Author: Andres-Papazian

DASHED HOPES FOR TURKISH-ARMENIAN RAPPROCHEMENT

AZG DAILY #220
30-11-2010

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

More than a year after the signature by Turkey and Armenia of protocols
aimed at normalising bilateral relations, the agreements have yet
to be ratified and the border between the two countries is still
closed. Despite the efforts of the United States, Russia and the
European Union, the short-term prospects for ratification are bleak.

Key stumbling blocks include Turkey’s promise to Azerbaijan not to
reopen the border until Armenia gives up control over the areas around
Nagorno-Karabakh – the disputed enclave in Azerbaijan ‘occupied’
by Armenia since a 1992-94 conflict – and the campaign for the
1915 massacre of Armenians by Ottoman forces to be recognised as
‘genocide’. The success of any diplomatic rapprochement will also
require a shift in popular opinion on both sides of the border.

Roots of the deadlock

A central failing on the part of all the key participants in the
normalisation process, and particularly Turkey, is the degree to
which they underestimated the importance of Azerbaijan, which was not
included in the process leading up to the signature of the protocols
in October 2009. Excluded, Azerbaijan used its historic and cultural
links with Turkey, as well as its grievances over Armenia’s occupation
of a large area of its territory, to mount a campaign of opposition to
the Turkish-Armenian normalisation process from within Turkey itself.

This served to strengthen Turkish public opposition to the ratification
of the protocols unless there was progress on Nagorno-Karabakh.

Armenia may appear to be the party with the most to gain from
normalisation, because the closure of its border with Turkey in
1993 has impeded its economic development. However, the move is
not universally popular among Armenians. President Serzh Sargsyan’s
decision to sign the protocols was, therefore, a gamble. Armenian
reservations – articulated mostly by its diaspora as well as domestic
political forces associated with Armenians abroad, such as the Heritage
Party, and by nationalist Dashnaks – are rooted in the perception that
the normalisation process will disrupt the campaign for international
recognition of the 1915 massacre as ‘genocide’.

Sargsyan was already under pressure after having agreed to establish
a sub-commission on the massacre, which was perceived by the diaspora
and affiliated parties as a concession to Turkey and as a means of
disputing the established facts. This left him with little political
capital with which to make a compromise on Nagorno-Karabakh.

In what could, therefore, be seen as a diplomatic victory for
Armenia, the protocols do not include any explicit reference to
Nagorno-Karabakh, even though the border closure was initially imposed
by Turkey in response to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Armenia’s
occupation of Azerbaijani territory. Yet Armenia’s refusal to address
Nagorno-Karabakh has contributed to the failure of the protocols. It
quickly became apparent that Nagorno-Karabakh and the normalisation
process were politically entwined, regardless of whether they were
linked in the documents or not.

Within Turkey, the normalisation process has become a hot political
issue. It has highlighted tensions between President Abdullah Gul –
who first travelled to Armenia in September 2008 to attend a World Cup
football match between the two countries, and who wanted to normalise
relations without any preconditions – and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan who took a more hardline stance from the outset. Erdogan
demanded concessions from Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh as a
precondition, and thus used the issue to strengthen his own support
base in Turkey and within the ruling Justice and Development Party.

Erdogan travelled to Baku during the summer of 2009 and delivered an
emotional speech at the Azerbaijani parliament, vowing not to open
the border with Armenia unless it made concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh
and withdrew from other occupied territories.

Russia’s position on the normalisation process has not been
straightforward. Given that most Armenian-Turkish trade today travels
through Georgian territory, Moscow initially supported the opening
of the border as a way to further isolate Georgia, which is already
subject to Russian economic sanctions, and to weaken its economy. Yet
as the signing of the protocols approached, Moscow began to fear being
unseated as the key mediator and power broker in the South Caucasus.

It was not ready to cede this role to the US, which was actively
promoting normalisation. Moreover, it was alarmed by Turkey’s growing
activism in the region, which served as a reminder of Ottoman-era
rivalries. Hence for Moscow the status quo, where the protocols
have been signed but not ratified, is preferable. In the past year,
Moscow has taken the opportunity to strengthen its influence over
both Armenia and Azerbaijan through expanded military ties.Meanwhile,
neither the US nor the EU has offered significant rewards to Armenia
and Azerbaijan to promote progress on Nagorno-Karabakh. And now that
Turkey’s accession efforts have stalled, the EU has found its power
to influence Ankara on the issue has also diminished.

