Month: October 2021

Iran emphasizes crucial significance of guaranteeing traffic via Goris-Kapan road

Jane Topchian

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 13:24, 25 September, 2021

YEREVAN, SEPTEMBER 25, ARMENPRESS. The need for guaranteeing traffic via the Kapan-Goris road and efforts for regulating transport shipments as a result of agreements on new demarcations in Syunik province have become of double importance for both Iran and Armenia, the Iranian embassy in Armenia said in response to an inquiry of ARMENPRESS, referring to the obstacles facing Iranian cargo truck drivers on the Kapan-Goris road caused by the Azerbaijani authorities in areas under their control, such as checkpoints and charging of duties.

The Iranian embassy added that clarifications made by Armenian government officials give great hopes around the swift development of the alternative bypass through Tatev, and that Iran is hopeful that in the nearest future they will witness the opening of a road with safe infrastructure. At the same time, the Iranian side expects that before the opening of the alternative road, traffic via the current road will resume normally.

ARMENPRESS – According to the official press release, on September 22 during a meeting with the Secretary of Security Council Armen Grigoryan, the Iranian Ambassador to Armenia H.E. Abbas Badakhshan Zohouri addressed the obstacles caused by Azerbaijan in the Kapan-Goris section of the interstate road, expressing concern over the problems around the use of infrastructures linking Iran with Armenia. What information can you convey over the course of actions in direction of resolving these problems and around the discussions over this issue with the Armenian and especially Azerbaijani sides? Does the Azerbaijani side continue to cause obstacles for Iranian motorists on the Kapan-Goris road?

Iranian Embassy – In the recent months, while communicating with relevant authorities of Armenia, the [Iranian] embassy tried to evaluate the unique condition of the Goris-Kapan road, the prospects of its exploitation and various sides related to the transit of goods and passengers from this and other possible roads. Undoubtedly, until the present phase of this road it was the main route of trade continuation and movement of citizens of the two countries. Nevertheless, as a result of the latest agreements on new demarcations in the Syunik province, the need to guarantee traffic and efforts for settling transport shipments have become of double importance for both the Islamic Republic of Iran and Armenia.

We believe that the security of Armenia’s land road, in addition to the positive effect it will have on the current communication, can present the stable picture of the region to the businessmen and investors of the two countries and the region and guide them to plan their economic activity and raise the level of mutual interactions. The security of this two-way road, in addition, can show Armenia’s reliable position for advancing major infrastructure projects in the region.

Undoubtedly, what was being proposed in the recent months as a goal – to unblock regional transportation communications, is again in this format, which is becoming actual.

ARMENPRESS – In your opinion, how can in principle the problem of the road linking Iran with Armenia be solved? Do you have any offered formula in this regard?

Iranian Embassy – During the latest meeting of the Iranian Ambassador and Mr. Armen Grigoryan the unique condition of the Goris-Kapan road and the unusual move implemented in direction of charging only Iranian cargo trucks with duties, and current programs and initiatives were discussed. The clarifications coming from Armenian government officials inspire great hopes around the swift development of the alternative route through Tatev, and we are hopeful that soon we will witness the opening of a road with safe infrastructure.

Certainly, the Islamic Republic of Iran expects that before the opening of the alternative road, the traffic via the current road will continue normally. These concerns have been communicated to Armenian government officials on various occasions. At the same time, this issue, besides proper attention and consultation of the Armenian government with its colleagues, requires also the efforts of other sides. Therefore, parallel to expressing Iran’s expectations to Armenian authorities, separate contacts are underway with other sides, including with Azerbaijani government officials.

ARMENPRESS – Do you see political subtexts in Azerbaijan’s actions given the recent Azerbaijani media reports saying that Iranians are conducting cargo shipments to Artsakh Republic?

Iranian Embassy – In the bilateral dimension, with the purpose of further advancing cooperation projects, an agreement was reached to hold a joint forum of economic cooperation between the two countries, which we are hopeful will be implemented soon. Fortunately, as part of the Dushanbe summit constructive negotiations of the two presidents took place, and there is a comprehensive program of joint cooperation.

 

Aram Sargsyan

Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan




Churches in a Siege: Armenians Alert about the Threat against Millennia-old Christian Sites

Emil Lazarian
Sept 27 2021

By Haykaram Nahapetyan

09/27/2021 Washington D.C. (International Christian Concern) – In the early morning of December 27th of 2020, about 1.5 months after the combats in Nagorno-Karabakh (historic Artsakh) ceased, a caravan of SUV cars left Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno Karabakh, embarking on a challenging trip to Dadivank monastery. An Armenian couple under the protection of Russia’s peacekeepers was planning marriage at this historical site, which Azerbaijani soldiers now surrounded.

A key Christian monastery of the area, Dadivank is also one of the most precious sites of early Christianity: the grave of St. Dadi, a disciple of St. Thaddeus is located here, according to existing information. If you have ever wondered why the traditional Armenian Church is called “Apostolic,” here is the reason: as Armenian chroniclers suggest, Christ’s two apostles, St. Thaddeus and St. Bartolomeo brought the emerging religion to Armenia shortly after the Crucifixion. One of them, disciple Dadi, was buried at Dadivank, where a church was built later.

“I wanted to marry at Dadivank,” said Aram Verdian when we sat down at one of Stepnakert’s main cafes for a brief interview. “I wanted to highlight that the Christian-Armenian traditions here did not cease to exist. A new marriage, a new family and, with God’s blessing, children to come – all these symbolize that the life in Artsakh continues.”

