Author: Andres-Papazian

‘POLITICAL FIRESTORM’ IF GENOCIDE RECOGNIZED

Armenian Weekly
Mon, Nov 29 2010
ANKARA, Turkey

In a letter leaked by Wikileaks, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey James
Jeffrey summarizes the “few key issues” that a U.S.

diplomat visiting Turkey should raise. Talking about the Caucasus,
Jeffrey says that Turkish officials constantly threaten of an imminent
“political firestorm” if the U.S. recognizes the Armenian Genocide.

“Turkey consistently warns that any U.S. determination of the events
of 1915 as ‘genocide’ would set off a political firestorm in Turkey,
and the devastating effect on our bilateral relationship-including
political, military, and commercial aspects-would be unavoidable,”
writes Jeffrey.

.

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Full text of the letter

Viewing cable 09ANKARA1472, SCENESETTER: YOUR VISIT TO TURKEY If you
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Help us extend and defend this work Reference ID Date Classification
Origin 09ANKARA1472 2009-10-13 08:08 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Ankara

VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #1472/01 2860830 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 130830Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY
ANKARA TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY INFO RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW
PRIORITY 0267 RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH// PRIORITY RUEHC/SECSTATE
WASHDC PRIORITY 0936S E C R E T ANKARA 001472

NOFORN SIPDIS

OSD FOR ASD VERSHBOW FROM AMBASSADOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM PTER TU SUBJECT:
SCENESETTER: YOUR VISIT TO TURKEY

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) Sandy, Glad you’ll be able to visit Turkey at this key
time. Your short visit will give you an opportunity to engage
with key Turkish leaders on, first and foremost in their minds,
missile defense. The Turks are keen to learn more about U.S. plans,
in particular what role the U.S.

wants/expects Turkey and others in Europe to play. The Turkish General
Staff (TGS) will be interested in our ideas for HLDG reform, even if
they may be slow to accept them.

¶2. (S) You know how broad our agenda is with Turkey. As you will
have a short time in country, I suggest you focus on a few key issues.

Be sure to raise: —————— – Missile Defense, with emphasis
on how the U.S. will look to several Allies – not just Turkey – for
help (para 3) – Repeat our commitment to our intel and other support
for strikes against the PKK (para 5-6) – Appreciation for Turkey’s
efforts on Afghanistan/Pakistan (para 13) – Float the idea of HLDG
reform and ensure Guner knows we expect him in Washington (para 4)
– Press for a realistic assessment of Turkey’s view of the threat
assessment from Iran (para 10)

Watch Out For: ————— – Pressure for direct U.S. milops
against the PKK (paras 11-12) – Conflation of Turkey’s exploration
of air defense capabilities with our Missile Defense needs (para 3)

Missile Defense —————-

¶3. (S) The Turks will appreciate your update on U.S. missile defense
plans and in particular will expect you to have specific ideas on
how Turkey would contribute to the PAA.

While the top-level bureaucrats with whom you will meet will understand
the rationale for the PAA and will be ready to explore ways Turkey
can help, the political environment for a request to base assets in
Turkey is mixed, and Turkey’s perception of the Iranian threat to
its territory differs from ours. The GOT continues to tread a fine
line in managing its strong relationship with the U.S. and its ties
with both the Islamic world and Russia. The government must be able
to demonstrate that any missile defense program is not specifically
anti-Iran, nor blatantly pro-Israel.

¶4. (S) Likewise, it will want to ensure that Russia is not opposed
to Turkey’s role. Also important will be clarity on the degree
to which this system is a NATO one, under NATO Command and Control
(C2). The PAA would presumably complement Turkey’s effort to establish
a domestic missile defense capability that would protect Turkey’s major
population centers. The PAC-3 has been offered in response to Turkey’s
air defense tender and you should highlight the system’s ability to
be interoperable with any future NATO command and control architecture.

HLDG —–

¶5. (C) You will need to outline U.S. views to streamline and alter the
current HLDG format to make it into a more substantive discussion. The
Turks are shy to stray from the status quo; you should emphasize
why we feel this change is necessary while underscoring that it is
vitally important the DCHOD Guner attend the upcoming HLDG in December,
when decisions about future dialogues will be agreed upon. (We have
learned that the new position of TGS number three, a four-star slot
held by General Balanli (with a focus on hardware), might get the
nod for the HLDG representative.

We’ve told Guner it should be his.) You should also be prepared for
the Turkish General Staff to raise the Shared Defense Vision document,
as they await a response to their latest proposed text.

PKK —-

¶6. (C) Turkey’s counter-terrorist efforts against the PKK
have evolved in the past year and have expanded beyond military
action alone. Although the government’s Democratic (i.e., Kurdish)
Initiative is not yet fully developed, the government has increased
social and economic support to ethnic Kurds in southeast Turkey,
has dramatically broadened the rights of Kurds to use their own
language, and increased educational opportunities as well. It is our
view that the TGS military success against the PKK, supported by our
intelligence–sharing operation, has given the civilians the political
space to explore this “opening.” Turkish military operations against
the PKK continue, however, and on October 6 Parliament extended the
government’s mandate to conduct cross-border operations against the
PKK in Iraq for another year.

¶7. (C) Our 2007 decision to share operational intelligence was a
turning point for the bilateral relationship, and President Obama’s
declaration before the Turkish Parliament of our continuing commitment
to support Turkey’s fight against the PKK was warmly welcomed. This
cooperation has helped to improve our bilateral relationship across
the board. Turkey’s military leaders value this intelligence and the
advice our military leaders give them. Our work has made it difficult
for PKK terrorists to use northern Iraq as a safe haven. Turkish
causalities are still occurring, however, and an increasing proportion
are from IEDs. Due to pressure on Chief of Staff General Basbug and
the Turkish General Staff (TGS) to “finish off” the PKK this year,
the government wants and has requested direct U.S. kinetic action
against the PKK; we have refused this request to date due to our own
rules of engagement. The GOT has also requested the sale of armed
MQ-9/Reaper UAVs, which will be a challenge to fulfill (see para 10).

