Nagorno-Karabakh and the Conflict That Never Ended

World Atlas

July 23, 2026

Nagorno-Karabakh contains a lot of history within its small area. Although the region is officially part of Azerbaijan, it has connections with Armenian traditions and identity. That duality has fueled competing claims to the region for generations. During years of Soviet control, the tension remained, but it was buried under Moscow’s tight control. Nevertheless, after the USSR collapsed, the conflict and pressure which had existed beneath the surface emerged. The conflict that intensified during the Soviet Union’s collapse continued for more than three decades. Azerbaijan’s return to full control in 2023 ended the separatist administration, but mass displacement and unresolved relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan ensured that the conflict’s consequences did not disappear.

The Historical Roots of Conflict

Dadivank is an Armenian monastery in Azerbaijan’s Kalbajar District. Much of it was built between the 9th and 13th centuries.

Nagorno-Karabakh sits in the South Caucasus, where decades of land and identity conflict have left their mark. At almost 1,700 square miles, most of the world recognizes it as part of Azerbaijan. Until the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive, most residents were ethnically Armenian. The region, known to Armenians as Artsakh, has long been associated with Armenian political, religious, and cultural history. It was incorporated into Armenian kingdoms during parts of antiquity and later contained a substantial Armenian population, although Armenian and Azerbaijani historians dispute aspects of its earlier political and ethnic history.

Despite the Armenian presence, it was often under foreign rule. At different points, the territory was controlled by Persian and Caucasian Albanian powers. Armenian noble clans, called meliks, managed to keep control in the highlands, using the Armenian language, with some local self-rule, even as real power belonged to Persian rulers and, later, to the Russians.

In the early nineteenth century, the balance of power shifted following the Russo-Persian Wars. Russia defeated Persia and annexed much of the South Caucasus, including the area around Nagorno-Karabakh. While control changed hands, the area’s mixed ethnic composition and historical claims remained, laying the groundwork for future disputes. When the Russian Empire fell apart, it left a power gap all across the South Caucasus. Armenia, along with Azerbaijan, emerged as independent states and clashed over territories, Nagorno-Karabakh being one of them.

Life Under the Soviets

Shusha’s Armenian quarters after conflict of 1920. Via Wikimedia Commons / Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute.

When the Red Army moved into the South Caucasus in the 1920s, Soviet rule brought changes to the region. It brought an end to the brief independence of the First Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. Both countries asserted their rights over Nagorno-Karabakh before their absorption into the Soviet Union. Soviet authorities placed the predominantly Armenian region within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and established the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in 1923. The decision remained deeply contested, with Armenians repeatedly seeking the region’s transfer to Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijani authorities defending its position within their republic.

In his article “Nationalities Problem in USSR: Discord over Nagorno-Karabakh”, P. L. Dash argues that the Soviet decision in 1923 to keep the region within Azerbaijan was shaped less by ethnic identity than by administrative and economic considerations, since transport links and infrastructure tied it closely to Azerbaijani territory, even though the population was largely Armenian.

On paper, the directive looked simple, but in reality, it was the opposite. Many children studied in Armenian schools, parents worshipped in Armenian churches, people talked in Armenian out on the sidewalks, but their bureaucratic superiors were Azerbaijani. Soviet officials from Moscow, along with Azerbaijan’s Communist Party, kept a tight grip on Nagorno-Karabakh’s political scene. Public demonstrations were forbidden, and security agencies monitored political actions and prevented any kind of public dialogue about the region’s position in places like schools and media outlets.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets strengthened Azerbaijan’s control by running the area’s economy and administration through Baku, Azerbaijan’s capital. They built new roads and industry to pull the region tighter into Azerbaijan’s sphere. Even though Moscow’s strict security stopped protests, ethnic Armenian dissatisfaction was rising. To many Armenians, it felt like Azerbaijani officials were erasing Armenian representation in the regional government. To Azerbaijanis, these policies were efforts to strengthen territorial integration and economic development within the Azerbaijani Soviet republic.

Circumstances changed in the 1980s. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev brought reforms which relaxed restrictions throughout the USSR. When Moscow’s control got weaker, public protests started emerging, and soon, violence broke out, and the hidden conflict that had existed for years was exposed.

First War (1988-1994): The Soviet Collapse and Ethnic Conflict

Armenian soldiers in Karabakh, 1994, wearing Soviet Army combat helmets. Armdesant, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

In 1988, crowds filled the streets of Stepanakert, the largest city in Nagorno-Karabakh, demanding changes to the region’s political status. There was a sizeable portion that wanted to break free from Azerbaijan and tie their future to Armenia. News caught fire, and Yerevan, the Armenian capital, quickly threw its weight behind the movement. If you asked Azerbaijanis, the events weren’t just street protests; it was a legitimate threat to their own existence. People in Sumgait began attacking Armenians, leaving hundreds injured and dozens killed in what became known as the Sumgait pogrom.

