of weapons from Israeli Aerospace Industries, an additional $5 billion worth of weapons in 2016, and another $127 million worth of weapons in 2017.[8] Most of the purchases consisted of unmanned aircraft and satellite technology to improve battlespace awareness for the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. 

All of this proved critical to Azerbaijan’s victories on the battlefield in the fall of 2020, and then its retaking of Nagorno-Karabakh in September of this year. This also revealed the substantial weakness of Nagorno-Karabakh's defense forces and Armenia’s political and logistical ties. Russia, Iran, and the worldwide Armenian diaspora—Armenia’s allies and supporters and, through it, supporters of Nagorno-Karabakh—proved incapable of defending those trying to tear the region away from Azerbaijan. The wealth and generosity of your allies matter, and in this case, Azerbaijan had the better, more capable allies. President Ilham Aliyev has demonstrated that he is not as weak as observers once worried he was after the 2003 death of his father, Heydar Aliyev. Azerbaijan’s security and negotiating position are much improved now.

Occupying another country’s land is costly and usually ends badly. Armenia had external support from its wealthy and politically influential diasporas located in the U.S. and France, among other places. These communities did a lot to keep up the dream of an independent so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (“Artsakh,” according to Armenians) alive—even at one point by financing the construction of an impressive highway linking Yerevan with Stepanakert/Khankendi—but enthusiasm, the leveraging of sympathetic politicians in important countries, and money to build roads and churches rarely change the conditions on the ground that matter in warfare. In fact, these factors can intensify the desire of refugees and internally displaced people to return to their homeland, and push for the chance to do so. 

Immediate Lessons

Beyond the key takeaways above, we should consider three more ideas as we reflect on Azerbaijan’s recent military operation in its Nagorno-Karabakh region.

First, this is an opportunity for the U.S. and allies to reach out to Armenia to help it to process what just happened and support the displaced. Russia and its peacekeepers standing between the Azerbaijanis and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians clearly failed to stop Azerbaijan’s offensive. Russia and Iran are increasingly becoming pariah states, given their aggression against Ukraine and Israel, respectively. They are on self-defeating trajectories. Armenia should be encouraged to further orient itself westward.

Second, the inaction of Russia’s peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani forces advanced might suggest to outside observers that Russia is distracted and stretched to the limits by Ukraine. In other words, Russia’s ongoing occupation of parts of Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) and its troops in Transnistria without the government of Moldova’s consent, while long-standing, might be worth pushing against, as Russia may not be as strong as we have long believed. At least it could be perceived that way after what just transpired in Azerbaijan. This bears further analysis. 

In the meantime, if the U.S. and other Western countries have not yet done so, they might consider cautioning the Moldovans and Georgians not to test Russian resolve, given Mr. Putin’s likely, unpredictable, and escalatory reaction to a testing of perceived Russian vulnerability. And the U.S. and others should keep an eye on Transnistria and the occupied territories Russia has been expanding in Georgia. Several recent and upcoming events concerning Moldova could provoke incidents, including the November 5 local elections, the potential parliamentary approval of Moldova’s National Security Strategy (which lists Russia as its main external threat), the EU’s decision about whether formal accession talks with Moldova can begin, and the renewal or expiration of the OSCE mandate in Moldova by the end of the year. It is worth remembering that Moldova is neither a member of NATO nor the EU and is not far from the Ukrainian port city of Odesa. Russia has been repeatedly targeting Odesa with missiles and drones, possibly as part of a larger effort to take Ukraine’s entire Black Sea coast and link Russia up with Transnistria to Ukraine’s west.

Third, if the U.S. and its allies and partners have not yet done so, they should make it clear to Azerbaijan that they will be watching them in the post-conflict period. As the saying goes, they should “trust but verify.” They should also warn Azerbaijan not to take military action to establish a land bridge between Azerbaijan proper and the exclave of Nakhchevan, an act which would require the seizure of Armenian territory.

Michael C. Keays is a senior diplomatic fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Wilson Center. While the author is on detail from the State Department to the Kennan Institute, the views are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. government or the Wilson Center.

