Month: February 2021

Armenia files interstate complaint against Azerbaijan in ECHR

Alex Nanijanian
JAM News
Feb 3 2021
    JAMnews, Yerevan

The Armenian government filed an interstate complaint against Azerbaijan with the European Court of Human Rights on February 1, the Armenian representation to the court stated on its Facebook page.

Yerevan accuses Baku of violating a number of conventions during the second Karabakh war in the fall of 2020 and beyond.

  • Everything known about Armenian PoWs in Azerbaijan
  • A Precarious Peace for Karabakh

“The Armenian government claims that Azerbaijan violated the right to life, the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment, the right to freedom, the right to property, the right to private and family life, the right to education, as well as a number of other convention rights of the population of Artsakh and Armenia,” reads the message of Armenia’s representative to the ECHR Yeghishe Kirakosyan.

The complaint also touches upon issues of protecting the rights of prisoners of war, killed and wounded civilians, those who lost their property, as well as representatives of local and foreign media.

“This interstate complaint is a key step in the lawsuit against Azerbaijan on behalf of the state. In this regard, it is noteworthy that this complaint is the first interstate complaint submitted by the Republic of Armenia to the European Court of Human Rights,” the representative of Armenia to the ECHR emphasized.

Yeghishe Kirakosyan’s message says that evidence of the charges against Azerbaijan is attached to the statement.

The War Within: How Karabakh Conflict Continues To Haunt Those [Azeris] Who Witnessed It – OpEd

Anna Tamamian
EurasiaReview
Feb 3 2021
February 3, 2021February 3, 2021 Tale Heydarov* 0 Comments

By Tale Heydarov*

The Karabakh peace accord of 10 November 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia brought an end to a 30-year conflict that has cost almost 40,000 lives over this period. The world now watches on as the region tries to rebuild, recover, and reconcile. One struggle, however, is seldom talked about or reported on – the psychological fallout of war, particularly for those on the frontline. Both soldiers and civilians will be beset by mental health problems as a result of the fighting. Indeed, it is estimated that between 20-30% of military veterans experience Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). In Azerbaijan, the recently formed YASHAT Foundation was established to support war veterans and their families financially, signifying the importance attached to care for veterans. 

Azerbaijan has also established a commission chaired by the Minister of Health to provide psychological support to servicemen and their families affected by the Karabakh conflict. The Labour and Social Protection Ministry is also assisting veterans by implementing plans to provide war veterans with housing between 2021-2025. The State Social Protection Fund has already paid out social welfare payments to over 7000 family members of the near 2800 Azerbaijani martyrs killed in the conflict, while also increasing the pension pot for affected families. The Ministry of Emergency Situations is also playing its part having invited 20 specialist Turkish doctors to help treat hundreds of veterans suffering from PTSD. These measures are indicative of the importance and understanding attached to the issue of PTSD and care for veterans in the country. 

PTSD often arises from experiencing or witnessing intensely threatening or stressful events. The symptoms range from anxiety and depression to insomnia, nightmares, and anger, yet sufferers are seldom aware of their diagnosis. Most go untreated. In Azerbaijan, this is a relatively newly understood phenomenon. Across Europe however, there are numerous charities, like ‘Combat Stress’ in the UK, operating a 24/7 helpline offering confidential mental health advice to veterans and their families. In the United States, the PTSD Foundation of America also provides support to veterans suffering from associated issues. The governments of both countries invest a considerable amount of money in assisting veterans returning from the frontline. Yet some remain mentally ‘left behind’ on the battlefield. 

Bolstering capacity, investment and the number of experts specially qualified to deal with such mental trauma and therapies is to be roundly welcomed. The more fundamental problem, however, is that mental illness the world over is often stigmatised, further impacting and scarring those suffering from said issues. Veterans, returning from the extreme conditions of war are often severely impacted by such stigma. Some of them not only have to deal with readjusting to their old lives but also suffer in silence while dealing with PTSD. Due to a lack of awareness and the stigma attached to mental health, we fail in our moral duty to take care of these individuals who have risked their lives for our safety, wellbeing, and homeland. 

A sense of awareness begins with understanding that PTSD is common amongst soldiers. Studies indicate that as many as 20-30% of US troops returning from Iraq and Afghanistan suffered from psychological illness. Despite high levels of psychological trauma, many veterans are ashamed to turn to their loved ones for help. An Azerbaijani veteran, Qasim, who fought in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s, described how his family and friends questioned his bravery, fortitude, and manliness when he told them about his suffering. Qasim and countless other veterans, often turn to alcohol to numb the pain. Rather than reducing veterans to self-medicating in silence, we need to address and confront these issues. Effective medical treatment and an open discussion will help both soldiers and societies heal faster from the horrors of war. 

