THE CRIMEAN KNOT
Russia in Global Affairs (English)
June 10, 2014 Tuesday 5:00 AM EST
Jun 07, 2014 Russia in Global Affairs (English):
When the Ukrainian crisis and standoff in Kiev’s Independence Square
peaked in early 2014, not a single political expert in Crimea, Kiev,
Moscow, or Washington could have predicted that in a mere six to
eight weeks events would unfold as they did. Unlike Transdniestria,
Abkhazia, or South Ossetia, Crimea was not a long-festering conflict
zone. Crimean problems were dealt with through the political
process with a consensus of main actors who had ideas regarding the
configuration of post-Soviet borders. And yet Crimea turned out to
be the pivot of instability where fundamental geopolitical shifts
took place. Although the root causes of those shifts belong to the
realm of global politics and to the relationship between Russia and
the West, the situation in Crimea is crucial to understanding why
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategy has proven for the most
part to be realistic.
HOW THE CRIMEAN KNOT WAS TIED
When Ukraine became an independent country after the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991, the Crimean peninsula was in a precarious
position. In 1952, Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev had taken the region
away from the Russian Soviet Socialist Federative Republic and handed
it to Ukraine. In 1991, over 60% of Crimea’s two million inhabitants
were ethnic Russians. Yet a majority of Ukrainians living in Crimea
were Russian speakers who identified more with Russian culture
than Ukrainian. Although a majority of Crimeans favored the idea of
Ukrainian independence (not an overwhelming majority, just slightly
more than 50%, as the referendum on 1 December 1991 clearly showed),
Crimean society was cautious about some trends in the new Ukrainian
state. For instance, the decision to make Ukrainian the only official
language and plans to sever economic and cultural ties with Russia
(on the pretext of overcoming dependence) expressed by a number of
Ukrainian politicians at the time.
Therefore, it is not surprising that in January 1991, in the last
months of the Soviet Union, one and half million people living in
Crimea, or 90% of its population, voted to restore Crimean autonomy
in a referendum held by the Crimean Communist authorities.
With the breakup of the Soviet Union, a powerful movement gained
momentum in Crimea whose goal was to expand the autonomy’s rights
and to reintegrate Ukraine with Russia within the CIS. A number
of local parties backed that movement, including the Communists,
the Republicans, and various Russian organizations. In May 1992,
the Republic of Crimea adopted a Constitution that stipulated for
a large degree of regional independence. The Rossiya election bloc
won the 1994 elections. Its leader, Yuri Meshkov, had become Crimea’s
president shortly before the elections. But his erratic activities and
pro-integration and pro-Russian rhetoric posed quite a few problems
for Kiev.
The central authorities in Simferopol and Kiev sorted things out
amid soaring tensions between Russia and Ukraine over the future of
the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet. At first, under CIS agreements
it was implied that control of the ‘strategic forces’ (and Russia
certainly regarded the Black Sea Fleet as strategic) would be decided
in a special way. However, it soon emerged that Ukraine and Russia
understood the term ‘strategic forces’ differently. The Ukrainian
Defense Ministry made a haphazard attempt to take over the Black Sea
Fleet only to run into strong resistance from the Fleet’s commander
Admiral Igor Kasatonov. In fact, Kasatonov forced Russian President
Boris Yeltsin to intervene and a protracted process began to separate
the Black Sea Fleet, which was extremely complex and fraught with
surprises. For Ukraine, the Crimean issue was closely linked with the
Black Sea Fleet, because ‘Crimean separatism’ was not an issue on its
own, but it gained momentum in combination with potential Russian
intervention. Throughout the 1990s, the Kremlin showed very little
interest in Crimea. Major territorial problems in the Caucasus and
internal political struggles limited Russia’s opportunities to press
for its interests on the Black Sea.
The repatriation of the Crimean Tatars and related issues were
the third group of problems to emerge in Crimea shortly before and
just after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Josef Stalin deported
the Crimean Tatars from the peninsula in 1944 on charges of mass
collaboration with the Nazis during World War II. Unlike other
‘deported peoples’ the Crimean Tatars were not exonerated under
Khrushchev because of foreign political and defense considerations.
