Azerbaijan’s efforts to cancel ECHR decisions failed

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 09:56,

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 17, ARMENPRESS. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), as a result of the actions taken by the Office of Armenia’s Representative at the ECHR, has rejected the demand of the Azerbaijani government to eliminate the interim measure applied on September 29, 2020, Armenia’s Representation at the ECHR told Armenpress.

“The European Court particularly has taken into account the fact that the demands for applying interim measure for the protection of rights of captured persons and the evidence on that continue to be presented against Azerbaijan. The Court has also noted that Azerbaijan has not regularly fulfilled the demands of the Court to provide respective information about that persons. Therefore, the Court has found that the circumstances serving as a base for the interim measure continue to exist, thus, there are no grounds to cancel its decisions or their implementation.

Finally, the European Court has stated that it will continue examining the demands submitted for applying interim measures.

Let us remind that according to the decision of September 29, 2020, the European Court has called on Azerbaijan to refrain from measures, in particular from military actions which could lead to violations of convention rights of civilian population, as well as could also endanger their life and health. The ECHR has also called on Azerbaijan to fulfill its convention duties, especially under Article 2nd (right to life) and 3rd (ban on torture, inhuman treatment) of the Convention”, the statement says.

 

Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan

United States claims Russian peacekeeping presence in Karabakh risks “destabilizing” situation

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 10:07,

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 17, ARMENPRESS. The United States believes that the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno Karabakh risks “destabilizing” the situation in the region, according to US Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper.

“In such cases Russia’s presence threatens with destabilization,” Cooper said when asked by an Azeri reporter whether or not the US “could counter the Russian influence.”

“This, of course, is a challenge for all parties and states involved,” Cooper added.

Russian peacekeepers are deployed in Nagorno Karabakh as part of the trilateral statement signed between the Armenian, Russian and Azerbaijani leaders that ended the 44-day war in Artsakh. The Russian peacekeepers are providing humanitarian aid and medical assistance to the Armenians of Artsakh, they have cleared landmines and have disposed unexploded ordnances.

The Russian troops are guarding the borders of the Republic of Artsakh, as well as the Lachin corridor. The peacekeeping contingent's Commander, Lt. General Rustam Muradov is personally supervising the repatriation of the Armenian POWs from Azerbaijan. The Russian peacekeepers are also escorting the refugees back to Artsakh, and are assisting in the search and retrieval of bodies from the battlefield. 

Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan

Moscow-brokered Nagorno-Karabakh truce vital for preserving life & stopping bloodshed in disputed region, says Putin

RT – Russia Today
Dec 17 2020


By Jonny Tickle
Russian President Vladimir Putin has reiterated that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh should remain unchanged, categorically stating that international law recognizes the disputed territory as part of Azerbaijan.

“Our position on the issue is the same as it has been for many years. I’ll repeat it now. The seven areas held around Nagorno-Karabakh should be returned to Azerbaijan,” Putin clarified.

Since the end of the 1994 Karabakh War, Armenia has occupied seven districts surrounding the region as a “buffer zone” between themselves and the Azerbaijanis. During this autumn’s conflict, Armenian forces lost control of the Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Zangilan, and Qubadli districts, and agreed to hand over the other three as part of the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement.

Also on rt.com Fighting returns to Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijan claims some Armenian troops broke terms of armistice by remaining in region

“The status of Karabakh should remain unchanged, and be resolved in the future,” Putin clarified. “From the international legal point of view, all these territories are an integral part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”

The president also supported Turkey’s position, which also shares Moscow’s viewpoint that “the territories that were occupied during the clashes in the 1990s” should be returned to Azerbaijan.
Putin noted that there had been just one breach of the Azeri-Armenian ceasefire since its agreement, but refused to rule out the possibility of increasing the number of Russian peacekeepers in the future.