Military conflict also exacts a heavy toll on civilians. In 2019, WHO found that one in five people in war zones suffer from mental health conditions. Those living in the borderlands of Karabakh, having experienced fighting over many decades, could be, if not definitely will be, significantly impacted. Psychiatrists have coined a medical term to describe the rapid increase in stress-related mental and psychical illnesses that followed the war’s immediate aftermath in the 1990s – ‘Karabakh syndrome’. An entire generation has known nothing but war in the mountains of Azerbaijan, with many who suffer from PTSD having contracted the condition after the first 1994 ceasefire and bearing witness to years of short and sharp fighting between the two sides on the line of contact. Their one solace being that Karabakh is for the first time in over thirty years free from Armenian occupation and rightly restored to Azerbaijani control in accordance with international law. 

Psychological war injuries should be approached with the same respect and urgency as we do for those who have suffered the physical horrors of conflict. Everyone deals with stress and trauma differently, but we should not underestimate the seriousness of this predicament. Azerbaijan is a small country. Most of our citizens will know someone affected by the war or injured or killed in battle. Only through time and openly talking about these experiences will we be able to truly overcome it. We need to begin by liaising with international health organisations so our doctors can receive the training and expertise they need from abroad. We also need to create and widely support social awareness programs that highlight the importance of mental health and the tragic consequences if we do not heed or spot the tale-tell signs of desperation and trauma. 

Journalists also have a critical role to play in raising awareness of this important issue. Our mental health staff should receive the best possible training to be able to deal with the challenge of PTSD. Additionally, we must focus on dealing with this issue before the trauma associated with the war becomes a more entrenched disorder. Medicine alone will not remedy this issue. Every sufferer needs an individually tailored approach to tackle the elements of PTSD that they are dealing with – there isn’t a ‘one size fits all’ approach. People suffering from PTSD in Azerbaijan should call the 112 hotline to reach the expert help and advice they need. Additionally, in the spirit of international collaboration, countries with more significant expertise in dealing with such matters should assist those with little or no experience. Only by understanding this silent phenomenon fully can we create stable communities and societies and a sense of durable peace in the South-Caucasus. 

*Mr Tale Heydarov is the Chairman of Gilan Holding, Founder of the European Azerbaijan School, Azerbaijan Teachers Development Centre, Libraff bookstores network, TEAS Publishing House, and until recently served as the President of Gabala FC football club (Azerbaijan Premier League) and Gabala Sports Club.

Azerbaijan won the war in Nagorno-Karabakh but reduced its sovereignty

Vanyan Gary
Greek City Times
Feb 3 2021



by Paul Antonopoulos

Azerbaijan Won The War In Nagorno-Karabakh But Reduced Its Sovereignty – Greek City Times

Although Azerbaijan won the war against Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh, both countries have in fact lost part of their sovereignty.

Azerbaijan won the war and expanded territorially after it captured or received the districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh proper that Armenian forces captured in the first war (1988-1994). The status of Nagorno-Karabakh proper remains undetermined but is protected by Russian peacekeepers and is still governed by Armenians.

Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Despite this territorial expansion, Azerbaijan has in fact partly lost its sovereignty. During the war, reports began emerging that Azerbaijani military leaders were becoming increasingly frustrated with the level of control that Turkey had over their fighting forces. These reports were quickly dismissed and denied by Azerbaijan as Armenian attempts to create division through misinformation. But if this was just misinformation, then there would be no risk of division to begin with, meaning it would not be worth giving attention to, suggesting there was certainly an element of truth to it.

Azerbaijan’s military success lays with two key factors: the Armenian political and military incompetency and lack of will, and Turkey’s contribution with drones, special forces, intelligence and transfer of Syrian jihadists.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan never truly committed to the war effort as Armenian forces were never fully mobilized, powerful Iskander missiles infrequently used, the Armenian Air Force mostly grounded, Armenian diaspora and foreign volunteers rejected from fighting, and local Armenian militias not equipped with enough ammunition, maps and communication devices, nor were the militias assigned commanders – yet this was supposedly a “war for survival,” as Pashinyan termed it.

None-the-less, despite the incompetency of the Armenian leadership, Azerbaijan’s rapid success in Nagorno-Karabakh would not have been possible without significant Turkish support. Even Azerbaijan’s success is limited as it did not achieve its main war aim – the capture of Nagorno-Karabakh.

More importantly, Ankara’s footprint in the country massively expanded through the deployment of more Turkish troops to Azerbaijan, control of more military bases, and the establishment of a joint observation center with Russia in the Agdam region.