Consequences of stalled normalisation

A successful Turkish-Armenian rapprochement had the potential to
improve the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, and to promote cooperation
in the divided South Caucasus. Its failure has instead resulted in
a dangerous backlash.

Most importantly, with Azerbaijan excluded from the talks while
feeling increasingly assertive due to its oil wealth and Armenia less
able to offer compromises, there is a danger of escalation in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. There has been a dramatic increase in the
number of ceasefire violations along the 175km Line of Contact. In
spite of growing international concern and much-improved cooperation
between the three co-chairs of the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group – Russia, the US and
France – little progress has been made in negotiations and Baku has
been stepping up its rhetoric, vowing to pursue a military solution
if no tangible results are achieved soon.

The delay in ratifying the protocols has also raised questions about
the viability of Turkey’s new ‘zero problems’ foreign policy, and
its desire for a regional and global role. Despite its ambitions,
Ankara has yet to prove that it has the capacity to successfully
navigate such a complex web of politically sensitive relations.

The failure so far of the normalisation process, coupled with growing
tensions along the ceasefire line with Azerbaijan, have left Armenia
increasingly dependent on Russia’s security guarantees. During a
visit to Yerevan by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in August 2010,
Armenia agreed to extend Russia’s lease on its Gyumri military base
until 2044, without any compensation from Moscow.

In tandem with the normalisation process, regional development has
also stalled.Closed borders and divisions are making it harder for
states to overcome the consequences of the global financial crisis
and to rebuild their economies.

Drivers for change

Although the short-term prospects for the successful completion of
the normalisation process are bleak, the outlook for its completion
over the next two to three years may be brighter.

The most important factor working in its favour is that despite the
deadlock at government level, the protocols have stimulated a new
level of Turkish public interest in their country’s historic relations
with the Armenians. In contrast to just a few years ago when even
mentioning the G-word would guarantee imprisonment or even death –
as in the 2007 assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant
Dink – today discussions of historical legacies are much more open
and no longer suppressed by the authorities. In April 2010, hundreds
of Turks were permitted for the first time to gather in Istanbul
and in Ankara to mark the anniversary of the Armenian massacre. As a
reflection of this new level of openness, there is now a larger media
debate about the fate of Turkey’s Armenian community and the need for
reconciliation. Meanwhile, there are a growing number of direct flights
between Armenia and Turkey. In September, hundreds of Armenian tourists
were permitted to attend the first service in Akhtamar’s Armenian
church for 95 years; it had previously been relegated to serving as
a museum. In the long term, such public reconciliation could provide
the basis for a more sustainable political reconciliation.

Another key factor is the growing evidence that Azerbaijan, which was
adamantly opposed to normalisation, might be reviewing its position,
amid suggestions that Baku has overplayed its hand and is now worse
off for having thwarted the normalisation process. It has been under
pressure from Turkey not to let the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict escalate
and, though it has sharply increased its defence budget since 2000,
few in Azerbaijan believe that Baku can fulfil its threat to retake
Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories by force.

Having witnessed the escalation of the Georgian-South Ossetian
conflict in 2008, major powers are anxious to prevent any new violent
confrontation over Nagorno-Karabakh, which has the potential to be
more devastating and to draw in Russia, Turkey and other regional
players. The Minsk Group co-chairs are sending strong messages to
both Baku and Yerevan to this effect, while Medvedev has met both
Sargsyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for extensive talks
three times in the last six months. There has been little progress in
these talks except for an agreement to hand over the bodies of those
recently killed along the ceasefire line, which remains unprotected by
any external forces or is only monitored intermittently by a handful
of OSCE officials.

The OSCE is holding its first summit in over ten years in December
in Astana, Kazakhstan, and it is hoped that it will deliver some
progress on Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar
Mammadyarov has expressed hopes that a ‘road map’ for the resolution
of the conflict could be adopted at the summit, but Armenians have
expressed scepticism and unwillingness to compromise at this stage. If
some progress is achieved, however symbolic, the summit could help
to unlock the stalled Turkish-Armenian normalisation process. But if
there is none, not only will the OSCE’s credibility be tested again,
but the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will also continue to escalate and
may even reach a new level of danger.