Exoneration implied the return of the Crimean Tatars to their ancestral
homeland. Soviet leaders were reluctant to allow the return of the
Crimean Tatars, fearing complications with Turkey, which had joined
NATO in 1952. The Caribbean crisis (provoked in part by the deployment
of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey) put the issue of Crimean Tatar
repatriation on the back burner. The issue was brought up again as
late as at the end of the 1980s, the beginning of perestroika.
At that time Crimean society was not prepared to welcome back as many
as 270,000 people who were very different culturally and mentally from
the majority of the peninsula’s population. Repatriation continued
on a massive scale in the wake of the Soviet collapse, which bred
immeasurable problems and sparked quite a few conflicts stemming from
political and socio-economic reasons.
Once repatriation began, the Crimean Tatar political movement
grew into a well-organized and effective force that had support
from liberals inside the Soviet Union and from the West. In 1991,
the Crimean Tatars set up a national parliament (the Kurultai) and
government (the Mejlis) under Mustafa Dzhemilev, a former dissident
who wielded a great deal of authority with the Crimean Tatars,
the West, and Turkey. From the outset the Mejlis launched a crusade
under the banner of self-determination for the Crimean Tatars and
sought to establish a political regime that would grant the Crimean
Tatars special status as Crimea’s indigenous and titular nation. An
immediate surge in tensions followed between the Crimean Tatars,
the Slavic majority, and the local authorities over such sensitive
issues as land, property rights, and jobs.
The initial repatriation period was accompanied by a number of
serious conflicts. Tensions peaked in 1995 when there was a real
possibility of widespread clashes and a major interethnic standoff
in eastern Crimea. Ukraine’s central television network successfully
used the Crimean Tatar movement as a counter-balance to so-called
‘pro-Russian separatism.’
The Kiev-Simferopol political conflict, problems over the presence
of the Black Sea Fleet, and the repatriation of the Crimean Tatars
were the three major components of an intricate Crimean knot that
none of the successive Ukrainian governments managed to untie.
THE ‘UKRAINIAN ORDER’ IN THE MAKING
Overburdened by complicated problems in the 1990s, Crimea managed to
avoid an armed conflict like those in many surrounding territories,
such as Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh. There are several reasons
for this.
Notably, all key participants in the events were aware of the
consequences of uncontrollable processes, so they preferred
negotiations. The region had no history of interethnic strife except
for the problem of the Crimean Tatars (but they accounted for a small
percentage of the population). Restoring the interethnic autonomy
proved an effective mechanism for settling disputes. Moreover, Russia
and Ukraine were busy with post-Soviet reforms and searching for
ways to resolve economic problems, which certainly distracted them
from territorial issues and conflict (for instance, Yeltsin easily
recognized the territorial integrity of Ukraine). In this sense,
Crimea could easily be considered a positive example of a civilized
(although very nervous) post-Soviet divorce. The era of Ukrainian
President Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) saw a more or less successful
solution to the ‘Crimean issue.’
Firstly, that was the time when a basis was created for establishing
the ‘Ukrainian order’ in Crimea. In 1997, Russia and Ukraine signed
what was sometimes informally referred to as the ‘Big Treaty.’ Russia
kept its naval base in Sevastopol; but under amendments to the
Ukrainian Constitution, Russia could only lease the base until 2017.
Ukraine received part of the former Soviet Union’s Black Sea Fleet
and had the opportunity to create its own small naval force. Most
importantly, Ukraine preserved its sovereignty over the entire
territory of the Crimean peninsula and Russia paid for its contingent
by extending Ukraine discounts on Russian gas.