Then, in 1990, things in Baku just got worse as protests and anti-Armenian violence broke out all over the city. Many hurried to escape, as families slipped away during the night, grabbing whatever they could carry with them. Once the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, with it went any barriers stopping outright conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

Arms were removed from Soviet military storage, and both Armenian and Azerbaijani sides started to form their own armed units. Fighting extended over Nagorno-Karabakh and nearby territories as battles for control of towns and supply lines started to break out. In “State at War, State in War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and State-Making in Armenia, 1991-1995,” Taline Papazian says that after 1988, insecurity and violence drove Armenians to create self-defense organizations as an answer to pogroms and other attacks; later, these groups became integrated into one centralized national army.

By 1992-1993, these formations had changed from militias into structured units fighting coordinated battles for land, while authorities allocated resources toward the Defense Ministry. Both sides experienced major casualties. However, both adjusted the figures to support their political narrative. Armenian sources often emphasized battlefield successes or highlighted their ability to withstand larger Azerbaijani forces.

On the other hand, Azerbaijani leaders emphasized the extent of the territory they had lost and the destruction inflicted on their towns and villages. By 1993, Armenian troops held the advantage, with swift offensives that let them take over not just Nagorno-Karabakh but also Azerbaijani regions like Kelbajar and Fuzuli. These advances forced large numbers of Azerbaijani civilians to flee, placing additional strain on the country as its government struggled to respond.

A ceasefire came into effect in 1994, but this was not the result of a genuine willingness to make peace. Instead, both sides were simply exhausted by the fighting. Russia helped broker the ceasefire through negotiations. Armenia and its allies in Nagorno-Karabakh retained control of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories. Azerbaijan was left with the pain of losing and faced the challenge of hundreds of thousands of displaced people. The fighting had largely stopped; however, there was little belief that the dispute was truly over, and the possibility of renewed conflict was still present.

The Frozen Conflict

An abandoned armored vehicle in Nagorno-Karabakh, 2015. Via Shutterstock / Sebastian Kastelier

The 1994 truce might have stopped the fighting, but in reality, the conflict never went away. Armenian-backed forces remained in control of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts. The region’s Armenian authorities declared the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in 1991. The unrecognized entity, later commonly called the Republic of Artsakh, developed its own institutions and armed forces with extensive political, economic, and military support from Armenia.

Together, Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding Azerbaijani districts under Armenian control amounted to roughly 13 to 14 percent of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory. Even with the ceasefire, with opposing forces positioned close to one another along the line of contact, the risk of more conflict was always present.

No side was willing to compromise, but mediation was conducted by the OSCE Minsk Group, an international body established to find a resolution to the conflict. Armenia and Azerbaijan had polarizing ideas regarding the area’s status and what would happen with the adjacent regions, so peace negotiations dragged on.

Russia, France, and the US threw themselves into the effort to steer the mediation, with a plan that outlined Armenia giving up Azerbaijani territory near Nagorno-Karabakh. At the same time, Nagorno-Karabakh would be granted autonomy and later have a say in figuring out its own future status. The proposal also dealt with allowing refugees to return to their homes and placing foreign peacekeepers on the ground. However, disagreements over sovereignty ultimately prevented the two sides from reaching a lasting agreement.

The two sides remained highly militarized. Elizabeth Fuller, in her work “Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” says that Armenian and Azerbaijani troops kept their positions across a tense frontline, with both sides refusing to surrender any land, while Azerbaijan invested more and more of its energy income into modernizing and reinforcing its military. On the other hand, Armenia, with its smaller economy, was increasingly dependent on Russian arms and security guarantees. The difference between their militaries was getting larger and larger.

In April 2016, the biggest battle since the 1994 ceasefire took place after Azerbaijan launched a major offensive along the line of contact. Over 200 people died during four days of intense fighting. Azerbaijan managed to regain territory for the first time in decades, signaling a shift in the balance of power and showing the conflict was far from resolved. Although a ceasefire was restored, the fighting showed both sides that another, much larger war was getting more likely.

The Second War (2020): Azerbaijan’s Military Offensive

Russian peacekeepers assisting ethnic Armenian refugees evacuating Stepanakert. By Mil.ru, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

Just a few years later, fighting started again. Azerbaijan launched an attack on 27 September 2020. This wasn’t a brief skirmish but a large-scale military campaign. The results of years of military investment became obvious. Azerbaijan deployed Turkish unmanned aircraft, mainly Bayraktar TB2s, operated nearly non-stop. Israeli loitering munitions were also used. In the first stage of the attack, numerous Armenian tanks and heavy guns were destroyed.

The fighting stretched on for forty-four days. Azerbaijan pushed through the south, taking Jabrayil and Fuzuli. Then Zangilan and Qubadli fell. Each week brought another former district under their control. By early November, troops had reached Shusha. The city sat above the main road to Stepanakert. Its loss broke Armenian defenses and left the capital exposed. Casualties were steep. Armenian authorities reported more than 3,700 Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh military deaths, while Azerbaijan claimed nearly 3,000 on their side. Rockets and missiles hammered Stepanakert, Ganja, and Barda.

