What worked in Iraq won’t work in Syria

Mideast Mirror
August 24, 2012 Friday

What worked in Iraq won’t work in Syria

It is clear that the Syrian regime’s use of air power against FSA
forces and other jihadist groups has inflicted large-scale human
losses and civilian damage. It has also allowed the regime to make
progress on the battlefield in light of the fact that the opposition
forces lack antiaircraft weapons. However, talk of imposing a no-fly
zone is one thing, and actually imposing it in these areas is another
matter altogether. What worked in Libya and in Northern and Southern
Iraq before that, may not work in Northern Syria. And, even if it did,
its military and political costs may be huge–pan-Arab al-Quds
al-Arabi

A few days ago, the U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Francis
Ricciardone…said that talk of establishing a safe corridor is easy,
but actually creating it on the ground faces serious obstacles…these
obstacles are not only logistical in nature. This is because a safe
corridor requires the creation and protection of a no-fly zone. That
would entail a fight with Iran and Russia. The war in and on Syria is
no longer purely a local war. It is a confrontation between Russia and
the U.S. together with their allies. And Turkey simply cannot ignore
this fact… any Turkish military adventure in Syria faces the genuine
fear that numerous volcanoes will erupt in Turkey itself–Mohammad
Noureddin in Lebanese as-Safir

Renewed talk of a no-fly zone in Northern Syria should not lead us to
expect that such a zone will actually be established, says the
editorial in a pan-Arab daily. The international scene surrounding the
Syrian crisis differs radically from that that led to such zones being
established in Iraq and Libya. Turkey’s talk of a humanitarian
corridor in Northern Syria is also unrealistic, argues a Lebanese
commentator. This would require the imposition of a no-fly zone, which
is impossible without greater Western involvement; and the latter is
unlikely in light of Russian and Chinese opposition.

OTHER OPTIONS: “The visible deadlock on the various military fronts
between the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and government forces in the Aleppo
area has begun to push the Western states – particularly the U.S. and
France- to seek other options,” writes the editorial in Friday’s
London-based pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.

This comes after the growing criticism of Western reactions from the
Syrian opposition factions, accusing Western governments of abandoning
the Syrian people and their revolution.

There are three major indications that cannot be ignored in this
regard. We should pause to consider them when trying to forecast
potential developments in the Syrian crisis in the coming weeks:

– First, French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian’s interview with
France-24 TV yesterday in which he said that imposing a no-fly zone on
part of Syrian territories from the Turkish borders to the city of
Aleppo warrants further study.

– Second, Italy’s call for an unofficial meeting in Rome, between a
number of allies and states to discuss the post-Assad phase.

– Third, the first meeting between Turkish and American officials to
‘plan operations’ aimed at toppling President Assad’s regime and
coordinate military, intelligence, and political reactions to the
violence in Syria as well as the regime’s threats to use chemical
weapons.

U.S./Turkish intelligence coordination is not surprising. It has been
going on since the crisis began. Similarly, there is nothing new about
Italy’s call for an unofficial meeting by member states of the Friends
of Syria (FOS) grouping. This is a follow-up to similar previous
steps. But what is new is the French defense minister’s views
regarding imposing a no-fly zone on Aleppo and its environs up to the
Turkish border.

It is clear that the Syrian regime’s use of its airpower against FSA
forces and other jihadist groups has inflicted large-scale human
losses and civilian damage. It has also allowed the regime to make
progress on the battlefield in light of the fact that the opposition
forces lack antiaircraft weapons.

However, talk of imposing a no-fly zone is one thing, and actually
imposing it in these areas is another matter altogether. What worked
in Libya and in Northern and Southern Iraq before that, may not work
in Northern Syria. And, even if it did, its military and political
costs may be huge.

When Washington imposed no-fly zones in Northern and Southern Iraq, it
had absolute freedom of action. Russia was passing through a
transitional phase, and China was focusing on its domestic scene at
the time in order to build a strong economy and sought to avoid being
implicated in foreign adventures that would obstruct its economic
development.

It is true that the U.S. imposed its no-fly zones in Iraq without
securing international cover – that is to say, without a UN Security
Council resolution to that effect. But it was assured by the absence
of any Russian or Chinese objections.

The situation may be different in Syria in light of China and Russia’s
absolute backing for the Syrian regime. For this reason, it is not
unlikely that a crisis will break out between the great powers over
this issue that may even develop into a war.

After all, the Russians would be faced with two options: First, to
take direct military action against the no-fly zone; and, second, to
provide the Syrian regime with advanced S-300 antiaircraft missiles to
confront any warplanes that may try to impose the proposed no-fly
zone.

The Western states must be placing such considerations at the top of
their concerns as they study whether to impose such a no-fly zone or
not. But what is also certain is that the West cannot stand aside
silent regarding the prolongation of the crisis in Syria.

“For this reason, we must expect serious developments in the coming
days and weeks,” concludes the daily.

TOP OF THE AGENDA: “The question of imposing a no-fly zone inside
Syria to provide shelter for Syrian refugees is back at the top of the
agenda,” writes Turkish affairs analyst Mohammad Noureddin in Friday’s
left-leaning Lebanese daily as-Safir.

