Explainer | Could Armenia have a snap election as soon as next year?

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has refused to rule out calling snap elections, just five months after winning the June parliamentary elections.

Despite their win, the ruling Civil Contract party lacks the two-thirds majority required to call a referendum to amend the constitution, something Azerbaijan has declared a precondition for the signing of a peace deal.

As a result, during a press briefing on 22 October, Pashinyan said if the government failed to convince the opposition to support holding a referendum on a new constitution, he might have to return to the voters in the hope of achieving the majority.

What is wrong with the current constitution?

Part of Armenia’s current constitution — adopted in 1995 through a referendum and amended in 2005 and 2015 — references the Declaration of Independence, which in turn was ‘based’ on a joint decision made by Soviet Armenia’s Supreme Council and the Nagorno-Karabakh National Council on the ‘reunification’ of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan has repeatedly demanded that the constitution be changed to remove that clause, and has said no peace treaty can be signed until then.

Pashinyan first linked the need for a new constitution to the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process in 2024, comparing it to red clothing that triggers a bull.

‘In other words, we need to solve the issue of that red cloth, but by changing the red cloth with a cloth of another colour, we do not get a guarantee, while with a red cloth we get a negative guarantee; with the other cloth we get a chance, but no guarantee. And if we act competently, we will turn that chance into a guarantee’, Pashinyan said in January 2024.

At the time, Pashinyan denied that there was any external pressure on the process of amending the constitution, a claim he has continued to express:

‘First, I must state that the agenda for a new constitution is purely an Armenian domestic agenda, not only because we adopted this agenda back in February 2020 and announced it, but also because now the citizens of the Republic of Armenia, by voting in favour of the Civil Contract party, also voted in favour of this agenda’, Pashinyan said in August 2026.

Two months later, Pashinyan announced that the peace agreement with Azerbaijan could be signed as early as 2027 or 2028. The statement came the day after Azerbaijani MP Gaya Mammadov shared Azerbaijan’s concerns over ‘Armenia’s apparent attempts to delay creating the conditions necessary for signing the peace agreement and fulfilling its other obligations’.

Political scientist Narek Sukiasyan argues that Azerbaijan’s demand for constitutional change in Armenia is a completely formal issue that does not make practical sense, nor would it have practical implications for the actual peace process.

‘The dilemma was imposed by Azerbaijan, and in a way it has cornered itself, as well as Armenia, in an impasse that will be difficult to overcome. This is not only because changing a constitution is typically a difficult undertaking, but also because the chances of the referendum passing are not particularly high’, Sukiasyan tells OC Media, adding that ‘Aliyev’s statements do not help public perception in Armenia; they reinforce the belief that this is another step towards further humiliating the population’.

At the same time, he argues that the recent waves of statements from Armenia about constitutional changes are largely motivated by the need to reassure Azerbaijan of Armenia’s commitment to the peace process.

‘That commitment experienced a cold shower after the diplomatic tour organised by Azerbaijan’s Presidential Administration for Armenian cultural heritage sites in Karabakh, which was followed by a corresponding response from Yerevan’, he adds.

Foreign diplomats visit the Gandzasar monastery in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2026. Photo via Azertac.

In any case, while the Armenian government has set multiple deadlines for publishing the new constitution text, no progress has been apparent. The most recent promised deadline is ‘by the end of the year’.

Sukiasyan believes one of the reasons the text was not published before the June parliamentary elections were due to fears it could have backfired, with the omission of the Declaration of Independence potentially playing into the hands of the opposition. However, if that were the only reason, Sukiasyan argues that the safer move would have been to publish the draft immediately after the elections, which did not happen. Therefore, he says, beyond any political reasoning, it is possible that the text is simply not ready.

Why is Pashinyan seeking a constitutional majority?

While the pressure from the Azerbaijani side continues, Pashinyan has found himself with limited options to move forward. Armenian legislation requires a referendum to amend or adopt a new constitution, yet holding such a referendum would require a two-thirds majority in the parliament, which Civil Contract does not possess. And even after that, Pashinyan would need a ‘yes’ vote from at least 25% of registered voters.

Currently, as a result of the June parliamentary elections, Civil Contract holds 64 seats in parliament, followed by the Strong Armenia Alliance, which holds 29, and the Armenia Alliance with 12. This means it is short of six mandates to provide the 70 seats necessary to set a referendum.