The disagreement between Baku and Yerevan began in 1988, when the disputed region announced its secession from the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic. In the six years that followed, Baku lost control not only of Nagorno-Karabakh, but also its surrounding areas. On September 27, the frozen Nagorno-Karabakh conflict suddenly erupted once again. The region is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan but is primarily populated by ethnic Armenians.

On November 9, following six weeks of conflict, the leaders of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan adopted a trilateral agreement on the cessation of fighting. As well as drawing up a new map, the parties also agreed on the deployment of Russian peacekeepers. At the time the truce was signed, Azerbaijan was at a clear advantage.

“The agreement is very important. I’ve already said that,” Putin explained. “It stops the bloodshed. Peacefully, people have stopped dying – this is an extremely important thing. It is fundamental. Everything else is secondary. Preserving people’s lives and health is the most important task that we have solved.”


Media Advocate: Information blockade underway in Armenia

Panorama, Armenia
Dec 17 2020

"It has been a long time since there is an information blockade in Armenia, as the authorities deprive citizens of their right to receive information, as state agencies seem not to be accountable to the citizens, at the same time the border situation is no longer presented to the public," Media Advocate initiative said in a released statement on Thursday. 

According to it, the public learns about most of the events taking place in Armenia and Artsakh either from Azerbaijani sources or through Telegram channels. Moreover, the authorities complain about media terror, but they are not honest and do not confess that they are the main ground of media terror with their silence or unreliable information.

It also noted that thus far, the authorities have failed to present exact data about captured civilians and prisoners of war held in Azerbaijan.

'Media Advocate” initiative next demands to act in line with the crisis situation and reminds that when the government conceals and does not provide official information, it creates a favorable ground for the spread of false information, which leads to panic. 

"We urge the government to end the information blockade. These days some of the pro-government deputies mock the journalists, refuse to provide information, divide media outlets into desirable and undesirable ones instead of realizing the seriousness of the situation," the initiative stressed. 

Clamart City Council passes resolution calling on French President to recognize Artsakh

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 10:58,

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 17, ARMENPRESS. The City Council of Clamart, France, has passed a resolution on the final settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and the recognition of the sovereignty of Artsakh, the Artsakh foreign ministry reports.

“France, based on its historic friendly ties with Armenia, should play a major role in the stable political and peaceful settlement. France should officially recognize the Republic of Artsakh for the sake of the peoples’ right to self-determination”, the resolution says.

The City Council stated that this recognition would allow to prepare ground for paving a way to the international recognition of nations.

The City Council has called on President of France Emmanuel Macron to engage France in the final settlement process of the conflict, the implementation of the peace process and the immediate recognition of Nagorno Karabakh, eliminate the ban put before the municipalities on having institutional ties with the Republic of Artsakh.

Recently the French Senate and National Assembly adopted respective resolutions on the need to recognize the Republic of Artsakh.

Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan

Armenia and Azerbaijan sign agreement to end two-decade old conflict

The Knight News
Dec 18 2020

While the United States remains divided over topics such as mask wearing, Armenians are being forced out of their homes due to the outcome of a conflict with Azerbaijan that dates back to the late 1980s. The two decade-long “Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” has been put to rest after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, cosigned a peace deal on Nov. 9. This deal ended the most recent six-week war between the two former Soviet republics that claimed thousands of lives on both sides. It also attempted a solution to the much longer ethnic and territorial dispute, by enabling Azerbaijan to retain a great deal of territory conquered over the duration of the conflict, but allowing the much disputed Stepanakert region to remain under Armenian control, both with Russia’s protection and assistance. 

There is certainly a great deal of rebuilding to be done after the series of clashes which have marked the region since the late 1980s. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan began when the two were still republics of the Soviet Union. The Union at the time was composed of 13 such republics, organized by ethnicity. Between the two large regions of Armenia and Azerbaijan was a far smaller republic, named Nagorno Karabakh, that was predominantly populated by Armenians. 60 to 70 percent of the region’s inhabitants were of Armenian descent, while only about 25 percent was Azari. However, the majority of the land was inside Azerbaijan. 

