Ankara is a comfortable partner for Moscow. it helps to “close” the space

Prior to the NATO summit in Turkey, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Russia and held high-level meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu.

The situation in the South Caucasus and the ongoing peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia were on the agenda of Turkey-Russia bilateral discussions, the latter, as Fidan informed, was discussed in detail because it is a very important aspect for peace in the region.

For his part, after negotiations with his Turkish counterpart, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said that they agreed to closely cooperate in matters of security in the Black Sea region, as well as in the Transcaucasia, the Middle East, and North Africa. We have good relations with Turkish partners everywhere, and they work on the principle of complementarity.

Later, in an interview with Turkiye newspaper, Hakan Fidan stated that the 3 3 format is a very important mechanism for deepening the cooperation between the countries of the South Caucasus and Turkey, Russia and Iran.

“This is a very important mechanism for deepening cooperation between Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Armenia and Georgia. As countries in the region, we must prioritize cooperation over competition and the pursuit of hegemony. We see this understanding reaching a certain point in the context of recent developments in the Middle East. With the same perspective, we can strengthen our economies and increase stability in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The quest for dominance must end. Peace, tranquility and stability will benefit everyone. We need to change our understanding. The formula 3 3 will do To implement significant cooperation in the Caucasus. Of course, there are obstacles. Mutual mistrust between some countries has reached a serious level. On the other hand, there is also a common aspiration,” he elaborated.

What messages are Turkey and Russia sending with these statements, is it in Turkey’s interest to restore Russia’s role in the South Caucasus, to what extent, and what consequences should Armenia take? On these and other issues 168.amhas talked “Henaket” Analytical Center expert Shiraz with Khachatryan.

– A very simple process is taking place. Hakan Fidan’s visit to Moscow and the statements made as a result of the meeting with Lavrov should be viewed, so to speak, from the point of view of these two regional actors opposing the possible activation of the Western vector. The idea is that regional problems should be solved by regional players without the intervention of other external power centers.

For Turkey, the “3 3” format is a platform where it, Russia and Iran can share spheres of influence, first of all pushing out Washington, why not also Brussels, and for Moscow, despite all the contradictions, Ankara remains a comfortable partner that helps to “keep” the doors of the region to the West in many issues.

In my opinion, this activity is also a preventive step against Iran’s possible independent play, because the possible tactical rapprochement between Washington and Tehran and the political and economic “strengthening” of Iran radically change the balance of power.

Freed from sanctions, Iran becomes a direct competitor for Turkey in terms of control of energy and logistics channels, and Turkey’s silent resistance to Pan-Turan projects and the idea of ​​a “corridor” passing through Syunik gains new geopolitical weight.

For Russia, any rapprochement between Iran and the West carries a risk, Tehran can turn into a supplier of alternative energy carriers for Europe. Therefore, Moscow and Ankara are in a hurry to fix their spheres of influence before global realignments change the rules of the game.

This situation gives Armenia a vital reason to think, but the sad reality is that the foreign policy conducted by the current authorities of Armenia is distinguished by the absence of a clear strategy and long-term vision. Today, Armenia has appeared in the role of an exclusively passive follower, watching from the sidelines the positional and tough struggle of major actors, and tries to orientate itself by purely situational adaptation, which, to put it mildly, every time leads to a fatal situation and stops the Armenian people.

– Against the background of Hakan Fidan’s visit to Moscow Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the Turkish “Nationalist Movement” party, “standing on the Zangezur line”, called to call things by their true names, stating: “This is a historic route that will strengthen Nakhichevan’s ties with its native Azerbaijan, and will connect Turkey with the Caspian Sea through fraternal Azerbaijan, and from there to Turkestan (Central Asia).․) with. The Zangezur line means ensuring the connection of Nakhichevan with Azerbaijan. This corridor will create a strategic environment to spread the spirit of “One Nation, Two States” throughout the Turkic world. This line is actually the Turan Corridor. The Turan Corridor is a historical and cultural gateway that stretches from Kars to the borders of Turkestan.”

Parallel to this, from Nakhijevan Chairman of the Council of “West Azerbaijan Community” Aziz Alekberli He clearly demands from Armenia to create conditions for the return of “West Azerbaijanis”. Coincidence or pattern, especially when both try to emphasize “historicity”? 

– Those two statements are interesting both in terms of their content and because they reflect the high degree of harmony between the actions of Ankara and Baku. It is clear to many that Turkey is advancing not only its immediate political and economic interests in the region, but also a wider pan-Turkish strategic vision, one of the key components of which is the idea of ​​the geographic and political unification of the Turkic world. In that context, the formulation “Turan Corridor” is the expression of that ideological project. At the same time, Azerbaijan continues to advance the “return of West Azerbaijanis” agenda on various platforms, filling the corridor topic with new political and “demographic” pressure components.

It is clear that Ankara and Baku act with complementary and coordinated logic in many strategic issues, often guided by their own long-term goals, which do not always coincide with the interests of other actors in the region. As a result, the topic of the “corridor” is constantly kept at the forefront of the regional agenda, with different formulations and different components, which proves that all this is part of a wider geopolitical strategy and is a key topic of regional politics.

– 2025 Amendments were initiated in the constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan, according to which the cabinet of ministers of the autonomous republic, which is part of Azerbaijan, will be subordinated not to the Supreme Mejlis, but to the President of Azerbaijan, coordinating its work order with him.

In addition, it was decided to remove references to the Moscow and Kars treaties from the constitution of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic and to emphasize that “the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic is an inseparable part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” In other words, Aliyev decided to limit the autonomy of Nakhichevan. We have repeatedly discussed the strategic goals of the developments around Nakhichevan and the risks for Armenia with you And today information was published, that Aliyev decided To grant the status of a state body of the 1st class to the authorized representative office of Azerbaijan in the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan. K:can we say that Baku, Aliyev, is trying to take “control” of Nakhichevan from Turkey, or even in this case, the Turkish presence will remain influential there?

– Let me say this: although in recent years Aliyev has consistently concentrated the political and administrative management of Nakhijevan in his hands, at the moment, purely from the point of view of the two countries’ opposition, he does not openly show that there is an attempt to “take” Nakhijevan from Turkey. Or, more precisely, Aliyev seeks to exclude the existence of any independent power center there and tries to keep the entire governmental control in his hands. At the same time, Turkey’s influence in Nakhichevan, especially in the military and strategic spheres, remains key.

Therefore, even if Baku strengthens its direct control over Nakhichevan, this still does not mean a weakening of the Turkish presence here, it is more likely that the close Turkish-Azerbaijani system will continue to operate in the region, where the political leadership will be concentrated in Baku. And no matter how significant Ankara’s influence remains, in this situation it does not hinder Baku from the point of view of promoting common strategies.

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