A Democracy in Danger – The Kremlin’s Shadow over Yerevan

On June 7, 2026, Armenian citizens will be called to the polls for parliamentary elections – a vote that goes far beyond everyday party politics. Since the peaceful Velvet Revolution in 2018, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has gradually steered the small South Caucasian state, traditionally strongly tied to Moscow, in a new direction. 

While Pashinyan’s leadership style is contested by some human rights activists including Kenneth Roth who recently voiced concerns that ‘Pashinyan’s populism borders on authoritarianism’, his pro-European Civil Contract party is securing a substantial lead according to recent polls. His government’s efforts to steer Armenia towards tackling systemic corruption, elite decision-making, weaknesses in the electoral framework, and the fragile rule of law are acknowledged by Freedom House, which currently awards the country a score of 54 out of 100, a notable improvement from the 41–46 range seen in the years preceding Pashinyan’s tenure.

In light of Russia’s security passivity during the recent conflicts with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, Yerevan froze its participation in the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on February 24, 2024, and is instead striving for deeper integration into the European Union. 

Yet the current elections and especially the candidacy of Pashinyan are being targeted by Russian disinformation operations as highlighted in a report by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. For the Kremlin, Armenia’s potential exit from its decades-old sphere of influence is a strategic defeat that it wants to prevent. Unlike the internal challenges addressed in a recent FairPlanet article, the threat posed by Russian disinformation represents an external risk. The upcoming elections are widely seen by the interviewed experts as a test for the country’s alignment between Western-style democratic reforms and traditional ties to Moscow.

The “Moldova Playbook” 

Intelligence experts note that the tactics currently observed in Yerevan are a direct evolution of the strategies Russia has already tested during the elections in the Republic of Moldova. At the core of this Moldova playbook is the creation of a permanent crisis narrative designed to wear down and polarise the electorate.

Political analyst and president of the NGO Free Citizen, Hovsep Khurshudyan, emphasised that a massive ‘battle for minds’ is taking place ahead of the election: ‘A battle for minds is primarily fought in the information sphere, where disinformation plays an extremely important role. For those voters who are motivated more by material interests, pre-election bribery may also have a significant impact. According to available information, such practices have already been initiated by one of the pro-Russian political forces.’ According to Khurshudyan, Russia has almost completely forfeited the organic trust of Armenian society due to its inaction during the ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, therefore Moscow is primarily shifting its efforts to the information space.

Human rights expert Artur Sakunts, head of the human rights organization Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly in Vanadzor, concretised this threat by pointing out that disinformation campaigns are increasingly accompanied by open threats at the highest political level. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin – especially following Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to the European Summit – bluntly referred to the fate of Ukraine to illustrate what could happen to Armenia if it draws closer to the EU.

At the same time, the country is being flooded with targeted fake news that appeal to the deep-seated existential fears of the population. ‘The second main method is the dissemination of disinformation about the current government’s policy, which exploits sensitive topics for the public, in particular, the alleged consent of the government to the resettlement of 300,000 Azerbaijanis in the territory of the Republic of Armenia,’ an entirely baseless claim serving solely to sow panic and portray the incumbent government as traitors to national security, according to Sakunts. 

However, this propaganda thrives because it exploits genuine public anger: a December 2023 IRI poll showed that 36 per cent of Armenians view the government’s actual handling of Nagorno-Karabakh as its greatest failure, which caused Pashinyan’s trust ratings to plummet to 17 per cent. While the specific claims are fabricated, the underlying sense of betrayal and security fears among the population are deeply rooted.

Economic Blackmail and the Illegal Flow of Rubles

In addition to disinformation, Russia holds significant structural leverage over the Armenian economy, which can be utilised for political pressure. Armenia is heavily dependent on the Russian market, particularly for agricultural exports and energy imports.