Since 1988, Armenians had demanded the region be formally recognized as a part of Soviet Armenia due to the largely Armenian presence. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the Armenians in the Nagnor Karabakh area were asked to move back into formal Armenian territory, their refusal sparked defiance and violence among villages which ultimately erupted into a full scale war.

“Russian troops are down in Nagorno Karabakh with peacekeepers and they’re working on

building infrastructure like electrical, water supply, and all the things that got destroyed during

wars,” explained Queens College (QC) political science professor Julie George. “Markets [have been] destroyed, trade roads, and land mines were put in place during this conflict. So they need to demine so that people walking around don’t explode.”

“What started off as a series of skirmishes became a much bigger conflict between places,” George elaborated. “In the middle of all that the Soviet Union collapsed and Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent countries. And this fight was ongoing between them.”

According to George, the Armenians initially had the upper hand and soon after 1994, a ceasefire was put in place. However, a great deal of sporadic violence which erupted between the two countries, combined with systemic intentional violence by the Azari, eventually disrupted the Armenian upper hand. The Azaris, who had powerful medians in terms of military strength, were then able to take back the occupied territory inside Nagnor Karabakh.

Although compromise and effort has been evident on both ends of the deal, the implementation has been far from simple. Many Aremnians in regions which have ceded to Azerbaijan would rather burn their homes than allow them to be taken by their enemies, and as a result, hundreds of homes in such areas have been destroyed by their owners. Despite the signing of the agreement, it is yet to be seen if tensions can truly be eased between the two neighboring countries. 

And in light of a conflict with such high stakes, it is important for those in the United States busy squabbling over indoor dining and mask wearing to note that some do not even have the privilege of not needing to dispute the right to their own homes and lives.


The South Caucasus: New Realities After the Armenia-Azerbaijan War (Part Two)

Jamestown Foundation
Dec 17 2020

Azerbaijan’s successful military action against Armenia’s occupying forces in Karabakh this autumn disproved Western diplomacy’s admonitions about post-Soviet “frozen conflicts” having “no military solutions” but “only political, negotiated solutions” with “no alternatives.” Armenia, however, had imposed its own military solution, without negotiation, in 1994 (modeled on Russia’s military solutions elsewhere in former Soviet territories), whereupon Azerbaijan sought redress through negotiations for 26 years, without results. Western diplomacy’s admonitions purported to overlook the decisive role of military instruments in shaping political outcomes. For his part, President Ilham Aliyev emphasized in the wake of the armistice that Azerbaijan has achieved a “military-political solution,” namely a successful military campaign followed by a negotiated armistice on terms favorable to Baku (Azertag, November 10, 20, 24, 25).

With international law on its side, Azerbaijan had, throughout the 26-year negotiations (including 17 years with Ilham Aliyev’s personal involvement), explicitly reserved the right to use force, rather than accept the loss of its territories in perpetuity. The Armenian government of Nikol Pashinian made war inevitable by repudiating the negotiation process outright (see EDM, November 25, and below). That challenge found Azerbaijan well prepared in advance for this eventuality. It went to war within the limits of international law, conducting military operations exclusively on its own territory, and without answering in kind to the Armenian army’s shelling of Azerbaijani undefended towns.

Confronted, nevertheless, with disapproval by France and the United States as mediator countries and by other Western authorities, Aliyev responded, “Based on the right of self-defense under the United Nations Charter, we are liberating Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory from occupation” (Azertag, October 25). Far from an illustration of power politics prevailing over international law, it was force tempered by international law. Tempered, too, by political considerations, Azerbaijan’s forces deliberately refrained from entering Upper (“Nagorno”) Karabakh’s Armenian-populated core areas.