Northern Iraq ————–

¶8. (C) Turkey will not consider any alternative to the political
unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, but has become more flexible
on how it engages “the local authorities of northern Iraq” (how Turkey
refers officially to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)). Turkey’s
policy remains focused on the government in Baghdad, but its outreach
to the KRG is expanding. This outreach is reinforced by the continued
dominance of Turkish products and investments in the KRG’s healthy
economy. It is also tied to turkey’s new opening to its own Kurds, by
far the biggest and most controversial domestic political issue here.

¶9. (S) The U.S.-Turkey-Iraq Tripartite Security talks continue
regularly and a new Tripartite operational office in Erbil,
established to share counter-PKK intelligence was established over the
summer. The Turks remain shy to share data; they are not convinced
that they can trust Iraqi/Kurdish individuals to keep information
concerning operations secret. Nevertheless, it is a step in the right
direction. Turkish military officials have become more strident in
their calls for KRG officials to take action against the PKK.

U.S. Drawdown through Turkey —————————–

¶10. (S) Habur Gate and the Incirlik Cargo Hub — vital to our
sustainment operations — could be helpful in our drawdown if other
options prove too difficult. Minister of National Defense Vedci
Gonul suggested to Secretary Gates in June that Turkey was ready to
agree to the increased use of Incirlik for this purpose. Using the
surface route from Habur Gate to Mediterranean ports (Iskenderun,
Mersin) is also worth exploring, and we may be able to involve
Turkish commercial shippers in support of the Northern Distribution
Network. We caution that the rough terrain, security environment,
and the cantankerous nature of the Turkish government bureaucracy
will challenge any U.S. operation. Nevertheless, we are evaluating
these options in cooperation with CENTCOM and EUCOM partners.

Iran ——

¶11. (C) Turkey understands and partially shares U.S. and international
concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but is hesitant to use
harsh language in public statements, in part due to its dependence
on Iran as an energy supplier and as a trade route to Central Asian
markets. PM Erdogan himself is a particularly vocal skeptic of the
U.S. position. Turkey believes international pressure against Iran
only helps to strengthen Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners. However,
it continues to press Iran quietly to accept the P5 plus 1 offer. The
GOT is a strong partner in our non-proliferation efforts, with several
significant results. Politically, Turkey will try to position itself
on Iran between wherever we are and where Russia is. In a pinch or
if pressed, the Turks will slant to us.

UAVs and Attack Helicopters —————————-

¶12. (C) Turkey seeks to acquire, on an urgent basis, its own UAV
capability. The administration has made clear at high levels that we
support this goal, and Turkey has pending request to acquire armed
Reaper UAVs. Ultimate approval for armed Reapers is complicated
due to MTCR obligations and Hill concerns. However, even if those
could be overcome, the delivery pipeline for these systems is long,
and Turkey’s leaders have sought reassurance that we will not pull
our intelligence support until they can replace it. We have not made
this commitment to date.

¶13. (C) Additionally, bad procurement decisions led Turkey to a
severe shortage of attack helicopters, desperately needed for its
fight against the PKK Turkey has looked to us to help them bridge
the capability gap, asking to purchase additional AH-1W Super Cobra
aircraft. These aircraft are in short supply in our own inventory,
but Secretary Gates and VCJCS Cartwright have promised to try to
support with request within a few years (four each in 2011, 2012,
and 2013). The Turks took this as an affirmative, and recently started
pressing for delivery in 2010 instead of 2011.

Afghanistan/Pakistan ———————-

¶14. (C) Turkey has commanded ISAF twice since its inception and will
take command of RC-Capital this November. Turkey leads PRT Wardak
and plans to open a second PRT in Jawzjan in early 2010. Turkey
has sponsored the “Ankara Process” dialogue, one of several
efforts to encourage constructive communications between Kabul and
Islamabad and is a leading participant in the Friends of Democratic
Pakistan. Turkey pledged significant aid to both countries: USD 200
million to Afghanistan and USD 100 million to Pakistan. Because of
its culture, history and religious orientation, as well as Foreign
Minister Davutoglu’s strategic ambition, Turkey is well disposed to act
as an agent of the international community’s goals in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Constraining Turkey’s potential is a lack of resources. Our
conversations with Turkish interlocutors have helped us identify
several areas in which Turkey can be of particular help: education and
health, military training and support, economics, counter-narcotics,
and trilateral engagement. (Note: Turkey will not support any CT
operations in Afghanistan. They do not believe there is a NATO/ISAF
mandate to engage in these operations, and they additionally have
national caveats preventing them from participating in NATO/ISAF CT
operations. The GOT also believes that ISAF should not/not be engaged
in the counter-narcotics fight, believing that foreign fighters who
engage in this fight just produces antipathy against foreign forces
in the local population. I do, however, believe the GOT are willing
to engage the training of Afghan security forces.)

Caucasus ——–

¶15. (C) Turkey seeks to develop itself as a regional power and
recognizes that the Caucasus region, stymied in its growth by frozen
conflicts, could turn to Turkey for develop.

The signing of the Protocol document in Zurich on October 10 was
a landmark for the region, and should serve as a starting point
for establishing bilateral relations and, ultimately, the opening
of its closed border. Nevertheless, future relations will still be
heavily linked to the 1915 “genocide” issue and the resolution of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey
consistently warns that any U.S. determination of the events of
1915 as “genocide” would set off a political firestorm in Turkey,
and the devastating effect on our bilateral relationship — including
political, military, and commercial aspects — would be unavoidable.

Political Environment ———————-

¶16. (C) PM Erdogan’s Islamist-leaning Justice and Development
(AK) Party is squarely in the driver’s seat, but fears an
erosion of its political base from more conservative/Islamist
parties. Civilian-military relations remain complex. Chief of Staff
General Basbug has worked out a modus vivendi with PM Erdogan, but
the long-running struggle between Turkey’s secularists (with the
Army as its champion) and Islamists (represented by the government)
naturally puts them at odds.

