MAFIA ANALOGY FOR ALIYEV DYNASTY: ILHAM ALIYEV AND CORLEONE BROTHERS (WIKILEAKS)
AzeriReport
Dec 2 2010
WASHINGTON
In US diplomatic cables newly released by Wikileaks, Aliyev clan~Rs
rule over Azerbaijan is compared to mafia, specifically to the
Corleones family in the famous ~SGodfather~T movie series. Ilham
Aliyev himself ~Sdescribed alternately as a mix of “Michael” and
“Sonny.” Maintaining ~Sa clever, realistic foreign policy~T that
he inherited from his father, he reminds of the cold-calculated
alliance builder Michael Corleone. But his domestic policies, with
crude retaliation against even minor challenges to his authority and
criticism, resemble the ~Sbrash, impulsive~T Sonny Corleone.
The transcripts give and explaination for the total suppression of
democracy and dissent in Azerbaijan: ~S[Ilham] Aliyev takes the
actions he does in order to eliminate even the semblance of risk
to his political prominence. His goal appears to be a political
environment in which the Aliyev dynasty is unchallenged~T. Do his
repressive domestic policies reflect his real personality and free
choice, or are they the result his insecurity and reliance on ~Sthe
advice of old-line Soviet-style political figures carried forward
from his father’s administration.~T
Continuing the mafia analogy, Ramiz Mehdiyev, the head of
presidential administration under both father and son Aliyevs, is
compared unfavorably to the loyal Corleone consigliere Tom Hagen,
with Mehdiyev lacking Hagen~Rs calm, conciliating qualities. The
cable further raises a question of who is the puppet or who the
puppet-master in Ramiz Mehdiyev~Rs relation with Ilham Aliyev.
The transcripts discount Ilham Aliyev~Rs pronouncements about
Azerbaijan’s right to liberate it~Rs territories in Karabakh
illegally occupied by Armenia as a mere ~Sbluster~T, and note that
the Azerbaijani President ~Sdeveloped a reportedly good rapport with
Armenian President Sargsian~T.
Below is the full text of the cable transcripts:
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DAS KAIDANOW
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2034 TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ RU TU AM SUBJECT:
PRESIDENT ILHAM ALIYEV – MICHAEL (CORLEONE) ON THE OUTSIDE, SONNY ON
THE INSIDE
REF: A. BAKU 724 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. BAKU 534 ¶C. 08 BAKU 1136 ¶D. BAKU
526 AND PREVIOUS ¶E. BAKU 696 AND PREVIOUS ¶F. BAKU 287
Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev utilizes
distinctly different approaches to foreign and domestic policies. He
typically devises the former with pragmatism, restraint and a helpful
bias toward integration with the West, yet at home his policies
have become increasingly authoritarian and hostile to diversity of
political views. This divergence of approaches, combined with his
father’s continuing omnipresence, has led some observers to compare
the Aliyevs with the fictional “Corleones” of Godfather fame, with
the current president described alternately as a mix of “Michael”
and “Sonny.”
Either way, this Michael/Sonny dichotomy complicates our approach
to Baku and has the unfortunate effect of framing what should be a
strategically valuable relationship as a choice between U.S. interests
and U.S. values. End Summary.
¶2. (S/NF) This striking aspect of President Ilham Aliyev’s governing
style was very neatly summed up recently by the witty, but somewhat
past-his-prime XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect). Commenting on
the GOAJ’s harsh reaction to the YouTube “donkey video” (Reftel A),
XXXXXXXXXXXX quipped to the Charge that what one must understand about
Aliyev, “He’s not Michael Corleone, he’s Sonny.” To some in Baku,
XXXXXXXXXXXX Godfather analogy seems apt – capturing essential truths
not only about Ilham Aliyev, but his father Heydar, who becomes by
implication the “Vito Corleone” of Azerbaijan. With that in mind,
this cable attempts to explain who Ilham Aliyev is and why he does
what h does. Aside from XXXXXXXXXXXX analogy, it also owe much to the
appraisals of Michael and Sonny from “The Godfather Doctrine (2008),”
by John Hulsman and A. Wess Mitchell.
“That’s my family, Kay. It’s not me.”
—————————————
¶3. (C) Ilham Aliyev inherited a newly independent, resource-rich
state, brought to order in the post-Soviet era by this father,
Heydar Aliyev, scarred by a catastrophic war with Armenia that
resulted in occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and seven
surrounding Azerbaijani regions. He assumed the presidency in 2003,
concurrent with his father’s death, in an election marked by a lack
of competition and debate, at a time when Azerbaijan’s re-developed
oil and gas resources were being brought on line for export. Dogged
by widespread doubts about his suitability for leadership based
on his age (then 41), lack of achievements and a “playboy” image,
he oversaw the launch of a one million-barrels-per-day oil pipeline,
which has flooded official and unofficial coffers in Baku and serves
as the financial backbone of the country.
