Chechen Mujahedin who fought alonside Azeris during the Karabakh war

Use of Mercenaries and Terrorist Groups to Impede People’s Rights For
Development and Secure Future

asbarez
Monday, August 20th, 2012

Chechen Mujahedin who fought alonside Azeris during the Karabakh war

BY MOVSES MUSAELIAN

Mercenaries have been used often throughout history in conflicts
throughout the world. Their presence has helped armies and fighting
forces gain manpower and fighting capability through monetary
incentive, which has proven to be a rather convenient method of
gaining a temporary military boost. The United Nations, however, has
recognized the dangerous implications that such mercenaries have for
international peace and security and has passed resolutions affirming
not only the danger, posed by the use of such mercenaries, to
international peace and security, but also to self determination and
the freedom of people1.

At the breakup of the Soviet Union, many conflicts rose up in the
Caucasus region and as a result of these conflicts, several parties
utilized mercenaries in their struggle; for example, the use of Afghan
and Chechen mercenaries against the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. The
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict arose when Azerbaijan attempted to brutally
suppress the legal expression of self-determination by the NK2 people,
who wished to live separate from a government that had continuously
denied them rights and kept them under oppression. Even though
Azerbaijan had a clear military advantage over the NK Armenians in all
aspects, they were not able to defeat these people, who were
determined to stay free. As a result of subsequent military failures
in the early 1990s, Azerbaijan desperately turned to the use of
mercenaries to try to change the course of the war. In recruiting such
mercenaries, Azerbaijan actively tried to play the `religion card’ in
portraying the conflict between Christian Armenians and Muslim Azeris,
when in reality such religious connotations were not at all at the
core of the conflict. As a result, Mujahedin groups from Afghanistan,
with ties to al-Qaeda, and extremist groups from Chechnya were brought
to help in the clamping down of this expression of free will. The
Washington Post in 1993 wrote, `The government of this Caucasian
republic has hired a force of more than 1,000 Afghan mujaheddin
fighters to buttress its sagging army, introducing a volatile new
element to the five-year Azerbaijani-Armenian war on the former Soviet
Union’s southern rim’-. This known faction was allied with infamous
warlord, Hekmaytar, and associated with the mujaheddin faction,
Hezb-i-Wahdat. In parallel, Chechen mercenaries were led by Chechen
terrorist, Shamil Basayev, infamous for the Beslan School attack, who
later realised that the conflict against the NK Armenians had little
to do with proper jihad.

After the end of the NK war and with tacit approval and knowledge from
the government, Azerbaijan continued to be used for terrorist
activities by groups such as al-Qaeda and Hezb-e-Islami, which had
logistical offices in the country. For example, Wadih el-Hage, leader
of the al-Qaeda cell in Nairobi, which later destroyed the US embassy
of Kenya in 1998, frequently relayed vital communication to
individuals such as Osama bin Laden while stationed in Baku. After the
US embassy attacks in 1998, international pressure began to mount on
Azerbaijan for the harboring of such terrorist organizations; in
response Azerbaijan did not extradite such individuals, rather
repatriated them. The US Department of State noted in 1999, in its
annual report on global terrorism, `Although Azerbaijan did not face a
serious threat from international terrorism, it served as a logistic
hub for international mujahidin with ties to terrorist groups, some of
whom supported the Chechen insurgency in Russia.’4 The FBI later on
established in 1998 that there were 60 telephone calls between Bin
Laden and his contacts from the branch of `Islamic Jihad’ in Baku, and
it is further speculated that as a result there might have been an
Azerbaijani trace in the September 11 attacks5. It was even mentioned
by the Associated Press that, `one of Bin Laden’s associate claimed
that Bin Laden himself led mujahedin in at least two battles in
Nagorno-Karabakh.’6 The Congressional Research Services in its issued
report also stated that groups and individuals affiliated with Osama
bin Laden and Al-Qaeda had used Azerbaijan as one of its bases in
their growing terrorist network7.