As the conflict raged, thousands of Armenians fled the area, swelling the numbers who’d already been uprooted in previous years. Then, Russia once again stepped in to broker a ceasefire and bring an end to the fighting. The ceasefire agreement required Armenia to return the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan took back most of the territories it had lost years prior.

Nearly 2,000 Russian peacekeepers were deployed to secure the Lachin corridor and also to observe the ceasefire. The 2020 war finished not as a stalemate but with an obvious Azerbaijani military success. The ceasefire reflected the military situation on the ground rather than the outcome of negotiations, requiring Armenia to cede territory and marking a clear shift in the balance of power. The six-week conflict altered the map once again. Azerbaijan saw it as a major victory, regaining the districts they had once lost. Armenia experienced political unrest domestically and had to face the reality of a major defeat.

A Shifting Balance and the 2023 Offensive

After the 2020 war, Azerbaijan was stronger than at any point since its independence. The army had modern weapons and funding from oil and gas. On the other hand, Armenia was divided. The territorial loss resulted in demonstrations in Yerevan, and the army found it difficult to recover from its previous defeat. Even as Russia maintained peacekeepers within the region, their responsibilities were restricted, mainly including checkpoint operations and road patrols.

In December 2022, groups calling themselves environmental activists stopped traffic on the road, although Armenia, together with many analysts, claimed there was actually support from the Azerbaijani state. What looked temporary dragged on, developing into a severe humanitarian crisis. Because of the blockade, by the middle of 2023, stores in Stepanakert lacked food and medicine. Azerbaijan’s growing military advantage reduced its incentive to compromise, making a negotiated resolution increasingly difficult despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers.

Nothing about the Russian peacekeepers could prevent the balance of power from moving more and more toward Baku. In the years following the war, this reality influenced events locally. Azerbaijan used its advantage by controlling territory and key transport routes. The Lachin Corridor was the only roadway linking Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. Azerbaijan progressively restricted movement along the Lachin Corridor and established a checkpoint there in April 2023. Russian peacekeepers proved unable or unwilling to restore normal access. In February 2023, the International Court of Justice ordered Azerbaijan to take all measures at its disposal to ensure the unimpeded movement of people, vehicles, and cargo in both directions, but severe shortages continued inside Nagorno-Karabakh.

Then, on 19 September 2023, Azerbaijan launched another military offensive. This time, drones and artillery targeted the positions of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian forces before Azerbaijani ground troops advanced from multiple directions. Within a day, the de facto region’s defenses collapsed, and its authorities agreed to a ceasefire and the disbandment of their armed forces. By the end of the month, Azerbaijan had re-established full control over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Aftermath and Ongoing Peace Efforts

Azerbaijani soldiers and Russian peacekeepers at a checkpoint in Kalbajar District. Via Mil.ru, CC BY 4.0 / Wikimedia Commons.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees says the military action in September 2023 caused Armenians to flee at a shocking rate, with more than 100,000 finding their way into Armenia in only days. Villages and towns were emptied, some entirely deserted. For many families, this was another forced exile inside of a cycle that dated back decades.

The consequences of the 2023 offensive have also put a fresh focus on the cultural heritage in the region. Some organizations and observers have mentioned that Armenian monuments and other historical locations were damaged, while discussions about their protection are still ongoing. These events amplified concerns about what will happen to Armenian cultural heritage in the area now that control has changed. But Azerbaijan maintains it is restoring and protecting cultural sites while rejecting allegations of deliberate destruction and emphasizing its preservation efforts.

Although Azerbaijan had restored control over Nagorno-Karabakh, relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan remained unsettled. In March 2025, the two governments announced that they had completed negotiations over the text of a peace agreement. Their foreign ministers initialled the document in Washington, D.C., on August 8, 2025, while the countries’ leaders signed a separate joint declaration supporting further normalization.

The initialling represented a major diplomatic breakthrough, but it was not the same as the treaty taking full legal effect. The two governments acknowledged that further steps were required for formal signature and ratification. As of mid-2026, Azerbaijan remained in control of Nagorno-Karabakh, while more than 100,000 Armenians displaced in September 2023 continued rebuilding their lives in Armenia. The question of whether Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh will ever return remains unanswered. The conflict might no longer lie on the battlefield, but its legacy continues through displaced communities and the challenge of building a lasting peace in a region shaped by decades of division.

In Conclusion

The history of Nagorno-Karabakh shows how disputes over territory and identity can shape generations. Even during periods of calm, tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis remained unresolved. Each new wave of violence reinforced past grievances, making a lasting political settlement harder and harder to achieve.

Over more than three decades, the conflict developed from competing historical claims into repeated wars that displaced hundreds of thousands of people and reshaped the political landscape of the South Caucasus. The wars of 2020 and 2023 restored Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh, but they didn’t resolve the humanitarian consequences of the conflict or the questions surrounding the future of those who were forced to leave. Although large-scale fighting has ended, the legacy of the conflict continues to influence the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan.