OilPrice
By Cyril Widdershoven
Jul 05, 2020
The rosy future of the offshore East Mediterranean (East-Med) gas boom
is in jeopardy. The current COVID-related economic downturn, combined
with the dramatic drop in demand for oil and gas worldwide, has
already led to several delays for major offshore gas projects in
Cyprus, Lebanon, Israel, and Greece. Offshore E&P budgets have been
cut by all oil and gas companies, leaving no room for high-risk
natural gas developments in the East Med in the coming years. At the
same time, geopolitical and military tensions between Turkey and the
other players in the region, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, and even Israel is
rising fast. Ankara’s unexpected but strong support for the Libyan
Tripoli-based government which is fighting out a long-lasting conflict
against East Libyan general Haftar’s LNA forces has not only tilted
the power structure in Libya, but has also put Ankara, as a NATO
member, on a collision course with Russia and the UAE.
At the same time, Turkish military moves in Libya, aiming to not only
open up Africa’s largest oil reserves to Turkish companies but also to
expand its sphere of influence in the East Med, have put a
confrontation with Egypt and possibly France on the table. In 2020, a
military confrontation between NATO members (Turkey-France) or allies
of NATO (UAE, Egypt, Israel) in the Middle East is no longer
unthinkable. Ankara’s approach in Libya suggests an aggressive Turkish
military strategy intended to set up military bases in the region.
On July 3, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar and Chief of General
Staff Gen. Yasar Guler have visited Libya to review the activities
carried out under a memorandum of understanding between the two
countries. The main focus during the visit was the expansion of the
Defense Security Cooperation and Training Assistance Advisory Command,
which was created within the scope of the memorandum of understanding
(MoU) between Turkey and Libya on November 27, 2019. In the same MOU,
Turkey and Libya signed the highly contested EEZ agreement, that
asserts Turkey's rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, putting Ankara
on a full collision course with Cyprus, Egypt, and Greece. A military
confrontation of some sort has been a distinct possibility since that
moment.
Turkey-Libya maritime deal, via trtworld.com Ankara’s aggressive
moves, however, may have reached a point of no return in the last few
days.
On June 10, Turkish navy vessels conducted radar-targeting on a French
warship trying to approach a Turkish civilian ship suspected of
skirting a NATO arms embargo on Libya. French government sources have
reported that France’s Courbet frigate was “lit up” three times by
Turkish radar. The incident has led to the end of French support for
the NATO naval mission, while officially requesting a NATO
investigation.
France, and indirectly other NATO countries, such as Italy and Greece,
are now openly discussing supporting the Eastern Libyan general
Haftar, whose forces have come under pressure after his latest
military assault on the GNA ruled region around Tripoli ended in an
unexpected defeat. Egypt has also now openly warned Turkey and the GNA
forces not to cross the Sirte line, a key threshold in the Libyan oil
sector. If Ankara and Tripoli continue their military advance,
Egyptian president Sisi has warned that the Egyptian armed forces will
enter Libya to support Haftar.
The current crisis within NATO (and the EU), sparked by Turkish
actions is a major concern.
A military conflict within the alliance will not only weaken its
position with regards to Russia’s power projections, but also puts
security in the (East) Mediterranean at risk. France at present
lobbying to put sanctions on Turkey. On July 13, a council of EU
foreign ministers will discuss EU-Turkish relations.
While all eyes are now on Libya, Turkey’s military moves in the East
Med are even more worrying. As some have indicated already, Turkey’s
Libya adventure falls within the strategy of squeezing the Middle East
into submission. Ankara’s military projects in Qatar, the Horn of
Africa, Sudan, and now Libya, set up a circle of military power
threatening Arab nations, at least in their views. East Med military
moves, officially to support Turkish oil and gas companies to search
for offshore reserves, are a direct threat to Greece and Cyprus. The
so-called ultra-nationalist “Blue Homeland” military strategy adopted
by Turkey is clear in its goals. Erdogan’s military doctrine targets
the domination of the Aegean, most of the Mediterranean, and of the
Black Sea. The ongoing provocations in the East Med, which doesn’t
only include Greece-Cyprus but also Egypt and Israel, are the
evidence.
The current chaos in NATO and the EU could hamper a joint concerted
action in case of unwanted Turkish action in the region. During the
last couple of years, analysts have focused on perceived
U.S./Washington support for East Med economic and energy integration
via the East Med Gas Forum.
The U.S. Senate and Congress have even supported some anti-Turkish
moves, such as the end of military sanctions on Cyprus. Washington,
especially via its thinktanks, such as Atlantic Council, has been
painting a positive pro-East Med (Greece, Cyprus, Egypt-Israel)
picture of economic, political, and military support. This policy, as
has been stated by some, needs to be taken with a truck-load of salt,
as the Trump Administration is once again opening up to Ankara.
A U.S.-NATO intervention or a concentrated EU move in the case of
Turkish action seems unrealistic, and Erdogan seems to know this based
on his recent actions. As long as Europe and NATO, both of which have
their HQs in Brussels, keep a low profile without countering Turkish
moves, Greece and Cyprus will be the next targets for a Turkish
military move.
The East Med tinder box is not only a threat to its offshore gas
future. A military conflict in the region, involving Turkey, will
threaten several major commodity and trade chokepoints. A
confrontation could lead to a major blockade of the Dardanelles
(Istanbul), the Suez Canal (Egypt), and the route between Libya and
the southern Italian islands. Ankara’s regional power play is not only
of concern to the littoral states of the East Med, but also to GCC oil
and gas exporters and EU-Asian trade. Erdogan’s regional gamble could
end up being a major catastrophe.