Erdogan has the clear upper hand, a fact with which Basbug has
seemingly learned to live. Alleged past military involvement in coup
contingency planning or even deliberate generation of internal chaos
remains political theme number one and preoccupies both Erdogan and
Basbug and their respective underlings.

Israel ——-

¶17. (C) While the Foreign Ministry and the Turkish General Staff
agree with us that a strong Turkey-Israel relationship is essential
for regional stability, PM Erdogan has sought to shore up his domestic
right political flank at the expense of this relationship. His outburst
at Davos was the first in a series of events the results of which we
and his staff have sought to contain. The latest of these was Exercise
Anatolian Eagle. Erdogan canceled Israel’s participation hours before
the exercise was to begin. With an Israeli strike – across Turkish
airspace – against targets in Iran a possibility, Erdogan decided he
could not afford the political risk of being accused of training the
forces which would carry out such a raid. Through some remarkable
work with Allies and with the inter-agency, we engineered a public
“postponement” of the international portion of the exercise, but the
relationship has begun to sour.

JEFFREY

“Visit Ankara’s Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey”

From: A. Papazian

TALE HEYDAROV: AZERBAIJANI LOBBY IS STRONGER THAN ARMENIAN LOBBY IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT

Today

Nov 29 2010
Azerbaijan

European Azerbaijan Society (TEAS) has published new book devoted to
Nagorno Karabakh problem, Chairman of the European Azerbaijan Society
Tale Heydarov said at the 1st Congress of World Azerbaijani Youth.

Heydarov said that the Society had offices in London, Berlin,
Brussels and Baku. The main purpose of the organization is to make
Europe recognize Azerbaijan in terms of policy, economy and culture:
“First of all, we think to bring the truths about Nagorno Karabakh
conflict to notice of the world. We have editions, we publish books,
magazine in English under title “Visions of Azerbaijan”. “Answers to
100 questions” book was published about Azerbaijan, each month our
bullets are demonstrated to several parliamentarians of European
counties. Our book on Khojali massacre has been demonstrated to
different universities and institutes of the world”.

Heydarov noted that on the basis of documents kept in Russian archives
the new book reflects facts and information on relocation of Armenians
to the Caucasus, as well as to the territory of today’s Armenia: “The
book includes 3 covers. Its Russian version is ready too. Versions
in Azerbaijani and English languages are being prepared. This book
will be demonstrated to the whole world”.

Heydarov also added that films on Azerbaijan and Khojali massacre
would be shot and shown on different televisions of the Europe.

Moreover, he spoke about Conservative Friends of Azerbaijan (CFAZ),
which was established in the British parliament. Heydarov said that as
a result of Azerbaijani diplomacy and Diaspora’s activity, Azerbaijani
lobby was stronger than Armenian lobby in the British parliament.

From: A. Papazian

TURKISH MP: SARGSYAN’S ABSENSE AT THE NATO SUMMIT CAN BE ASSESSED AS UNWILLINGNESS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS

Today

Nov 29 2010
Azerbaijan

Interview with Birgen Kelesh, member of the Great National Assembly
of Turkey (Parliament), member of the Turkish delegation to PACE.

In your opinion, how long normalization of the Armenia-Turkey relations
may take?

It’s hard to predict anything here. Naturally, this is related to
actions Armenia will take in the future. If Armenia de-occupies
Azerbaijani territory and gives up unjust claim against Turkey,
the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations is possible, and
this may happen in short period of time. I do not think that this
can happen very quickly. But if Karabakh conflict settlement fails
to see progress and Armenia continues to put claims against Turkey,
the normalization is impossible.

Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan said that Armenia wants peace and
stability in the Caucasus, and therefore it takes efforts to find a
peaceful and lasting solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. How
can you comment on this statement? Is Armenia close to resolving the
problems with Azerbaijan and Turkey?

This is a difficult question to answer unequivocally. I note that
after the Armenian-Turkish protocols were signed, Armenia did not give
up its claims against Turkey. That is, Armenia still continues its
anti-propaganda, makes claims and does not make any concession in its
policy. There is no progress in politics towards Azerbaijan, either.

What impact might the upcoming OSCE summit in Kazakhstan have on the
normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations and Karabakh conflict
settlement?

It is impossible to normalize Armenian-Turkish relations without
settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Besides, in my opinion,
it is impossible to reach agreement on any issue while Armenia makes
claims towards Turkey. Personally, I do not expect anything from the
OSCE summit in Kazakhstan.

Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan did not take part in the Lisbon
summit of NATO. Armenian media reported that Sargsyan may refuse to
participate in the OSCE summit in Kazakhstan as well. How can you
comment on stance of the Armenian president?

It can be assessed as unwillingness to solve problems. But at the same
time, I have not heard that something related to our common problems
will be resolved in Kazakhstan.

Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian said that Turkey is to
blame for the possible failure of the Armenian-Turkish process. How
can you comment on this statement?

Actually, Armenia constantly accuses us of something and does not
change its position. I think in this case Armenia will do the same.

They sometimes say that they are ready to change stance and negotiate.

But when it comes to “action”, Armenia puts forwards opposite
position. With the help of the diaspora Armenia continues to bring
claims against Turkey. Such statements only damage the process of
normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations. In this case, Armenia
tries to present itself as an innocent party, allegedly doing the
right thing. Armenia believes that doing so it gains supporters,
although in reality nothing happens.

From: A. Papazian

OSCE DISCUSSES NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

Today

Nov 29 2010
Azerbaijan

OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Igor Popov and OSCE Chairman-in-Office,
Kazakh Secretary of State and Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev
discussed the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict today,
KazTAG reported.

“The special representative of the OSCE chairman-in-office on the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and I met with the Kazakh FM and discussed
issues concerning the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,”
Popov told journalists after the meeting.

“We told him about the meetings that have been held in the past few
days in Baku and Yerevan, our meetings with presidents Ilham Aliyev and
(Serzh) Sargsyan, and works on the preparation of basic principles,”
he added.