Khurshudyan strongly warned about the role of economic blackmail. According to the expert, voters are deliberately intimidated by the narrative that a victory for pro-Western, democratic forces would inevitably lead to harsh Russian economic sanctions, the collapse of bilateral trade relations, and skyrocketing energy prices. This pressure especially affects rural families whose relatives live as migrant workers in Russia and whose remittances ensure their survival.

Furthermore there are growing concerns that direct financial incentives and illicit funds are being

used to influence voters. Both Khurshudyan and  Sakunts highlighted the danger of direct voter bribery. According to Sakunts the Armenian Anti-Corruption Committee has uncovered concrete cases of bribery by supporters of the ‘Strong Armenia’ party and ‘has initiated criminal proceedings, within the framework of which there are arrested and detained persons.’ This party is financed by the pro-Kremlin oligarch Samvel Karapetyan, who has been declared as the party’s candidate for prime minister despite being constitutionally ineligible due to his multiple citizenships, including Russian citizenship.

The Role of the Fifth Column and Moscow’s “Plan B”

Moscow’s primary goal is to prevent a pro-Western majority, Khurshudyan explained and warned of a Russian ‘Plan B’ for the post-election period should pro-Russian forces fail to gain a majority. This pro-Russian opposition is anchored by traditional conservative blocs like Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance and newly formed Kremlin-backed movements, most notably the Strong Armenia party led by Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan. According to Khurshudyan, they will use their resources to continuously sabotage Armenia’s European integration from the opposition: ‘This could include mobilising paid groups, as well as some genuinely dissatisfied citizens, provoking clashes, creating an atmosphere of chaos, and ultimately delegitimising the elected authorities.’

For Armenian citizens, this election is about the fundamental foundation of their civil liberties. Sakunts believes that a return to Moscow’s orbit would inevitably be accompanied by a massive democratic backslide. The Russian-led structures like the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are based on authoritarian models of governance: ‘These processes and these programmes are aimed at strengthening human rights protection mechanisms and are in contradiction with the obligations stipulated by the membership of the EAEU and the CIS.’

European Support and Civil Society Gaps

In response to these hybrid threats, the Armenian government and its Western partners have begun strengthening the country’s resilience. The role of the European Union is perceived extremely positively by the Armenian public. Sakunts highlighted its civilian monitoring mission (EUMA), which plays a crucial role in preventing military actions by Azerbaijan at the border and countering Kremlin-narratives of a nation abandoned by the West: ‘The EU is providing serious expert support to the RA government in order to identify and prevent various hybrid threats from the Russian Federation, which is perceived as hostile by the Kremlin. International monitoring missions, namely those of the EU, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE, are also of key significance.’

Despite these developments, the architecture of Western support faces significant structural vulnerabilities. Khurshudyan sharply criticised the bureaucratic implementation of European aid. While the will to support Armenia is clearly recognisable at the highest political levels of the EU, this engagement fizzles out at middle and lower institutional levels.

‘Civil society organizations that serve as locomotives of the pro-European agenda in Armenia are also not meaningfully involved in strategic communication with the European Union at the middle and

lower institutional levels, including structures such as the Strategic Communication division within the European External Action Service,’ Khurshudyan said, calling for an investigation into this gap, as the lack of structural and financial support for these NGOs weakens Armenia’s resilience against Moscow’s hybrid attacks.

A test for Armenia’s future

As the June 7, 2026, elections approach, international observers are closely monitoring the South Caucasus. The upcoming vote is widely considered a significant test of whether Armenia can successfully diversify its security and economic partnerships away from its traditional reliance on Moscow.

An outcome that favors pro-Kremlin forces could slow down regional integration with the West and impact similar reform movements across the post-Soviet space. Conversely, if Armenia maintains its current political trajectory and ensures a transparent electoral process, it could solidify a shift in the regional dynamics of the South Caucasus, demonstrating the resilience of its democratic institutions under external pressure.

Interview requests were sent to both the Prime Minister’s press office and Armen Grigoryan, Secretary of the Security Council. Neither had responded by the time of publication.