As said, reports circulated during the war that divisions in the Azerbaijani military and political circles were emerging between a pro-Turkish faction and another faction in opposition to Turkey’s dominant role in the war effort. These reports have only intensified in recent days as Turkish troops are now deployed in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani politicians and military leaders are beginning to worry about Ankara’s strong influence in the country, with critics commenting that Azerbaijan has become the 82nd province of Turkey. Although Azerbaijan now controls most of the formerly Armenian-held territory, it cannot exercise control over it without Turkish and Russian oversight.

In fact, even Iran has greater opportunities to influence Azerbaijan that it was not able to do before the war. Azerbaijan’s capture of the districts to the south of Nagorno-Karabakh proper means that it shares external borders with only Armenia and Iran. Effectively Iran has great opportunities to be one of the leading foreign investors in the region as Armenia and Azerbaijan have not normalized their relations. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif visited the Nakhichevan exclave of Azerbaijan, the region wedged between Armenia, Turkey and Iran, to boost regional cooperation through new railroad and transportation routes.

In turn, it will be inevitable that Iran will attempt to gain influence through pan-Shi’ism, but this may prove difficult to gain a foothold as pan-Turkism has become the dominant ideology of Azerbaijan because of Turkey’s own soft power manoeuvers. Russia will utilize its influence through its peacekeepers in the region, and also soft power through economic exchanges.

Although Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev will relish his country’s long-awaited victory after his father Heydar Aliyev signed a humiliating ceasefire in May 1994 to conclude the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, the long-term repercussion means that Turkey dominates the Azerbaijani military and wields great political influence over Baku. Also, there is limited Azerbaijani governance in the territories it controls because of Russia’s watchful eye through the deployment of peacekeepers. And finally, we can see much stronger Iranian influence as it aims to penetrate the region through economic and religious means.

Azerbaijani flags may be flying over the captured territories, but it certainly has come at the price of reduced sovereignty – militarily, economically, politically, and perhaps even religiously and culturally.

Source: InfoBrics



Turkey, Azerbaijan hold joint military drills next to Armenian border

Janet Ekmekjian
AHVAL News
Feb 3 2021

  • Feb 03 2021 01:43 Gmt+3
  • Last Updated On: Feb 03 2021 01:48 Gmt+3

Turkey and Azerbaijan are holding joint military exercises this week in Turkey’s eastern province of Kars, bordering Armenia.

The Turkish Defence Ministry posted a video on its Twitter account displaying two combat helicopters hovering around a Turkish flag flying above the castle of Kars city.

The military drills, set to last until Feb.12, will enhance cooperation and coordination of joint operations and assess the capabilities of Turkish and Azeri units’ in harsh winter conditions, the state-run Anadolu reported two weeks ago.

Turkey and Azerbaijan held joint military exercises in the Azeri capital of Bakü and in the country’s Nakhchivan region in August. It preceded an armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which began in September. A Russia-brokered truce in November ended the fighting.

A joint Russian-Turkish ceasefire monitoring station has begun operating in Aghdam in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Turkish Defence Ministry announced on Saturday. Aghdam was handed over to Azerbaijan by Armenia on Nov.20 as a condition of the truce.  

Did the Armenia-Azerbaijan War Weaken Iran?

Edgar Tavakalian
Algemeiner
Feb 3 2021

In the wake of the Second Karabakh War, Iran now finds itself facing Turkey’s growing influence north of its border. Ankara gained a corridor through Armenian territory, potentially anchoring itself in the Caspian region. This will represent a major challenge for Iran, which (together with Russia) has viewed the Caspian region as within its sphere of influence.

Despite troublesome ties, Azerbaijan has served Iran as a transit country for the north-south transport corridor stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Baltic Sea. Increased Turkish economic influence, to say nothing of its enhanced military influence, will limit Iran’s ability to build closer ties with Baku.

Iran’s dilemma is also complicated by its wide-ranging interest in keeping good bilateral ties with Turkey. Ankara’s relationship with Tehran is complex and marked by periods of both collaboration and conflict over the Kurdish issue and in Syria.

In a way, the conclusion of the Karabakh war signals some positive trends for Tehran. The West failed to provide a diversified foreign policy toward the region, which allows an adaptation to the changing circumstances on the ground. The Western political retreat from the region suits Iran’s vision — but it also propels Turkey and Russia to fill the vacuum, which does not correspond to Iranian interests. Indeed, Ankara’s recent proposal to create a six-nation pact involving the South Caucasus states plus Russia, Turkey, and Iran is a sign of changing geopolitical trends that will not necessarily work in the Islamic regime’s favor.