Popov also noted that the OSCE Minsk Group’s representatives voiced
hope that the OSCE summit in Astana will become “an important area
for further dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan.”

From: A. Papazian

US AMBASSADOR DECONSTRUCTS ERDOGAN
By: Nanore Barsoumian

Mon, Nov 29 2010
ANKARA, Turkey

A report sent to the State Department by U.S.

Ambassador to Turkey Eric Edelman, and carrying the subject line
~Sturkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the
face of strong challenges?~T attempts to sum up Turkey~Rs PM Recep
Tayyip Erdogan~Rs character, before his scheduled visit to Washington.

The ~Sconfidential~T report, leaked by Wikileaks just yesterday,
was dated January 20, 2004, and was scheduled to be declassified on
January 7, 2014.

Erdogan In the report, the Ambassador lists topics that interest the
Turkish PM, such as the intolerability of a Kurdish state in northern
Iraq, the opening of the border with Armenia, economic reform, a
Cyprus settlement, cooperation on Iraq and against terrorist groups,
and ~Sthe clearest possible signal~T that the U.S. stands behind
Erdogan~Rs government.

~SWho are we dealing with?~T asks Edelman~E

~S~ECharismatic, and possessing a common touch and phenomenal memory
for faces and functions of thousands of party members across the
country, Erdogan has a strong pragmatic core,~T notes the report.

Erdogan is ~Sa natural politician,~T who ~Sprojects the image of the
Tribune of Anatolia, ready to take on corruption and privilege and
to defend conservative traditions.~T

However, ~S[he] has traits which render him seriously vulnerable to
miscalculating the political dynamic, especially in foreign affairs,
and vulnerable to attacks by those who would disrupt his equilibrium,~T
states the report, and goes on to list five observations.

~SFirst, overbearing pride. Second, unbridled ambition stemming
from the belief God has anointed him to lead Turkey~E Third, an
authoritarian loner streak which prevents growth of a circle of strong
and skillful advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or
development of effective communications among the party headquarters,
government, and parliamentary group[s]. This streak also makes him
exceptionally thin-skinned. Fourth, an overweening desire to stay in
power which, despite his macho image, renders him fearful and prone
to temporizing even at moments which call for swift and resolute
decisions. Fifth, a distrust of women which manifests itself not only
in occasional harsh public comments but also in his unwillingness to
give women any meaningful decision-making authority in AK.~T

The Ambassador also lists the ~Srival centers of power,~T highlighting
the reported rumors ~Sof the tensions between Erdogan and Gul, with
the latter appearing repeatedly to try to undercut Erdogan.~T

~SWhile his ultimate direction and success remain to be seen, at this
time Erdogan is the only partner capable of advancing toward the U.S.

vision of a successful, democratic Turkey integrated into Europe,~T
concludes Edelman.

Full report.

Viewing cable 04ANKARA348, turkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington:
how strong a leader in the face of strong challenges?

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the
structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See
also the FAQs

Understanding cables Every cable message consists of three parts: ~UThe
top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom
it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.~UThe
middle box contains the header information that is associated with
the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a
general subject.~UThe bottom box presents the body of the cable. The
opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables
(browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed
by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific
topics and a comment section.To understand the justification used for
the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article
as reference.

Discussing cables If you find meaningful or important information in a
cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to
a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying
the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please
mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the
hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g.

#04ANKARA348.

Help us extend and defend this work Reference ID Date Classification
Origin 04ANKARA348 2004-01-20 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text
of the original cable is not available.

201247Z Jan 04C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 04 ankara 000348

Sipdis

E.o. 12958: decl: 01/07/2014 Tags: prel, pgov, pins, tu Subject:
turkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the
face of strong challenges?

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).

¶1. (C) Summary: P.M. Erdogan expects Washington to focus on Cyprus,
economic reform, and anti-terrorism cooperation among other issues. In
turn he will press for (1) concrete U.S. actions to block what Turks
believe is the formation by accretion of a de facto Kurdish state
in n. Iraq; (2) concrete U.S. actions against the PKK in Iraq; and
(3) clear USG support for his government. While the Turkish side
sees the visit as mainly about developing our broad common strategy,
Erdogan is also looking for a public outcome he can characterize as
concrete results. At the same time, although Erdogan is currently
unchallenged as the paramount political figure in Turkey, he and his
party face deep challenges which, if he cannot rise to them, will
affect his longevity in government, Turkey’s democratic development,
and U.S.-Turkish cooperation. End summary.

¶2. (C) P.M. Erdogan appears to be riding a political high and
uncommon luck as he prepares for his Jan. 28-29 visit to Washington,
where he hopes to demonstrate the Administration recognizes him as
an equal partner.

¶3. (C) Erdogan has been primed to hear plainspoken expressions of
U.S. interest in Turkish action (1) to reach a Cyprus settlement by
May 1; (2) to hew to credible economic reform and macro policies;
(3) to cooperate unreservedly against terrorist groups of all stripes,
including Islamist ones (he rejects the term ~SIslamic terrorism~T);
(4) to cooperate on Iraq; (5) to open the border with Armenia; and
(6) to reopen the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Halki seminary in a way
acceptable to the Patriarchate.

¶4. (C) In turn Erdogan will argue that raising U.S.-Turkish relations
to a higher level depends directly on (1) clear USG political and
diplomatic actions to dispel the conviction and consequent resentment
among Turks of all political stripes that the U.S. is tolerating
step-by-step formation of a de facto independent Kurdish state in
northern Iraq; (2) concrete USG actions to remove the PKK threat from
Iraq; (3) high-level, sustained USG support for the GOT’s new Cyprus
initiative; and (4) the clearest possible signal that the U.S. stands
behind the democratically-elected government.

Who are we dealing with?