In March 1995, Ukrainian secret services took advantage of an internal
political crisis in Crimea to oust President Meshkov and establish
full control over the region. That process was described as ‘Crimea’s
induction into Ukraine’s legal space.’ Relying on sharp disagreements
inside the criminalized local elite, the Ukrainian authorities promptly
enforced crucial decisions. In the second phase (starting in 1998),
Kuchma, after winning a second term, eliminated criminal clans in
Crimea and formalized a limited autonomy regime. Throughout that period
the Ukrainian government maintained control of the local authorities,
first by using the conflict between the head of Crimea’s legislature
Leonid Grach and the head of government Sergei Kunitsin.
Later Kuchma supported the duo of Kunitsin and the new speaker of
the regional parliament Boris Deich.
Kuchma handled the problem of the Crimean Tatars with relative
success. Over the previous decade, the repatriation of the 270,000
Crimean Tatars was essentially completed. Those who remained in exile,
mostly in Uzbekistan, did so for various personal reasons. An economic
rebound at the end of the 1990s somewhat eased social tensions among
the returnees. In 1999, Kiev agreed to a partial legalization of
local self-government for the Crimean Tatars. After a series of mass
demonstrations organized by the Mejlis, the Ukrainian government
created a special council made up of Crimean Tatar representatives
under the Ukrainian president. All Mejlis members took seats on that
council. Crimean Tatars had begun infiltrating federal agencies on
a massive scale and the process of forming ethnic bureaucracy and
ethnic bourgeoisie was proceeding in full swing.
Crimea’s first decade as part of an independent Ukraine was
economically bleak as local industries closed (with the exception of
chemical giants in northern Crimea, companies that mined construction
materials, and some shipbuilding facilities (in Kerch)). The entire
military-industrial complex, including electronics, as well as TV
manufacturing and a greater part of shipbuilding, failed to survive the
economic devastation of the 1990s. The same was true of agriculture,
whose export potential was reduced to zero. All former Soviet republics
were experiencing the same kind of problems, so Crimea’s economic
collapse had no noticeable political effects.
The local population managed to adjust to the new capitalist realities
and only a relatively small percent of local residents emigrated. The
repatriation of the Crimean Tatars contributed to population growth
throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s. In time, demand for labor
resources grew in the tourist and recreation industry, and in the
construction sector. Small and mid-sized businesses were created. The
Ukrainian economy stabilized and grew in the late 1990s and early
2000s, giving rise to some social optimism, while the relatively mild
policy of Ukrainization was neither wholly rejected nor resisted.
The ethnic makeup of Crimea’s new population of nearly two million
was as follows: 58% were ethnic Russians (a unique parameter for
Ukraine), 24% consisted of Ukrainians (mostly Russian-speaking and
who considered themselves culturally closer to Russia), and 12% were
made up of Crimean Tatars, whose role in the political affairs of
the peninsula, by virtue of their historically greater passionarity,
was proportionately larger than their share of the population.
Nevertheless, despite the explosive potential of this ethnic
‘cocktail,’ Crimea managed to avoid large-scale interethnic conflicts.
Ukraine’s Orange Revolution shattered that fragile idyll. Overall,
Crimea did not support the first series of protests in Kiev at the
end of 2004 and early 2005. In fact, Crimea refused to recognize
the newly-elected president Viktor Yushchenko. The Party of Regions
won local parliamentary elections and Crimea, just like a number of
other regions and cities in southeastern Ukraine, remained under the
control of the Party of Regions practically throughout Yushchenko’s
presidency. Such a state of affairs was largely a result of political
reform carried out at the beginning of 2005, which stripped the
central authorities of many opportunities to influence local
situations effectively. Indeed, all of Crimea’s hopes were pinned
on Viktor Yanukovich, the presidential candidate from the Party of
Regions who represented the interests of Ukraine’s Russian-speaking
industrial southeast. Crimea, along with the Donbass coal-mining
region, was the core of Yanukovich’s support (with more than 70%
of the electorate ready to vote for him).
