What Open Source Evidence Tells Us About The Nagorno-Karabakh War

Forbes
Oct 23 2020


Since Azerbaijan launched its assault on Armenian forces in the Nagorno-Karabakh region on September 27, there has been a torrent of violent imagery from both sides on social media.

Video after video depict drone strikes setting military vehicles ablaze and unsuspecting troop formations abruptly vanishing in spasms of artillery fire. Photos reveal urban apartment buildings torn apart by massive rockets, and corpses piled up like cordwood after deadly ambushes in narrow valleys. Reporters venturing to Armenian and Azerbaijani communities mid-bombardment have shared images of devastation and tales of suffering.

It’s possible to draw upon this huge but disturbing body of evidence to gain insight into what is happening on the ground—even while remaining mindful that what gets recorded on camera and shared on the internet is by no means the whole picture.

Here’s what open sources and journalistic accounts can and can’t tell us about territorial changes in the conflict, vehicle losses, the number of dead, drone losses, attacks on civilians, war crimes, and the role played by Turkey in the war.

Azerbaijani Ground Force Have Captured Significant Territory

The war is over Nagorno-Karabakh, a region which has an Armenian majority population, but which de jure is generally recognized as Azerbaijani territory.

Since a war in the 1990s, a de facto Armenian government called Artsakh or the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) has controlled the region, and several Azerbaijani districts outside of it, with support from Armenia.

A mutual history of atrocities and ethnic cleansing predating the fall of the Soviet Union has resulted in decades of border skirmishes and deepening enmity and mistrust between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, with little progress towards a peaceful resolution.

As of October 22, Azerbaijani forces have seized a number of towns and strategic heights from Armenian troops across the breadth of the frontline in Nagorno-Karabakh, including the (until recently) populated towns of Hadrut, Mataghis and Zangilan, as well as many depopulated ghost towns such as Füzuli, Jabrayil and Talish.

While Armenian and Azerbaijan have offered conflicting accounts, some of the territory changes can be verified by geo-locating photos of Azerbaijani troops in these areas.

Using geo-location of photos, one analysis on October 22 estimates Azerbaijan has occupied nearly 10% of the territory in Nagorno-Karabakh formerly held by Armenian forces, up from an estimated 2.8% according to different analysts in an article published October 14.

In a speech on Oct. 20, Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev suggested expansive objectives for expelling Armenian forces from the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Despite earlier signaling openness to negotiations, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan subsequently stated Armenians would have “victory or defeat, nothing in between.”

Azerbaijan’s military will hope its territorial gains will rupture the cohesion of the Armenian defensive lines, allowing them to advance with greater momentum at lower cost.

By contrast, Armenian forces will pin their hopes on executing a defense in depth, in which Azerbaijani forces that break through in one sector are denied momentum by being immediately confronted by a new line of formidable defenses.

The naturally-occurring fortifications created by Nagorno-Karabakh mountainous terrain assist such defensive strategy. Commanding heights overlook ground largely devoid of cover and narrow road chokepoints create abundant opportunities for lethal ambushes.

Armenian troops also appear in recent videos to have fallen back to wooded terrain providing cover from aerial observation and attack.

But mountainous terrain holds perils for the defender too, constraining lines of resupply, retreat and counterattack. Notably, if  Azerbaijan succeeds in physically occupying the Lachin highway connecting Stepanakert to Armenia, than the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh Republic could become untenable and even civilian refugees may find themselves without a route through which to flee the fighting.

According to some reports, Azerbaijani forces have advanced within 6 miles (10 kilometers) of the Lachin highway.

This coincides with a second issue: behind the frontline fighting, Armenian support units and lines of communication have come under an aerial assault of unprecedented scale in the long-running conflict.


Hundreds of videos released by Azerbaijan show drones blasting Armenian fighting vehicles and heavy weapons, as well as destroying resupply and reinforcement convoys. Azerbaijan’s government is posting the strike footage on digital billboards for public viewing.


Azerbaijan’s primary aerial combat system in the conflict are an unknown number of Turkish-built Bayraktar TB2 drones, which can deliver precision strikes from a relatively safe altitude using small laser-guided micro-missiles, or help guide deadly artillery barrages.

However, Azerbaijan is also using its fleet of Israeli Harop and smaller Orbiter-1K loitering munitions, which can both surveil targets and kamikaze into choice targets like a missile.