Even if the dynamics surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh do improve, Turkish
domestic politics could then get in the way of any rapprochement.

Erdogan’s victory in the September 2010 referendum on constitutional
reform has strengthened his domestic power base, meaning that he does
not need to use populist rhetoric with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh
and Armenia in his domestic political battles. However, the prospect
of presidential elections in 2012 – in which Erdogan is widely
expected to run – will most certainly limit his room for manoeuvre
with regard to the ratification of the protocols, which he has so
publicly opposed. Moreover, with the current overload of issues on
Turkey’s foreign and domestic agenda, it will be hard to put the
normalisation process back on the list of priorities once it has
fallen from the agenda all together. Yet the Turks cannot ignore the
issue indefinitely.

If no further progress on the Turkish-Armenian normalisation process
has been achieved by 2015, which will mark the 100th anniversary of
the mass killings of Armenians, Turkey risks international humiliation
as more countries, possibly even the US, move to call the killings
‘genocide’. In March, 2010, a non-binding resolution was narrowly
approved by the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs in favour of
the term – despite last-minute pleas from the White House to abandon
the vote. Moreover, given the recent deterioration of Israeli-Turkish
relations, the powerful pro-Israel lobby in the US, which used to
block efforts to persuade Washington to recognise the massacre as
‘genocide’, has signalled a possible change of stance. However,
if some progress towards a diplomatic rapprochement is achieved,
accompanied by a popular reconciliation, the 100th anniversary could
provide an opportunity for both Turkey and Armenia to finally resolve
the most difficult issues in their history and foreign policy.

From: A. Papazian

ON WIKILEAKS ALLEGATIONS
IGOR MURADYAN

Lragir.am
29 Nov 2010

When the world community is having economic and political crisis, it
is the right time for scandals of international level. The Wikileaks
is certainly the result of the home political struggle in the United
States, which is self-evident in a tough home political struggle,
however, it is also self-evident that among the participants of the
project there are countries which are close partners of the United
States.

They mentioned the Caucasus as well, which necessitates the expression
of a certain opinion on this. My friends from the analytical community
of several western countries are drawing attention to the fact that
despite the presence of several real materials evident falsifications
related to the key scandalous and attractive events in international
politics are being published.

I would like to note that among the Wikileaks materials there is a
certain material which I had made at the request of one of the key
British advisory organizations. However, at that time I presented it in
the form of a debate, proposals and analysis rather than an allegation,
in a rather moderate analytical mode. This is not the first time I
witnessed examples of such high-level falsification which are issued
in the form of texts, with only slight stylistic changes.

It should be noted that this job is being done by a team of skilled
analysts, and some of them are well-aware of the regional materials. I
do not dare to insist but I think I even know one of these analysts
quite well. Well done, boy, once again made money on falsification.

There is something to learn from him.

Interestingly, this material is in the form of an official document
which means it is intended to undermine certain political processes,
which is of positive importance for the national priorities of Armenia,
nevertheless the Wikileaks documents must be slightly revised.

One way or another, this is a clear brunt for the Obama administration
but disclosure of certain circumstances will hardly shatter the
national interests of the United States.

From: A. Papazian

WIKILEAKS DOCUMENTS REVEAL TURKEY’S EFFORTS TO USE PROTOCOLS TO DERAIL GENOCIDE AFFIRMATION; FORCE PRO-AZERBAIJAN SETTLEMENT ON KARABAKH

Noyan Tapan
29.11.2010 | 10:43

Politics

Pres. Aliyev: April 24th a “Sword of Damocles” over the
Turkey-Azerbaijan-Armenia Relations

WASHINGTON, DC , NOVEMBER 29, NOYAN TAPAN. The public disclosure today
by WikiLeaks of tens of thousands of US diplomatic cables included many
of special interest to Armenian Americans, most notably a “smoking
gun” revelation that Turkey has aggressively used the Turkey-Armenia
Protocols, particularly the prospect of its ratification, to pressure
American leaders against US recognition of the Armenian Genocide and in
favor of a pro-Azerbaijani settlement of the Nagorno Karabagh conflict,
reported the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA).