This came after Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s statement
that if the number of refugees flowing into Turkey exceeds
one-hundred-thousand, his country would be unable to absorb any more
refugees. Once that happens, a safe corridor should be established
inside Syria.

This recalls a statement he made earlier this year, saying that Ankara
would be unable to absorb more than 50 thousand refugees. At the time,
the number of refugees stood at around ten thousand. At that time as
well, it was evident that the establishment of Syrian refugee camps
inside Turkey was being exploited by Ankara to exert pressure on the
Syrian regime and embarrass it before international public opinion.
For that reason, the Turkish camps became a preferred destination for
international figures and ‘messengers’ such as [U.S. actress] Angelina
Jolie.

The situation worsened in Syria and the number of refugees reached
fifty thousand. According to Turkish estimates, in fact, that number
is now close to seventy thousand. Despite this, no safe corridor has
been established.

Davutoglu’s one-hundred-thousand figure signals that Turkey failed to
promote the creation of a safe corridor or convince its allies, let
alone its enemies, of such an option. Therefore, the
one-hundred-thousand figure is likely to rise to 150 thousand and
perhaps more. And this will have a negative effect on Turkey’s
credibility.

In fact, this confusion reflects an inability to impose such a
corridor, even if the figure were to exceed 100 thousand for the
following reasons:

– First, the Turkish minister himself linked the creation of a safe
corridor to an international resolution, with the UN taking charge of
setting up and supervising the camps. But such a prospect is out of
the question in light of the Russian/Chinese veto.

– Second, Turkey will not venture to establish such a zone alone.
However, it did try to establish an undeclared safe corridor when PM
Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that his country had ‘changed the rules
of engagement’ with Damascus after the Syrians downed a Turkish jet in
June, and that any Syrian warplane flying up to ten kilometers from
the borders would henceforth be a target for Turkish missiles.
According to Turkish officials, Turkey has succeeded in creating this
zone. As a result, FSA armed elements have managed to move freely in
the border areas near Turkey, but without having safe havens for
refugees.

In fact, it appeared as if that undeclared zone was not intended to
provide shelter for refugees, but to consolidate the deployment of FSA
elements in these areas, as a prelude to declaring them ‘liberated
zones’ areas. However, the recent Syrian attack on I’zaz area, which
is very close to the Turkish borders and within Ankara’s undeclared
ten-kilometer zone, undermines the principle underlying the Turkey’s
‘rules of engagement.’ Ankara did not respond to this Syrian raid.
Some in Turkey explained this by claiming that Erdogan’s government
realizes that the object behind the I’zaz attack was to lure Turkey
into a confrontation with Syria, and that Turkey will not fall into
that trap.

– Third, the truth is that Turkey did not respond to the I’zaz raid,
not because it does not want to be drawn into a confrontation with
Syria, but because it cannot sustain it in the absence of a
Western/NATO – specifically American – decision to that effect.
Washington, however, is still wary of involvement in a military
adventure in Syria with unpredictable results before the U.S.
presidential elections. It fears that that could have a negative
effect on President Barack Obama’s chances of returning to the White
House.

The U.S. administration has confirmed that the establishment of a safe
corridor is not one of its priorities, as U.S. Defense Secretary Leon
Panetta has openly declared. A few days ago, the U.S. Ambassador to
Ankara, Francis Ricciardone, repeated that position when he said that
talk of establishing a safe corridor is easy, but actually creating it
on the ground faces serious obstacles.

– Fourth, these obstacles are not only logistical in nature. This is
because a safe corridor requires the creation and protection of a
no-fly zone. That would entail a fight with Iran and Russia. The war
in and on Syria is no longer purely a local war. It is a confrontation
between Russia and the U.S. together with their allies. And Turkey
simply cannot ignore this fact.

– Fifth, any Turkish military adventure in Syria faces the genuine
fear that numerous volcanoes will erupt in Turkey itself. The first is
Kurdish, and stems from the armed Kurdish factions that have all
threatened Ankara with a bloodbath if it enters Syria. And a second
volcano erupted yesterday, when Armenian circles began moving via the
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA.) The latter
has had numerous battles with Turkish embassies around the world. It
warned Ankara against entering Syria on the grounds that that would
threaten the [Syrian] Armenian population’s security and integrity.

Similarly, the fact that the spark has moved to the Turkish interior
after the [this week’s] Gaziantep bombing, the Foça bombing in Western
Turkey, and the intermittent but ongoing clashes with the Kurdistan
Workers Party [PKK] in Southeastern Turkey, threatens yet another and
more dangerous front in Turkey.

– Sixth, the fact that public opinion is opposed to a Turkish
adventure in Syria, even if via the gateway of a safe corridor, is not
unimportant. This is not confined to the political opposition, but
includes a large section of the ruling Justice and Development Party’s
[AKP’s] popular base.

“Exceptional and unexpected developments aside, Turkish talk of a safe
corridor will thus remain unrealizable and no more than a tool to be
exploited to pressure the Syrian regime while we wait for the decisive
battle that will finally settle the conflict in and over Syria,”
concludes Noureddin.

From: Baghdasarian