During that time other political forces opposed to Kiev were gaining
strength, including Russian groups and organizations. Some of the
more popular were the Russian Community of Crimea (led by Sergei
Tsekov), the movement Proryv (Breakthrough), and Russian Unity (led
by Sergei Aksyonov). All these organizations were strongly critical
of Ukrainization, in particular the policy of making into heroes the
leaders of Ukrainian nationalism in the mid-twentieth century. Along
with a general atmosphere of resistance to radical nationalist forces
in Ukraine, a new challenge contributed to the fresh surge in activity
of Russian organizations after the lull in the second half of the 1990s
and early 2000s. That challenge came from the Crimean Tatar movement.
Kuchma’s land reform in the mid-2000s fueled widespread arbitrary
seizures of land by Crimean Tatars, who had originally been barred
from taking part in the privatization of assets that once belonged to
former Soviet farm cooperatives and state-run farms. The first massive
protests in Kiev’s Independence Square in the mid-2000s weakened both
the central and local authorities to the extent that Crimean Tatar
activist organizations were able to seize thousands of hectares of land
to build private homes, mostly around large cities and on the southern
coast of Crimea. This Mejlis-led squatting campaign peaked in 2006,
provoking numerous conflicts and explosive situations. The issue of
legalizing the land seized during that period remains unresolved.
The influence of political Islam was another important trend among
the Crimean Tatars. The Crimean Muslim Board, like the overwhelming
majority of Muslim communities, traditionally remained under
the control of the Mejlis, a nationalist and secular pro-Western
organization. However, the mid-2000s saw the rise and growth of
so-called ‘independent’ communities, often under the influence of
foreign Islamic centers (currently over 10% of all communities are
independent). Islamic sentiment was present in the Crimean Tatar
movement much earlier, but in the second half of the 2000s a political
split occurred between the Mejlis and various Islamic groups. The
international party Hizb-ut-Tahrir increased its activities in the
region. Additionally, some local Wahhabi organizations (such as Sebat)
emerged. All of those parties and groups were critical of the Mejlis
for not paying proper attention to traditions and for caring more
about itself than the people. This growing influence of Islamists on
the Crimean Tatar ummah aroused deep concern among the Slavic majority
on the peninsula.
During Yushchenko’s presidency the overly-friendly rhetoric towards
Russia during Kuchma’s administration gave way to a noticeable cooling
in relations between Russia and Ukraine. Yushchenko’s anti-Russian
stance was a crucial element in the negative image of his regime by
the majority of the population of Crimea.
In the 2010 presidential election, Crimean voters predictably voted for
the leader of the Party of Regions, while most of the Crimean Tatars
followed instructions from the Mejlis and voted for Yulia Timoshenko.
THE PARTY OF REGIONS’ LEGACY
The years 2010-2014 have left a controversial legacy. On the one
hand, Crimea welcomed the normalization of relations with Russia
(the signing of the so-called Kharkov Pact on the Black Sea Fleet),
the adoption of the law on regional languages, and political and
economic stabilization. On the other hand, under the Yanukovich
administration anger mounted over government bureaucracy, blatant
corruption, and the redistribution of property.
Immediately after the new authorities in Crimea took power, the local
political space was systematically cleansed. Relying on support from
a greater share of the electorate, who initially pinned their hopes
on the Party of Regions as protection from the ‘Orange’ forces, the
‘Regionals’ placed their own people in all leadership positions in
Crimea. These new leaders were from the Donetsk Region (in Crimea they
were promptly called ‘Makedonians’ – a group of outsiders mostly from
the industrial centers of Makeyevka and Donetsk). Both Crimean prime
ministers in that period – Vassily Dzharty and Anatoly Mogilyov –
represented the interests of that powerful business and political clan.
Firstly, the centers of political influence changed. The legislature
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea retained merely representative
and ceremonial functions, while the center of personnel and economic
decisions was moved to the republic’s Council of Ministers, which was
closely connected with the Ukrainian presidential staff. Secondly,
all other Crimean political forces–oppositional forces and political
allies – were pushed to the sidelines of political life. Economic and
judicial pressures greatly weakened the Bloc of Yulia Timoshenko (BYT)
(led by Andrei Senchenko). The strong, local branch of the Ukrainian
Communist Party, led by Leonid Grach, fractured from within, the
Union Party (led by Lev Mirimsky) was forced to become less active,
and the Russian Unity Party (led by Sergei Aksyonov) lost influence.
