Armenia’s atomic dilemma. what does the experience of Bulgaria teach? Wahe Da

Soviet technological base deep modernization through to maintain the experience Of Yerevan for more up to date is, than ever 

The recent visit of the management of the Armenian NPP (Metsamor) to the Bulgarian “Kozloduy” NPP is difficult to assess as a regular exchange of experience between the two atomic facilities created within the framework of the Soviet Engineering and Technology School.

In a broader geo-economic context, it demonstrates the continued importance of the Soviet engineering school in atomic energy and simultaneously reflects Armenia’s complex search for a new technological model.

The Armenian delegation in the period between July 14-17 met In the operation experience of “Kozloduy”, including the issues of extending the service life of power units, upgrading equipment, increasing the level of safety and international cooperation. Particular attention was paid to the technical maintenance and management of the existing NPP infrastructure.

The choice in the Bulgarian direction is symbolic

Kozloduy NPP, like Metsamor NPP, is a product of the Soviet atomic school. An agreement on the construction of the plant was signed between the USSR and Bulgaria in 1966, and the first power unit started producing electricity in 1974. Between 1991 and 2002, the plant had six power units with a total capacity of 3,760 MW, and provided more than 45% of Bulgaria’s electricity production.

However, after Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, the country had to decommission the first four VVER-440 units. Brussels considered them insufficiently compliant with European safety requirements due to the lack of a modern protective sealant.

At the same time, the fifth and sixth power units with ВВЕР-440 00 reactors, after modernization in 2005-2006, continue to work and today meet EU standards (Recommendations for decommissioning the existing unit of the Metsamor nuclear power plant are included in both the RA-EU Comprehensive and Extended Partnership agreement (2017) as well hereby year RA-EU joint agreement signed in May declaration):

It is this experience of preserving the Soviet technological base through deep modernization that is of particular interest to Armenia.

Today, the power unit of the Metsamor nuclear power plant is undergoing the second program of extending its operation period. The station was shut down in May of this year for scheduled preventive maintenance for a period of five months. The main works are carried out with the participation of specialists of the Russian state corporation “Rosatom”. The 65 billion US dollars saved in the framework of the first extension program will be used for these purposes.

Officially, the current horizon of operation of the Armenian power unit is determined until 2036. Q:it was planned to create a new atomic facility in that period. However, Yerevan has started in recent months proofread the discourse. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announcercome out is About the possibility of extending the operation of the Metsamor nuclear power plant until 2046, justifying it by the need for additional time for the selection of a new technological platform.

A key question arises. what will be the future architecture of atomic energy of Armenia?

On the one hand, Yerevan actively shows interest in American technologies. In February of this year, within the framework of the US Vice President JD Vance’s visit to Armenia, an agreement was signed to continue cooperation in the field of civil nuclear energy worth about 9 billion dollars, which provides for the development of small modular reactor (SRM) technologies. Moreover, it is necessary to separate the political presentation of the agreement from its economic and legal content.

The announced amount of 9 billion US dollars was not mentioned as a direct volume of American investments in the construction of the NPP in Armenia, but was related to the potential volume of future cooperation, including consulting, technological and other directions.

Official Yerevan has repeatedly announced that the strategic decision was made in favor of the construction of small modular reactors (SRM). A proposal for the construction of small modular reactors was also received from Moscow. In parallel with the experience of operating the Akademikos Lomonosov floating nuclear thermal power plant, which is equipped with KLT-40С reactor installations, Russia is developing a new generation of small reactor technologies based on the RITM-200 installation created for nuclear icebreakers of the “Arctic” type 22220 project. The above-ground modification of RITM-200H with a capacity of about 60 MW is considered one of the options for the use of PMRs in the conditions of limited power systems.

The choice of Armenia’s future nuclear capacity should be considered not only through the prism of domestic energy consumption, but also in a broader geo-economic context. In the coming decade, there is a significant increase in demand for electricity in neighboring Georgia expected (22 billion kWh by 2030 instead of 13.8 billion kWh in 2025), and northern regions of Iran are already facing electricity shortages.

Under these conditions the new Armenian NPP could become not only an instrument of national energy security, but also an element of the regional energy architecture, which would allow Armenia to occupy a more noticeable position in the system of cross-border energy flows of the South Caucasus. That especially is being updated In connection with the implementation of the “North-South” electric energy corridor (Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Russia) project, the creation of which is considered within the framework of the expansion of regional synchronization of energy systems.

From this perspective, betting exclusively on small modular reactors (SRMs) raises certain questions. For a country with a limited domestic market, but a significant energy export potential, it seems more logical to build a medium or large-scale nuclear power plant capable of meeting both domestic needs and exporting electricity. In this case, essentially, nuclear energy production requires more energy than domestic energy.

In general, the actual operation practice shows that Armenia continues to rely on the Soviet engineering school and the experience of countries where Russian design reactors have been preserved. In this sense, the visit to “Kozloduy” is quite demonstrative. Moreover, Bulgaria itself shows how difficult the transition from a Soviet technological base to atopical solutions.

After abandoning the construction of the “Belene” NPP, Sofia considered the possibility of creating a new power unit on the “Kozloduy” platform. As an alternative to the Russian ВВЕР-1000 project, the American Westinghouse AP1000 reactor was considered. But the initial project faced financial problems. the cost of construction was estimated at several billion dollars, and the lack of guaranteed financing made it economically problematic.

Later, Bulgaria again returned to the idea of ​​using Russian-made equipment for the unfinished Belene nuclear power plant during the construction of a new unit at the Kozloduy platform. This once again showed that technology choices in nuclear power are determined not only by political considerations, but also by issues of cost, infrastructural compatibility, personnel potential, and long-term safety.

The Armenian case develops according to a similar logic.

For Armenia, nuclear energy is not only a matter of choosing between Russia and the USA. d:It is a question of technological sovereignty, energy security and the state’s ability to integrate into the global chains of the atomic industry. Today, Armenia simultaneously studies the experience of operating Soviet reactors, maintains cooperation with “Rosatom” and opens a negotiation path with the United States on small modular reactors.

The main challenge for Yerevan is not only the choice of specific technology. It consists in creating a sustainable nuclear policy model where geopolitical diversification does not mean technological dependence on a new supplier.:

The experience of “Kozloduy” shows that In nuclear energy, the winners are not those who are faster to change technology partners, but those who are able to maintain competence, ensure safety and create a long-term industrial strategy.

Vahe Davtyan

fondsk.ru

Translation by Zhanna Avetisyan

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