Opinion | Pashinyan’s cabinet shakeup shows he is weaker than he appears

Armenia’s June parliamentary elections saw the ruling Civil Contract party re-elected, securing a three-fifths majority — or 64 seats — in parliament. However, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, the leader of the ruling party, appears far less confident than his public demeanor suggests.

A clear picture of Pashinyan’s ‘political fears’ can be drawn primarily from his post-election personnel policy and the constant swapping of roles within the prime minister’s staff, among his teammates, and across government officials.

At the same time, it was the questionable decision by the CEC — the chair of which is Vahagn Hovakimyan, who previously served as a journalist at Pashinyan’s Haykakan Zhamanak newspaper and later as a ruling party MP — to not hold re-votes in two electoral precincts that effectively prevented Prosperous Armenia from crossing the electoral threshold. The vacant seats were subsequently distributed among Pashinyan’s party and the two other opposition forces that entered parliament, allowing Civil Contract to pass numerous appointments and decisions using only its own votes — without needing to seek consensus or engage in political bargaining with the parliamentary opposition.

The parliament: trading independent players for absolute loyalty

Returning to Pashinyan’s post-election personnel policy, the most striking shift was the ruling party board’s selection of Ruben Rubinyan — Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Armenia’s envoy for Armenia-Turkey normalisation talks, and a longtime political protégé of Pashinyan — as the candidate for the new parliamentary speaker. The previous speaker, Alen Simonyan, had discredited himself in the eyes of the public on numerous occasions, long becoming a toxic political figure for both Pashinyan and his team.

However, public image was not the primary factor behind the decision. The core issue was that, unlike Rubinyan, Simonyan had always been a somewhat independent player, maintaining his own ties with business, media, and political circles — including opposition and former regime figures. At this stage, where Pashinyan has not secured a landslide victory, lacks a two-thirds constitutional majority, depends on the opposition to put constitutional referendums to a vote, and faces the risk that Russian sanctions could gradually stir internal resistance among businesses and the public, an independent parliamentary speaker poses a political liability. In contrast to Simonyan, Rubinyan is Pashinyan’s clear favorite, as evidenced by his assignment to the sensitive Armenia–Turkey negotiations. Most importantly, Rubinyan possesses neither personal business networks nor independent political capital, remaining entirely reliant on Pashinyan’s political patronage.

To understand the critical emphasis on controlling and directing the ruling party’s new parliamentary faction, one must look at another key appointment: Arusyak Manavazyan’s nomination as head of the Civil Contract parliamentary faction. For 11 years (2008–2019), Manavazyan served as chief accountant at Dareskizb LLC (the publishing company behind Pashinyan’s newspaper) — a role reserved strictly for ultra-trusted confidants responsible for managing financial flows in the Armenian media landscape.

Furthermore, Manavazyan assumed an even more sensitive role from 2019 to 2021, serving first as chief accountant and then as acting director of the Kond Condominium Complex. This state-owned residential complex in Yerevan houses the country’s top officials — including the prime minister, speaker of parliament, president, president of the Constitutional Court, and foreign minister — along with their families. Manavazyan was effectively the custodian of the sanctuary of Pashinyan’s personal life, private secrets, and family residence, a role built on absolute trust. Appointing an MP with such deeply personal loyalty to lead the faction demonstrates that Pashinyan harbours distrust toward parliament — and even towards his own faction — prompting him to install one of his most trusted guardians over them.

Changes were also made to the ruling party’s candidates for deputy speakers. Hayk Konjoryan, former head of the ruling faction, and Vahagn Aleksanyan, deputy chair of the Civil Contract board, were nominated for the parliamentary vice-presidential seats allocated to the ruling party. Neither possesses personal political weight or independent networks, having risen entirely under Pashinyan and remaining completely reliant on his leadership capital and favour.

Clearing out the prime minister’s staff

Another critical set of changes unfolded within Pashinyan’s personal staff. Arayik Harutyunyan — a long-time ally who served as Chief Advisor prior to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 and took over as Chief of Staff during the post-war political crisis — has stepped down after five years in office. Having retained his parliamentary mandate, he will transition from Chief of Staff to a rank-and-file MP.

Interestingly, amidst reports of Harutyunyan’s transfer and removal, news of his resignation was briefly published on the websites of Haykakan Zhamanak (now owned by Pashinyan’s family) and Civic.am (affiliated with Civil Contract), before being swiftly deleted. On 3 August, Pashinyan officially introduced Lilit Makunts as his new Chief of Staff; previously, Makunts served as Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister and former Armenian Ambassador to the US, who was reportedly also in the running for the post of parliamentary speaker.

Following Harutyunyan into parliamentary ‘exile’ is his deputy, Taron Chakhoyan, one of the key figures overseeing information policy for Pashinyan and his staff. The third ‘victim’ of this administrative rebranding is former MP and spokesperson for Pashinyan, Nazeli Baghdasaryan, who is likewise returning to parliament.

Unconfirmed reports suggest Pashinyan was dissatisfied with Harutyunyan’s management of the election campaign. However, the concurrent transfers of Chakhoyan and Baghdasaryan point to a broader pattern: restructuring staff to break up patronage networks, weaken influential teammates, and strip them of their influence over state resources.

In effect, Pashinyan is conducting a comprehensive reset. By dispatching figures like Harutyunyan, Chakhoyan, and Baghdasaryan — who had built up personal standing, media influence, and networks — into honorable ‘retirement’ as backbenchers, he is systematically dismantling emerging centres of influence.

For a leader with authoritarian tendencies and a populist governing style centred exclusively on a direct bond between the leader and the public, independent figures with personal political weight are intolerable. This is especially true in the current post-election climate, marked by heightened tensions with Russia, a narrow parliamentary margin, upcoming unpopular decisions regarding territory exchanges with Azerbaijan, and local government elections scheduled for the fall. Driven by a desire to preemptively insulate himself and keep his team firmly under control, Pashinyan made Harutyunyan — along with his deputy and spokesperson (the latter rumoured to have aligned closely with Simonyan) — the next major casualties of his political reshuffle.

Subordinating the executive branch

Finally, a novel tactic has emerged within the government cabinet. While temporarily maintaining the current roster of ministers, Pashinyan has moved to replace deputy ministers across various departments.

These deputy ministers are expected to owe direct, unmediated loyalty to Pashinyan alone. Simultaneously, this move ensures that ministers do not possess enough autonomy to retain their own deputies or act as primary decision-makers. This logic led to the replacement of the deputy education minister, while the minister of high-tech industry was dismissed reportedly for resisting this exact approach. This wave of deputy minister replacements is expected to resume and expand after the summer recess once officials return to their posts.

Following the recent parliamentary elections, Pashinyan’s sweeping post-election reshuffles reveal a leader driven by political insecurity rather than the confidence of victory. By sidelining semi-independent allies and dismantling emerging patronage networks within his administration, Pashinyan is systematically surrounding himself with hyper-loyal confidants to consolidate personal power. This preemptive purge reflects a calculated strategy to centralise control, neutralise internal dissent, and keep his team firmly in check ahead of daunting geopolitical and domestic challenges.

The same logic applies to the criminal cases initiated against members of the pro-Russian Strong Armenia party, the main opposition force that entered parliament. These prosecutions are likely to serve as a crucial instrument for keeping the opposition in check — maintaining leverage over its MPs, keeping them on a short leash, and ensuring they remain under political control.

Pashinyan’s sweeping post-election reshuffles clearly reveal a leader driven by political insecurity rather than the confidence of victory. By sidelining semi-independent allies and dismantling emerging patronage networks within his administration, Pashinyan is systematically surrounding himself with hyper-loyal confidants to consolidate personal power. This preemptive purge reflects a calculated strategy to centralise control, neutralise internal dissent, and keep his team firmly in check ahead of daunting geopolitical and domestic challenges. Whether this post-election restructuring will be politically justified remains to be seen. Ultimately, the expediency of these changes will be judged by how effectively Pashinyan’s hyper-centralised  inner circle can navigate upcoming internal and external challenges, execute long-term strategic planning, and maintain stability in an increasingly volatile political landscape.