¶4. (C) The President and his cohorts, who largely were carried
over from his father’s administration, now seek predictability,
stability and continuity to preserve and protect public and private
fortunes. Ilham Aliyev’s landslide 2008 re-election was followed
by a hastily-called March 2009 referendum, which among other things
removed term limits for the President. Aliyev’s cabinet has changed
very little over the years, with few “reformers” brought in or
remaining in power. The Prime Minister position is largely ceremonial
and weak. Because of family connections, dynastic succession, the
strong arming of the opposition and the creation of an elaborate
patronage/protection network, the Aliyev Administration has developed
an “organized crime” image in some quarters, leading some analysts
to see Ilham Aliyev at times in a mafia-like role.
“Never hate your enemies. It affects your judgment.”
BAKU 00000749 002 OF 004
——————————————— ——–
¶5. (C) In their short study “The Godfather Doctrine,” Hulsman
and Mitchell present brothers Sonny and Michael Corleone from
“The Godfather” as exemplars of two out of three schools of
U.S. foreign policy thought (with consigliere Tom Hagen representing
the third.) However, there are important points they raise about the
two that apply well to Aliyev and his policies abroad and at home.
Michael, they write, is a talented balancer of alliances, aware of
limitations on his own power who, importantly, knows when something
isn’t personal, but only business. Sonny, by contrast, is brash,
impulsive, and puts blind faith in force to address affronts to the
Corleone family. For him, business is personal. Finally, Sonny refuses
to contemplate a present or a future in which the Corleone family
does not dominate New York, despite obvious and growing portents to
the contrary.
“This is business, not personal” – Balanced Foreign Policy
——————————————— ————-
¶6. (S) President Aliyev inherited from his father a clever, realistic
foreign policy that he has largely maintained.
With the overarching goal of maintaining and increasing Azerbaijan’s
independence and sovereignty, he encourages involvement with NATO and
Euro-Atlantic security and political structures and supports a policy
of westward transit of Azerbaijani oil and gas through non-Russian
channels. Otherwise, though, he alternates between assertiveness
and appeasement where his powerful neighbors Russia and Iran are
concerned. For example, Azerbaijan routinely accuses Russia of
supplying Armenia with weapons and pointedly absents itself from the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), while participating in
GUAM. At the same time, Aliyev constantly plays up his relations with
President Medvedev with frequent visits and has kept open the channels
of negotiation on energy issues, concluding a small but symbolically
important agreement with Gazprom to supply gas to Dagestan (Reftel
B). He is assertive enough to defend Azerbaijan’s prerogative for an
independent policy, but discreet enough that he is in no danger of
joining Saakashvili on Moscow’s hit list.
¶7. (S) In foreign policy, Aliyev has also been able to maintain
generally the distinction between “business and personal.” For
all his bluster about Azerbaijan’s legal right to liberate
the Armenian-occupied territories by force, Aliyev has worked
constructively on the Minsk Group-proposed Basic Principles and
developed a reportedly good rapport with Armenian President Sargsian
– in contrast to the much more confrontational relationship between
the countries’ foreign ministers. Similarly, even as Aliyev regards
with horror the prospect of Turkey-Armenia rapprochement ahead of
Nagorno-Karabakh resolution, the President has instructed SOCAR
to continue gas transit and supply talks with Turkey, and no one
in Baku has dared to consider a cut in oil exports through the BTC
pipeline. The gas transit talks are a hardball affair to be sure,
but Aliyev surely recognizes that Azerbaijan cannot really afford a
total rupture with Turkey and certainly is not going to go so far as
to foreclose on options out of pique while the Turkey-Armenia question
remains open.
“You touch my sister again and I’ll kill you.” – The Hardliner
——————————————— —————–
¶8. (S) For all of the cool-headed calculation that generally
influences Aliyev’s foreign policy, his domestic policies are another
matter. As Aliyev perceives a challenge to his authority or affronts
to his family dignity, even minor ones, he and his inner circle are
apt to react (or overreact), much to the detriment of the country’s
democratic development and movement toward Western alliances. The
example of the crude retaliation against the young bloggers Emin Milli
and Adnan Hajizade is the most recent and public example (Reftel A).
Earlier, defending his decision to rescind licenses for foreign
broadcasters, Aliyev expressed his anger that Radio
BAKU 00000749 003 OF 004
Liberty had mocked his plan to build the world’s tallest flagpole in
the Baku port area, demonstrating exceedingly thin skin (Reftel C).
