The danger of a new wave of military operations in the region is very real. Aliev

The other day, Hikmet Hajiyev, assistant to the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev referred to to accusations that there are Israeli military facilities in Azerbaijan, or that Baku is a “lifeline” and its territory can be used by Israeli special services against Iran, and assured that they are ready to provide their territory for any inspection.

In this context, Hajiyev added that they will never give their territory to any third country against a neighboring state, and in particular, a friendly Iran, and then, according to him, it is technically impossible to reach Azerbaijan from Israel, the territory of Turkey must be used for this, which is excluded.

What does Aliyev want to understand by this and to whom? Does Iran continue to distrust Azerbaijan and send similar signals non-publicly?

On these and other issues 168.amhas talked “Base” military analytical of the center founder Vitaly with Mangasaryan.

– The question of whether the territory of Azerbaijan is being used by Israel’s special services against Iran is not new, but in recent months, it can be said, it has gained new momentum.

According to CNN’s extensive coverage, Israeli special forces, rescue units, and Mossad agents operated from the territory of Azerbaijan, providing reconnaissance and strike operations along Iran’s northern border, including the assassination of IRGC intelligence officer Rahman Moghaddam on March 4 of this year.

The following day, drones struck Nakhichevan airport in what Ilham Aliyev described as an “ugly, cowardly and shameful act of terrorism”, blaming Iran, while Tehran denied any involvement.

At one time, this topic was circulated quite intensively in the Iranian pro-government press and in the statements of officials, often accompanied by direct accusations against Baku. There were open warnings from the Iranian side that Tehran will not tolerate the presence of the enemy’s special services or military infrastructures in the immediate vicinity of its borders for a long time.

As we know, after the 2020 war, Azerbaijan started large-scale construction of airports and strategic infrastructures, and some of these facilities could practically serve or have served intelligence purposes against Iran.

Today, when the situation in the region is quite tense again, and the danger of a new wave of military operations is very real, Aliyev is trying to make himself a “strakhovka”, so to speak. I think that Iran, for obvious reasons, did not allow itself to take tougher steps, especially that it is not advisable for Tehran to make new enemies at this stage.

The assurances given by Hajiyev show that Azerbaijan is trying to neutralize the accusations against it. Thus, the Aliyev regime is trying to reduce the immediate risks by avoiding an open confrontation with Iran, especially when the regional balance of power can change at any moment.

– In any case, how would you assess the strategic and military relations between Azerbaijan and Israel? Is Baku not able to be useful to Israel at all, or how is it able to be useful?

– It is no secret that Israel was the main supplier of military equipment to Azerbaijan in the 44-day war. As a result of that large-scale support, it can be stated that Azerbaijan is indebted to Israel, both morally and strategically. When Baku became diplomatically and materially dependent on the supply of modern weapons, Israel itself did not shy away from implementing these large-scale programs, despite possible international opposition.

Thanks to that support, Azerbaijan was able to achieve its military goals, which for the Israeli side became an investment in strengthening bilateral long-term ties.

I think it would be wrong to think that Azerbaijan is not useful to Israel at the current stage. Moreover, the long-term strategic culture for which the Israeli state is known implies that support of this scale, including technology transfer, training and building trust levels, is built with the expectation of long-term impact, not a one-time deal. Azerbaijan has become a strategic base for Israel in the region.

In this sense, the support provided during the 44-day war can be considered as an investment, the “interest rate” of which is not necessarily claimed by Israel today. Israel may have much more long-term and far-reaching plans, and the time will come when Baku will be asked to “return” that debt.

– Azerbaijan attaches special importance to the strengthening of the air defense system without “economies”. This is expressed not only by the acquisition of weapons, but also by the addition of anti-aircraft units, recently 20 new facilities were put into operation, where the Minister of Defense of Azerbaijan conducted inspections, instructed to ensure uninterrupted protection of the country’s airspace, to study in depth the rules of effective use of new weapons in combat conditions. Moreover, Turkey has transferred to Azerbaijan the modern air operations management system developed for its army, i.e., a joint Azerbaijan-Turkey airspace control and operations management system has been formed, what are they wary of?

– Azerbaijan places special emphasis on strengthening the air defense system, while expanding cooperation with Turkey in the direction of airspace control and joint management of air operations. Back in 2023, the leadership of the Turkish military industry announced the creation of a joint air command management system called “HAKİM” by Ankara and Baku, in the event of its full implementation, the jointly controlled airspace will stretch from the Aegean Sea to the Caspian Sea basins. This means that the air forces of the two countries will be able to carry out operations on the basis of a coordinated, unified picture, which significantly changes the qualitative picture of the ratio of regional forces.

I think that Azerbaijan is seriously studying the experience of both Russian-Ukrainian and Iranian-Israeli conflicts and the requirements of the current military reality. Both conflicts have shown how crucial a role modern air defense systems play in defending against both ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as mass attacks by tactical and strategic UAVs.

However, at the same time, Azerbaijan is trying to solve another problem: to increase its offensive potential, because Baku is well aware that in modern wars it is not possible to ensure serious success only with defensive capabilities. Special emphasis is placed on the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and military aviation capabilities.

Concrete steps have already been taken in this direction, including the operation of JF-17C (Block III) fighter jets purchased from Pakistan, their possible integration with Turkish air-to-air missiles, as well as regular participation in joint tactical flight exercises with Turkey, such as the “Anatolian Eagle” exercise held in Konya in June 2026.

Defense and national security spending in Azerbaijan currently accounts for about one-fifth of the budget, and this trend has been continuous since 2020, especially amid increasing oil and gas revenues. In parallel, the Azerbaijan-Turkey-Pakistan strategic trilateral axis, which was formed during the 44-day war in 2020 and was further strengthened by bilateral and trilateral agreements, is also expanding.

It is in the background of this complex picture that the warnings that the security balance in the region may continue to change become relevant, and it is necessary to follow these developments not only by the quantitative indicators of military equipment, but also by the degree of qualitative integration.

– In the context of regional security and geopolitical developments, we should note that In November, CSTO members will discuss the issue of depriving Armenia of the right to vote in the organization’s bodies due to non-payment of membership fees. Of course, this issue requires a de jure consensus, on the other hand, Russia’s role here is big. Now What risks does leaving the CSTO entail for RA, including in the context of RA-Russia bilateral military relations, after all, they exist at least in the field of military equipment maintenance, and not only?

– I think that the issue of Armenia’s possible exit from the CSTO, and the debate on this topic, often takes place in an emotional, rather than a cold, calculation. In reality, however, the problem has very specific, measurable consequences, starting from the maintenance of military equipment, to the emergence of a security and military-political vacuum.

The first and, perhaps, the most topical problem here is the military-technical aspect. A significant part of Armenia’s weaponry is still of Soviet and Russian origin, and the operation, provision of spare parts, modernization and maintenance of this equipment over the decades have been built on the very Russian production and technical infrastructure.

Mechanisms operating within the framework of the CSTO, in particular the contracts for the preferential purchase and maintenance of military equipment, facilitate this process. A complete exit from the organization would not automatically eliminate Armenia’s dependence on Russian technology, but it could complicate the legal and practical framework by which that dependence is managed.

In other words, the final termination of our membership in the CSTO will multiply the existing technical and logistical problems, making them much more complicated and practically unsolvable.

And, most of all, if Armenia does not have an alternative military-political structure or a clear system of guarantees “in sight” along with the final withdrawal from the CSTO, it will not give the country anything tangible positive, it will not increase Armenia’s military capabilities, but on the contrary, it can create a security vacuum.

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