For background info: exactly one hundred years ago, the Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh (historically known as the Armenian region of Artsakh) and its millennia-old Christian heritage were handed over to Turkic Azerbaijan by Soviet dictator Stalin who back then was in charge of Nationality Affairs in the first Bolshevik government.

“Though we do not know the full extent of the reasons for the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Soviet Azerbaijan in the 1920s by Joseph Stalin, we are fairly certain that the decision was arbitrary, circumventing, or rather disregarding both the ethnoreligious background of region’s inhabitants and their popular will,” says Dr. Artyom Tonoyan, a research associate at the University of Minnesota’s Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies. Near the end of Soviet rule, in the late 1980s, the Armenians of NK attempted to withdraw from Soviet Azerbaijan and reunite with the neighboring Soviet Armenian Republic. Public rallies in NK were followed by massacres of Armenians in various settlements of Soviet Azerbaijan. After the USSR collapsed in 1991, the hostilities turned into full-scale war.

By 1993, the NK Armenians established control over the area of Dadivank and eventually attempted to rebuild the site. The somewhat slow-motion restoration advanced between 2015-2018 as the new road running beside the temple brought more tourists and pilgrims to the area. However, last year, on this day of September 27th, the Azerbaijani attack supported by Turkey and mercenaries from the Middle East resulted in the loss of Dadivank altogether with many other religious sites. Russia’s peacekeepers came to the area in November. Now it’s them protecting this precious temple, with a growing number of Azerbaijani troops deployed in the vicinity.

Aram Verdian says the last war highlighted how a coalition of radical forces can attack an isolated Christian community in the 21st century. “The support of the Christian world that we received was mainly limited to statements of goodwill. We largely remained by ourselves against mighty powers, including mercenaries and Turkey’s soldiers. Does this mean we are disappointed in our Christian faith? No. To me, the last war highlighted the importance of surviving in a siege,” Aram continued.

As it has been reported earlier, International Christian Concern dispatched a crew for a field study to Artsakh last May. They met locals, the authorities and released a report shortly after the return. ICC’s observations are in line with what Aram told me. “Quite often, we were met with wordless grief as residents struggled to understand why they were left alone in their hardships and how it is that they have come to be surrounded by Turkic nations (Azerbaijan and Turkey) who seek only their complete annihilation,” highlighted ICC’s fact-finding mission. Referring to Nagorno-Karabakh as “an isolated enclave of Christianity,” ICC identifies the Azerbaijani-Turkic current policy against Artsakh as a “continuation of the 1915 Armenian Genocide.”

According to ICC’s regional manager Claire Evans, Azerbaijan wants nothing less than the total destruction of the Armenian people, and “they are attempting to justify those actions by rewriting history (which means destroying Armenian heritage sites).”

“President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev does to the Christian heritage of Artsakh what Recep Erdogan did to Hagia Sophia temple in Turkey: they Islamize or distort the Christian heritage,” Bishop Vertanes, the religious leader of Artsakh, said when we met at the diocese center. He alerted me that the archive of the Church of Artsakh remained in the currently occupied historical town of Shushi. BBC highlighted that a church in the southern area was razed to the ground.

It is still unclear how many Christian sites were lost to Azerbaijanis due to the War: it depends on what you count as Christian sites. According to a database prepared by Armenian-American historian from Tufts University Christina Maranci, the number can go as high as 4041 if we count everything from churches to gravestones. Otherwise, as Artsakh’s religious and political authorities say, there have been 13 cathedrals, 22 churches, four chapels, over 500 crosstones. *

“We have reports that Armenian gravestones are used to construct a highway in the occupied area of Hadrut,” David Babayan, the Foreign Minister, stated. This is not the first time that they have destroyed our gravestones, the Minister added.

Babayan, a native of NK himself, refers to the tragic precedent of the medieval Armenian gravestones that the Azerbaijanis had destroyed in the Nakhichevan region. The United States Commission for the International Religious Freedom referred to this act of vandalism in its 2015 report. Babayan highlighted that Azerbaijan’s authorities impose a growing number of restrictions on Armenian pilgrims who want to visit Dadivank.

“In the first weeks following the end of the combats, almost 100 pilgrims were able to visit this site each week. Now the number is down by about ten times,” the Minister said.

Artsakh’s foreign ministry is trying to draw the attention of international organizations to the conditions of the Christian heritage in NKR. So does the Armenian Church, which organized a conference in Armenia earlier this month. Armenian American community and the Embassy of Armenia to the United States have been in touch with the Bible Museum of Washington, D.C. to arrange a virtual exhibit dedicated to the Christian Armenian heritage of Artsakh. Jeffrey Kloha, the chief curatorial officer of the Museum, set up an online exhibition, “Ancient Faith: The Churches of Nagorno-Karabakh,” to alert about the existing situation. “We are alerting about seven notable Christian sites in Karabakh that need to be preserved,” said Mr. Kloha when we communicated.

While this report was being prepared, new images depicting severe destructions of the Green Church of Shushi became available on public domains. A soldier, presumably related to Azerbaijani forces, is posing in front of a half-destroyed Christian monument. This area was fully renovated before the last attack took place.

_____

Haykaram Nahapetyan is the U.S. reporter for Armenia’s First channel. He is a Ph.D. student at Liberty University in Virginia.

*Characteristic of medieval and contemporary Armenian art, cross-stones or khachkars represent a carved stele bearing a cross, often with additional motifs and ornaments.

