The retreat of Baku’s anti-Iranian rhetoric. Tehran’s new positions and new reality

Days after the signing of the Iran-US memorandum and the US-Iran negotiations in Switzerland, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, left for Azerbaijan. In Baku, he is participating in the 20th session of the Parliamentary Union of the member countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. On June 24, the delegation led by Ghalibaf was received by the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev. According to the official message of the Azerbaijani side, Aliyev noted that during the war, Azerbaijan was on the side of the Iranian people and state.

Ilham Aliyev emphasized that Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s visit will also create a good opportunity for discussing issues related to the bilateral agenda.

He also referred to the successful development of Azerbaijani-Iranian relations. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf thanked Aliyev for visiting the Iranian embassy and expressing his condolences on the death of Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and many civilians, as well as for his congratulatory message on the election of Ayatollah Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei as the supreme leader of Iran. The parties also exchanged ideas on the prospects of bilateral relations, including issues of inter-parliamentary cooperation, and referred to the activities of the intergovernmental commission.

The meeting between Ilham Aliyev and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and the subsequent official message document the shift in the balance of power in the South Caucasus. After the signing of the US-Iran memorandum and the first round of negotiations between Washington and Tehran in Switzerland, Azerbaijan seems to be forced to change its anti-Iranian rhetoric. The overcoming of the West-Iran war crisis has returned Tehran to the status of a key regional player, which forces Baku to pursue a more prominent policy with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The US-Iran negotiations are already reflected on the regional dynamics of the South Caucasus. And the message of the Aliyev-Ghalibaf meeting is an indicator of the change in that dynamic. It is noteworthy that the official messages released after the meeting emphasized the development of bilateral relations, inter-parliamentary cooperation and mutual understanding on regional issues. However, what was more remarkable was not what was said, but what was not said.

Several months ago, during the military confrontation between Iran and the USA, after the incident that happened near the Nakhichevan airspace, Azerbaijan demanded responsibility from Tehran with harsh statements and openly expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of the Iranian side.  Iran-Azerbaijan relations were tense, in turn, Iran not only responded to Azerbaijan, but also threatened countries that might give their territory to Iran’s enemies to carry out actions against Iran. Now that topic is completely absent from the official agenda.

This change cannot be explained by diplomatic ethics alone. More likely, it reflects a change in the regional power balance. If until recently, Baku could afford tougher anti-Iranian rhetoric, taking into account Tehran’s international isolation and confrontation with the West, then the war, the start of the US-Iran negotiation process changes the situation. The easing of the war crisis and the restoration of direct contacts with Washington return Iran to the position of an important regional actor, which forces Azerbaijan to conduct a more cautious and balanced policy towards its southern neighbor.

The importance of Iran for Azerbaijan is determined not only by security, but also by economic and transport factors. Iran is the only regional power that has consistently stated that the change of state borders or the creation of extraterritorial channels in the South Caucasus is unacceptable. For this reason, Baku, even maintaining the strategic partnership with Turkey and Israel, cannot ignore the Iranian factor.

The emerging situation may have important consequences for Armenia as well. If Iran’s international positions are indeed strengthened and Tehran returns to a more active regional policy, the restrictions that Iran imposes on power scenarios and attempts to reshape regional borders will be strengthened.

This can have an additional deterrent effect in the South Caucasus, simultaneously creating a favorable situation for the recovery of the “3 3” platform. At the same time, Armenia can benefit from Iran’s growing economic and transport role, especially in the context of the development of north-south channels and regional communications.

Therefore, Ghalibaf’s visit to Baku should be considered not as an ordinary ceremonial event, but as a manifestation of a wider process. Azerbaijan actually records that the new stage in US-Iran relations changes the regional environment and forces to review the previous tough approaches towards Tehran. Perhaps a new period is beginning in the South Caucasus, where Iran can turn into a key factor, whose interests and positions are increasingly difficult to ignore for all actors in the region.

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