For small and not rich countries, the main question should be: how did you get it?

Artak Zakaryan writes on his Facebook page. “The English King’s College London has published research, according to which it is no longer justified for countries with limited budgets to copy the armies of great powers on a smaller scale.

From the conclusions of the research, it follows that the scaled-down models of large armies are considered more expensive, while at the same time, from the point of view of the combat effectiveness of the armed forces of a small country, they are less effective.

It should be noted that in the conditions of modern war, not the status of existing weapons and tactical-technical characteristics, but your own ability to make the aggression started against you long-lasting, costly and unpredictable for the enemy has become much more important.

The concept of “deterrence by denial” is based on this principle, the goal of which is not to defeat a stronger state in an open conflict, but to deprive it of the opportunity to achieve quick and cheap success. In a strategic sense, this is a defensive approach, when the state seeks not to threaten the opponent with a heavy punishment or a counterattack, but to organize its defense in such a way that the opponent ultimately cannot achieve its goals.

Ukraine, Taiwan, Finland, and Iran present various examples of the implementation of this approach.

Taiwan relies on a so-called “hedgehog strategy,” using mobile coastal missile systems, mines, drones, distributed air defense systems and infrastructure stockpiles to make a possible invasion as difficult as possible.

The Ukraine war showed that relatively inexpensive UAVs, satellites, civilian communications networks, radio-electronic warfare and flexible logistics can cause systemic damage when used effectively.

Finland and Sweden demonstrate a model where defense is built not only on armed forces, but also on a trained public, reservists, strategic reserves, vital infrastructure and stable governance.

The main conclusion is that the effective defense of medium and small states sometimes depends not on expensive and well-known systems, but on the goal and target architecture of security, defense capability and military-political management.

Unmanned aerial vehicles, mobile missile systems, distributed sensors, radio electronic warfare means, munitions stocks, backup energy supply, protected channels and decentralized command can, in specific situations, together provide no less deterrent effect than the few authoritative systems and classic models of warfare that usually become the primary targets.

This does not mean the abandonment of traditional military equipment, but requires a review of defense concepts and justifications for the acquisition of armaments.

Modern conflicts show that cheap and massive means, if properly integrated, can significantly change the balance of power.

For small and non-rich countries, the main question should be not how to create a smaller version of the armed forces of big and rich powers, but how to turn your limited resources into the most expensive retribution tool for the aggressor.

That is why the defense concept of “deterrence by excluding the opportunity” is not just a theoretical idea today, but a practical strategy for states that cannot afford to participate in a symmetrical arms race.

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