 

One year after the Karabakh war, politics in Azerbaijan has come to an end

Garnik Zakarian
Open Democracy
Sept 27 2021




With the Aliyev regime still triumphant one year on from its military takeover in Nagorno-Karabakh, chances for dialogue – whether over Karabakh or inside Azerbaijan – are non-existent

Bahruz Samadov
27 September 2021, 11.59am


One year has passed since the beginning of the war between Azerbaijan and the Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh, supported by Armenia. Already this description would cause dispute: Nagorno-Karabakh has never been accepted as a party to contend with in Azerbaijan. For many Armenians, there is only the Armenian community in Nagorno-Karabakh – while the suffering of Azerbaijanis from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas, who were forced to leave their homes during the first war, has been largely ignored.

Despite discontent over interpretation, a very real war took place last autumn, taking thousands of young souls to their graves. The winning side, Azerbaijan, confidently claims that the conflict is over (resolved through war) and that there is no such thing as Nagorno-Karabakh. In doing so, the Azerbaijani government not only rejects the existence of a separate region, but also any further dialogue over granting Nagorno-Karabakh some kind of autonomous status. Indeed, the Azerbaijani president, Ilham Aliyev, recently claimed that 25,000 ethnic Armenians live in Nagorno-Karabakh, while Armenia estimates that 120,000 Armenians currently live there. In either case, the Armenians living there do not see their future in Azerbaijan: there is nothing commonly shared for that to happen.

The contours of national identity in Azerbaijan have changed since the war: while the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions during the First Karabakh War in the 1990s was perceived as a national trauma, now there is a national narrative of victory. In June, a monument of an ‘iron fist’ – commemorating Azerbaijan’s military operation to retake Karabakh – was erected in the town of Hadrut, previously inhabited by Armenians. In April, a military trophy park opened in Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku, complete with the helmets of Armenian soldiers and dehumanising wax figures depicting them.

Azerbaijan has also made direct and indirect territorial claims to Armenia, namely to the southern Syunik province, which have been articulated in both official and political discourses. Rivalries also continue as Azerbaijan aims to control roads that lead to Nagorno-Karabakh. The post-war discourse of the Azerbaijani government does not seek dialogue. On the contrary, it pushes the Armenian government to accept the victor’s position and deny the existence of Nagorno-Karabakh as an actor.

To put it simply, there is nothing that would carry even a faint promise of reconciliation and co-existence. Victory has only deepened the antagonistic nature of Azerbaijani national identity.

The arrival of a Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh followed the Russia-brokered ceasefire on 10 November 2020. While the mandate of the peacekeeping mission is still unclear, its very presence should remind us of the region’s colonial past.

Once a part of Tsarist Russia, Azerbaijanis and Armenians fought previously, for example in 1905-07. Massacres took place in many cities of modern Azerbaijan, including the city of Shusha in Nagorno-Karabakh. Both communities were concerned with the aims of the Russian administration to privilege one group over the other. Battles took place again in 1918, in March and September respectively, in Baku and other regions of Azerbaijan. While March 1918 was more the result of an absence of any strong administration and the lack of representation of Muslim Azerbaijanis, the clashes in September 1918, when Armenians were the target, were provoked by the imperialist Islamic Army of the Caucasus of the moribund Ottoman Empire.

Neither before or after, communication with the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh simply does not exist in Azerbaijan – neither at the state level nor via civil society

A few years later, when the dust had settled after the revolutions in the South Caucasus, the Soviet authorities decided that Nagorno-Karabakh should live within the borders of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic as an autonomous region. When both countries were included in the Soviet Union, a new narrative of ‘togetherness’ began to emerge as part of the state socialist ideology. Authors, poets and musicians praised brotherhood between the two nations. Even when the hostilities started again in the late 1980s, popular singers from both sides continued to talk about ‘brotherhood’.

While the colonial nature of the Soviet Union can be discussed elsewhere, history shows that as soon as the Soviet administration weakened, old traumas and resentments were revealed: the Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh demanded unification with Armenia and ethnic Azerbaijanis were forced to leave their homes in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Similarly, after anti-Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan, Armenians no longer felt safe in Azerbaijan, which took the path of nationalism as an alternative to the dissolved Soviet ideology.

Now, after the war, the situation has not changed: Armenians would not feel safe in Azerbaijan, a country with a state ideology based on resentment and revenge. Hopes for a broader dialogue, which would include non-state actors, were destroyed after Aliyev’s authoritarian turn, which included not only internal repressions in 2013, but also a nationalistic turn.

One only has to look at the story of Ramil Safarov, an Azerbaijani army officer who murdered his Armenian counterpart, Gurgen Margaryan, during a NATO training in Budapest in 2004. When Safarov was extradited to Azerbaijan, after being sentenced to life imprisonment in Hungary, he was pardoned by President Aliyev and promoted to the rank of major. This increased Aliyev’s popularity and could be read as a nationalistic turn in the state ideology. This turn was needed to justify the increasingly authoritarian measures against the country’s opposition and civil society and changes in the constitution that now allow Aliyev to be re-elected more than twice.

It should not surprise anyone that Azerbaijan does not aim to integrate Nagorno-Karabakh. This process would require democratisation in Azerbaijan, the expansion of the public sphere and inclusive changes in national identity. Instead, the presence of the Russian peacekeeping mission is a consensus between the three sides: with all the colonial features, the mission at least guarantees the safety of ethnic Armenians. It could be argued that the end of war transformed the conflict from routine armed hostilities to an illiberal peace with colonial features. Neither before or after, communication with the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh simply does not exist in Azerbaijan – neither at the state level nor via civil society. The latter enthusiastically supported the 2020 war and has remained silent about war crimes committed by Azerbaijani forces and the fate of Armenian prisoners of war.