“These files are a smoking-gun,” explained ANCA Executive Director
Aram Hamparian. “They reveal the remarkable candor with which Ankara
has, from day one, sought to pressure the United States to enforce it
preconditions for the Turkey-Armenia Protocols. It’s painfully clear
from the words of Turkey’s own leaders that, rather than seeking
peace, they instead sought to use the prospect of the ratification
of these accords to block the Armenian Genocide recognition and to
force a pro-Azerbaijani resolution of Nagorno Karabakh.”

In a February 25, 2010, confidential cable from the U.S. Embassy in
Ankara, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey James Jeffery noted that Turkey had
made it clear that its ratification of the Turkey-Armenia Protocols
was predicated on Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev’s approval.

Specifically, in describing a February 18, 2010, meeting between U.S.

Under Secretary of State William Burns and Turkey’s Undersecretary
of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Sinirlioglu,
Jeffery writes:

“Sinirlioglu appealed for ‘simultaneity’ between Armenian Protocols
ratification and the Minsk Process. He emphasized ‘a strong
reaction’ against the protocols among ruling party MPs had to be
overcome before the government would hazard a ratification effort. He
warned Congressional passage of an Armenian genocide resolution would
‘complicate’ his government’s domestic political calculations regarding
ratification. He said if something acceptable to Azerbaijani President
Aliyev can found, then ‘we can move’ the protocols forward.”

Read the complete cable at:

In a January 20, 2010, confidential cable, Amb. Jeffery provided his
analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy, citing concerns about Turkey’s
“inability to bring to conclusion foreign policy initiatives,”
specifically noting the Turkey-Armenia Protocols, and noting Foreign
Minister Davutoglu’s “tendency to substitute rhetoric for long term
investment of diplomatic, military, and assistance capital.” Amb.

Jeffery went on to note that:

“Turkey will have to stand and be counted on Iran, in the Security
Council, with MD, and in implementation of UN or US sanctions. This
will have a profound effect on relations second only to the fate of
the Armenian protocols over the next year.”

Read the complete cable at:

Pres. Aliyev: Armenian Genocide Remembrance “Sword of Damocles”
Over Turkey-Azerbaijan-Armenia relations

In a confidential cable from the U.S. Embassy in Baku, senior diplomat
Donald Lu reported on a meeting between U.S. Under Secretary of State
Burns and President Ilham Aliyev, in which the Azerbaijani leader
advocated the combining of the Turkey-Armenia Protocols discussion
and the Nagorno Karabakh peace negotiations. He also urged the
postponement of any Protocols ratification until after April 24th,
Armenian Genocide remembrance day, describing this date as a “Sword of
Damocles” hanging over political initiatives in the region. Lu wrote:

“U/S Burns stressed that the U.S. believes that progress on the
Turkey-Armenia protocols could create political space for Sargsian to
be more flexible on NK. He continued that the reverse was also true,
that a failure of the Turkey-Armenia process would almost certainly
result in serious negative consequences for the NK process. Aliyev
said that NK progress would require a minimum of five or six months.

He suggested that the entire Turkey-Armenia protocol ratification
process be delayed until afterApril 24. He said that the ‘Sword of
Damocles’ of Armenian Remembrance Day is hanging unhelpfully not only
over the Turkey-Armenia process, but also now the NK progress. ‘If
there were no deadline, maybe we could see how to combine our efforts
(to resolve NK).'”

According to the cable, President Aliyev urged Under Secretary Burns
to pressure Armenia to accept the most recently proposed OSCE Minsk
group settlement regarding Nagorno Karabakh, calling on the three
co-chair countries to “send a strong message that the independence
of NK is not under review,” and urging “consequences in terms of
international isolation” if Armenia does not accept the measures.

Read the complete cable at:

Concerns over Armenia-Iran relations

A cable citing the text of a letter from U.S. Deputy Secretary of
State Negroponte to the Armenian Government expressed concern about
the reported sale of weapons to Iran, stating “Notwithstanding the
close relationship between our countries, neither the Administration
nor the U.S. Congress can overlook this case.” The letter went on to
note that there would be consideration “whether there is a basis for
the imposition of U.S. sanctions.”

“What this cable, and all that has transpired since it was written
in 2008, shows is that the U.S. government, having reviewed all the
relevant facts, concluded that Yerevan did not merit sanctions –
on assistance, on exports, or, for that matter, in any other area,”
commented Hamparian.

Read the complete cable at:

Additional Resources:

A complete listing of WikiLeaks cables related to Armenia, released
to date, may be viewed at:

A complete listing of WikiLeaks cables relating to Turkey, released
to date, may be viewed at:

A complete listing of WikiLeaks cables related to Azerbaijan, released
to date, may be viewed at:

From: A. Papazian

NKR PRESIDENT HOLDS MEETINGS IN PARIS

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2010-11-29 14:10
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic

After the nation-wide telethon in Los Angeles completed, President
of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic Bako Sahakyan left for Paris.

According to the Central Information Department of the NKR President’s
Office, on November 27, Bako Sahakyan met member of the “Hayastan”
All-Armenian Fund’s Board of Trustees, director of the Fund~Rs local
body in France Petros Terzyan.

The President expressed his gratitude to the French branch of the fund
and its director for organizing the 2010 phonotone in Europe. Some
issues related to the realization of different projects in the NKR
were discussed during the meeting.

On November 28, the NKR President met in Paris with entrepreneur and
philanthropist Vardan Sermakes. Issues related to implementation of
different projects in Artsakh were discussed during the meeting.

On the same day, Bako Sahakyan took part in a Sunday mass serviced
by Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians Garegin II at
the Paris St. John the Baptist Cathedral.

The Head of the State also took part in an annual meeting of the
Union of Armenian Doctors of France. The President appreciated the
long-term assistance shown to Artsakh noting the important role the
union plays in developing the sphere of medicine in Artsakh. Issues
related to the future cooperation in the health care system in the
republic were also discussed during the meeting.

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of
Armenia in France Vigen Chitechyan, Head of the Central Information
Department of the NKR President~Rs Office Davit Babayan, NKR Permanent
Representative to France Hovhannes Gevorgyan took part in the events.

From: A. Papazian

LE PRIX OCEANES 2010 A ETE REMIS A L’AUTEUR DU ROMAN HISTORIQUE ” EREVAN “.

Paris Normandie

29 Nov 2010
France

Gilbert Sinoue honore

Gilbert Sinoue est cette annee le laureat du prix Oceanes. Le jury
l’a recompense pour son roman historique Erevan (Flammarion), dont le
recit a pour cadre le genocide armenien. Le prix lui a ete remis par
le maire dans les grands salons de la mairie, en presence des membres
du jury et de Francoise de la Porte, de la Galerne. Cette librairie
est, depuis 1998, partenaire de la Ville pour l’organisation du prix.

Gilbert Sinoue avait auparavant rencontre des lecteurs et presente le
roman a la Galerne. Le prix Oceanes honore chaque annee l’auteur d’un
roman historique ou d’aventure. Selectionnes en octobre, six romans
sont mis pendant six mois a la disposition des 150 membres du jury
: des Havrais et des habitants de l’agglomeration. Des rencontres
mensuelles ont lieu a la Galerne pour que les jures echangent et
confrontent leurs opinions et commentaires.

” Lire, c’est l’une des plus belles aventures personnelles. C’est
merveilleux “, s’exclamait le maire, avant de se tourner vers Gilbert
Sinoue et de faire reference aux precedents laureats du prix : ”
Vous rejoignez une liste prestigieuse “. Edouard Philippe annoncait
ensuite la remise d’une ” ~uvre locale choisie par Chantal Ernoult,
l’adjointe a la Culture. Quelque chose qui est fait au Havre… Des
boutons de manchette en beton “. Le maire precisait que Gilbert
Sinoue etait la 2e personne, après le President de la Republique,
a recevoir ce cadeau dans les grands salons de la mairie.

Prenant a son tour la parole, l’ecrivain affirmait : ” Les prix de
lecteurs, c’est de plus en plus rare “.