¶9. (S/NF) It is examples like these that inspired XXXXXXXXXXXX quip
to the Charge about Sonny and Michael. XXXXXXXXXXXX elaborated on the
point in that conversation, recalling times when he was an XXXXXXXXXXXX
and similar situations arose. Heydar would never have allowed himself
to be goaded into ridiculous reactions, he said. (Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX
memory on this might be a little selective, but he has a point that
the space for opinion was wider under the last President, a view often
echoed by journalists who look back to the 1990s nostalgically. End
Note.) Ilham Aliyev, in XXXXXXXXXXXX view, is not inclined to subtlety
or deliberation in his response to these kinds of issues.
“I don’t feel I have to wipe everybody out. Just
my enemies.”Q———————————–
————————–
¶10. (S) Aliyev takes the actions he does in order to eliminate
even the semblance of risk to his political prominence. His goal
appears to be a political environment in which the Aliyev dynasty is
unchallenged, which was demonstrated by the hastily organized March
2009 constitutional referendum removing presidential term limits.
This strangled the hopes of any and all pretenders to succession,
including his wife (who in Azeri politics is thought of as a rival
Pashayev, not an Aliyev).
¶11. (S) The dissonance between Aliyev’s sensible approach to
foreign affairs, manifested by the cosmopolitan image he presents to
Western visitors, with his tailored suits and flawless English, and
the unpleasant reality of his approach to domestic issues raises the
obvious question of how these two realities coexist. One explanation
is that Aliyev is insecure in domestic politics and relies heavily on
the advice of old-line Soviet-style political figures carried forward
from his father’s administration, such as Presidential Chief of Staff
Ramiz Mehdiyev. Alternatively, Aliyev’s domestic actions are free
choices made in accordance with his instincts, with Mehdiyev and
others playing the “heavy.”.
¶12. (S) Occasionally, Aliyev’s confident tough-guy image gives way to
an impression that he is yielding on domestic issues. Outside pressure
does not always fail. A recent positive example was the outcome of the
parliament’s initiative to ram through a Russian-style law on NGOs. In
the face of a domestic outcry – including from government-supported
NGOs, the Presidential Administration intervened to prevent the law
as drafted from passing (Reftel D). Likewise, the President recently
rejected a bill from parliament that would have required foreign-based
entities to hire vetted Azerbaijanis citizens as deputy directors. The
business community strongly opposed this bill (Reftel E).
Also, the government earlier this year released one of the prominent
journalists whose imprisonment was widely believed to have been
politically motivated (Reftel F).
“Keep your friends close and your enemies closer.”
——————————————— —–
¶13. (S) Comment: It is clear that Azerbaijan’s future development
would better suit United States policy goals if Aliyev pursued his
domestic policies in a manner that resembled his foreign policy
methods, however imperfect they may be. A full-scale democratic
conversion, however, is an unlikely outcome, and the record of
presidents in this region leaving office voluntarily is rather
thin. What is desirable and perhaps achievable, however, is that Aliyev
would govern as a manager of alliances, viewing the political space
occupied by dissents as a source of ideas and a warning system for
when policies are hurting the national interest; and ceasing to feel
that he should strike hard at every criticism that arises, or that
he can do so without consequences. At least this type of evolution
would better prepare Azerbaijan for the post-Ilham Aliyev era, whenever
BAKU 00000749 004 OF 004
that begins.
¶14. (S) Comment Continued: Here is where the Godfather analogy
begins to break down. In Azerbaijan the role of loyal consigliere to
the father and the son is played by the long-time head of Presidential
Administration Ramiz Mehdiyev.
Mehdiyev is no calm, conciliating Tom Hagen. We do not know if
President Aliyev personally ordered the many iron-fisted domestic
initiatives, although he almost certainly approved them, even if
after-the-fact. We do see Mehdiyev’s fingerprints all over the arrests
of journalists, the stifling of opposition leaders, the closure of
mosques, the restrictions on the media and the general law-and-order
approach to governance. Is he the puppet or the puppet-master? At age
71 and often seen in frail health, this is an increasingly important
question. While the rule of 47-year old Ilham Aliyev could continue
for decades, it would be most likely without the benefit of his
consigliere.
Without Mehdiyev, it is not clear whom Aliyev will turn to for help
in maintaining the same firm grip on the instruments of power.
¶15. (U) “Don Corleone, I need a man with powerful friends .
. . I need all of those policians you carry around in your pocket,
like so many nickels and dimes.”
LU
VZCZCXRO8966 PP RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHROV RUEHSL DE RUEHKB #0749/01
2611117 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 181117Z SEP 09 FM AMEMBASSY BAKU TO
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1767 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES PRIORITY RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
PRIORITY 3544 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA
WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1463S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04
BAKU 000749
SIPDIS NOFORN
From: A. Papazian