¶5. (C) Charismatic, and possessing a common touch and phenomenal
memory for faces and functions of thousands of party members across
the country, Erdogan has a strong pragmatic core. His pragmatism has
led him away from the radical Islamist milieu of his past, a point
noted to us unhappily by his (radical) former spiritual leader Kemal
Hoca. His pragmatism has also led him to avoid precipitously pushing
Islamic agenda items such as the wearing of Islamist headscarves
while using his outstanding preacher skills and persona as someone
persecuted by the secularist Establishment to maintain his hold on
the hearts of his more religious supporters.

¶6. (C) In short, a natural politician, Erdogan has a common touch and
an ability to communicate his empathy for the plight and aspirations
of the common citizen. He projects the image of the Tribune of
Anatolia, ready to take on corruption and privilege and to defend
conservative traditions. As a result his AK Party won a two-thirds
parliamentary majority in Nov. 2002 national elections. Owing to
AK’s image as the party of change at the national level, good record
in providing services at the municipal level, and lack of viable
political alternatives, AK could gain around 50% of the vote in
March 28 nationwide local elections. Party insiders project that
such a result would give AK control of 65% or more of the 3,200
municipalities in Turkey, including probably Istanbul and Ankara and
perhaps even Izmir, where AK has not done well to date, plus most of
the other large cities. Every step by the Turkish Establishment to
try to diminish him ~V whether by blocking legislation or attacking
his motives ~V cements his popularity in Turkey’s urban sprawls and
across the Anatolian heartland. While opposition to him remains bitter
in various loci of the State apparatus, Erdogan currently faces no
credible political opponent or party.

¶7. (C) Moreover, Erdogan knows his government has gained credit
well beyond AK supporters, as well as in the EU, for political
reforms which, if fully implemented, will substantially strengthen
democracy in Turkey. His government’s inability to pass legislation
or regulations favored by AK supporters ~V land registry reform,
Supreme Education Board (YOK) reform, Koran course reform ~V has not
eroded support. Indeed, even right-of-center Turks who remain wary of
AK readily tell us the Establishment’s opposition to such reforms is
counterproductive. Even if one can attribute Turkey’s lowest inflation
and interest rates in 30 years to luck, Central Bank skill, and global
emerging market trends rather than to the AK government’s actions,
Erdogan has reaped the political benefit.

¶8. (C) Taking a high-profile approach in pursuing Turkey’s EU
candidacy through direct campaigning in EU capitals, Erdogan has
relished being feted by EU leaders for the past year. He will have
had positive visits by EU Commission President Prodi and German FonMin
Fischer before his Washington trip and looks forward to the February
visit by German Chancellor Schroeder. He sees himself at this point
as one of (if not the) most important leaders of the Muslim world.

Erdogan’s view of relations with the u.s.

¶9. (C) Erdogan recognizes that U.S. support can be important for
Turkey’s economy and EU aspirations. He sees his task as managing
Turks’s ambivalence toward us; at the same time he wants to avoid
being labeled pro-American. From the low point in bilateral relations
in March 2003 he has taken several supportive steps, while being
careful not to be too closely associated with us since opening
Turkish airspace for the Iraq war. Erdogan agreed to a ground line
of communication for Coalition forces in Iraq. He pushed through
authorization for a Turkish deployment in support of the Coalition. He
agreed to U.S. troop rotation through Incirlik airbase. In line with
long-standing U.S. desires, he took a bold step in Nov. 2002 to try
to move Turkey away from its no-solution stance on Cyprus and may be
prepared now to do more. He seems to be more open than any previous
Prime Minister to a re-opening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s
Halki seminary.

¶10. (C) On the other hand he has made public his discomfort with what
most fellow Turks also see as American complicity in creation of a de
facto independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq and lack of concrete U.S.

action against the PKK/KADEK/KHK. He has not controlled anti-American
suspicions among the AK parliamentary group or within the Cabinet
(DefMin Gonul told us recently on the margins of a symposium in
Istanbul that in closed meetings FonMin Gul continues to praise
the Parliament’s March 1, 2003 turndown of U.S. deployment and to
advocate a more Arab/Islamic foreign policy orientation as a counter
to relations with the U.S.). Nevertheless, Erdogan and Ministers like
Gonul and Justice Minister Cicek see U.S. support for his government
as essential to his survival, and he wants a successful visit.

The deeper challenges for erdogan

¶11. (C) Erdogan, AK, and his government face half a dozen serious
domestic challenges which, if he does not manage them well, will begin
to put a severe strain on his ability to govern by late 2004 and on
his and our ability to maintain dynamic, deep U.S.-Turkish cooperation:

~VErdogan’s character: Erdogan has traits which render him
seriously vulnerable to miscalculating the political dynamic,
especially in foreign affairs, and vulnerable to attacks by those
who would disrupt his equilibrium. First, overbearing pride. Second,
unbridled ambition stemming from the belief God has anointed him
to lead Turkey (Mustafa Bilginer, a close confidant of Erdogan
and his wife Emine from 1997-2003, has analyzed this trait in a
draft book on Erdogan’s character; Erdogan used Koranic allusion
in his speech to the AK Congress in Oct. 2003 to make the point
about his God-appointed mission). Third, an authoritarian loner
streak which prevents growth of a circle of strong and skillful
advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or development of
effective communications among the party headquarters, government,
and parliamentary group. This streak also makes him exceptionally
thin-skinned. Fourth, an overweening desire to stay in power which,
despite his macho image, renders him fearful and prone to temporizing
even at moments which call for swift and resolute decisions. Fifth,
a distrust of women which manifests itself not only in occasional
harsh public comments but also in his unwillingness to give women
any meaningful decision-making authority in AK.

~VRival centers of power: Cabinet Ministers, Erdogan advisors and a
raft of M.P.s constantly tell us of the tensions between Erdogan and
Gul, with the latter appearing repeatedly to try to undercut Erdogan.

Parliamentary Speaker Bulent Arinc, who has a strong following among
more Islamist AK M.P.s, has also caused problems for Erdogan on
controversial questions like pushing the right to wear headscarves
at State functions. Although Arinc has kept a low profile for the
past seven months, he remains a locus of troublemaking, especially on
questions involving the U.S. (e.g., troop rotation through Incirlik).