Azerbaijan’s complete military victory, therefore, has produced an incomplete political victory. While regaining some 80 percent of the total Armenian-controlled land area, it left some two thirds of Upper Karabakh still under Armenian—and henceforth also Russian “peacekeeping” —control. This situation entails manifold opportunities for Russia to arbitrate and manipulate the still-unresolved conflict.

The negotiating process from 1994 to date—including the “Basic Principles” that governed the negotiations in the last decade—treated Upper (“Nagorno”) Karabakh as a territorial unit: legally a part of Azerbaijan, but home to an Armenian community entitled to a yet-to-be negotiated “status” vis-à-vis Baku. This territorial unit, however, has now been partitioned between an Armenian-controlled zone in the north and center, hosting Russian “peacekeeping” troops; and an Azerbaijani-controlled zone in the south, free of Russian “peacekeepers.” In accordance with several presidential and governmental decisions, Azerbaijan is installing military-civilian administrations in the regained districts, under direct supervision from the presidential administration in Baku (Azertag, October 29, November 24, December 3).

Only a small number of Armenians resided in Upper Karabakh’s southern zone prior to this war, and they apparently moved to the Armenian-controlled zone after the November 10 armistice (although Baku would have preferred that they stay and become one of Azerbaijan’s showcase minorities). Absent these Armenians, the “status” issue becomes irrelevant to this southern zone; but it remains topical for Upper Karabakh’s Armenian-populated, larger zone and will probably come up for negotiation, once this process resumes in full.

At this stage, however, President Aliyev and Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov take the position that “the Karabakh conflict has conclusively been resolved,” in the sense that Yerevan has “capitulated” militarily, the “period of post-conflict reconstruction” has begun, and Azerbaijan reverts to diplomacy with a view to “reintegrating the Upper Karabakh Armenians within our political, social, and economic spaces” (Azertag, November 21, December 1, 3). Baku apparently rules out a territorially based status for Karabakh’s Armenian community, if and when it reverts to Azerbaijani jurisdiction. Aliyev has mentioned cultural autonomy or municipal self-governance as possible options for Karabakh Armenians (Azertag, November 20, 24, 25, December 1, 3), apparently envisaging those options as internal Azerbaijani solutions, rather than internationally negotiated ones.

In that post-conflict spirit, Baku is actively facilitating the delivery of Russian humanitarian assistance to Upper Karabakh’s Armenian population (Western or other international humanitarian assistance is not forthcoming as yet). Russian assistance cargoes are delivered by air to Yerevan and onward across Azerbaijan, by railway to Barda and by road via Aghdam to Upper Karanakh’s administrative center of Stepanakert (Khankendi). Another delivery route is by railway, from Russia into Azerbaijan and onward via Yevlakh to Upper Karabakh. Yet another route of smaller capacity uses Azerbaijan’s Ganja airport, where assistance cargoes flown in from Russia are similarly forwarded via Barda and Aghdam by Azerbaijani authorities for final delivery to Stepanakert.

Armenia’s government, in the wake of a lost war, still calls for Upper Karabakh’s outright “self-determination” away from Azerbaijan, a stop to “Azerbaijan’s aggression against Artsakh [Armenian name for Upper Karabakh]” and Azerbaijani “de-occupation [sic] of Artsakh’s districts” (TASS, December 3, 8; Arminfo, Armenpress, December 7, 9). This stance flows from Pashinian’s pre-war abandonment of negotiations about Upper Karabakh’s status and switch to the goal of severing “Artsakh” from Azerbaijan to incorporate it with Armenia (see EDM, November 25).

The South Caucasus: New Realities After the Armenia-Azerbaijan War (Part Three)

Jamestown Foundation

Dec 18 2020

Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently supplanted the Minsk Group’s triple co-chairmanship (the United States, France, Russia) as mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It was Putin, not the Minsk co-chairmanship, who mediated the November 10 armistice agreement, shunting aside the Minsk Group’s troika. The armistice agreement does not even mention the Minsk Group and does not reference any “status” goal for Karabakh Armenians (see EDM, November 12, 13).

