When economist Jim O’Neill, then working at Goldman Sachs Group Inc., coined the term BRIC in 2001 to draw attention to solid growth rates in Brazil, Russia, India, and China, few may have anticipated that two decades later, this term will be the buzz word shaping the global geopolitics. In 2010, BRIC became BRICS after South Africa joined the club, but even then, many were sceptical that a grouping of such diverse countries can play a meaningful role in global politics.
However, as China transformed itself into a global economic heavyweight, and Russia – West relations hit their lowest point since the end of the Cold War as the result of the Russia – Ukraine war, scholars, experts, and politicians started to actively discuss the emergence of a new, multipolar world order, viewing BRICS as one of its pillars.
The next milestone in the development of the BRICS was the 2023 summit in South Africa, when Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were invited to become members of the group as from January 1, 2024. Subsequently, the newly elected President of Argentina, Javier Milei, withdrew the country from its planned entry into the BRICS, but other newcomers officially became members of the organization on January 1, 2024.
Iran's membership in BRICS brought the organization to Armenia's doorstep, making Yerevan a neighbour of BRICS. Currently, Armenia is in the painstaking process of re-assessing and re-evaluating its foreign policy after the defeat in the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war, the military takeover of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic by Azerbaijan in September 2023, and the forced displacement of all Armenians from the region. Some in Armenia hoped that after finishing with Nagorno Karabakh, Azerbaijan would sign a peace agreement with Armenia based on the recognition of mutual territorial integrity within the 1991 Soviet administrative borders, and on the restoration of communications accepting the sovereignty of states over the routes passing their territories. In December 2023, some high-level Armenian officials, including the Speaker of the National Assembly, stated “that the peace with Azerbaijan was never as close as now.”
However, this positive mood changed significantly after President Aliyev's January 10, 2024, interview with local media outlets. President Aliyev clearly stated that Azerbaijan would not withdraw from at least 200 square km of Armenian territory, which it controls as a result pf incursions into Armenia in May and November 2021, and September 2022, and demanded passport and customs-free passage to connect Azerbaijan with Nakhijevan via Armenia, otherwise vowing to continue the blockade of Armenia. He rejected the possibility of establishing the institute of guarantors for the future Armenia – Azerbaijan agreement and Armenia's offer to accept the Soviet Union Armed Forces General Staff 1975 maps as a base for future delimitation and demarcation. He demanded that either maps of 1918-1920 or the early Soviet period (1930-1940s) should be used, adding that after the 1940s, several thousand square km of Azerbaijani lands were transferred to Soviet Armenia, and the fate of these territories should be discussed during the delimitation and demarcation process. On January 13, 2024, Prime Minister Pashinyan mentioned that Aliyev’s statements were a severe blow to the peace process.
What if the Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement is not be signed in the foreseeable future? In that case, Armenia needs quick actions to raise its capacities and capabilities to deter potential new Azerbaijani attacks. It is a challenging task, as the military takeover of Nagorno Karabakh has put the Southern part of Armenia (Vayots Dzor and Syunik regions) in an extremely vulnerable situation. They are sandwiched between Azerbaijan proper and Nakhijevan Autonomous Republic, while the narrowest part dividing the two is around 25 km, and the widest part is only 42 km. Deterring Azerbaijan, which has the full support of Turkey, cannot be based only on military power, and it should also include the development of cooperation with external powers who have an interest in keeping Armenia within its current borders. In this context, the membership of Iran into the BRICS, and the "arrival of BRICS" to Armenia's doorstep is another opportunity for Armenia.
Within Armenia's renewed efforts to diversify its foreign and economic policy, India, UAE, and Saudi Arabia are among the top destinations. They are now members of the BRICS; all have complicated relations with Turkey, and are not interested in seeing the additional expansion of Turkish influence into the South Caucasus. The same applies to Iran, a new BRICS member, which, in the last three years, has sent multiple signals to Azerbaijan and Turkey that it would not tolerate the establishment of an extraterritorial corridor via Armenia to connect Azerbaijan with Nachcivan and Turkey. Then we have Russia, which, due to the war in Ukraine, needs Azerbaijan and Turkey for diversification of logistics, circumventing Western sanctions, and other reasons, but simultaneously, is not interested in seeing more Turkish influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. China is not an active player in the South Caucasus yet, but Beijing also has no interest in seeing more Turkish influence in Central Asia, including through the mechanisms of the Organization of Turkic states, and China and Russia are also BRICS members. Egypt has its problems with Turkey, stemming from Turkish support to the Muslim Brotherhood and longtime nonrecognition of President el-Sisi government. The restoration of diplomatic ties in the Summer of 2023 did not solve all problems, as was indicated by the postponement of the July 27, 2023 el-Sisi visit to Turkey. So, Russia, China, India, Iran, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, albeit for different reasons, are not interested in seeing Turkish dominance over the South Caucasus, and they are all BRICS members.
Armenia should carefully look into ways to expand its cooperation with BRICS member states, first of all in the economic area, inviting BRICS investments into the infrastructure and other projects in Armenia. Armenia is in active discussions with Iran, India, and UAE to bring their investments into Armenia, and there is potential to have Chinese involvement through the Belt and Road Initiative. The possibility of receiving funding from the BRICS New Development Bank for various projects, which can be implemented by BRICS member companies, should be studied, too. As the first step, the Armenian government should establish an interagency task force to develop and present in Autumn 2024 a concept for Armenia – BRICS cooperation. Another step should be organizing an international expert conference in Armenia (preferably in the Syunik region) on Armenia- BRICS cooperation in June or September 2024. Meanwhile, as a preparatory action, a webinar on this topic with the participation of think tanks from Iran, India, Russia, China, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt can be organized in April or May 2024. The participation of Georgian Think tanks in the webinar will add more value to the event.
After the loss of Nagorno Karabakh and continued policy of pressure and blackmail by Azerbaijan, Armenia faces tough years ahead. The establishment of multilateral cooperation with BRICS member countries and with the organization itself can be one of the effective ways to diversify Armenian foreign and economic policy, increase Armenian deterrence capacities and capabilities, and ensure stability and security in the South Caucasus.