The opposition has repeatedly ruled out any possibility that any of them would side with Civil Contract. Armenia faction MP Anna Grigoryan told parliament in August that they are willing to discuss and negotiate on other issues, but not this one, calling the concept ‘Aliyev’s Constitution’.

Despite the backlash, Sukiasyan does not rule out the possibility that Pashinyan will be able to acquire the necessary 70 votes in the current parliament.

‘First, the vote triggering the referendum is a secret ballot, so working behind the scenes with individual members of the opposition may prove to be a possible option. Second, it is worth asking how likely the opposition is, beyond its public statements, to actually go into another round of national elections, considering the resources required and perhaps also the timing․ Though the Armenian opposition does not lack financial resources, its readiness to engage in an intense long-term confrontation is yet to be tested’, Sukiasyan says.

Indeed, it seems apparent that Pashinyan’s government does not want to hold snap elections without first trying to negotiate with the opposition.

In response, the opposition has raised concerns that even if they agree to support the referendum, it may not be Azerbaijan’s only precondition for signing the peace agreement.

‘If we have approval that this is the final move before the peace agreement, will you come with us to carry it out? Think about it and let us know’, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said in parliament on 29 October.

He also urged the opposition to vote in favour of the referendum, adding that if Civil Contract does not secure the necessary votes to change the constitution, they would resign.

In turn, Pashinyan added that they would find other ways to pressure the opposition.

‘There is a very high probability that this will not lead to early elections. On the contrary, we will make an offer that the opposition cannot refuse. Yesterday, they allowed us to conduct the process in such a way that public pressure would be generated on the opposition, enabling them to make a referendum on a new constitution possible through their vote’, Pashinyan said.

Sukiasyan believes that regardless of the ruling party’s tactics, the opposition will definitely interpret constitutional change as a national issue. Therefore, in order to succeed, the ruling party will need to implement a massive rebranding campaign and get rid of the image of it being ‘Aliyev’s project’.

‘The technique we can already see in that campaign is the concept of “Real Armenia”. The new constitution is supposed to establish the strategic code that the ruling party adopted at one of its recent party conventions’, Sukiasyan says.

Pashinyan’s ‘Real Armenia’ ideology redefines Armenian identity and statecraft around the internationally recognised sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia (29,743 square kilometres), rather than historical and territorial claims..

Can Pashinyan win a snap election?

If the ruling party opts for snap elections, a favourable outcome is far from guaranteed.

As Sukiasyan notes, snap elections more often than not favour the incumbent, who controls the timing, can start preparations earlier, and can set the agenda.

Yet, Civil Contract has won a constitutional majority only once, in 2018, when they took 70% of the vote at the peak of their popularity, just months after the Velvet Revolution. At that time, they used the opportunity to schedule a constitutional referendum, which was cancelled shortly thereafter due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The party’s support has fallen at every election since: 54% in the 2021 snap elections and 50% in 2026.

Armenia’s election code ensures that no matter what the electoral calculus in allocating seats, no party can receive a constitutional majority unless they receive over two-thirds of votes.

A second obstacle is that, if the party does secure a constitutional majority and schedules a referendum, they would need ‘yes’ votes from at least 25% of all registered voters. Average turnout in the last three parliamentary elections was only 52%.

However, several developments could work in Civil Contract’s favour. New legislation restricts voting rights for citizens who have not lived in Armenia during the past year, and as a result, around 70,000 people have been struck off the voter registry since the June elections. Because the pool of registered voters has decreased, the party could potentially win a larger share of the vote, and therefore more parliamentary seats.

The opposition’s weakness is another factor. The leaders of all three main opposition parties are facing criminal proceedings. The founder of the Strong Armenia party Samvel Karapetyan is under house arrest, Prosperous Armenia leader Gagik Tsarukyan is in detention, and Armenia Alliance leader, former president Robert Kocharyan’s pre-trial detention has just been extended by another two months.

While it seems clear Pashinyan is willing to take Armenia to another snap election, there are no clear timelines on when such a vote could take place, if it comes to that. However, Pashinyan’s commitment to signing the peace agreement in either 2027 or 2028 suggests that the elections and the following referendum (if the necessary votes are obtained), must happen before then.