The US and French co-chairs, removed from the negotiations by Putin’s maneuver, are keen to re-enter the process by having the Minsk troika discuss the Karabakh “status” issue with Baku and Yerevan. The Kremlin, however, will probably take up this issue on its own initiative, dealing directly with Baku and Yerevan (the same procedure it used when mediating the armistice); and Moscow will await a convenient opportunity to initiate this process on its own timing.

Indeed, according to Putin (and contrary to Azerbaijan’s position—see above), this conflict is not conclusively resolved because the problem of Upper (“Nagorno”) Karabakh’s status remains open (TASS, November 17, 21).

The Kremlin had played “neutral” during the 44-day Karabakh war before intervening to stop the fighting. Exploiting Yerevan’s adventurism (see EDM, November 25), and undoubtedly anticipating its debacle, Putin intervened at the last moment on the Armenian side as a providential “savior,” namely on three counts: “saving” the Karabakh Armenians by sending Russian “peacekeeping” troops; “saving” the Armenian army’s remnants from total destruction by stopping the war at that point; and “saving” Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian’s government from collapse with fulsome praise for Pashinian’s acceptance of hard but inevitable armistice terms (TASS, November 17, 21, December 2).

Putin’s salvage operation has rendered an exhausted Armenia more dependent on Russia than ever before. Moreover, all of Armenia’s political forces—from Pashinian to his Yerevan opponents to the Stepanakert leaders—are outbidding each other in expressions of gratitude to Putin’s Russia and faith in the bilateral alliance.

Russia, however, had made clear all along that its treaty-based security guarantees to Armenia do not apply to Karabakh. It was Yerevan that guaranteed Karabakh’s security until this lost war. After this war, Russia has taken over from Armenia the role of guaranteeing Upper (“Nagorno”) Karabakh’s security—if not officially, then clearly de facto by stationing Russia” “peacekeeping” troops there. As a cumulative result, Russia’s guarantees now cover both Armenia and the parts of Upper Karabakh not regained by Azerbaijan. By the same token, Russia’s military presence helps perpetuate this territory’s separation from Azerbaijan and the unrecognized “Karabakh republic” proto-state. Its “president,” “parliament,” “government” and “defense army” continue their existence. Russia does not officially recognize them but deals with them and sustains them de facto. At the same time, amply using the tools of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, Russia is increasingly taking control of Upper Karabakh from the debilitated Yerevan (see EDM, December 8, 10).

Nevertheless, even as it strengthens its grip on Upper Karabakh de facto, Russia officially deems it to be part of Azerbaijan’s sovereign territory de jure (unlike Upper Karabakh’s hitherto-guarantor Armenia, which did not and does not recognize Azerbaijan’s sovereignty in this territory). The Kremlin duly requested and received Baku’s consent to Russia’s “peacekeeping” presence in this territory of Azerbaijan, a spart of the quid pro quo terms of the armistice (see Part One in EDM, December 16).

In sum, Azerbaijan now finds itself confronted with two patrons of the “Karabakh republic”: Yerevan the declared but weak patron, Moscow the unofficial but strong patron. Yerevan, for all its weakness, remains absolutely intractable in negotiations, while Moscow is all too willing to mediate some compromise on the “frozen conflict” model: professing to recognize Azerbaijan’s sovereignty while preventing it from exercising that sovereignty in practice, and making it subject to perpetual negotiations with Yerevan through Russia’s mediation.

Controlling Azerbaijan’s Lachin corridor between Armenia and Upper Karabakh with Russian “peacekeeping” troops, as well as controlling the Armenian transit route to and from Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave with Russian border troops, as per the armistice agreement, will provide Russia with additional opportunities to manipulate this conflict.

Moscow must be content to have allowed Yerevan to de-frost and heat up this conflict, setting the stage for Russia to intervene and re-freeze it, with built-in opportunities to warm it up again if necessary in the future.