Temoignages de jures

Les membres du jury du prix Oceanes 2010 sont tous des passionnes de
litterature et des devoreurs de livres. Pour le devenir, il leur avait
fallu simplement repondre a la convocation par les organisateurs et
etre dans les 150 premiers. Une femme qui etait pour la première fois
juree du prix Oceanes se declarait satisfaite, du choix du jury : ”
J’ai bien aime le livre. J’avais donne une bonne note. Je n’avais rien
lu auparavant sur le genocide armenien, j’ai decouvert, j’ai appris “.

Un enseignant qui, lui, a deja siege plusieurs fois dans le jury
confiait : ” C’est une experience interessante quand on aime les romans
historiques. Ca permet de decouvrir tous les ans des romans nouveaux. ”

From: A. Papazian

A MEMORIAL TABLET OPENED IN ODESSA IN MEMORY OF THE FIRST ARMENIAN CHURCH
By Vigen Margaryan

YerevanReport.com
Nov 29 2010
Armenia

YEREVAN, November 29 – The author of the idea of commemorating the
first Armenian church of St. Gregory the Illuminator is an expert
IMAC Analitika.at.ua, the head of the Armenian historical club,
David Davtyan, who also wrote a historical essay devoted to the church.

The first St. Gregory the Illuminator church was erected in 1844 in
the intersection of Catherine (69) and Bazarnaya streets. The church
was not closed by the Soviet Government and continued to operate even
during World War II.

However, half of the building was destroyed with a firebomb in 1944
and the ruins of the church remained at the center of Odessa until
1951. Now a five-story building rises in the place of the Armenian
church.

By the 15th anniversary of the consecration of the new Armenian Church
of St. Gregory the Illuminator, with the blessing of the abbot of the
Armenian Church of Odessa archimandrite Levon, as well as with the
efforts of David Davtyan, permission was obtained from the authorities
for the establishment of the memorial tablet.

The project of the memorial tablet was designed by Edgar Sahakyan,Armen
Hovakimyan worked out the sculptural representation.

This kind of work would be impossible to accomplish without the
support of philanthropist Eduard Khachatryan.

From: A. Papazian

RUSSIAN PRESIDENT’S ADMINISTRATIVE HEAD VISITS MEMORIAL OF GENOCIDE VICTIMS
By Vigen Margaryan

YerevanReport.com
Nov 29 2010
Armenia

During the official visit to the Republic of Armenia, on November
29 the Administrative head of the Russian President Sergey
Narishkin visited Memorial to the victims of the Armenian Genocide
(1915-1923). Narishkin put flowers on the Memorial of the innocent
victims, and visited the Museum-Institute of the Armenian Genocide
by the accompaniment of the head of the Museum Hayk Demoyan. In the
Museum Narishkin watched the exhibits and testimony of the first
Genocide of the 20th century. Sergey Narishkin left a note in the
book of the honorable guests of the Museum.

The Administrative head of the Russian President wrote: “I bend my
head over the victims of national tragedy of the Armenians. The
Memorial leaves an indelible impression. Here you deeply realize
what challenges the Armenian nation took and how courageously and
honorably revives his native land. I wish the fraternal Armenians
lot’s of success and prosperity.”

From: A. Papazian

WIKILEAKS REVEALS NEGROPONTE’S CHRISTMAS EVE ULTIMATUM
By Aram Hovakimiants

YerevanReport.com
Nov 29 2010
Armenia

YEREVAN, November 29 – A US demarche dispatched to the Republic
of Armenia in the waning hours of the Bush administration alleged a
transfer of arms to Iran and their subsequent use in Iraq, a diplomatic
cable uncovered by WikiLeaks site on November 28 reveal.

The diplomatic cable – dispatched from the Department of State
headquarters in Washington to the American Embassy in Yerevan at 9:58
pm on December 24, 2008 – contained a letter from Deputy Secretary
of State John Negroponte addressed to President Serge Sarkisian.

The letter made reference to a transfer of arms from Armenia to Iran
and alleged that those weapons were later used in insurgent attacks in
Iraq and resulted in deaths of US military personnel. Negroponte made
a perfunctory reference to US efforts to promote common interests such
as an “agreement in Nagorno Karabakh and normalization of Armenia’s
relations with Turkey,” and proceeded to threaten sanctions against
Armenia.

