Why did Pashinyan call Putin? “Export call”. European ephemera

July 30, 2026

The telephone conversation between Nikol Pashinyan and Vladimir Putin on July 27 effectively summed up the first two months of the trade crisis between Armenia and Russia.

After announcements about diversification of exports, state subsidies and reports about the opening of the European market, the Prime Minister of Armenia had to directly appeal to the President of Russia with a request to intervene in the situation.։

According to the statement of the RA government, Pashinyan stated that the restrictions on the export of goods of Armenian origin contradict the Armenian-Russian legal base and the norms of the Eurasian Economic Union, and asked to take measures to resolve the issues.

But there was no concrete promise to lift the restrictions or specify dates for their cancellation in the official messages. The Kremlin, for its part, emphasized Yerevan’s European course. Putin announced the need to hold a referendum on EU membership in Armenia a day ago.

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So, about the export the conversation was directly related to the broader political issue of Armenia’s attempt to simultaneously maintain the advantages of the EAEU and move towards the European Union.

Restrictions began to be applied successively in the second half of May.  They touched on flower products, “Jermuk” mineral water, strawberries, tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, greens, stone fruits, grapes, dried fruits, fish and products of some alcoholic beverage manufacturers. Since May 30, “Rosselkhoznadzor” has limited the import of a number of vegetables, berries and greens from Armenia to Russia.

From June 2, the Armenian side was offered to stop the veterinary certification of live fish and fish products of all enterprises, except for the two companies that passed the Russian inspection. From June 12, the restrictions were extended to all quarantine goods of Armenian origin and their transit through Russia to other EAEU countries. The Russian side officially explained the decision with the systematic disclosure of quarantine facilities, insufficient traceability of products and problems in the work of the Armenian control system.

Therefore, legally, it is more correct to speak not about a complete ban on all Armenian exports, but about a wide complex of phytosanitary, veterinary and consumer restrictions, which were introduced by various Russian departments.

Moreover, it is impossible to ignore the political context.  The restrictions began to expand just before the parliamentary elections on June 7, due to the conflict between Moscow and Yerevan over Armenia’s foreign policy, CSTO, EAEU and its relations with the European Union. to the landscape:

The Russian side claims that the decisions are exclusively sanitary in nature. However, the simultaneous emergence of problems related to several important product categories at once՝ from flowers and vegetables to fish, mineral water and alcohol turned a technical dispute into a serious political and economic crisis.

The main problem of Armenia is the structure of its exports. For years, the Russian market has been not only one of the destinations, but also the main buyer of Armenian agricultural products.

According to the data provided by Deputy Minister of Economy Arman Khojoyan, in 2025, Armenia exported 146.5 thousand tons of fresh fruits and vegetables. A significant part of that production was traditionally sent to Russia. According to Anna Fedyunina, associate professor of the Higher School of Economics, in 2025, the Russian market will account for about 98% of the Armenian export of vegetables and root fruits and about 90% of the export of fruits and nuts.

The value of the export of fruits and vegetables from Armenia to Russia was estimated at 142.5 million dollars. This means that it is almost impossible to redirect the product to other markets within a few weeks; it requires buyers, contracts, certification, logistics, appropriate packaging and competitive pricing.

Flower production should be considered separately. According to the Ministry of Economy, Armenia exported 1320 tons of flowers in 2025, compared to 566 tons in 2024. The industry expanded rapidly due to the possibility of supplying large volumes to the Russian market.

After the restrictions were imposed, the authorities announced trial deliveries of flowers to Latvia, Ukraine, EU countries and the UAE. These supplies are important as an attempt to find new directions, but they still do not prove that Russia has already been replaced.

In June, it was reported ohfor example, about sending 5.5 thousand flowers to Latvia and 9.5 thousand flowers to Ukraine.  For testing routes s:It is a result, but for the sector that exported 1320 tons of products in 2025, such batches cannot fully replace the former market.

A particularly difficult situation has arisen in the field of fish farming. According to the data of the Fisheries Union, in 2025, Armenia supplied Russia with about 9 thousand tons of fish and 72 million dollars worth of fish products.

Mostly trout was exported.  After the imposition of restrictions, exports were preserved only for two enterprises that passed the inspection, while a significant number of farms were deprived of the opportunity to send products to Russian buyers.

This is a direct threat to the industry. fish cannot be kept indefinitely as a normal industrial product. Live fish require water, electricity, feed and maintenance on a daily basis. It continues to grow, goes beyond the optimal product parameters, and economies have to pay wages and service loans at the same time.

On July 21, fish farmers and farm workers protested in front of the government building. According to the participants of the action, about 15,000 tons of live fish have been accumulated by the producers, not counting the products of the refrigerators and the batches previously returned to Russia. This is not a government statistic, but a statement from representatives of the industry, but it shows the supposed scale of the accumulated problem. The participants of the action claimed that the actual export of fish to Russia was stopped already on May 15.

The official Russian request to stop certification of almost all enterprises came into force on June 2, so these dates should be separated. May 15 is the date of the actual cessation of supplies announced by fish farmers, June 2 is the date of official certification restriction.

The fish farmers demanded a meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister, because, according to them, the previous discussion with the Minister of Economy Gevorg Papoyan did not yield results. They stated that the two support programs proposed by the government are unrealistic and cannot solve the problem of the sector.

The producers also emphasized that the domestic market of Armenia is not able to quickly absorb the accumulated volume. Attempting to sell fish en masse within the country will inevitably lead to falling prices, economic losses and the risk of loan defaults.

Action panorama The authorities announced the opening of the European Union market for Armenian fish. It is necessary to clearly understand the meaning of that statement. Armenia received a permit to export aquaculture products from the European Commission as early as March 16, 2025. However, one general permit for the country is not enough.

Each enterprise must pass an inspection, comply with European requirements and register in the TRACES system. Only on July 16, 2026, the RA government approved the procedure for the registration of producers and the issuance of veterinary sanitary certificates. Five Armenian companies have expressed interest in exporting, but only one has submitted a written application at the time of publication of relevant reports.

Therefore, the words that the EU market is “open” for now mean the emergence of a legal procedure, not the beginning of mass deliveries.  Businessman Harutyun Mnatsakanyan announced on July 21 that as of that moment not a single kilogram of fish was exported from Armenia to the EU.

This is a statement from a business representative, not a published customs statistic, but it has not been refuted by information about established commercial shipments. Not only registration and certifications, but also water and feed quality, production standards, packaging, refrigeration logistics and cost remain major barriers. A European buyer does not have to purchase Armenian fish just because a legal permit for shipment already exists.

For Russia, Armenian fish is only a small part of the huge market.  On the contrary, Russia was the main sales destination for Armenian producers. It is this difference that makes the negotiation positions of the parties unequal. The Russian market can replace Armenian products with supplies from other countries or with its own production, while Armenia has to look for buyers almost from scratch. The European market is significantly richer, but at the same time much more competitive and regulated.

Fish producers from Norway, Turkey, Greece, Spain and other countries that have sea and land logistics are already working on it. Armenian products must compete with them simultaneously in terms of quality, price and supply stability.

To mitigate the crisis, the RA government launched export subsidy programs. Compensation was provided for June shipments: 770 drams per kilogram of strawberries, 275 drams per kilogram of tomatoes, 400 drams per kilogram of pepper, and 37 drams per kilogram of flowers. This list was expanded in July.

The state has set compensation for one kilogram of apricots – 200 AMD, for one kilogram of plums, peaches, nectarines, dried fruits and vegetables – 250 AMD, for one kilogram of cherries – 400 AMD, for one liter of grape wine – 350 AMD, for one liter of fruit and berry wine – 200 AMD, for absolute brandy for one liter – 830 AMD, for one liter of mineral water – 150 AMD, for one kilogram of trout – 820 AMD, and for one kilogram of sturgeon – 1350 AMD.

Subsidies can partially offset freight and price differences, but they do not create buyers. The state actually begins to pay from the budget a part of the costs incurred after the loss of the regular market. At the same time, it is not clear how long the program will last, what volumes of products will be exported thanks to it, and whether the budget will be able to continuously support exports, which are not sufficiently competitive without subsidies.

If the state has to pay 820 drams for each kilogram of exported trout and 1350 drams for one kilogram of sturgeon, this in itself shows how expensive the attempt to reorient the sector has become.

The Central Bank of Armenia pointed out the scale of the macroeconomic risk. Central Bank President Martin Galstyan stated that the export of Armenian goods to Russia corresponds to approximately 6% of the country’s GDP, and the restricted categories account for about a third of that volume, that is, approximately 2% of the GDP. This does not mean that Armenia has already lost 2% of its GDP.

We are talking about an extreme scenario. if the restrictions are maintained for a long time and the products are not redirected to other markets, the potential negative impact can reach 2% of the GDP. Additional risks include a fall in domestic prices due to a surplus of commodities and a deterioration in the ability of farmers to service loans.

Thus, during the last two months, a fundamental difference between the political declaration and the economic reality has emerged. The European market can be declared open with a single announcement, but to actually enter it requires years of preparation, certification, investment and building trade ties.

Russia already had a ready sales infrastructure, an Armenian product known to the consumer, the absence of customs duties within the framework of the EAEU, and long-term contacts between suppliers and trade networks. For now, the EU provides an opportunity to go through the admission procedure, but does not guarantee either the volume of necessary purchases or the favorable price.

Pashinyan’s call to Putin should therefore be seen as an acknowledgment of the limitations of rapid diversification. If the new markets would already compensate for the Russian direction, there would be no need to appeal to the Russian president, asking him to intervene in the situation. Armenia really needs to diversify, but only on the condition of maintaining the main sales market, in particular, the Russian market.

While the authorities are talking about new opportunities in the EU, fish farmers are coming out, products are accumulating in farms, the state is forced to subsidize every kilogram exported, and the Central Bank warns of a risk of up to 2 percent of GDP in an extreme scenario.  As a result, it turned out that the European door can be officially opened, but the Armenian product is still not able to pass in the volumes that the Russian market used to accept.

Arman Ghukasyan

fondsk.ru

Translation by Zhanna Avetisyan




Disclaimer: This article was contributed and translated into English by Anna Tamamian. While we strive for quality, the views and accuracy of the content remain the responsibility of the contributor. Please verify all facts independently before reposting or citing.

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