Israel’s Recognition of Armenian Genocide Further Sours Relations with Turkey

June 29 2026

Israel’s recognition of the Armenian genocide comes amid a broad deterioration in ties with Ankara, as Israeli concerns over Turkey increasingly extend beyond politics to the Mediterranean, Gaza and regional security.

After years of hesitation, Israel on Sunday formally recognized the Armenian genocide, likely ushering in more contentious chapter in its already sharply deteriorating relationship with Turkey. 

Turkey “has effectively become an enemy state to Israel,” Alon Liel, a former Israeli ambassador to Turkey, told Alhurra. He said developments in Gaza will largely determine whether bilateral relations continue to deteriorate or eventually improve. 

The confrontation spans multiple arenas, including Gaza, Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, energy competition, and Israel’s expanding military cooperation with Greece and Cyprus. 

Israel’s cabinet unanimously approved a proposal by Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar recognizing the Armenian genocide committed during the final years of the Ottoman Empire. 

Sa’ar said the move was “not an act of revenge” against what he described as Turkey’s “open hostility, inflammatory rhetoric and hostile actions” toward Israel under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Turkey’s promotion of what he called “false narratives against Israel,” he added, does not grant it “immunity from historical truth.” 

For years many Israeli politicians, academics and human rights advocates had called for Israel to deem Turkey’s actions against Armenians a genocide. Such an action had repeatedly been postponed, however, because of the sensitivity of Israel’s relationship with Ankara, which adamantly denies that a genocide took place. 

Presenting the proposal to the cabinet, Sa’ar described it as “Israel’s official recognition of the genocide committed against the Armenian people during the final years of the Ottoman Empire.” 

He said the events began on April 24, 1915, with the arrest, deportation and killing of hundreds of Armenian intellectuals and community leaders in Constantinople before evolving, according to the text of the resolution, into a systematic campaign involving mass killings, forced deportations and death marches into the Syrian desert. Sa’ar said the genocide claimed the lives of approximately 1.5 million people. 

Israel has taken the decision at a time of unprecedented tensions with the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 

Recognition of the Armenian genocide “should have happened long ago,” former Israeli lawmaker and Middle East researcher Ksenia Svetlova told Alhurra,  arguing that its timing is clearly linked to the escalating confrontation with Erdogan’s government. 

“If this is truly a moral decision, why was it rejected every previous time?” she said. “The issue came up repeatedly, and each time it was either postponed or removed from the agenda.” 

Recognizing the Armenian genocide should be a principled moral position, she said, “not a bargaining chip or a political tool in dealings with the Turkish president.” 

The debate is not new in Israel. Over the years, politicians have voiced support for recognizing the Armenian genocide, and several initiatives were introduced in the Knesset to adopt an official position. None, however, resulted in formal recognition. 

A Naval Incident That Nearly Escalated 

The growing tensions between Israel and Turkey are no longer confined to political rhetoric. Israeli officials are increasingly discussing the possibility of a future military confrontation at sea. 

Israel’s Channel 12 reported that an Israeli missile ship participating in a joint exercise near Cyprus with Greece and Cyprus nearly encountered Turkish warships after four Turkish destroyers rapidly approached to within a few hundred meters. 

According to the broadcaster, such incidents have prompted Israel’s security establishment to reassess Turkey’s status. Rather than viewing Ankara solely as a political rival, Israeli defense officials increasingly regard it as a country capable of becoming a military adversary. That reassessment has led the Israeli military to begin developing a new naval force structure while continuing preparations for potential confrontations with Iran and the Houthis, Israeli officials told the network. 

Israeli officials link this shift to Erdogan’s “Blue Homeland” doctrine, which seeks to expand Turkey’s maritime influence across the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean while securing Turkish interests in energy and maritime navigation. 

Turkey showcased elements of that maritime strategy during its Sea Wolf 2026 naval exercises, held earlier this month across the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. The drills involved 125 naval vessels, 60 aircraft and roughly 18,000 military personnel. 

The exercises featured tests of several domestically developed weapons systems, including the AKYA heavyweight torpedo, the ATMACA anti-ship missile and the HİSAR-D naval air defense system. Turkey also deployed Bayraktar TB3 unmanned aerial vehicles launched from the amphibious assault ship TCG Anadolu. 

Turkish Navy Commander Adm. Ercüment Tatlıoğlu said Ankara was testing its weapons in the Eastern Mediterranean “at the maximum possible range.” He said the capabilities form part of a broader effort to build a navy that is “strong, effective and deterrent,” capable of protecting Turkey’s political, military and economic interests within what Ankara calls the “Blue Homeland” and beyond. 

Tatlıoğlu also highlighted plans to develop new air defense destroyers, submarines and a domestically built aircraft carrier, while expanding the use of drones, electronic warfare and unmanned systems. 

Channel 12 reported that the Israeli military has begun reassessing the role and operational doctrine of its navy, factoring in the possibility of a future confrontation with Turkey alongside continued preparations for potential escalation involving Iran, the Houthis and tensions in the Red Sea. 

The reassessment comes against the backdrop of a significant imbalance in naval capabilities. Israel is seeking to narrow that gap through a modernization plan estimated to cost about $20 billion over the next decade. The program includes building a new class of Reshef missile ships, upgrading existing surface vessels and developing an operational concept that integrates missile ships, submarines and unmanned platforms into a unified naval force. 

At the same time, Israel is expanding military cooperation with Greece and Cyprus through joint exercises, intelligence sharing and energy and infrastructure projects backed by the United States under the 3+1 framework. Israeli officials view these efforts as part of a broader strategy to establish a regional axis capable of balancing Turkish influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

For Liel, however, neither the maritime rivalry nor Israel’s recognition of the Armenian genocide alone will determine the future of relations with Ankara. Gaza, he argues, remains the decisive variable. 

“The trajectory from this point forward—whether relations deteriorate further or begin to improve—depends on what happens in Gaza,” he said. 

If the war resumes and Israel reoccupies the entire Gaza Strip, he said, Turkey could become “an enemy state.” But if Israel withdraws from Gaza, or even begins withdrawing, “relations could improve.” 

Svetlova offered a different assessment. 

While acknowledging that Israeli-Turkish relations have reached their lowest point in years, she said she does not view Turkey as an enemy comparable to Iran, but rather as “a competitor or rival across multiple arenas.” 

She said Ankara’s rhetoric toward Israel is “deeply troubling” and argued that Erdogan’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood remains a source of concern for Israel and several other countries in the region. 

Still, she cautioned against drawing direct comparisons with Iran, noting that Turkey remains a member of NATO and a strategic partner of the United States. 

The debate reflects the increasingly complex nature of the crisis. The relationship between Israel and Turkey is no longer shaped solely by the personal rivalry between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan or by periodic diplomatic disputes. It is increasingly influenced by overlapping theaters of competition stretching from Gaza and Syria to the Eastern Mediterranean, energy security and shifting regional military alliances. 

Taken together, the developments suggest that Israeli-Turkish relations have entered a new phase. The long-standing policy of avoiding the most sensitive issues with Ankara—foremost among them the Armenian genocide—has all but come to an end. 

Whether that shift remains a form of political pressure or marks the beginning of a broader strategic confrontation will depend on events unfolding simultaneously in Gaza, at sea and across the Eastern Mediterranean. 

Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.

—