[1] Vladimir Solovyov, “Azerbaijani Control of Nagorno-Karabakh Will Not Stop Conflict in the South Caucasus,” Carnegie Politika, September 28, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90655

[2] Anna Marie Obermeier and Siri Aas Rustad, Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946–2022 (Oslo, Norway: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2023), https://reliefweb.int/report/world/conflict-trends-global-overview-1946-2022#:~:text=Despite%20the%20increase%20in%20battle,in%2038%20conflict%2Daffected%20countries

[3] bp Azerbaijan (website), “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline,” https://www.bp.com/en_az/azerbaijan/home/who-we-are/operationsprojects/pipelines/btc.html

[4] Jayshree Bajoria, “The Sri Lankan Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations, updated May 18, 2009, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sri-lankan-conflict

[5] GlobalSecurity.org (website), “Azerbaijan—Introduction,” https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/azerbaijan/intro.htm

[6] Edward J. Erickson, “The 44-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh: Turkish Drone Success or Operational Art?” Military Review, August 2021, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2021-OLE/Erickson/

[7] Haldun Yalçınkaya, “Turkey’s Overlooked Role in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War,” GMF (German Marshall Fund), January 21, 2021, https://www.gmfus.org/news/turkeys-overlooked-role-second-nagorno-karabakh-war

[8] Erickson, “The 44-Day War.” 

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no-86-what-resolution-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-teaches-us

The Milken Institute School of Public Health will partner with an Armenian university to research the prevention of chronic diseases like cancer and cardiovascular disease for the next five years, officials announced last month.

Milken and the American University of Armenia Turpanjian College of Health Sciences, or AUA, in Yerevan, Armenia, will annually enroll five to six Armenian students to take courses on chronic diseases from Milken and AUA faculty and conduct research between September 2023 and 2027 on AUA’s campus. Carla Berg, a principal investigator of the project, said the institutions aim to develop a formal prevention program for noncommunicable diseases, or NCDs — diseases like heart disease and diabetes that do not spread through infection — allowing both institutions to share research findings to help inform health policy related to NCD prevention.

Unhealthy eating habits, smoking tobacco, infrequent exercise and high alcohol consumption are the behavioral origins of susceptibility to NCDs. Generational poverty can also increase the risk of developing NCDs because of insufficient access to health care, indicating the growing need for global research into their prevention, according to a 2023 study published in the National Library of Medicine.

“We hope to enhance research capacity related to NCD prevention and control, emphasizing social determinants of NCD risk factors,” Berg, a professor of prevention and community health at GW, said in an email.

Berg said selected Armenian citizens studying medicine receive covered tuition from the U.S National Institute of Health Fogarty International Center and additional funds to conduct research. Principal investigators Berg and Nino Paichadze, Milken professors, and AUA professor Varduhi Petrosyan are leading the project.

Berg said researchers want to share practices that mitigate the development of NCDs, like improving social conditions and reducing tobacco and alcohol consumption, to advance their research. She said the program looks to widen the scope of research into NCD prevention with the students launching research careers focused on NCDs at the end of the program’s five years.

AUA held the introductory meeting for the program from Oct. 9 to 11 where program leaders convened to share their research findings related to NCDs, like the high risk of NCD development linked with global tobacco use, with participating students who will research similar topics.

“One of my mottos is, ‘To whom much is given, much will be required,’” Berg said. “I feel like it is incumbent on countries with resources and expertise to share and elevate our neighbors around the globe.”

Experts in global health and NCDs said cooperation and education across national borders is crucial to advancing research into NCDs, which affect people globally.

Olatunji Alese, an associate professor of hematology and medical oncology at Emory University, said international partnerships can be beneficial in reducing the time required to make necessary medical breakthroughs to help patients.

“Being able to collaborate with investigators, clinicians all over the world is advantageous because that way there can be a rapid translation of advances toward patient benefit,” Alese said. “Literally reducing the time it takes for such discoveries, usually in the lab, to be translated into actually helping patients at the bedside.”

Alese said mentored research ensures that medical students are equipped to respond to current circumstances in global health, like the increasing of chronic degenerative diseases like cancer and progress toward treatment of infectious disease in developed countries.

“One of the biggest ways to improve outcomes is training the next generation of health care providers,” Alese said. “That’s no no-brainer. Making sure there is adequate education and training for the next generation of oncologists not just in the U.S., but globally, is extremely important.”

Cher Dallal, an associate professor of epidemiology and biostatistics at the University of Maryland, said the rising toll of global deaths caused by NCDs indicates the growing need to study their prevention.

“Educating medical students on noncommunicable diseases, and particularly the risk factors for these diseases, such as obesity and physical inactivity, is crucial for prevention and ultimately, reducing mortality rates and improving the overall health of adults worldwide,” Dallal said in an email.

Dallal said there are specific benefits to studying these diseases from a global perspective, like progressing research regarding cancer control and prevention. She said global inequalities in socioeconomic factors like health care access influence the likelihood of developing a NCD.

“Incidence and mortality rates for cancer differ globally with documented geographical heterogeneity,” Dallal said. “These differences are, in part, due to the distribution and prevalence of risk factors, screening modalities, access to care, social determinants of health and other potential factors.”

Caryn Peterson, an assistant research professor studying epidemiology and biostatistics at the University of Illinois at Chicago, said studying NCDs from a socioeconomic perspective can help researchers understand the global health disparities that countries experience and can inform policies of targeted prevention. She said structural factors like access to quality health care and an individual’s exposure to risks like air pollution can increase susceptibility to NCDs.

“All of these things play a huge role and to ignore them is to create an incomplete picture of the cause of disease and in particular, the cause of health disparities,” Peterson said.

The establishment of territorial sovereignty for each State in the world is a necessity, it is in this regard that Azerbaijan, by regaining control of Nagorno-Karabakh in September after a lightning offensive, can argue that it was seeking to restore its territorial sovereignty lost during the previous conflict. The reconquest could be seen as a legitimate response to the unacceptable status quo situation that had prevailed in the region for many years, and as a manifestation of the international right of each country to guarantee its territorial integrity. Regional stabilization is an essential element for Azerbaijan. The reconquest of Nagorno-Karabakh could be interpreted as an attempt to restore regional balance and put an end to a persistent source of tension. In this light, Azerbaijan could argue that a tough stance is necessary to ensure stability and security in the region.

Additionally, Azerbaijan’s recent decision to decline participation in normalization talks with Armenia, scheduled to take place in the United States in November, has heightened tensions. Azerbaijan invokes a “partial” position from Washington, thus highlighting the complexity of alliances in the region. Baku’s refusal to engage in negotiations is a direct response to the events of September 19, suggesting that the current situation requires tangible progress on the path to peace to restore normalization of relations.

 American Response and Risks of Loss of Mediation

The reaction of the US national security adviser, Mr. O’Brien, underlines the firm stance of the United States towards Azerbaijan after the events of September. The cancellation of high-level visits and condemnation of Baku’s actions highlight the United States’ determination to push for concrete progress toward peace. However, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry’s response, suggesting that this unilateral approach could cause the United States to lose its role as mediator, highlights the geopolitical risks inherent in this situation.

The rounds of negotiations between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, mediated by the European Union, reflect the complexity of the situation. However, Ilham Aliyev’s refusal to participate in negotiations in Spain citing France’s biased position raises questions about the EU’s ability to play a neutral mediation role. The initially planned presence of the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, accompanied by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, underlines the importance of European mediation.

The territorial conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh, the massive population displacements, and the flight of more than 100,000 Armenians to Armenia highlight the major humanitarian challenges linked to the conflict. Nikol Pashinian, Armenian Prime Minister, reaffirms Yerevan’s desire to sign a peace agreement in the coming months, despite current difficulties. The leaders of the two former Soviet republics have raised the possibility of a comprehensive peace deal by the end of the year, but this will largely depend on the resolution of geopolitical obstacles and the willingness of all parties to agree. engage constructively in the negotiation process.

Azerbaijan’s attitude towards international mediations, including distrust towards mediation perceived as “biased” by France, can be interpreted as the protection of national sovereignty. This attitude may reflect the belief that crucial decisions related to conflict resolution should be made independently, thereby preserving national autonomy and avoiding harmful external interference.

The deep complexity of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The dynamics at play, shaped by passionate domestic reactions, diverse international interventions and complex regional implications, create an ever-changing geopolitical landscape. The humanitarian challenges resulting from the conflict, such as massive population displacements, highlight the urgency of concerted action.

It is clear that mediation in this sensitive region must adapt to a nuanced reality, taking into account deep national sensitivities, the requirements of international diplomacy and glaring humanitarian imperatives. The search for a lasting resolution requires a delicate balance between these various factors, and the obstacles to mediation highlight the need for a strategic and inclusive approach.

Ultimately, the quest for peace in Nagorno-Karabakh requires a comprehensive vision and the willingness of all parties involved to transcend differences, demonstrate flexibility and resolutely engage in constructive negotiations. The future of the region will depend on the ability of domestic and international actors to skillfully navigate these complexities to forge a path toward a lasting and peaceful resolution.