~VLack of technocratic depth: While some AK appointees appear to be
capable of learning on the job, others are incompetent or seem to be
pursuing private or lodge (cemaat) interests. AK is far from bringing
the bureaucracy under control or making it work efficiently. We hear
constant anecdotal evidence, not only from those on the secularist
left who have deep prejudices against AK but also from contacts
on the right, that AK appointees, at the national and provincial
levels, are incompetent or narrow-minded Islamists. AK officials
~V from Cabinet Ministers to local-level party activists across
the country ~V admit to us that the party’s choice of competent and
broadly acceptable candidates for the March local elections will be
exceptionally difficult and the election of controversial or inept
AK candidates would complicate AK’s ability to govern both at the
local and national level.

~VWeakness of public relations and the image of hidden agendas: Erdogan
lacks advisors who are able to pre-empt or handle the news cycle; none
of his advisors has good working relations with the Turkish military.

His government has failed continually to consult broadly and openly
or to prepare public opinion for legislative initiatives, long-overdue
reforms, or foreign policy steps (e.g., pre-war U.S. troop deployment
or troop rotation). As a result AK creates the impression, exploited by
the Establishment, that it harbors an anti-republican, deep Islamist
agenda or is selling out the country, leading to Establishment
(dis)information campaigns which cause the government to retreat.

~VCorruption: AK rode to power on the common citizen’s revulsion
against corruption. Charges that Erdogan amassed his fortune through
kickbacks as mayor of Istanbul have never been proven but we now
hear more and more from insiders that close advisors such as private
secretary Hikmet Bulduk, Mucahit Arslan, and Cuneyd Zapsu are engaging
in wholesale influence peddling. xxxxx that Erdogan and he benefited
~Sdirectly~T from the award of the Tupras (state petroleum refinery)
privatization to a consortium including a Russian partner. Erdogan’s
direct acquisition of a significant interest in a food distribution
company has become a public controversy.

~VIslamist complexes and prejudices: Some appointments, such as Prime
Ministry Undersecretary Dincer (who stands by his 1995 article calling
into question the relevance of the Republic), Education Ministry
Undersecretary Birinci (who in the past called himself an ~Summetci~T,
i.e., a follower of a greater Islamic order and an opponent of the
Republic), and head of State-run Turkish Radio and Television Demiroz
(who once paid homage to Afghan fundamentalist Hekmatyar), have made
the core of the State Establishment ~V Armed Forces, Presidency,
and Judiciary ~V profoundly uneasy. Erdogan’s refusal to condemn
these positions, the question of the level of influence of Islamic
brotherhoods and groups (including the followers of Fethullah Gulen)
on the government, and the presence of Turkish Hizbullah supporters in
AK Party provincial structures in the Southeast have also raised deep
concerns among many long-standing Embassy contacts who themselves
are pious. Erdogan himself recognizes the pernicious effect of a
~Sclosed brotherhood mentality~T (cemaatcilik) in political affairs,
as reflected in his Jan. 10 speech to a symposium in Istanbul, but
how well he can control the phenomenon remains a very open question.

Comment

12. (C) As Erdogan rides the twin desires for reform in Turkey and
for wider prosperity, he challenges those who have traditionally
reserved power and wealth for themselves at least to yield pride of
place to a different elite. While his ultimate direction and success
remain to be seen, at this time Erdogan is the only partner capable
of advancing toward the U.S. vision of a successful, democratic Turkey
integrated into Europe. Edelman

From: A. Papazian

OSCE: ASTANA SUMMIT TO GIVE POSITIVE IMPETUS TO NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Today

Nov 29 2010
Azerbaijan

The upcoming Astana summit will give momentum to the resolution of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, head of the OSCE Conflict Prevention
Center, Ambassador Herbert Salber said today.

“It is unrealistic to expect to resolve the issue during the summit,
but we expect to establish a positive atmosphere for improving
relations,” Salber said at a news conference in Astana.

The OSCE summit will be held in Astana on Dec. 1-2 and will bring
together the presidents and prime ministers of 56 OSCE member countries
and 12 OSCE partner countries, as well as the heads of 68 international
organizations.

He added that the conflicting parties must decide on the issue
themselves and “on our part, we can only help.”

“We need a realistic attitude toward the conflict, which has deep
roots and a 20-year history,” Salber said.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict cannot last long, he stressed, and the
sides should come to a decision on the basis of a compromise.

From: A. Papazian

OSCE SECRETARY GENERAL MARC PERRIN DE BRICHAMBAUT: CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH IS NECESSARY FOR NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT SETTLEMENT

Today

Nov 29 2010
Azerbaijan

For the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement, the constructive approach
and spirit of both sides are necessary, so that it would be possible
to achieve peace in the region, and this is the target of the Minsk
Group and the OSCE Chairman, the OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin
de Brichambaut said to a press conference in Astana on Sunday.

“It is time to turn the page so that the two neighboring countries can
live in an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation. It is necessary
to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,” said De Brichambaut.

According to the Deputy Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan Konstantin
Zhigalov, who also attended the press conference, since the beginning
of its chairmanship to the OSCE, Kazakhstan visited the areas of
protracted conflicts.

“We have consistently visited Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia,
attaching great importance to this issue,” Zhigalov said, noting that
discussions on the problem move very difficultly on some directions,
although much has been done.

According to him, the Minsk Group plays an essential role in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement, and today the representatives
of the Minsk Group arrived in Astana, and are actively working to
find formulas for protracted conflict.

“I hope that in the remaining days, we will also come to a consensus
formula, since all the OSCE member countries understand that we need
to increase capacity in the early settlement of the conflicts. We
will strive to certain attempts to make a positive contribution so
that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue finds its true reflection in the
summit documents, and we hope that we will succeed,” Zhigalov said.