Russia has positioned itself as arbiter between Armenia and Azerbaijan for a long time to come. The Kremlin is not interested in a conclusive resolution of this conflict. It is, instead, interested in prolonging and managing it, with the collateral benefit of justifying Russia’s military presence.

The Kremlin is also mindful of the domestic ramifications to its involvement in the Karabakh conflict. Addressing a senior staff meeting devoted to this matter, Putin noted that more than two million Armenians and more than two million Azerbaijanis currently live and work in Russia, and their sentiments must be taken into account. Russia, therefore, should pursue a “balanced approach [to the Karabakh conflict] in the interest of consolidating Russia’s internal stability” (TASS, November 20).

https://jamestown.org/program/the-south-caucasus-new-realities-after-the-armenia-azerbaijan-war-part-three/?fbclid=IwAR2oiTdhVR4hCkw5SIkQzw4qnHthRYEgWz1jwaQQXfre6oSdlfuiMunKTdg


FBI offers $50K reward in Armenian church arson investigation

KRON4
Dec 18 2020


SAN FRANCISCO, Calif. (KRON) – An Armenian church building in San Francisco was intentionally set on fire earlier this year.

On Thursday, FBI announced a five-figure reward for information that can solve the hate crime.

This Armenian church that’s been around for 60 years went up in flames in the early morning hours back in September but on Thursday, the question remains, who was behind the arson?

The FBI hopes a $50,000 reward will get some answers.

Investigators believe San Francisco Armenian church was intentionally set on fire

“We are committed to protecting the first amendment rights of everyone in our communities including the free exercise of religious beliefs,” Craig Fair, FBI Special Agent, said. 

FBI Special Agent Craig Fair stands in front of what is left of the Cultural Center of the St. Gregory the Illuminator Armenian Apostolic Church in San Francisco announcing his bureau is financially backing a hate crime investigation.

They are offering up to $50,000 for information that may lead to the arrest and conviction of the person or people who intentionally set the structure on fire at around 4:15 a.m. on September 17th.

“Thankfully no one was injured however this attack was not just on a building but on a congregation. this was an attack on a community,” Fair said.

San Francisco police investigate 3rd hate crime against Armenian community in last 2 months

The church arson was one of three hate crimes targeting San Francisco’s Armenian community this year – sparking not only flames – but fear among the group.

Two days later on September 19th, the KZV Armenian School was shot at and on July 24th hateful graffiti was discovered on their campus walls where Haig Baghdassarian’s daughter graduated last year.

“We’re hopeful that what’s been offered by the FBI as well as what’s been offered by the community will entice the people that know something about the crime to step forward it’s been a terrifying thing to have to deal with,” Baghdassarian said.

Police have not identified any suspect and these incidents have not officially been linked but the FBI wants any details on all three of the crimes.

In the meantime, the Armenian community can’t help but fear this may be connected to, yet another devastating war waged once more between Turkey-backed Azerbaijan and their homeland this fall.

“It almost seems like the July and the September events were a precursor to the devastating events that were launched against the Armenian nation between September 27th and November 10th of this year while much of the world’s attention was turned away due to the pandemic and the presidential elections here in the U.S. the dissidents who perpetrated the Armenian genocide 100 years ago,” Baghdassarian said.

If you have information, call the FBI San Francisco Division at 415-553-7400 or go to tips.fbi.gov. You can also call the SFPD anonymous tip line at 415-575-4444 or text a tip to TIP411.

Baghdassarian went on to say it catching a suspect will really help put the Armenian community at ease.

https://www.kron4.com/news/bay-area/fbi-offers-50k-reward-in-armenian-church-arson-investigation/amp/?fbclid=IwAR2OGWCJaBCztJuFfNt41loz6v1lPhqZDx81hHg99_yNs8jD8pTbnI8EGMg
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