Negroponte listed several conditions for averting imposition of US
sanctions against Armenia, including reforms of the Armenian export
control regime and its harmonization with the EU. Negroponte also
requested that each point of entry into Armenia be equipped with
Armenian teams “dedicated to detecting and interdicting dual-use
commodities and other contraband.”

Further, Negroponte requested that Armenia “periodically accepts
unannounced visits by US experts to assess the work of the teams.”

The language of the ultimatum – it cannot be described in other terms
– is uncharacteristic of State Department diplomatic correspondence,
and can be assumed to have been generated in one of myriad agencies
engaged in US homeland security efforts.

Equally unusual is the form of the letter, which was to be delivered
by the American Embassy in Yerevan. In diplomatic practice, heads of
states receive correspondence from their counterparts, or foreign
ministers and ambassadors accredited to the head of state from his
or her colleague. It is therefore unusual that a US deputy secretary
of state would address a letter to a foreign president, especially
since Secretary Rice was not away and signed the cable from Washington.

But a letter from Secretary Rice or President Bush would have required
an extensive political vetting by the State Department and National
Security Council staff. It is unlikely that the contentious and loaded
content of the Negroponte letter would have survived a political,
legal, and factual background check.

The request for ‘unannounced’ visits by US teams to check on the
Armenian border controls, in particular, is a direct affront of
Armenia’s sovereignty. Moreover, the Armenian-Iranian border is under
a dual control of the Armenian border, customs, and export control
officials and the Russian border guards, a fact US Government and all
observers of Armenia are aware of. Further, the US has been helping
Armenia to strengthen the export control regime for over a decade,
including provision of equipment that has been placed at those
entry points.

Given this context, the Christmas Eve timing of the demarche and its
lack of high-level political signature could mean that the Negroponte
letter has not been cleared properly, and several layers of State
Department bureaucracy either ignored the content, or advanced them
with a personal agenda in mind.

Alternatively, it could be a “file-closer,” a letter containing demands
that the drafter knew would be rejected or could not be satisfied. The
purpose of the request, in this scenario, is to provide cover for
the bureaucrats or political operatives who advanced the notion
of arms transfers from the Republic of Armenia to Iran during the
Bush administration. Once a serious allegation is put forward by the
national security staff, it has to be acted upon. Having delivered the
ultimatum to Armenia, the political hacks secured themselves against
future criticism of lack of action on the alleged arms transfer.

It is too early to assess the reaction of US and Armenian officials.

Perhaps subsequent publications by WikiLeaks will shed more light
into this matter. But analysis of news from Armenia in 2009-2010
does not suggest a high-level follow up to those allegations and
their investigation.

It is now impossible to go after Negroponte to inquire about
the reasons of the December 2008 ultimatum to the Republic of
Armenia. But he will likely be offered a position in the future
Republican administrations – and confirmation hearings should look
into that episode.

From: A. Papazian

ARMENIA TO PRODUCE POMEGRANATE CHAMPAGNE
By Vigen Margaryan

YerevanReport.com
Nov 29 2010
Armenia

YEREVAN, November 29 -“Yerevan factory of sparkling wine will soon
start to release pomegranate champagne,” the owner of the factory
Hrayr Hakobyan announced.

“It is an innovation not only in the Republic of Armenia, a trial
lot of sparkling wine enjoyed a great success, particularly at the
international exhibition Green Week 2010 in Germany,” added Hakobyan.

Today the company produces three types of champagne, as well as cognac,
vodka, wine and water.

“The factory’s products are exported to Russia, Belarus, European
and Baltic countries, as well as to America,” said the owner of
the company.

According to him, the global financial-economic crisis forced to
implement huge investments for entering the world market, and as a
result export volumes increased significantly this year.

Among the drinks that enjoy popularity in Russia, Hakobyan segregated
fruit wines. According to him, the company produces eight different
kinds of fruit wines.

Hakobyan noted that the Armenian champagne is also in requisition. The
company does not intend to increase the prices on the New Year eve.