Hopes for the democratisation of Azerbaijan have also dissolved, and many activists are simply disillusioned. President Aliyev remains triumphant, the opposition is even more nationalistic, and it feels as if the notion of democracy itself has no power. If before the war there were sometimes more or less vibrant independent political activities, now any concerted political activity would be a failure: it is simply impossible. While the mainstream opposition either tries to devalue Aliyev’s victory or criticise the Russian peacekeeping mission, populist parties make Azerbaijan’s political culture only more toxic.

To put it simply: the war has effectively put the political process in Azerbaijan to an end.



Armenia, Azerbaijan mark one-year anniversary of war

Talar Tumanian
EurasiaNet.org
Sept 27 2021
Heydar Isayev, Ani Mejlumyan Sep 27, 2021
President Aliyev and his wife, First Vice President Mehriban Aliyeva, led a march of 3,000 soldiers in Baku to commemorate the dead. (president.az)

A year after the outbreak of war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the two countries commemorated those who were killed in the fighting.

On September 27, 2020, Azerbaijan launched an offensive aimed at retaking the territories it had lost in the first war with Armenia in the 1990s. In the 44 days of fighting that followed, an estimated 7,000 soldiers and civilians were killed and tens of thousands wounded. 

Azerbaijan managed to take back most of its lost territory, forcing thousands of ethnic Armenians to flee their homes. Meanwhile, the hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis who were themselves forced to flee in the first war have not yet been able to return to their former homes, though the Azerbaijani government has been quickly reconstructing some infrastructure in its retaken territories.

On the evening of September 26, thousands marched to Yerevan’s Yerablur military cemetery, carrying torches in commemoration of those who were killed. Another torchlight march was held the same evening in Stepanakert, the de facto capital of Nagorno-Karabakh. 

The Yerevan march was led by former president Robert Kocharyan and members of other opposition parties. "Today is a memorial march. With this march, we show that we do not accept defeat, we will stand up and continue the work of our heroes," said Ishkhan Saghatelyan, the deputy speaker of parliament for the Kocharyan-led Armenia Alliance. 

In a sign of the deep political grievances that continue to divide the country, even events like independence day celebrations or memorials to fallen soldiers cannot unite Armenians: Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan paid a separate visit to Yerablur the following morning.

(primeminister.am)

In both Armenia and Karabakh, a minute of silence was observed at 11 a.m.

Pashinyan also telephoned the de facto leader of Nagorno-Karabakh, Arayik Harutyunyan; Pashinyan’s office said the two men discussed ongoing efforts to “ensure the return of Armenian prisoners of war held in Azerbaijan to the homeland, the solution of security issues, as well as the ensuring normal life in Artsakh [an alternate Armenian name for Karabakh], the improvement of infrastructure and the construction of housing.”

On the morning of the anniversary, the Investigative Committee of Armenia announced an updated official number of deaths during the war: 3,781, including both soldiers and civilians. As of now, the whereabouts of 231 service members and 22 civilians are unknown. 

In Azerbaijan, a series of events marking the date took place that mixed the commemorative with the triumphal.

President Ilham Aliyev decreed that the anniversary would be marked annually as Memorial Day, devoted to the soldiers killed during the war. Azerbaijan has said that 2,907 of its soldiers were killed. 

Aliyev himself addressed the nation, going over well-worn territory of criticizing what he called Armenian “fascism,” celebrating the military victory and thanking Turkey for its assistance, along with a commemoration of the country’s war dead, whom he said had been avenged. 

Aliyev said that the foundation for a new war memorial and Museum of Victory would be laid that day. 

Aliyev and his wife, First Vice President Mehriban Aliyeva, attended a march of 3,000 soldiers in Baku to the site of the war memorial and museum. 

Azerbaijan also observed a minute of silence, at 12 o’clock.

In Shusha, the historic Karabakh city that was the single biggest prize of the war, a small military parade was held.

 

Ani Mejlumyan is a reporter based in Yerevan.

Heydar Isayev is a journalist from Baku.

 

​Why India needs to rediscover Armenia to counter Turkey and Pakistan

George Mamian
IANS (India) – MSN
Sept 27 2021

Why India needs to rediscover Armenia to counter Turkey and Pakistan

IANS

New Delhi, Sep 27: Recently the Republic of Armenia celebrated 30 years of independence. This year too, the Armenian College and Philanthropic Academy celebrated the bicentennial – a seminal moment not just for the academy, or for the Armenian community of Kolkata or India but for India-Armenia relations. These enjoy a natural edge given the centuries long history of interaction between our two peoples. At least since the 16th century AD, there is documented history of Armenians in India; undocumented history of interactions stretch back to before the Christian era.

Fast forward to the present. Prime Minister Narendra Modi met his Armenian counterpart Nikol Pashanian in New York in September 2019 on the side-lines of the UN General Assembly. "Had extensive deliberations with PM @NikolPashinyan. We talked about expanding India-Armenia cooperation in aspects relating to technology, pharmaceuticals and agro-based industries. PM Pashinyan also referred to the popularity of Indian movies, music and Yoga in Armenia," he had tweeted after the meeting.