Azerbaijan is also operating domestic drones, including antiquated An-2 Colt “biplane” transports fitted with remote-control systems. Ostensibly used to draw fire from Armenian air defenses, at least some of these Colts appear to have been carrying FAB 250-kilogram bombs. Armenian videos document the destruction of 7 of the pokey drone biplanes, often using man-portable surface-to-air missiles.

Azerbaijan’s attack helicopters, by contrast, have only seen limited use. Armenian aviation has not been active, save for an Su-25K attack jet sortie which ended with the loss of the plane under disputed circumstances.

We can quantify some of the scale of the material losses suffered by Armenian forces due to work by open-source intelligence bloggers Stijn Mitzer and Jakub Janovsky, who document and classify vehicle losses confirmed by visual media from both sides, taking care to avoid counting the same damaged or destroyed vehicle more than once.

Of course, their tally cannot account for all the losses which haven’t been recorded and shared on the internet, or that otherwise escaped their notice. However, they do offer a minimum count of the damaged, destroyed or captured vehicles that can be visually verified.


On the first day of hostilities Azerbaijani drone strikes focused heavily on short range air defense vehicles in Nagorno-Karabakh. These 1970 and 1980-era Soviet systems designed for use against airplanes may have lacked resolution to consistently detect and engage drones at long range and higher altitude. Later, more powerful S-300 and 2K12 air missile batteries and long-range air defense radars were also struck.

Air defense vehicles damaged or destroyed include:

  • 14 9K33 Osa (SA-8) and 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13) mobile short-range air defense systems
  • 4 S-300PS (SA-10) and one 2K12 (SA-6) medium or long-range surface-to-air missile launch vehicles
  • 8 air defense radars

Two loitering munition strikes early in the conflict struck dummy air defense vehicles. However, the successful use of such decoys has not been documented since.


After the first few days, drone strikes were primarily directed at vehicles, facilities and artillery behind or approaching the frontline.

The following is a non-comprehensive list of Armenian vehicles that have been shown to be damaged, destroyed or captured. In aggregate, they amount to the loss of around five armored or mechanized battalions.

  • 144 T-72A and T-72B main battle tanks
  • 35 BMP-1 and -2 infantry fighting vehicles                                       
  • 19 MT-LB tracked APCs, some with heavy weapons
  • 310 trucks, jeeps and miscellaneous soft-skinned vehicles

Armenian artillery losses appear equally staggering as of Oct. 22, equivalent to the destruction of six or seven artillery battalions in aggregate:

  • 49 122- and 152-millimeter towed howitzers and field guns           
  • 12 2S1 and 2S3 armored self-propelled howitzers                          
  • 52 BM-21 Grad 122-millimeter multiple rocket launchers               
  • 3 BM-30 and WM-80 heavy multiple rocket launchers

Starting around mid-October, drone footage showed a new emphasis on hitting infantry positions, presumably near the frontline.

Meanwhile, since the beginning of hostilities, the destruction or capture of the following Azerbaijani armored vehicles were recorded, mostly using anti-tank guided missiles, artillery and rocket propelled grenades:

  • 20 T-72A and AV main battle tanks
  • 2  T-90S main battle tanks
  • 17 BMP-1, -2 and -3 tracked infantry fighting vehicles
  • 5 BTRA-82A wheeled personnel carriers

There are several important caveats to bear in mind when considering these numbers.

First, because Armenian forces aren’t operating combat drones, they inevitably are recording less imagery of vehicles getting destroyed.

Furthermore, as the Bayraktar uses small 20-pound MAM-C and 50-pound MAM-L munitions (compared to the 105-110 pound U.S. Hellfire anti-tank missile), strikes on tanks may not always result in destruction or heavy damage.

Thus some of the targeted vehicles may be restored into operational condition—unless they are captured by advancing ground forces.

It’s fair to conclude then that open sources don’t give a clear picture of Azerbaijani vehicle losses. But they do suggest that Armenian vehicle and artillery losses to air attacks alone are extremely heavy.


How many soldiers have died in the fighting so far?

As of October 22, the Armenian government has named over 900 soldiers dead.

Baku has not reported Azerbaijani casualties, though there’s reason to believe its personnel losses are also heavy. Assaulting mountainous fortifications historically has proven a costly endeavor even when successful, and several Armenian post-battle videos (not shared here) depict dozens of dead in distinct individual engagements.

On Oct. 22, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at the Valdia Discussion Club that his data suggested both sides had suffered over 2,000 dead in the war, with the combined death toll approaching 5,000.

How many drones has Azerbaijan lost?

