What happens to the Caucasus when Russia stumbles
By Vartan Oskanian
30 Oct 2014 08:18
Vartan Oskanian is a member of Armenia’s National Assembly, a former
foreign minister and the founder of Yerevan’s Civilitas Foundation.
It is hard to think of another region in the world where three
neighbouring countries, with at least seven decades of a common past,
have taken such divergent paths in their political orientations and
state building processes as the three republics of the Caucasus –
Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.
What divides these countries today is not religion, ethnicity,
culture, history, or traditions; it is the differing visions,
prospects, ambitions, convictions, and aspirations that they espouse
and pursue.
The list of examples is long. Armenia is a member of the Russia-led
Collective Security Treaty Organisation, while Georgia and Azerbaijan
are not. Georgia aspires to NATO membership; Azerbaijan does not, and
has strong security arrangements with Turkey and Israel while
purchasing modern military hardware from Russia.
Georgia recently signed the Association Agreement with the European
Union joining the Union’s free trade zone while committing to reforms
that will strengthen the European value system in Georgia. Armenia
went in the other direction by joining the Eurasian Union with Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan, becoming part of a customs union that will
enable free trade among the four with common customs regulations.
Azerbaijan stayed away from both.
Divisive similarities
These are just some of the differences. There are similarities but of
a divisive nature: The imitation of democracy and a lack of an
independent judiciary – albeit to different degrees and in different
forms.
Pretence at democratisation is dangerous and counterproductive. It
distorts the relationship between government and the governed, raising
expectations that can’t be met, and obstructing progress that could be
taking place elsewhere in society. Constitutions, which, by
definition, affirm the prevalence of law over governmental fiat, have
little meaning where the notion of an independent judiciary is
nonexistent.
This non-democratic and non-judicial environment breeds the kind of
populism among leaders that we witness in Armenia, Georgia and
particularly in Azerbaijan. They have moralised politics, claimed that
they alone represent the people, and it is they who can identify the
common good and implement the public’s genuine desires. This way, they
relegate all political opponents to obscurity.
Such disconnect is fraught with dire social and economic consequences,
growing resentment and disenchantment among the public in all three
republics.
Georgians have twice forced a change of government – first through the
2003 Rose Revolution, which imposed the popular will on an unelected
government, and then again last year through the ballot box. However,
there is little progress in Georgia on things that matter to
Georgians, including jobs and territorial integrity. The economy is
stalling, foreign direct investment is drying up and political
pressure on the media is rising.
For their part, Armenians came close to forcing a change of government
through street protests on three occasions – but failed each time. No
election since independence has brought a change of government. This
past month, three leading Armenian opposition parties joined forces –
for the first time since independence – in mobilising the public in
two mass rallies demanding fresh national elections.
Azerbaijan is the most autocratic among the three. No serious attempt
to change the government has been made. Indeed, power has simply been
transferred from Heydar Aliyev to his son, Ilham Aliyev, who, after
assuming office in 2003, amended the constitution to make himself
“President for Life”.
Dissent is brutally suppressed and the crackdown on protests is harsh.
Over the last two and a half years, Azerbaijan has either threatened
or actually brought criminal charges against at least 50 independent
and opposition political activists, journalists, bloggers, and human
rights defenders.
Russia’s vision
Regardless of the nature of its formal relations with each of the
three republics, Russia casts a long shadow over the Caucasus.
Whatever these countries decide, they must remain cognisant of the
“Russia factor”, the perceived significance of which inevitably
influences their foreign policy orientation and priorities.
The three republics have varying degrees of dependencies on Russia.
Armenia’s is the deepest. Russia is Armenia’s largest trade partner,
biggest investor and sole supplier of gas and nuclear fuel. All three
have big diaspora communities in Russia and they send billions of
dollars in remittances to their kin back home – critical inflows for
the economic survival of the individuals and their republics. But the
biggest dependence for all three countries is geopolitical as they
struggle to resolve ethnic conflicts in which Russia is either the
main protagonist (in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) or a
major player (in the case of Nagorno Karabakh).
Russia today faces serious geopolitical and economic challenges. It is
in direct confrontation with the West on its vision about the world
order, Ukraine, Syria and a great many big and small issues.
Economically, Russia is beginning to feel the aggregate impact of
western economic sanctions, falling oil prices, ruble devaluation,
capital outflow and decline in direct foreign investment.
What’s happening to oil prices today is very reminiscent of
developments on the eve of the sunset of the Soviet Union. It took two
years for crumbling oil prices to bring the Soviet Union to its knees
in the mid-1980s, and another two years of stagnation to break the
Union altogether.
One might think the pressures, the declining economy and the
anticipated public dissatisfaction, especially among the elite, may
force the Kremlin into partial submission and change its posture on
global issues and weaken its grip on its immediate neighbourhood. But
Putin could easily see his way out of this by consolidating the most
vulnerable.
Russia’s weakening status no doubt will have a major economic and
political impact on the divided and fragmented Caucasus causing
further turmoil and economic misery in the three republics.
Indeed, the Caucasus today is a divided and incoherent region. The
three republics – Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan – could have learned
from countries in similar configurations, such as the Benelux
countries and the Baltic States. These other regions, each in their
time, were catapulted to stability, prosperity and democracy by virtue
of their common history, unity and clear sense of purpose, despite the
great many historical grievances and political differences and
disagreements among them. For the Caucasus, it is too late.
From: Baghdasarian