From: A. Papazian

ALI HASANOV: ONE OF MAIN TASKS BEFORE AZERBAIJANI YOUTH IS TO PREVENT FALSE ARMENIAN PROPAGANDA

Today

Nov 29 2010
Azerbaijan

One of the main tasks before Azerbaijani youth in the whole world
is to protect the national heritage from Armenian usurpers and to
oppose to the Armenian propaganda full of lie and fabrications,
the head of Azerbaijani Presidential Administration’s department on
public-political issues Ali Hasanov said in his statement, made on
Saturday at the I World Azerbaijani Youth Congress which is being
held in German city Frankfurt.

“Azerbaijani young people in the world must be converted to such
a significant factor, force which may be taken into consideration
in those countries where they live. The more you integrate in
public-political environment, society, the more your words have
importance in states where you live and study in the more it will
have great significance for the dissemination of the fair Azerbaijani
country’s voice in the world. In this direction you must act in
all states together with Turkish Diasporas and make effort to tackle
jointly mutual problems. At the same time you, as the young Azerbaijani
young people living in various states of the world must know each other
very well else you can not tell the world about Azerbaijan. Therefore,
it is necessary to take advantage of the chance for the communication
which is granted by this event,” Hasanov said.

On Saturday in Frankfurt at the “The Westin Grand” hotel the work of
the first World Azerbaijani Youth Congress has been commenced. The
Congress is organized by the Azerbaijani State committee on the work
with Diaspora jointly with the national Ministry of sports and youth.

This arrangement is being held according to the “State program of
Azerbaijani youth” approved by the Azerbaijani president, the State
committee on the work with Diaspora reported.

Hasanov told in detail about the youth policy of Azerbaijani state. He
reported that all peoples and states in the world always pursue
special policies regarding youth. According to him, one of the main
missions of every state is to prepare the generation which will be
able to be trusted.

“The main direction of our policy regarding to Diaspora is the work
with Azerbaijani youth, of our youth policy – to hold effective and
correlated activity with the youth, of our educational policy – to
bring up new, healthy, reliable, contemporarily thinking, intellectual,
high-level educated youth,” Hasanov said and noted that the youth
policy composes the fundament of every state.

Mentioning the history of the Azerbaijani youth policy, Hasanov
reminded that the one of memorable steps made by the Azerbaijani
national leader Heydar Aliyev after his return to power in 1993 was
the creation of the Ministry of youth and sports in 1994.

“At that time when our public political life came to grief, the
national leader foresaw these days, the future of the youth by this
step, by the commencement of the youth policy. The national leader
formed rightly and successfully the youth policy by the establishment
of the healthy state fundament,” Hasanov said.

At his appeal to the youth, Hasanov said that the one of the main
obligations imposed on them is the familiarization with national and
universal values, getting of nice education, acquiring modern values
but at the same time – never forgetting national roots.

“Your power, your intellect is the power and intellect of the
Motherland, state, nation. One of the main tasks of the policy
exercised by the president Ilham Aliyev is the upbringing of the
healthy and the educated youth. However, regardless from the location
where you live never forget our people and Motherland, mother tongue,
national values and traditions. People will know us, love us, respect
us and support us to such a degree as you will represent our people
and state”, he said.

In the name of the chairman of Azerbaijani youth organization of Russia
(AMOP) Leyla Aliyeva the executive director of this organization Emin
Hajiyev read her letter addressed to the Congress participants. In
this letter she underlined the importance of this forum as the first
event when representatives of Azerbaijani youth who are living abroad,
in Europe, America, on different continents and in various countries
will feel moral unity, get an opportunity to make acquaintances with
people making efforts zealously to achieve mutual goals.

“All Azerbaijanis are united by the love to their Motherland regardless
of their residence. The first World Azerbaijani Youth Congress held in
Frankfurt is not also good ground for the establishment of friendly
and business links among Azerbaijanis but also a unique, rare chance
for the strengthening connections with Motherland, reinforcement of
the young people’s socio-political activity. Besides, the Congress
is creating the conditions for the attraction of new forces in
order to form and reinforce links within Azerbaijani Diaspora
functioning throughout the world. Attachment of the big significance
to this work by Azerbaijani state is very important support for
us. This proves once more that we are on the right way and moving
on successfully. Azerbaijani youth organization of Russia has been
already functioning for two years and all this time it endeavored to
support the initiatives of the young Azerbaijanis to wide extent”,
reported in the Leyla Aliyeva’s letter.

During the previous years AMOP widened significantly the geography
of its business, reported in the letter.

“Today our departments are functioning near in all regions of Russian
Federation. All our arrangements are oriented to the consolidation of
our youth. We help them to get education, support the dissemination
of healthy lifestyle, of the rise of attention towards cultural and
historical values; we promote their desires to study mother language,
literature and national traditions. These are all very important”,
Leyla Aliyeva considered.

According to her, the participation on the Congress of the several
hundreds of young people representing a number of countries of
the world is proving once more the importance of communication of
Azerbaijani youth with their peers.

“I am sure that all participants of the meeting are talented, perfect,
bright and creative people. You all are making efforts in order to
get higher education of high quality in prestigious universities of
the world. You all are having the serious goal and don’t abandon to
achieve it. This means that you are the trust and basis of the future
Azerbaijan. Your future is the future of our country. I am confident
that the establishment of the World Association of Azerbaijani Youth
within the youth congress, which participants we are, will be the next
and very important step on the way of the strengthening of our youth
Diaspora. Great tasks are waiting for us ahead on this way. I wish new
successes to you and new achievements to the work of the congress!”,
reported in the statement of Leyla Aliyeva.

The 1st World Congress of Azerbaijani Youth will be one of the decent
pages of the rich public-political history of Azerbaijan, said Youth
and Sports Minister Azad Rahimov.

“I believe that everyone who was lucky to attend this historic
event, will feel a sense of pride in whole life and will be properly
understand the responsibility which rests on them in our modern
history,” said the minister.