Armenian forces might be able to weather the drone onslaught if they were inflicting unsustainable attrition on Azerbaijan’s drone fleet, a possibility discussed in this earlier article by my colleague Paul Iddon.

Indeed, the Bayraktar and Harop cost in the low millions of dollars, more than the market value of the mostly dated Soviet military vehicles they are destroying.

But the evidence of heavy drone losses remains unpersuasive. Armenia claims to have shot down dozens of drones including 10 TB2s. However, there is only visual confirmation of the destruction or capture of 17 Azerbaijani drones.

Furthermore, drones vary greatly in size, cost and capability. Only nine of the lost drones can be visually identified:

  • 7 Harop loitering munitions (shot down before they could strike their target)
  •  1 Orbiter 1K loitering munition
  •  1 Bayraktar TB2

Notably, the first imagery confirming the loss of a TB2 in this conflict emerged on October 19. The video below shows the drone’s recovered Canadian-built WESCAM optical sensor turret.

As detailed in this earlier article, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are unleashing long-range artillery on each other’s civilian population centers. Armenia has reported 37 civilian dead so far, while Azerbaijani media reports 61 dead.

Azerbaijan has continuously bombarded the Nagorno-Karabakh regional capital of Stepanakert and the nearby cultural center of Shusha/Shushi.

Armenia has retaliated with artillery strikes on many Azerbaijani communities. Some, like Ganja—Azerbaijan’s second city—are located well outside the conflict zone.
Both sides have claimed the attacks are precision strikes on military targets within the city. However, most of the rockets and missiles used are designed to devastate large areas, such as huge BM-30 Smerch rockets used by both sides. Photos show these weapons have demolished civilian neighborhoods.

Armenian forces also reportedly used Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) and Scud ballistic missiles in four separate attacks on Ganja between Oct. 5through Oct. 17, killing 25 civilians.

Cluster munitions, which are banned in many countries, but not by the combatants in question, were identified showering down on Stepanakert. The munitions are reportedly of Israeli manufacture.


Azerbaijan has also shared images of BM-30 Smerch cluster bomblets allegedly fired by Armenia.

The deliberate attacks on civilians, which are war crimes, are likely intended to demoralize their respective civilian populations, and decrease support for a continued war effort. The ultimate effect can only be to deepen the enmity between the two nations.


War Crime On Video

A video shared on Azerbaijani social media appear to show an incident in which two Armenian soldiers surrender to Azerbaijani troops at Hadrut. A subsequent video (not shared here) appears to show the killing of the same two POWs.

The Azerbaijani government later took down the videos and claimed they were fake. However, a detailed investigation by Bellingcat concluded they appeared to be authentic.

Other crimes have been alleged by both sides but have not been verified as far as the author knows.


Just how involved is Turkey?

Ankara openly supports Azerbaijan’s campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, journalists and open source intelligence has illuminated aspects of the relationship that were unconfirmed or contested.

Most importantly, Turkey quietly transferred TB2 drones to Azerbaijan prior to the commencement of hostilities. Their activity over Nagorno-Karabakh was discerned through open-source analysis a week before Azerbaijani officials admitted their presence.

Multiple and distinct press outlets have also seemingly confirmed rumors denied by Ankara that Turkey had transported mercenaries recruited from Syrian rebel groups to support Azerbaijan’s campaign.

Armenian sources have also claimed Turkish F-16 fighters have attacked Armenian targets. A New York Times NYT investigation released satellite photos confirming the presence of two Turkish F-16s in Ganja International Airport in Azerbaijan.


However, this does not necessarily prove the F-16s have been used in a combat role—they may have been detached to escort Turkish cargo planes transporting arms to Azerbaijan instead.


Final Thoughts

Earlier in October, several observers remarked that the huge destruction apparently inflicted by Azerbaijan’s drones interdicting vehicles behind the frontline had not resulted in major territorial gains, the objective of Azerbaijan’s offensive.

Air forces tend to prefer interdiction missions rather than close air support at the frontline because vehicle convoys and conspicuous rear-are bases and bivouacs are more vulnerable than well-camouflaged and entrenched frontline units.

But interdiction strikes have a delayed payoff: they reduce an enemy’s ability to resupply and reinforce frontline units and concentrate fresh forces to mount counteroffensives.

It’s too early to tell whether Azerbaijani ground forces will sustain the advance or get bogged down by Armenian defenses, difficult terrain and forthcoming winter weather. However, if Azerbaijani troops manage to cut off the logistical link connecting Stepanakert to Armenia, the position of Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh may become highly precarious.

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