As a result, when the Yanukovich administration decided in 2013
to take a fatal turn towards closer ties with the European Union,
Crimean residents did not put up strong resistance, although the
majority was cautious. It is revealing to examine what happened to
the political elites and society over the brief period Yanukovich
and the Party of Regions were in power.
The ‘Regionals’ conducted a policy to restrict the influence of the
Mejlis inside the Crimean autonomy. Significantly, the Mejlis could no
longer distribute budget funds through its proteges inside Crimea’s
governing agencies. Also, there were attempts to counter-balance the
Mejlis by supporting alternative organizations: the Milli-Firka,
Sebat, and others. In 2013 several high-ranking Mejlis leaders
(such as Remzi Ilyasov) were replaced by more loyal figures (Vasvi
Abduraimov). Conversely, the authorities, with support from Yanukovich,
reformatted the ‘council of representatives’ of the Crimean Tatar
people at the presidential office (established under Kuchma) to
complement it with the leaders of opposition groups (Lentun Bezaziyev,
Vasvi Abduraimov, and others), after which Mejlis representatives
ended their participation in that organization.
At the same time Kiev agreed to major concessions for the Crimean
Tatars. The Ukrainian government legalized some territory claimed by
the Crimean Tatars and gave permission for the local muftiate to build
a large Cathedral Mosque. That policy proved to be a major test for the
Mejlis; firstly, because such steps by the Crimean authorities (and to
a certain extent the authorities in Kiev) coincided with the movement’s
internal crisis, as the Mejlis began to lose authority in the Crimean
Tatar community and younger people moved into leadership positions.
For the past decade analysts have repeatedly said that the Mejlis
was steadily losing power. The organization was gradually becoming
bureaucratized, while the life of ordinary citizens was not getting any
better. The Mejlis came under growing criticism. The local authorities
looked favorably on the opposition organizations that emerged (although
not very large ones).
Mustafa Dzhemilev, who remained at the helm of the Kurultai and the
Mejlis for many years, declared repeatedly his intention to quit the
post of the organization’s leader and end his political career. With
time, this tactic began to be seen as a sort of political gimmick.
However, in 2013 Dzhemilev was forced to step down after his son, who
was a drug addict, shot a man. The Kurultai elected Dzhemilev’s deputy,
Refat Chubarov, as the new leader. Chubarov, despite his merits, lacks
the authority of his predecessor (Dzhemilev is the movement’s honorary
leader) and is more perceptive to messages from the authorities.
That policy, however incomplete and inconsistent, paid off during
the political crisis at the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014.
Although both Dzhemilev and Chubarov supported the pro-European Union
demonstrations in Kiev’s Independence Square, the Mejlis preferred to
avoid active involvement in the events, apparently lacking popular
trust and fearing retaliation by the authorities. During the entire
Ukrainian crisis, the Mejlis brought its fighters onto the streets
for a standoff only once on 26 February 2014, the day a new chapter
began in Crimea’s modern history…
However, the Party of Regions policy to clean up politics in 2010-2013
had several boomerang effects. Shortly after party officials focused
on administrative resources and clamped down on civic society, both
central and Crimean authorities all of a sudden found themselves
face-to-face with Euromaidan forces with no civic anti-Maidan forces
by their side. Reliance on pre-paid political mercenaries, to whom
Ukrainians commonly refer to as titushki, did not work.
Weakened non-governmental and political organizations, such as
Russian Unity, had to promptly mobilize supporters when the Yanukovich
administration began to crumble. The February 26 events in Simferopol
demonstrated how weak civic resistance organizations in Crimea
actually were after being ‘cemented in a barrel’ (this mafia term
is the best description for the condition of the political elites)
by the ‘Makedonians.’ Mejlis activists blocked the Crimean parliament
building so that legislators could not gather for a session where they
were expected to defy the decisions of those who had seized power in
Kiev the previous day.