This news gained currency because just days before that, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had stridently condemned India's reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir state. And Armenia, inimical to Turkey as it was because of the genocide of the Armenians by the Ottomans, became a popular word for a while. Then in March last year India won a $40 million defence deal to supply four indigenously-built military radars to Armenia. The equipment was developed by India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and manufactured by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL). This had also generated some excitement in India, and then was forgotten.

Then the war erupted in the South Caucasus between Armenia and Azerbaijan over disputed territories. Going into the history of the unfortunate enclave of Nagorno Karabakh will require a separate article. But Azerbaijan won the war purely because of Turkish support. As a result, Ankara gained a strategic foothold in the region.

While India officially kept equidistant from the parties to the conflict, most Indians batted for Armenia.

More recently External Affairs Minister Jaishankar met with his Armenian counterpart Ararat Mirzoyan in Dushanbe, on the side-lines of the SCO and CSTO meetings which were hosted in the Tajik capital. During that meeting, the two top diplomats agreed to take bilateral relations to a "qualitatively new level". And Armenia at the meeting once again expressed support for India's position on Jammu and Kashmir.

There is a case to be made for closer ties with Armenia. There is immense goodwill for Indians in the tiny Caucasian country. Tapping into it will produce long-term strategic benefits. For one, being as it is in Russia's strategic backyard, Armenia enjoys deep bilateral relations with Russia. It past of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, (CSTO) as well as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which is also headed by Moscow. Therefore, closer defence ties would be to the benefit of both countries.

At the ongoing UN General Assembly, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has once again raked up the Kashmir issue. Armenia, which has no diplomatic relations with Turkey, unequivocally backs India's position on Kashmir as it supports India's claims to a permanent UN Security Council seat.

Turkey is also now well ensconced in South Asia through its close cooperation with Pakistan mostly through defence deals even if Pakistan does more of the paying. But now, Armenia's arch-rival Azerbaijan is also injecting itself into South Asian politics. While Pakistan firmly supported Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia last year, with some credible reports of Pakistani fighters joining the war on the Azeri side, Azerbaijan has in recent times increased its partnership including in defence ties with Pakistan. Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan recently held two weeks long military drills 'Three Brothers – 2021' in Baku.

Most significantly, these drills followed a tripartite meeting in Islamabad in January this year of the foreign ministers of these three states and the adoption by the three states of the "Islamabad Declaration ''. And what did this declaration say? Amongst other things it said that all three states, i.e., Azerbaijan, Turkey and Pakistan back each other's position on Kashmir, Cyprus and Nagorno Karabakh.

The tripartite statement that was issued, "Reaffirmed the most recent OIC resolution 10/47-Pol on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute adopted in Niamey in November 2020 and Communiqués of OIC Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir and expressed deep concern over the unilateral actions of 5 August 2019, continuing grave human rights violations in and efforts to change the demographic structure of Jammu and Kashmir, and reiterated their principled position for a peaceful settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions…"

After Erdogan's tirade this year at the UN podium, Jaishankar met his Cypriot counterpart Nikos Christodoulides and tweeted "….Important that relevant UN Security Council resolutions in respect of Cyprus are adhered to by all", in an obvious reference to Turkey.

But mere tweeting is a knee-jerk reaction not becoming of an emerging power. India has been trying to cultivate ties with Greece, again spurred on by its strained relations with Turkey. Cultivating close relations with Armenia, including in defence, should therefore be a matter of course.

In this context it is significant that Armenia is part of the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and Indian ambassador in Tehran is on record saying that India plans "…. to connect the western part of Chabahar (port) and the Indian Ocean with Eurasia and Helsinki in Finland, through the territory of Armenia, creating a North-South Corridor" rather than through Azerbaijan.

This is why the virtual event to mark Chabahar Day earlier in March this year included, along with the traditional signatories of the Tripartite agreement – Iran and Afghanistan – Armenia too. India wishes to link up the INSTC to Chabahar Port which logistically makes a lot of sense for India's trade.

With the ascendancy of the Taliban in Afghanistan, a consolidation of Turkey's footprint in the region is a matter of time. For India it is time to follow up rhetoric with action. And aligning strategically with Armenia and getting a foothold in the Southern Caucasus would be a good way to start. Simultaneously, New Delhi may also consider recognising the Armenian genocide of 1915.

(Aditi Bhaduri is a columnist specialising in Eurasian geopolitics. Views expressed are personal. The content is being carried under an arrangement with )

–indianarrative

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/why-india-needs-to-rediscover-armenia-to-counter-turkey-and-pakistan/ar-AAORfkv

Trauma, stigma plague soldiers a year after Karabakh war

Samvel Nahapetian
France 24
Sept 27 2021

Baku (AFP)

Insomnia and nightmares, heart palpitations and aggression — one year after Asif Maharramov was sent to fight in a brutal conflict between two ex-Soviet rivals, he is struggling with lingering psychological injuries.

For six weeks last autumn, his country Azerbaijan fought neighbouring Armenia for control of the Nagorno-Karabakh contested region in a war that claimed 6,500 lives and exposed the Caucasus foes to deep societal traumas.

Maharramov, 20, is among thousands of veterans on both sides suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in patriarchal societies where seeking help for mental health can be taboo.

Armenia and Azerbaijan are working to expand access to psychological care for former servicemen, an effort that is gradually drawing out battled-hardened veterans overcoming fears of being seen as weak.

But the challenge of reaching everyone who needs help is huge.

"A year has passed since the war but the stress is still there," Maharramov told AFP, listing symptoms including a racing heart and sleeplessness.