Iran’s unfavorable position was clearly visible on the diplomatic front. During the war, Seyed Abbas Araghchi, the regime’s deputy foreign minister for political affairs, toured Baku, Moscow, Yerevan, and Ankara to help end the war. On November 4, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stressed Iran’s support for the Araghchi peace plan, but with little result. Neither the belligerents nor Turkey or Russia expressed any interest in the plan.

The war also disrupted the equilibrium Tehran has been trying to uphold since the 1990s. The fear of a strong Azerbaijan and a weakened Armenia has been at the heart of Iran’s geopolitical vision — but the existing balance of power was no longer tenable, because the geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus is no longer what it was at the time of the 1994 ceasefire. Turkish military and economic involvement in Azerbaijan has tipped the balance. Azerbaijan’s economic power, propelled by oil and gas revenues, also contributed to the changes. The status quo around Karabakh could no longer be sustained. The question for Iran was what could be done to secure its position.

In fact, Iran could do little to prevent the growth of Turkish influence. To keep Turkey at bay in the long run, Moscow (whose position largely dovetails with that of Ankara) and Tehran had to make sure Azerbaijan was rewarded for its military success with the return of lost territory. This could explain Iran’s changing rhetoric during the war. Over the course of the six weeks, Tehran sent four official representatives of the Supreme Leader to visit the north and stress that “Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan,” and that Baku has every right under Islamic law to seek to liberate occupied territory. On November 3, Khamenei said, “Azerbaijani lands occupied by Armenia should be liberated and returned to Azerbaijan.”

Beyond the Turkish factor, there is also the Russian factor. Some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers are now stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh. Their presence some 100 km from the Iranian border is another source of tension for Tehran, which will have to devote time, resources, and perhaps even troops to adjust to the new geopolitical reality.

This could mean a gradual elevation of the South Caucasus in Iranian foreign policy to almost the same level as other theaters, like, for instance, the Middle East. Iran’s policies toward the South Caucasus have been based more on geopolitical interests than on the ideological principles and rhetoric that permeate the Iranian leadership’s policies toward most of the Middle East. At times, a pragmatic realpolitik was mixed with elements of ideology, historical experience, and balance-of-power calculations, but overall this made the region less important for Iran’s calculus than other theaters of geopolitical tension.

It is still unclear what Azerbaijan’s victory will mean for Iran’s Azerbaijani minority. Complications for Tehran might ensue as ethnic Azerbaijanis living in Iran are emboldened in their own nationalistic aspirations. The problematic ethnic situation was on display during the recent visit by Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Baku, which prompted Tehran to accuse Ankara of purposefully interfering in Iran’s internal affairs. (With that said, the potential threat of ethnic troubles is at times overstated by analysts. Pan-Turkic [pan-Azerbaijani] sentiments among the Azerbaijanis of Iran are effectively dealt with by the regime.)

A much larger potential problem for Iran is that Azerbaijan could be used as a jumping-off point for foreign powers to project influence into northern Iran. Beyond Turkey, Azerbaijan’s relations with the US have been of concern to Iran since before the 2020 war. Though Washington often criticizes Baku, the two countries’ interests converge on a number of issues. They work together to promote European energy security, expand trade and investment, and combat terrorism and transnational threats. Mercenaries from the American company Blackwater (now called Academi) trained Azerbaijan’s marines, and the US supplied vessels for the Azerbaijan navy.

A bigger fear for Tehran is the potential growth of Israeli influence — perhaps even a clandestine Israeli presence in Azerbaijan, as some Western media sources have claimed. The Karabakh war showed how dependent Baku is on Israeli technology. In many ways this support was critical to its victory. Azerbaijan-Israel relations have advanced to such a level that reports have emerged about Baku trying to mediate tensions between Turkey and Israel. Baku and Jerusalem also share energy interests, and their mutual concerns about Iran are a powerful incentive. But it is unlikely that Baku will openly challenge Tehran’s interests. Clever diplomacy will be needed to navigate among Turkish, Israeli, and Iranian interests.

Iran is facing a new and different geopolitical configuration in the South Caucasus. It was left out of the negotiation process, and is witnessing a disruption of the balance of power in which Azerbaijan is much stronger and Armenia much weaker. Russia and Turkey managed to advance their military interests, and Iran now has to change its traditional calculus toward the region.

A large resource base will be needed if Iran is to halt the diminishment of its position and compete against the might of Russia, Turkey, and second-tier powers such as Israel. The prospects are not especially bright, as the Islamic Republic’s efforts to assert soft and economic power have often alienated the three South Caucasus states.

Emil Avdaliani teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi State University and Ilia State University. He has worked for various international consulting companies and currently publishes articles on military and political developments across the former Soviet space.

A version of this article was originally published by the BESA Center.

After the Karabakh War, Iran Faces Stiff Competition in the Caucasus

Ara Felekian
The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
Feb 1 2021
By Emil Avdaliani February 1, 2021
Iranian Deputy FM Seyed Abbas Araghchi presents Iran peace plan for Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan, image by Press Office of Government of Armenia via Twitter @araghchi

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,910 February 1, 2021

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The Second Karabakh War changed the geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus. Much has been written on Russia’s and Turkey’s gains, but Iran’s diminished position has gotten less attention. Though not involved in the military operations, Iran saw a steep decline in its geopolitical fortunes in the region as a result of the war.

In the wake of the Second Karabakh War, Iran now finds itself facing Turkey’s growing influence north of its border. Ankara gained a corridor through Armenian territory, potentially anchoring itself in the Caspian region. This will represent a major challenge for Iran, which (together with Russia) has viewed the Caspian region as within its sphere of influence.

Despite troublesome ties, Azerbaijan has served Iran as a transit country for the north-south transport corridor stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Baltic Sea. Increased Turkish economic influence, to say nothing of its enhanced military influence, will limit Iran’s ability to build closer ties with Baku.

Iran’s dilemma is also complicated by its wide-ranging interest in keeping good bilateral ties with Turkey. Ankara’s relationship with Tehran is complex and marked by periods of both collaboration and conflict over the Kurdish issue and in Syria.

In a way, the conclusion of the Karabakh war signals some positive trends for Tehran. The West failed to provide a diversified foreign policy toward the region, which allows an adaptation to the changing circumstances on the ground. The Western political retreat from the region suits Iran’s vision—but it also propels Turkey and Russia to fill the vacuum, which does not correspond to Iranian interests. Indeed, Ankara’s recent proposal to create a six-nation pact involving the South Caucasus states plus Russia, Turkey, and Iran is a sign of changing geopolitical trends that will not necessarily work in the Islamic regime’s favor.

Iran’s unfavorable position was clearly visible on the diplomatic front. During the war, Seyed Abbas Araghchi, the regime’s deputy FM for political affairs, toured Baku, Moscow, Yerevan, and Ankara to help end the war. On November 4, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stressed Iran’s support for the Araghchi peace plan, but with little result. Neither the belligerents nor Turkey or Russia expressed any interest in the plan.

The war also disrupted the equilibrium Tehran has been trying to uphold since the 1990s. The fear of a strong Azerbaijan and a weakened Armenia has been at the heart of Iran’s geopolitical vision—but the existing balance of power was no longer tenable, because the geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus is no longer what it was at the time of the 1994 ceasefire. Turkish military and economic involvement in Azerbaijan has tipped the balance. Azerbaijan’s economic power, propelled by oil and gas revenues, also contributed to the changes. The status quo around Karabakh could no longer be sustained. The question for Iran was what could be done to secure its position.

In fact, Iran could do little to prevent the growth of Turkish influence. To keep Turkey at bay in the long run, Moscow (whose position largely dovetails with that of Ankara) and Tehran had to make sure Azerbaijan was rewarded for its military success with the return of lost territory. This could explain Iran’s changing rhetoric during the war. Over the course of the six weeks, Tehran sent four official representatives of the Supreme Leader to visit the north and stress that “Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan,” and that Baku has every right under Islamic law to seek to liberate occupied territory. On November 3, Khamenei said, “Azerbaijani lands occupied by Armenia should be liberated and returned to Azerbaijan.”

Beyond the Turkish factor, there is also the Russian factor. Some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers are now stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh. Their presence some 100 km from the Iranian border is another source of tension for Tehran, which will have to devote time, resources, and perhaps even troops to adjust to the new geopolitical reality.

This could mean a gradual elevation of the South Caucasus in Iranian foreign policy to almost the same level as other theaters, like, for instance, the Middle East. Iran’s policies toward the South Caucasus have been based more on geopolitical interests than on the ideological principles and rhetoric that permeate the Iranian leadership’s policies toward most of the Middle East. At times, a pragmatic realpolitik was mixed with elements of ideology, historical experience, and balance-of-power calculations, but overall this made the region less important for Iran’s calculus than other theaters of geopolitical tension.

It is still unclear what Azerbaijan’s victory will mean for Iran’s Azerbaijani minority. Complications for Tehran might ensue as ethnic Azerbaijanis living in Iran could be emboldened in their own nationalistic aspirations. The problematic ethnic situation was on display during the recent visit by Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Baku, which prompted Tehran to accuse Ankara of purposefully interfering in Iran’s internal affairs. (With that said, the potential threat of ethnic troubles is at times overstated by analysts. Pan-Turkic [pan-Azerbaijani] sentiments among the Azerbaijanis of Iran are effectively dealt with by the regime.)

A much larger potential problem for Iran is that Azerbaijan could be used as a jumping-off point for foreign powers to project influence into northern Iran. Beyond Turkey, Azerbaijan’s relations with the US have been of concern to Iran since before the 2020 war. Though Washington often criticizes Baku, the two countries’ interests converge on a number of issues. They work together to promote European energy security, expand trade and investment, and combat terrorism and transnational threats. Mercenaries from the American company Blackwater (now called Academi) trained Azerbaijan’s marines, and the US supplied vessels for the Azerbaijan navy.

A bigger fear for Tehran is the potential growth of Israeli influence—perhaps even a clandestine Israeli presence in Azerbaijan, as some western media sources have claimed. The Karabakh war showed how dependent Baku is on Israeli technology. In many ways this support was critical to its victory. Azerbaijan-Israel relations have advanced to such a level that reports have emerged about Baku trying to mediate tensions between Turkey and Israel. Baku and Jerusalem also share energy interests, and their mutual concerns about Iran are a powerful incentive. But it is unlikely that Baku will openly challenge Tehran’s interests. Clever diplomacy will be needed to navigate among Turkish, Israeli, and Iranian interests.

Iran is facing a new and different geopolitical configuration in the South Caucasus. It was left out of the negotiation process, and is witnessing a disruption of the balance of power in which Azerbaijan is much stronger and Armenia much weaker. Russia and Turkey managed to advance their military interests, and Iran now has to change its traditional calculus toward the region.

A large resource base will be needed if Iran is to halt the diminishment of its position and compete against the might of Russia, Turkey, and second-tier powers such as Israel. The prospects are not especially bright, as the Islamic Republic’s efforts to assert soft and economic power have often alienated the three South Caucasus states.

View PDF

Emil Avdaliani teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi State University and Ilia State University. He has worked for various international consulting companies and currently publishes articles on military and political developments across the former Soviet space.

https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/caucasus-iran-influence/

All Azerbaijani Captives Returned Under Karabakh Deal, While Some Armenian Captives Still Await Return

Garik Boshkezenian
The Organization for World Peace
Feb 3 2021
February 3, 2021  in Current Events by Chloe Jackson (updated on February 3, 2021)

As of January 18th, 2021, Armenia has returned all Azerbaijani prisoners from the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The six-week struggle last year ended with a ceasefire agreement initiated by Russia, says Reuters. An end to the violence required both Azerbaijani and Armenian forces to exchange all prisoners. However, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov reports that progress has stalled on the return of Armenian prisoners. Armenia claims many of its prisoners remain in Azerbaijan well after the 2020 conflict ended. Lavrov clarified that the reason Armenian prisoners have yet to be returned is due to lack of communication between the two sides and Armenia’s failure to produce a list of prisoner’s names in a timely manner. Deputy Prime Minister Tigran Avinyan announced the return of four Armenian captives on December 28th, 2020 through mediation by the International Committee of the Red Cross of the Russian Federation, but many still await their release. Russian peacekeepers in the Nagorno-Karabakh region are working to uncover the location of remaining Armenian prisoners and ensure their safe return. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, an effort established in 1994 to resolve the land dispute, is aware of the Armenian prisoners that remain in unlawful captivity.

The sluggish exchange of prisoners reflects the inefficacy of previous ceasefires. The peace agreement in November 2020 “leaves many key aspects of the simmering conflict unresolved,” says the Washington Post. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan labels the agreement as “incredibly painful both for me and for our people.” The November truce was a triumph for Azerbaijan but caused outrage and protests against Prime Minister Pashinyan in Armenia. According to the Washington Post’s recount of a January 11th meeting with Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, the Russian-brokered deal also worked out the reopening of transport routes in the region. Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey shut their borders to Armenia at the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and land-locked Armenia will now supposedly be able to improve their economy with reopened borders. The new border policies will likely contribute to resolving the issue of Armenian prisoners that remain in Azerbaijani captivity. Russian President Vladimir Putin argues “the implementation of those agreements will benefit both the Armenian and Azerbaijani people and the entire region” and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev agrees, stating “it opens completely new perspectives that we couldn’t even imagine in the past.” Prime Minister Pashinyan disputed these claims by maintaining that the region’s status is unclear, but also recognized the reinstated transit routes.

Productive dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan must continue to reach peace in the long-standing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Both sides struggle with communication, a crucial element in negotiating disagreements in the region. To arrive at a permanent solution to the violent outbreaks, both sides must agree upon a resolution that ends the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for good.

Conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region has persisted for several decades. During the 20th century, fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan was kept in check under Bolshevik rule. However, as the Soviet Union began to dissolve, the autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh region declared independence and war between Armenia and Azerbaijan erupted soon after. As stated by the Council on Foreign Relations, fighting over the region spanned from 1988 to 1994, resulting in 30,000 casualties and hundreds of thousands of refugees. In 1994, Russia brokered a ceasefire that remains in place. Though Nagorno-Karabakh has been classified a frozen conflict since 1994, breaches of the peace agreement have occurred in recent years. The most intense fighting since the ceasefire broke out in early April 2016, effecting dozens of deaths and over 300 casualties. Following four days of violence, the two sides consented to a revised ceasefire agreement.

Tensions heightened again in July 2020, and fighting then escalated in late September 2020, resulting in deaths of over 1,000 soldiers and civilians. The United Nations, United States and Russia encouraged new peace agreements in light of the violence, but both parties rejected such advice and continued to fight. The struggle intensified when Azerbaijani and Armenian forces transitioned from cross-border shelling to heavy weaponry, including long-range artillery. As of October 2020, several new ceasefires have been negotiated via communication with France, Russia and the United States. Infringements of the truce continue as fighting persists in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. While both opposing sides accuse each other of breaking the ceasefire, Russian peacekeepers argue the arrangement is working thus far.

The exchange of Azerbaijani and Armenian captives is a step toward peace in the region. However, future relations between the two sides remain uncertain. Putin deems the November 2020 peace deal as a “necessary basis for a long-term and full-format settlement of the old conflict,” says the Washington Post. While mediators like Putin are optimistic about relations in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, current resolutions may not bring an end to struggles between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

  • Author
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Chloe Jackson
Chloe has been involved with the OWP since 2020 and is currently working as a Correspondent reporting on world peace issues. Chloe is interested in global human rights debates and inequalities among marginalized groups. She believes that progressive solutions to conflicts regarding world peace are possible through dedication and collaboration.

Karabakh Is Settled, Who Is Next? No Peace In Sight For The Donbass.

Liana Toganian
The Organization for World Peace
Feb 3 2021
February 3, 2021  in Current Events / Europe / Russia / Ukraine / Ukraine War by Luca Giulini (updated on February 2, 2021)

On December 12, despite the ceasefire formally in force since July, Ukrainian mortars and grenade launchers hit several areas in the Eastern formerly autonomous regions of Donetsk (RPD) and Lugansk (RPL), including Jakovlevka, Spartak, and Trudovskaja. Two militiamen of the RPD were also killed in the village of Leninskoe by the 36th Marine Infantry Brigade. As signalled by these individual episodes, it seems that the situation in the Donbass is evolving, impacting stability in a place where, de facto, hostilities never ceased. According to the last report of the OECD, Ukrainian forces have started deploying heavy artillery, including more than 90 M-64 tanks, near the front line.

With the title “it will soon begin”, even a traditionally anti-war agency such as RIA Novosti has exposed the danger of open war re-starting in 2021. This can be seen in parallel with Baku’s military victory in Karabakh. As noted by Iščenko, on-field observer for Svobodnaja pressa, a two-day study of the conflict was held in Kyiv immediately after the peace. Kyiv would be willing to implement a similar strategy, shifting from small, destabilising actions to a massive and simultaneous attack on all fronts, testing both the defenses of the RPL and RPD and the limits of Russian involvement. Commenting on this situation in his annual speech, Putin underlined how Russia, if needed, would intervene directly in defense of the two republics. This means that Zelenskyj would have to challenge not just the RPL and RPD’s militias, but also the better organized Russian troops.

If it is true that helping Ukraine militarily is an activity that NATO itself would struggle to carry out, as it would clash too hard with Moscow’s regional interests, it is also true that there is a powerful NATO ally recently increasing its regional influence: Turkey. Turkey has proven to be a potential stabilizer and counterweight for Russia in the Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea, and its leader, Erdogan, seems interested in rebalancing power in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. As Russian expansionistic aims collide with Erdogan’s intentions to reconstruct a neo-Ottoman empire, Ankara has already challenged Moscow indirectly in Karabakh, where it demonstrated that its role as a supplier of military equipment and strategic intelligence is not to be underestimated. However, Ankara cannot risk getting too entangled in Ukraine’s problems and Erdogan wishes to avoid open confrontation with Russia. Therefore, it is likely that Turkey will just stop at providing Zelenskyj with its Bajraktar YB-2 drones.

Lacking direct support, it is also likely that directly opposing Russia would result in the defeat of Ukrainian forces’, said military expert Aleksej Leonov. However, even in the event of a defeat, ongoing hostilities would still beneficial for Zelenskyj’s domestic purposes. A protracted war would allow him to foment a climate of national mobilization around the president, consolidating popular consensus. Using the pretext of a new conflict, Zelenskyj could manipulate the conflict as a convenient scapegoat for the current socio-economic and health crisis.

