New Russian-Turkish Conspiracy
Igor Muradyan, Political Analyst
Comments – Saturday, 31 May 2014, 19:55
Maidan has produced a tremendous effect on most states and not all
countries have realized the consequences of those developments for
their countries. In this situation, Turkey has gained considerable
advantage, which has not been fully covered by international political
literature, as well as Turkish mass media.
So far the relations between Turkey and Russia on Ukrainian
developments have not been substantial, and there is a mere exchange
of opinions without any radical steps and attempts at escalation.
However, the meeting of the foreign ministers of these countries in
Moscow has apparently led to considerable changes in relations,
including their positions on the topic of Karabakh.
At the same time, during these developments everyone realized that
controversies are too strong, and a lasting stage of balanced
positions has passed while latent issues have actualized. It is
meaningless to hide these problems, and it should be figured out how
the Turkish-Russian relations will be developing later.
Is it possible to return to the previous relations when problems were
latent, and the sides pretended as if mutual interests may “set off”
real problems or is there a necessity to set up new relations based on
compromise and concessions and what concessions will be essential in
the new state of affairs?
Apparently, Russia is not prone to return the former nature of
relations and is trying to achieve a breakthrough in its relations
with Turkey but it is possible only in case of a principal compromise.
Over the past 25 years Turkey has made considerable financial and
political expenditure on creating an ethnic hotbed of Crimean Tatars
and support to political claims, and Ankara’s project is threatened
now.
However, Turkey does not give up, and new interests may come up,
juxtaposed to some extent to American interests and already creating a
powerful factor of dissatisfaction in the political “field” of Russia,
which will form a sheer “belt” of dissatisfaction provided the
activation of Circassia issues.
Turkey will realize over time that while being part of Ukraine the
Turkish-Tatar Crimea was in a state of stagnation but had a
considerable influence on Russia. Under Ukrainian control, this region
did not have an operational importance while now, being the center of
a conflict, Crimea is an important tool for different undertakings,
primarily against Russia.
Moscow will not understand this, and now they see that Turkish
positions in Russia are stronger, and Turks have a new strong lever of
influence on Russia.
Nevertheless, the key issue remains the extent to which the United
States will prefer changing his policy on Turkey or continue the
policy of “double containment” on Turkey and Russia.
Not only decisions are concerned which have a temporary meaning but
important strategic issues of security and the United States would not
hurry to make such decisions unless it notices substantial changes in
Turkey’s policy.
Nevertheless, it is more important to Turkey to overcome the meaning
and concept of the “double containment” policy which makes it a
marginal, an ordinary regional state isolated in every dimension.
The Turkish political circles fear ending up like Iran, which will be
reflected in the economy with unpredictable outcome. Turkey has not
achieved a geopolitical breakthrough in any priority dimension due to
the policy of the United States and its partners there is a “short
circuit” of isolation in the Black Sea basic on which Turkey made a
large bid as a European region which would bring it closer to Europe.
Now Turkey again needs the Americans and Europeans to block Russians
in the south because it is believed that only Turkey can fulfill this
objective. In addition, Turkey has understood that it can have an
approval of closer rapprochement with Azerbaijan and Georgia when the
third player in the South Caucasus has stopped being a sovereign
actor.
It is not enough, considering that the United States and NATO
conducted a policy of increasing the distance between Turkey and
Azerbaijan for 20 years. However, Turkey will not be limited to this.
It will need new positions not only in the regions but also NATO, as
well as agreements with the United States.
The attempts of Turkey and Russia to bring their positions closer
cannot leave the United States and NATO as mere observers. The United
States will respond to the Turkish-Russian conspiracy and will not
allow a violation of the balance of forces in the Black Sea and the
South Caucasus. The United States will make efforts for quite powerful
pressure on Turkey.
Therefore, there are hopes and prospects that the “third force” will,
nevertheless, emerge in the region which will be responsible for
intensifying the “mosaic” of the Black Sea-Caucasian region. Turkey
must react to this U.S. policy and will most probably prefer the
classical foreign policy, i.e. maintenance of the balance of forces.
Hence, Turkey will not make a final decision unless it sees which side
is ready to cede but both sides understand that they will cede in the
Black Sea-Caucasian region because the United States and its partners
will not cede anything in the Near East, even at the cost of blockade
of Russia.
The bid is on Turkey and Azerbaijan but there are expectations that
this policy will not last long, and the West will return to the policy
of “double containment” when the issues of isolation and blockade of
Russia are resolved.
For its part, having thwarted Eastern Partnership, Russia has an
opportunity for a trade-off with Turkey on all the assumed issues,
including its interests in the South Caucasus. Davutoglu’s visit to
Moscow confirms the assumption that Turkey has not become a tool for
the United States and remains a serious problem for the Americans, as
previously.
Hence, the formation of a “double containment” strategy of Turkey and
Russia remains actual for the small countries of the South Caucasus
and soon there may be developments.
In terms of concept, it still has to be figured out which prospect is
more dangerous for the countries of the region, the Russian-Turkish
conspiracy or Turkey as a partner to the United States and NATO
policy. In this regard, the situation is not so pessimistic despite
the disaster.
One way or another, while Turkey and Russia are not ready to agree on
large-scale issues, they will easily reach an agreement on Karabakh,
of course, in favor of Azerbaijan. The situation is such that change
of the balance of forces in favor of Azerbaijan and the international
isolation of its rival is the key factor of implementation of the
goals of Turkey and Russia.
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From: A. Papazian