"My temper worsened. When I hear someone saying something I don't like, I want to hit them. It's out of my control."

Health professionals in both countries lamented an underdeveloped culture of psychiatric treatment they said was hindering efforts to help PTSD-diagnosed veterans.

– Dreams of the dead –

"Only a quarter of war veterans agree to undergo treatment," said doctor Khachatur Gasparyan of the Intra psychological centre in the Armenian capital Yerevan.

"Society has to be taught there is nothing shameful in visiting a psychologist — that it's normal," he said.

In January, Azerbaijan set up psychological rehabilitation centres for veterans in all major cities.

"Since then the number of former soldiers seeking psychological treatment has kept growing," said psychologist Sabina Rashidova.

The centre in Azerbaijan's capital Baku has been seeing around 50 former soldiers each week, with rounds of treatment centring on psychotherapy and medication.

Her colleague Nargiz Huseynova said they routinely encounter "aggressiveness, insomnia, and apathy".

David Stepanyan narrowly escaped death on his first day fighting when an Azerbaijani shell blew up a car he had just got out of Karen MINASYAN AFP

Maharramov was among those to have received treatment.

Sent to the war days after clashes erupted on September 27 last year, he spent his first night under artillery fire.

His team managed to capture a strategic hilltop position, but Maharramov suffered a head injury and his captain was killed.

"We saw him laid on the ground and blood was flowing," recounted Maharramov.

He spent five months in a hospital being treated for the head injury and PTSD.

"I often see him in my dreams," Maharramov recounted of his captain. "I often see my fellow soldiers in my dreams. They are screaming, calling me."

The government in Armenia has launched a similar network of rehabilitative centres for veterans, former war prisoners, and families of the dead and missing.

Programme coordinator Andranik Hakobyan told AFP he hopes 10,000 people will benefit from the rehabilitative services, citing "shock, rejection, and guilt" as endemic problems.

Time was a factor, he added: "Without timely psychological help, they suffer from suicidal thoughts or become aggressive."

– 'No winners' in war –

"There are no winners or losers in war," he added. "Armenians and Azerbaijanis suffer equally from the war's aftermath. We all have a long road ahead towards psychological recovery."

David Stepanyan, who narrowly escaped death on his first day fighting when an Azerbaijani shell blew up a car he had just got out of, is still on that road.

The 21-year-old was wounded less than a month into the war and taken — unconscious — to a hospital, where doctors told him a sniper's bullet had pierced his flesh millimetres from his heart.

The bullet is still lodged in his chest and his entire body is scarred, but it's the psychological wound he struggles with most.

David Stepanyan, 21, was wounded less than a month into the war Karen MINASYAN AFP

For months, he said, he couldn't sleep well and fragments of memories from the war would encroach into his dreams and waking hours.

"I couldn't interact with family or friends and finally decided to get medical help," he told AFP.

"The worst memories from the war are the moments when you see your wounded friend nearby, but can't help him because of the enemy's heavy fire," he said.

But he said eight psychotherapy sessions had brought about some relief and that he now can sleep for as much as four hours a night.

Not everyone makes progress.

Maharramov, the Azerbaijani veteran, now works as a security guard at an oil facility outside Baku and feels his life lacks prospects.

"If I ever get married, there will be no music at my wedding party," he told AFP.

"I know people who will never marry because they died in a war."

© 2021 AFP

  

America Can Still Broker an Elusive Armenian-Azerbaijani Peace

Arpi Talalian
The National Interest
Sept 27 2021

One year after the war between Armenian and Azerbaijan, there is no peace and the potential for renewed conflict remains.

by Robert F. Cekuta

The ceasefire Russian president Vladimir Putin brokered between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in November 2020 may have stopped full-blown fighting between the two European states, but it has not stopped their militaries from crossing the border into each other’s territory. Furthermore, the agreement has not prevented their forces from firing on each other, nor has it alleviated any of the hatreds that grew during the decades Armenian-backed forces occupied Nagorno-Karabakh and neighboring chunks of Azerbaijani territory. Azerbaijanis point to the nearly complete destruction and depopulation of Agdam and other towns and cities in the areas Armenians occupied for decades; Armenia recently filed a complaint with the International Court of Justice charging Baku with government-sponsored programs “directed at individuals of Armenian ethnic or national origin” in violation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

The ceasefire agreement provided the basis to put Russia’s troops onto Azerbaijani territory and to increase Russia’s presence in Armenia. Yet continued hostilities and the lack of progress towards a lasting resolution also serve Russian interests. It is no secret that Russia uses, and even stimulates, conflicts within and between countries on its periphery to try to re-assert control over the states of the old Soviet Union, to discredit the United States, to degrade the rules-based international order, and to enhance its global status. As in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and elsewhere, Russia has used—and continues to use—the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia for its own ends.

Moreover, despite what U.S. leaders say about curbing Russian, Chinese, and Iranian ambitions, officials, academics, and members of the public in the region repeatedly state that the United States is needed, but sadly absent. Many in the region feel that they have no choice but to deal with Moscow.

This situation does not have to persist.

The United States has both the proven experience and capability to engage and help Armenia and Azerbaijan move towards peace, to help them improve their security and prosperity, and to show the strength and benefits of the international rules-based system Americans long fought to build and uphold.

There are a number of specific steps the United States can easily take. One is to engage in more visible diplomacy. While in-person visits by top-level U.S. officials would be ideal, virtual interactions and phone calls can yield excellent results, and given the realities of the Covid-19 pandemic, these forms of communication have become a widely accepted diplomatic norm. Such things seem mundane to an American audience, but phone conversations, as well as other engagements, between national leaders and senior Washington or Moscow officials are national news in many countries. In addition, more energetic U.S. public diplomacy flagging such high-level conversations would get the American message out to a wider audience. Furthermore, given the recent U.S. military pullout from Afghanistan, frequent, visible, and high-level contacts will re-assure the broader region as well.

Second, the United States should use its influence with both Baku and Yerevan to help build a climate in each country in which the publics will support actions their leaders agree to take for peace, prosperity, and lasting security. Decades of conflict, of inflammatory statements, and of outright hatred and fear of the other side mean sizable numbers of Armenians and Azerbaijanis do not know, let alone trust, each other. This limits both the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments’ abilities to move towards a peace agreement and eventual reconciliation. The United States should work with Armenia and Azerbaijan to establish people-to-people contacts to examine specific issues and to develop possible approaches to address them. As the experience in Northern Ireland and other conflicts shows, such Track II programs can pay important benefits.

Third, the United States should work with both Armenia and Azerbaijan to open new transportation and communication action links across the two countries and the South Caucasus. Such efforts will engender business opportunities, boost economic growth, and further the well-being of Armenians and Azerbaijanis. These transportation and communication links could be especially important for Armenia, which has isolated itself from Turkey as well as Azerbaijan due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. And these projects will also stimulate the broader Caucasus and Central Asia, serving as an answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Importantly, none of these actions by the United States would entail sizeable outlays of resources. They just require a bit of initiative and commitment.

And the payoffs will be significant. Actions the United States took this past spring support this point. Following a phone call by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, a visit by the then acting head of the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs and the U.S. Minsk Group co-chair helped broker an agreement for Azerbaijan to release a group of Armenian prisoners of war and for Armenia to provide Azerbaijan with maps showing where landmines were placed in the territory Armenia had occupied before Azerbaijan won it back in last year’s war. The action won appreciation by both Armenians and Azerbaijanis and was something Russia had been unable—or unwilling—to do.

As a top official from the region said recently, “If the United States wants to push back on the Russians and trim their sails, then it should help make peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.” What could be more in the American interest than that?

Robert F. Cekuta is a member of the advisory board of the Caspian Policy Center, an independent, nonprofit research think tank based in Washington DC. He was formerly U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan from 2015 to 2018, and previously principal deputy U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources, as well as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy, Sanctions, and Commodities.

Nagorno-Karabakh: A Year of U.S. Failure in the South Caucasus

Christine Harutyunian
The National Interest
Sept 27 2021


Azerbaijan and Turkey launched their assault on Nagorno-Karabakh to continue the Ottoman project of more than a century ago. Silence encourages them and others.

by Michael Rubin

One year ago today, the Azerbaijani army, backed by Turkish Special Forces and Syrian jihadis acting as Turkish mercenaries, launched a surprise attack on Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed territory which Armenia controlled since the end of the 1988-94 Nagorno-Karabakh War. While Azerbaijan justified its actions in the fact that the international community recognized the territory as Azerbaijani, the situation was more complex.

Legally, at least from Washington’s perspective, Azerbaijan’s case is not as cut-and-dry as its proponents claim. First, the United States continue to recognize the Republic of Armenia as an occupied nation after Joseph Stalin gerrymandered its borders and incorporated it into the Soviet Union. Also, when in 1991, Azerbaijan re-asserted its independence upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, its parliament did so based on the borders of the first independent Republic of Azerbaijan and not upon the territory of the subsequent Soviet-created Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Third, the population of the autonomous oblast voted to secede from Azerbaijani control, a move that was constitutionally valid.

The diplomatic case is as important. While Azerbaijani authorities never accepted Armenia’s control over Nagorno-Karabakh and several Azerbaijani districts that separated the territory from Armenia proper, Baku had committed as part of the Minsk Group process to resolve the territorial dispute diplomatically. While Azerbaijani diplomats might say the progress was going nowhere, that was a lie: There was broad consensus within the Minsk Group about the dispatch of peacekeepers, likely from disinterested Scandinavian countries, as well as the eventual Armenian return of occupied Azerbaijani districts as confidence grew. Regardless, the State Department had, six months before Azerbaijani dictator Ilham Aliyev ordered the assault, waived provisions of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act to enable U.S. assistance to flow to Azerbaijan. The basis of that waiver was Azerbaijan’s commitment to the diplomatic process.

That Azerbaijan surprised not only Armenians but also Americans remains an intelligence failure that both Congress and the broader U.S. intelligence community have so far failed to investigate. Nor can any honest analyst ignore the fact that the invasion coincided with the one-hundredth anniversary of the Ottoman invasion of independent Armenia against the backdrop of the Armenian genocide. This was not a coincidence but deliberate. Simply put, Azerbaijan and Turkey’s move constituted an opening salvo in what both countries’ leaders hoped would amount to an Armenian Genocide version 2.0.

In the aftermath of the invasion, the State Department under both Secretaries of State Mike Pompeo and then Antony Blinken recommitted the United States to diplomacy. Andrew Schofer, the Minsk Group’s American co-chair, returned to the region to try to jumpstart diplomacy.