In this context, the consequences of Joe Biden’s electoral victory also need to be assessed. Biden has already selected staff of veterans of the two previous administrations, including the new Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, a close associate of Hillary Clinton. And this is not a coincidence: it was under Clinton that the then director of the Cia, John Brennan, succeeded in fomenting the revolt in 2014, which ousted a duly elected president, Viktor Yanukovych. If Washington returns to meddle with regional powers by enacting a renewed Clinton-style type of interventionism, the situation might even get worse.

South Australia recognizes the Republic of Artsakh, condemns Azerbaijan and Turkey

Karlen Baghdasarian
Public Radio of Armenia
Feb 3 2021

South Australia became the second state in Australia to recognize the rights to self-determination of the Republic of Artsakh, condemning Azerbaijan and Turkey for their invasion of the country’s indigenous Armenians in a motion passed with a vote in the House of Assembly, reported the Armenian National Committee of Australia (ANC-AU).

The motion follows one passed by the New South Wales Parliament’s Legislative Assembly in October 2020, and similarly “calls on the Federal Government to also recognize the Republic of Artsakh as the only permanent solution to the conflict to avoid further attempts of such military aggression”.

Member for West Torrens, the Hon. Tom Koustantonis MP moved the historic motion, which also called out “the actions of President Erdogan of Turkey and President Aliyev of Azerbaijan in their pursuit of a policy of Pan-Turkish nationalism, which has previously led to genocide and which now threatens the Armenian population of Artsakh with ethnic cleansing”.

The House of Assembly considered a proposal to “adjourn the debate”, however this was defeated by the casting vote of the Speaker. The debate resumed and resulted in a vote – without dissent – in favor of the motion.

ANC-AU Executive Director Haig Kayserian thanked the Armenian Cultural Association of South Australia (ACASA) for their grassroots advocacy.

“We were proud to support members of Adelaide’s dedicated Armenian community for their tireless efforts on the ground, which have ensured South Australia’s parliament has joined a growing number of legislatures around the world supporting the legitimate rights to self-determination of the Republic of Artsakh,” said Kayserian.

“Mr Emil Davityan and the President of the Armenian Cultural Association of South Australia are a credit to the greater Armenian-Australian community and were a pleasure to work with to achieving this wonderful outcome for our heroic brothers and sisters of the Armenian Republic of Artsakh,” he added.

Emil Davityan added: “We thank Mr Tom Koustantonis and Ms Jayne Stinson for championing this motion and extend our gratitude to all parliamentarians who supported its passage in the name of human rights.”

“South Australia’s Armenian community wanted to play its part in supporting the people of Artsakh, bringing attention to the critical humanitarian issues in the region and contributing to an enduring and peaceful settlement to the conflict. The community thanks all who supported it in its endeavors.”

Armenia strongly condemns Turkey’s policy of misappropriation of Armenian cultural heritage

Jack Hunanian
Public Radio of Armenia
Feb 3 2021

Armenia strongly condemns the policy of consistent destruction and misappropriation of Armenian cultural heritage by the Turkish authorities, SPokesperson for the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Anna Naghdalyan has said.

The comments come in the wake of Turkish media reports on the sale and destruction of the Armenian churches in Turkey. There are numerous facts about the destruction of Christian churches and graves, which receive no response from the relevant bodies of Turkey.

“We are familiar with the reports in Turkish media about the sale of Armenian churches in Turkey. In particular, the Armenian Catholic Church in Sebtash district of Bursa was put up for sale for 6 million Turkish lira, while another Armenian church in Bursa was put for sale for 6,3 million Turkish lira. Moreover, the Armenian St. Toros Church in the western Turkish province of Kutahya was destroyed,” Naghdalyan said.

“We strongly condemn the policy of consistent destruction and misappropriation of Armenian cultural heritage by the Turkish authorities that gained new momentum, and urge Turkey to strictly adhere to its obligations under the international agreements,” she added.

The Spokesperson noted that the calls on cooperation for regional peace and stability by a state which demonstrates such attitude towards historical-cultural monuments at least cannot be credible.

Referring to Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusogl’s “advise” to Armenia to “learn lessons from history,” Naghdalyan said “no one has the right to speak disrespectfully with the language of threat and give lessons of history to the nation who survived genocide.”

“Turkey’s authorities must clearly realize that a relevant environment of trust is needed for a dialogue, and the destruction of the Armenian historical-cultural heritage definitely does not contribute to the establishment of such an environment,” the Spokesperson concluded.