Putin Says Armenia And Russia Can Achieve A ‘Civilized Divorce’ – Analysis

By Paul Goble

Until recently, most Armenians and observers elsewhere assumed that Yerevan had little choice but to rely on Moscow for its defense and even survival (see EDM, April 22). The Kremlin’s failure to help Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan, either directly or indirectly via the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), together with the expanded efforts of the European Union to support moves toward a peace treaty between Yerevan and Baku, have shifted opinion in Armenia and the West (International Republican Institute (IRI), March 5; Novaya Gazeta Evropa, May 5).

This sea change is far from the end of this story. It came to a head last week, initially by the first-ever expanded EU summit in Armenia—attended by the leaders of more than 40 countries, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy—and then by Putin’s statement (Council of the European Union, May 4; Arbat Media, May 7; see EDM, May 11). Putin will likely attempt to torpedo any Armenia–EU moves, based on his past comments as the framework for future policy. Even so, there can be no doubt that his words do mark a significant and, what may be especially important, a forced change in Moscow’s position.

No matter what Putin does next, his words will affect all countries in the post-Soviet space and make it far less likely that he will be able to reassemble the empire as he has often suggested he wants to restore. Consequently, many observers not only in Armenia but also in Azerbaijan and other former Soviet states are describing the summit and Putin’s words as a turning point in the evolution of the former Soviet space (Charter 97, May 6; Kasparov.ru, May 7; The Insider, May 9; Altyn-Orda, May 10).

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created, two competing visions emerged concerning what the CIS represented. Most in the non-Russian countries felt that the CIS would provide a framework for “the civilized divorce” of their countries from Moscow (Window on Eurasia, November 2, 2025). Some in Moscow, and most prominently in recent years, Putin himself, viewed the CIS and its allied structures as the basis for reassembling the empire.

Some of the former Soviet republics, most prominently Armenia and Belarus, long felt they had little choice but to remain within a Russian-led and Russian-dominated space. Belarus continues to take that position, although even Minsk has shown signs of interest in greater independence and expanded relations with the West in recent months (see EDM, December 4, 2025, April 16). Armenia, since the conflict with Azerbaijan ended in 2023, has dramatically shifted its position (see EDM, October 15, 2025, March 25, April 22).

Before that time, many Armenians felt they had little choice but to rely on Russia for economic development and security. In the last several years, however, a majority of them, along with their current leader, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, have decided that their country’s future lies with Europe rather than Russia. They have taken steps in that direction, which the European Union’s and especially France’s support and actions have made easier (see EDM, November 6, 2023, March 11, 2024; IRI, March 5;The Insider, May 9). Moreover, Moscow’s responses to what Armenia and the European Union have been doing are proving counterproductive, further alienating Armenians and leaving Russia with fewer levers (Window on Eurasia, April 12).

Putin, until now, has opposed any idea of any “civilized divorce,” most prominently seen in his expanded war against Ukraine. Now, however, as that war grinds on into its fifth year and Moscow is trying to find an offramp, the Kremlin leader has taken a new tack, acknowledging that a civilized divorce is possible. He has suggested that if a referendum shows the people of Armenia desire this and that it is not just an anti-Russian move orchestrated by Europe and the West more generally, he is prepared to accept it.

Given his track record, however, what Putin will do in reality is likely to differ from what he now says. He will certainly use what levers he can, both to ensure that any referendum in Armenia will fail, either by winning over the support of more Armenians to a pro-Russian position or by claiming that outside actors falsified the results. At the same time, he will work to persuade the Europeans to abandon their plans for Armenia, lest they suffer the consequences of continuing to pursue them (Council of the European Union, May 5). If Putin fails in either effort, he may find that the only country beyond Russia’s borders that shares his vision of the future will be Belarus, and even that is uncertain (Charter 97, May 6).

As important as the European summit in Yerevan and Putin’s words about a civilized divorce between Russia and Yerevan certainly are, they are likely to have a far greater effect elsewhere in the former Soviet space (Altyn-Orda, May 5). Some commentators are already speculating about the collapse of the CSTO and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) that Moscow created to keep these countries institutionally tied to Russia (Charter 97, May 6, 7). Others are discussing how their own countries can take advantage of these developments in Armenia (The Times of Central Asia, May 8). Perhaps most immediately relevant, a few are now openly asking if Moscow is prepared to allow Armenia to go its own way after a referendum, why is it not willing to do the same for Ukraine? (Altyn-Orda, May 10).

Putin views Ukraine as being in a different category than Armenia. He even denies that Ukrainians are a separate nation with a right to their own state. He will not agree to a similar “civilized divorce” with Kyiv. By going to war, the Kremlin leader has shown he will not do that, but having now taken the position he has with respect to Armenia, he may find it even more difficult to garner support at home for what he continues to do in Ukraine. Russians may reasonably ask, if there is a way one former Soviet republic can achieve “a civilized divorce” with Moscow without violence, then why should the people of Russia pay such a high price to keep another in its sphere of influence? That is a question Putin cannot afford to have ever more Russians posing.