Unfortunately, through no fault of Schofer’s, Blinken and President Joe Biden bungled it. Biden was right to recognize officially the Armenian Genocide. However, the following day, Blinken quietly waived Section 907 again, effectively rewarding Azerbaijan for its aggression. By both the letter and the spirit of the Freedom Support Act, Blinken’s move violated U.S. law, though Congress has been too distracted to hold him to account and force the waiver’s reversal. While National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Blinken may have thought an olive branch appropriate to keep Azerbaijan at the table, the net effect was to eviscerate any American leverage and to telegraph to Aliyev that the United States was weak.

A short survey of the past six months shows that far from returning to diplomacy, American passivity is enabling increased Azerbaijani aggression. On March 25, 2021, Azerbaijani soldiers threw stones at Armenian civilian cars on the Sarushen-Karmir Shuka road in Artsakh’s Askeran region. Three days later, Azerbaijani troops ambushed an Armenian vehicle transporting the bodies of Armenian soldiers killed in the forty-four-day war. On April 20, Azerbaijani forces fired at an Armenian home on Vagharshyan Street in the Stepanakert, the capital of Artsakh, the self-governing Armenian republic in Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite Azerbaijan’s diplomatic promises to respect religious freedom, on April 26, three Azerbaijani soldiers beat and dragged an Armenian pastor in Syunik’s Aravus village. Two days later, between eight and ten Azerbaijanis in civilian dress infiltrated the buffer zone between the two sides, before being chased off by Armenian forces. In effect, Azerbaijan’s constant probing and attempts at infiltration appear to take a page from North Korea’s playbook vis-à-vis South Korea.

In May 2021, such violations increased. Azerbaijan began a show trial for Lebanese Armenian Vicken Euljekjian, kidnapped by Azerbaijani forces after the November 9, 2020, ceasefire; he remains in prison. On May 12, 2021, Azerbaijani forces moved two miles into Armenian territory in the Syunik region to seize Sev Lich. Such unilateral “border adjustments” continued over subsequent days. On May 14, for example, Azerbaijani Armed Forces advanced another 300 to 400 meters toward Vardenis in Armenia proper. Azerbaijani forces have also continued to fire across the border at Armenian soldiers in Armenia’s Gegharkunik Province. A similar attack on Artsakh’s Sos village injured a civilian. The lack of any serious American diplomatic pushback simply caused Aliyev to become more aggressive. At around 9:10 pm on May 20, several Azerbaijani soldiers entered Armenia. Armenian soldiers intercepted and, in the resulting brawl, almost a dozen were injured. Less than a week later, Azerbaijani forces killed Armenian Sergeant Gevorg Y. Khurshudyan near the village of Verin Shorzha, in Armenia proper. Two days later, Azerbaijan kidnapped six Armenian soldiers doing engineering work near the Gegharkunik border. Once again, Aliyev appeared to take a page from the North Korean playbook. And, once again, Blinken was silent. Up to 1,000 Azerbaijani troops remain in Armenia proper, according to Artak Davtyan, Armenia’s chief of the General Staff.

In June, such aggression accelerated yet again. Azerbaijani soldiers, perhaps hungry as Azerbaijani officials embezzled military supplies, fired on shepherds in Armenia and stole their cattle. Armenian soldiers stopped another attempt to steal horses from a shepherd in Gegharkunik. Nor are Armenians the only victims. In June 2021, Azerbaijani soldiers threatened to execute Spanish journalists reporting from the Armenian side of the border and, the next month, Azerbaijani raids on livestock as well as sniping attacks—some fatal— and skirmishes continued across the Armenian border. As the Biden administration remained silent, Azerbaijan increased the severity of attacks. Small arms sniping evolved into the firing of mortars across the border, for example, and ceasefires proved fleeting. In August, Azerbaijani forces took a page from Islamic State actions in Iraq and Syria and began setting fire to Armenian crops and grassland.

Both the office of the Artsakh ombudsman and Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights have begun collecting evidence, documenting such attacks in earnest. Armenia’s Ministry of Defense also announces the deaths of its soldiers as they occur.

Perhaps the biggest Azerbaijani affront, however, is the continued holding and torture of Armenian prisoners of war (POW). While the State Department might make occasional calls for their return, Azerbaijani authorities dismiss these as readily as the Taliban does Blinken’s calls for diversity in the Taliban cabinet. After all, when Blinken waives sanctions on Azerbaijan to allow American funding to flow to Baku, why should Aliyev take American statements seriously? Nor can Biden or Blinken expect Russia or Turkey to take them seriously when Blinken does not demand that Russia publicize its peacekeeping and monitoring reports which, as a party to the Minsk Group, it is legally obliged to do. Nor has Biden yet to take substantive action against Turkey for its use of American components in the drones its uses to target not only Armenians but also Kurds and perhaps even Tigrayan Christians.

Biden and Blinken may not care about American prestige, but this is not the only thing at issue in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan and Turkey launched their assault on Nagorno-Karabakh to continue the Ottoman project of more than a century ago. Silence encourages them and others. The precedent of ethnic cleansing that they undertake—and the lack of any serious response to it—could destabilize areas far beyond the South Caucasus. So too is American silence regarding the Turkish and Azerbaijani use of Syrian jihadis, some with previous service in the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. It behooves Biden and Blinken to show that this is a red line. Nor does it make sense to reward Azerbaijan financially when it is no longer the stable, tolerant ally Washington once believed it to be, but rather does increasing business with both Russia and Iran. It is time to sanction Azerbaijan until Aliyev returns the last Armenian POW, pays compensation for his aggression, and holds accountable every Azerbaijani soldier on video torturing Armenians or destroying cultural heritage.

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.