The minister noted that being deprived of its independence several
times, the Azerbaijani people have now become the owner of its
destiny. He stressed that the Azerbaijani state is developing based
on strong foundations that were created as a result of the authority,
militancy, determination and strong will of National Leader Heydar
Aliyev.

Rahimov also spoke about the work done in the field of youth policy
in Azerbaijan. “Over the past five years, the government has allocated
funds amounting to 3.8 million manat to support more than 350 projects
of youth organizations. Youth representation in government agencies
and elected agencies in the country increases every year. Currently,
approximately 30% of municipality members are youth, of whom 326 are
chairmen of municipalities,” said the minister.

Rahimov also reported on the activities of diasporas of Azerbaijani
youth abroad. “Over recent years, the Azerbaijani youth, who study
abroad, have strengthened in the sphere of diaspora and lobbying. In
this case, the special role belongs to the State Program for Education
of Azerbaijani Youth Abroad in 2007-2015 signed by the President of
Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev.

“Within the program, every year Azerbaijani young people are sent to
study at prestigious universities in different countries. This program
creates new opportunities to strengthen the future of intellectual
potential of the country, the participation of youth in science and
business, as well as in the culture of our country,” he said.

According to him, such conditions make it necessary to direct the
energy of youth towards productive direction and the formation of
intercultural dialogue.

“The correct application of the knowledge and skills is also
an important issue. In some countries, non-governmental youth
organizations are established to unite young Azerbaijanis living
and getting education abroad. Among them, I particularly note the
activities of the Azerbaijani Youth Organization in Russia. This
organization, chaired by the Head of the Heydar Aliyev Foundation’s
representation in Russia, Leyla Aliyeva, turned into a single platform
that combines youth clubs and voluntary groups operating in Russia.

The projects realized by the organization are aimed at promoting
the Azerbaijani cultural heritage and its reality in Russia and
strengthening the ties between young people of both countries. Over the
past several years, forums of young Azerbaijanis studying in Germany,
France, Greece, Austria, Belgium, Britain and other countries have been
conducted. The forums were attended by parliamentarians, politicians
and businessmen in these countries. In addition, traditionally the
forms of Azerbaijani youth studying abroad are conducted during
summer vacation every year. Eight forums have already been held,
and in August this year, an organization was established under name
“International Forum of Azerbaijani students getting education and
becoming graduate abroad,” said the minister.

Of the state and government officials, the forum is attended by the
Head of the Socio-Public Department of the Azerbaijani Presidential
Administration, Ali Hasanov, Head of the State Committee for Diaspora
Nazim Ibrahimov, Youth and Sports Minister Azad Rahimov, Deputy Head
of the Cabinet of Ministers Department on Science, Culture, Education
and Social Issues Gurban Amirov, the Azerbaijani Ambassador to Germany
Parviz Shahbazov, the head of the Azerbaijani permanent mission to the
Council of Europe, Ambassador Arif Mammadov, Azerbaijani Ambassador
to the Netherlands, Fuad Iskandarov, the Azerbaijani Ambassador to
Switzerland Nadzhafbeyli Murad, General Secretary of the Youth Forum
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference Elshad Iskandarov ,
Secretary General of the Turkic Parliamentary Assembly organization
Ramil Hasanov, the Consul General of Turkey in Frankfurt Ishan
Saygili, founding rector of the Middle East University of Northern
Cyprus Suat Gunsel, Director of the Information Institute of the
National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan, correspondent member of
NASA Rasim Aliguliyev and other guests. In total, the event brings
together representatives of 41 youth organizations from Azerbaijan,
131 youth organizations from 23 countries, the heads of 41 diaspora
organizations from 25 countries. At the meeting of Azerbaijani Youth
Organization of Russia (AMOR), managed to do a great job in a short
period of its activity, is represented by a delegation of 23 persons.

After reading the appeal by the Head of the Azerbaijan Youth
Organization of Russia Leyla Aliyeva, congratulatory speeches were made
and views were expressed about the importance of the Congress by the
General Secretary of the Turkic Parliamentary Assembly organization
Ramil Hasanov, Secretary General of the OIC Youth Forum Elshad
Iskandarov, Turkish Consul General in Frankfurt, Ishan Saygili,
Azerbaijani Ambassador to Germany Parviz Shahbazov, according to
information released by the State Committee for Diaspora.

From: A. Papazian

TURKISH DIPLOMAT: ALIYEV DOESN’T TRUST US

PanARMENIAN.Net
November 29, 2010 – 15:43 AMT 11:43 GMT

Turkey’s Deputy Foreign Minister Feridun Sinirlioglu appealed for
“simultaneity” between Armenian Protocols ratification and the Minsk
Process.

According to a secret cable released by WikiLeaks, Sinirlioglu
emphasized “a strong reaction” against the protocols among ruling
party MPs had to be overcome before the government would hazard a
ratification effort.

He warned Congressional passage of an Armenian genocide resolution
would “complicate” his government’s domestic political calculations
regarding ratification. He said if something acceptable to Azerbaijani
President Aliyev can found, then “we can move” the protocols forward.

Sinirlioglu suggested Azerbaijan and Armenia’s announcement of an
agreed framework for Minsk Group progress would provide the GoT with
the necessary political cover. Burns inquired about the prospect for
progress on a natural gas deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Sinirlioglu implied Aliyev is holding an agreement hostage to Turkey’s
handling of the protocols: “He doesn’t trust us.”

From: A. Papazian

ARMENIAN FM MEETS WITH EU SPECIAL REP

news.am
Nov 29 2010
Armenia

Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian received EU Special
Representative for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby. The sides
discussed the preparatory work of the Armenia-EU Council as well as
the details of the Armenian FM’s forthcoming visit to Brussels.

The press service of the RA foreign office informed NEWS.am that
the sides summed up this year’s achievements in Armenia’s European
integration. They pointed out the developing Armenia-EU relations.

The sides also exchanged views on an association agreement under the
Eastern Partnership project, development of free trade and signing
of a comprehensive agreement on simplified visa requirements.

From: A. Papazian