Crimea’s political elite was unprepared to resist Euromaidan as well.
On February 22, after Yanukovich fled the capital, Mogilyov, the head
of Crimea’s government, said that the resolutions by the Ukrainian
parliament were legitimate and he was ready to implement them. Many
Crimean legislators preferred to take a wait-and-see position. Several
Ukrainian parliamentary members from Crimea supported the coup
either overtly or covertly. If not for the firm position taken by
Konstantinov-led members of the Crimean legislature’s presidium,
the determination of Russian Unity’s leader Aksyonov and support
from Russia, Crimea would have surely succumbed to the Euromaidan
supporters.
Disillusioned with Yanukovich’s policies, Crimean society was split
and demoralized at a very dramatic moment. Alongside those who were
prepared to actively resist the nationalist forces and join ‘people’s
militia’ groups, many people were just waiting for the ‘victorious
opposition’ to take over and were bracing for the worst.
The events that followed early in the morning on February 27 in
Simferopol created a very different situation for the Crimean elite and
the local community. Changing the date and wording of the referendum
indicates the evolution of political expectations. At first, Crimean
legislators did not go much farther other than demanding greater
autonomy within Ukraine. But as the crisis worsened in Kiev and with
the stepped-up rhetoric against ‘Crimean separatists,’ and, of course,
Russia’s clear and firm stance, an unambiguous political strategy
was drafted. That strategy gained tangible support from a majority of
the population whose pro-Russian sentiment not only has never faded,
but also has soared in the wake of the events in Kiev. The referendum
saw an 82% turnout in which 92% of Crimean voters chose to rejoin
Russia. There is every reason to believe that those results are very
close to actual public sentiment.
The reasons behind the desire to join Russia are as follows:
a majority of the population still feels lasting historical attraction
and sympathy towards Russia and – what is very important – Putin’s
Russia; profound disillusionment with Ukraine’s ‘European’ choice
and mostly fear about the costs of accompanying nationalism.
The conclusion to be drawn from everything said above is paradoxical.
The policies that the Party of Regions and Yanukovich pursued in
Crimea were relatively successful: issues related to the presence of
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet had been settled; Crimean political elites
had been brought under control; a generally favorable image of the
new authorities had been created; and important steps had been taken
to diversify the political influence of the Mejlis. Another five to
seven years of such policies might have led to the peninsula’s full
integration with the Ukrainian political, cultural, and ideological
system.
However, Yanukovich’s systemic mistake regarding the foreign policy
vector of Ukrainian development proved fatal for him, for Ukraine, and
for its territorial integrity. That mistake sparked a political crisis
and the regime’s rapid collapse. Moreover, the rise of nationalist
forces fueled a renewal in Crimean fears. Russia’s unexpectedly clear
policy to support the nascent Crimean movement and the favorable image
of Russia that had taken shape in Crimea by the mid-2010s determined
the outcome of the March 16 referendum.
* * * Different interpretations abound as to what happened to the
‘Crimean knot’ after the drastic turn in Crimea’s fate, which some
analysts are calling the Russian Spring of 2014. Was that knot loosened
or tightened? Whatever the case, Russia will have to deal with the
effects of Crimea being part of an independent Ukraine for 23 years.
Naturally, those years have left a lasting imprint on Crimean society.
A Crimean political and business elite has emerged with its own values,
bonds, and relationships. A self-isolated Crimean Tatar movement
with its own experience of intra-Crimean dialogue is another fact
of life. Also, Russia is not the motherland of an entire generation
of Russian-speaking youth who are coming of age, but the motherland
of their ancestors. All this complicates political processes in
Crimea. Russia will likely spend quite some time handling the Crimean
knot. Fortunately, Russia can rely on its own vast experience.
From: Baghdasarian