From: A. Papazian

THE LEAKS SO FAR: ARMENIA – US RELATIONS, TURKISH-ARMENIAN RELATIONS, NAGORNO KARABAKH CONFLICT

YerevanReport.com

Nov 29 2010

Politics

The imminent release by Wikileaks of many years of US diplomatic
communication promises to contain a wealth of information about Armenia
and its region, including information on Armenia – US Relations,
Turkish-Armenian relations, Karabakh conflict, and more.

The Guardian Newspaper in the UK has already begun publishing some of
the leaked cables. Below is a summary of some of the Guardian-published
cables released so far:

Turkey Pushes Back on Protocols (February 2010)

In a cable from Ankara, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey documents his
discussions with Turkish MFA Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioglu. The
meeting was part of “Shared Vision” US-Turkey meetings and touched a
host of topics including US displeasure of Turkish support for Iran,
Turkish-Armenian relations, and the war in Iraq. According to the
leaked cable, Turkey continued to push back on the ratification of
protocols claiming that there is a “strong reaction” among MPs from
the Justice and Development party (AKP). Sinirlioglu also reportedly
mentioned:

â- Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan is angry at Turkey an has to be appeased
before moving forward on the protocols.

â- An Armenian Genocide resolution in the US Congress would
“complicate” the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.

â- Azerbaijan is allegedly holding a natural gas deal with Turkey as
hostage, in order to prevent the ratification of the protocols.

Below is the direct Armenia-related quote from the cable:

3. (C) Sinirlioglu appealed for “simultaneity” between Armenian
Protocols ratification and the Minsk Process. He emphasized “a strong
reaction” against the protocols among ruling party MPs had to be
overcome before the government would hazard a ratification effort. He
warned Congressional passage of an Armenian genocide resolution would
“complicate” his government’s domestic political calculations regarding
ratification. He said if something acceptable to Azerbaijani President
Aliyev can found, then “we can move” the protocols forward.

Sinirlioglu suggested Azerbaijan and Armenia’s announcement of an
agreed framework for Minsk Group progress would provide the GoT with
the necessary political cover. Burns inquired about the prospect for
progress on a natural gas deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Sinirlioglu implied Aliyev is holding an agreement hostage to Turkey’s
handling of the protocols: “He doesn’t trust us.”

Aliyev: “Sword of Damocles” of April 24 hanging over the
Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations (February 2010)

Charge d’Affaires in Azerbaijan, Donald Lu, held a meeting with Ilham
Aliyev on February 25, 2010. During the course of this meeting Aliyev
registered displeasure at Armenian-Turkish reconciliation.

Additionally, Aliyev urged the US to attempt to force Armenia’s hand
in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations. Below is a direct quote:

– the three co-chair countries should consolidate their efforts at
a senior-level,

– (C) the three co-chair countries should send a strong message that
the independence of NK is not under review, and

– (C) if these new proposals are not accepted, there should be
consequences in terms of international isolation, especially in the
form of Russia,s curtailing some of its economic support for Armenia.

Alleged Armenian Arms Transfers to Iran (December 2008)

A cable sent to Embassy Armenia in December 2008, directs the
ambassador to send a letter expressing US fury at alleged arms
transfers to Iran. The cable alleges that “Armenia facilitated
Iran’s purchase of rockets and machine guns” in 2003. Furthermore,
according to the cable as published by the Guardian, in 2007 some of
those weapons were found in Iraq.

In order to avoid sanctions, the US advises Armenia’s government to
present written compelling evidence that Armenia will not become
a source of weapons for Iran in the future, including agreeing to
surprise visits by US to assess compliance as well as consulting with
United States on the future transfer of weapons to any country that
is not a member of EU, NATO, or any country that is not one of the
participants in the Wassenaar Arrangement. Currently there are 40
participating states in the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Full Leak Will Contain Much More

The Guardian Newspaper also published statistical data about all the
documents, including the source and subject. Here is an accounting
of documents issued by US embassies in Armenia and it’s neighboring
countries:

â- Embassy Yerevan – 1,735 cables â- Embassy Ankara – 7,918 cables
â- Embassy Baku – 1,569 cables â- Embassy Tbilisi – 1,167 cables

From: A. Papazian