CRIMEA RUSSIA’S ARTSAKH
Editorial, 23 March 2014
For more than two decades Artsakh’s fate has hinged on
two contradictory international principles: the territorial
integrity of states versus the inviolable right of people for
self-determination. These two key principles are enshrined in the
United Nations charter and in a number of fundamental international
documents. Armenians don’t see a contradiction in the two schools of
thought when it comes to the status of Artsakh because they believe
that since Artsakh was illegally given to Azerbaijan, by Joseph Stalin
in the early ’20s, the territorial inviolability of Azerbaijan did
not apply when the Armenians of Artsakh declared independence. They
were merely exercising their right of self-determination.
Thus when Russian-speaking Crimeans opted for self-determination
and joined Russia, President Serge Sarkissian of Armenia recognized
the Crimean referendum within a few days. And even if Armenia hadn’t
believed in the principle of a people’s right to self-determination
or there was no Artsakh issue, Armenia had no choice but to accede
to Vladimir Putin’s wishes. That Armenia is dependent on Moscow
militarily, politically, and economically is no secret, especially
to neighboring countries such as Ukraine. Thus Kiev’s high dudgeon
against Armenia is ingenuous.
Soon after Sarkissian recognized the Crimean referendum to join
Russia, Kiev recalled its ambassadors from Yerevan and threatened
Ukraine/Armenia relations were about to go south. One would have
thought Kiev authorities, aware of Armenia’s circumstances and of
the centuries of friendship between the two people’s would have
been more circumspect in their condemnation. When Kazakhstanâ?”a
much-stronger state than Armenia and a Turkic country in sympathy
with the Crimean Tatarsâ?”recognized the results of the referendum,
why would Ukraine pick on tiny Armenia? As well, Kiev should remember
that despite Ukraine’s weapons sales to Azerbaijan, a country which
regularly threatens to invade Armenia, Yerevan did not complain,
let alone recall its ambassador from Ukraine.
It’s too early to determine whether the Crimea development would
buttress Artsakh’s assertion of people’s right to self-determination,
particularly when so much of international politics depends on who
has the power to get what it wants. Russia can recognize Artsakh in a
jiffy and cite the principle of self-determination. But since Russia is
concerned in NATO’s courtship of Baku, it sees no benefit in alienating
Azerbaijan to please Armenia, a small country dependent on Moscow.
The West will play similar games of self-interest: It backed
self-determination in Kosovo justifiably expecting that the
mini-state would be a Western puppet and a constant irritant
to hostile-to-the-West Serbia. Since an independent Artsakh or an
Artsakh united with Armenia is of no perceived benefit to the West,
it would let Artsakh’s remain in suspended animation.
Whether Artsakh becomes independent or joins Armenia depends on Baku,
but not in a martial sense. If Baku decides to go to bed with the West,
Russia will at first try to abort that plan. If it fails, it will give
up on the Azerbaijan’s rulers and punish them be recognizing Artsakh.
The story line might also change if Russian/European Union commercial
relations go into deep freeze and Germany, France, et al begin to
look for an alternative source for natural gas which they now buy from
Russia. A new natural gas source might be the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey
pipeline. But the Azeri wells are now shallower than they were believed
to be a few years ago. Would the Europeans invest billions of dollars
when the well might go dry in ten to 15 years? A much richer source
is Iran. It has the second-biggest proven natural gas sources. But
Iran is in the bad books of the West, particularly that of the United
States. If Iran and the West make peace, Iranian fuel can be exported
to Europe through Syria’s Mediterranean ports. If Iran and the West
make peace, Saudi Arabia and Qatar would halt their support of the
extremist Sunnis who want to topple Assad of Syria.
The next six months would be as unpredictable and suspenseful as a
chess match between two grandmasters. In this case the chess board is
three dimensional and the players a dozen or more. Armenia will be
a pawn in the match, but being a pawn isn’t necessarily a bad thing
when you are on the side which says “Check mate.”