While Azerbaijan made stronger declarations to tackle terrorism after
the September 11 attacks, it has used the pretext of both fighting
terrorism and its frozen conflict with NK to suppress freedoms of
various sorts and democracy in its own country. The United Nations has
similarly passed resolutions on `the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’8 which Azerbaijan has
continued to violate. For example, the intimidation and imprisonment
of journalists and activists has become routine in order to solidify
the Aliyev clan’s authoritarian grip on the country. Amnesty
International and various other human rights organization have often
criticized this human rights situation and in one of its press
releases, Amnesty International stated, `In oil-rich Azerbaijan, 20
years of independence, economic prosperity and relative stability have
failed to translate into greater fundamental freedoms for its citizens
while the consolidation of authoritarian rule over the last decade has
been largely ignored by the outside world.’9 Freedom House has
continuously described Azerbaijan as `not free’ in both political
rights and civil liberties and in May of 2011 the European Parliament
expressed deep concern in this worsening of human rights in Azerbaijan
and called on remaining political prisoners to be freed and for
Azerbaijan to respect its duties to conventions on human rights10. The
bleak status of democracy in this country was only darkened more by a
referendum that abolished presidential limits and effectively allowed
for Aliyev and his family to rule the country without end. In addition
to this oppression, Azerbaijan has continued with provocative and
violent actions in the border area with NK and Armenia, which has
threatened the peace and security of the civilians living in the
border areas; for example, its recent shooting on Movses village in
the border area. The acts of such subversive terrorist groups by the
Azerbaijan military in the border areas and near civilian populations
can be seen as acts of terrorism and add to the legacy of Azerbaijan’s
association with terrorism. The complete destruction of the Julfa
Armenian cross stones by Azerbaijani military has added a cultural
dimension to this terrorist ideology as well. Organizations such as
UNESCO and the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS)
brought forward appeals to Azerbaijan to stop this blatant act of
cultural destruction.

I shed light on the associations that Azerbaijan in particular has had
with terrorism and violent mercenary groups, which, contrary to UN
principles, contributed to the oppression of people’s rights to
freedom and self-determination, namely that of the Nagorno-Karabakh
people. The subject of terrorism and international strategies in
tackling terrorism is a frequently discussed matter at the United
Nations, in addition to the core UN principles of freedom and
self-determination that have so frequently been violated by the
Republic of Azerbaijan towards the NK people, who have expressed
democratic desire for self-determination, and towards their own
people, who have expressed the desire for a democratic country. During
the time of the two week internship the subject of counter-terrorism
was frequently discussed in the General Assembly. In UN’s 2006
strategy for counter-terrorism, it was affirmed that, `States must
ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their
obligations under international law, in particular human rights law,
refugee law and international humanitarian law.’11

In conclusion, in the past decade the importance of effective
counter-terrorism strategies has greatly increased as the type of
threats in the world have also changed. In employing effective
counter-terrorism strategies it has been stressed by the UN that such
strategies not affect basic human rights of the citizens. In extension
to this, the use of mercenaries has also been brought under more heavy
scrutiny, especially following the use of such mercenaries in the War
on Iraq by US forces, which is reported by the UN Human Rights
Council12. In the case of Azerbaijan, we have seen an almost
intersection of these two important themes and it is hoped that
countries like Azerbaijan can move to be more compliant with
international conventions, requests, and urgings in order to
contribute to the betterment of international security.

Notes
1. A/RES/42/96
2. Nagorno-Karabakh
3. The Washington Post
4.
5.
6. Associated Press 11/14/99
7. Congressional Research Services (CRS, 9/10/2001)
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Movses Musaelian completed the Internship program at the Armenian
Mission at the United Nations this summer. Above is a research project
completed for the internship.

From: Baghdasarian

http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/eurasia.html#Azerbaijan.
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/a2aa12004f018b88b8d1fc3170baead1/WP20-2008_Taarnby_Mujahedin_Nagorno-Karabakh_Global_Jihad.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=a2aa12004f018b88b8d1fc3170baead1
http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/international-community-must-act-azerbaijan-crackdown-2011-11-16
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0243+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN
http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml#poa4
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/18session/A.HRC.18.32.Add.4_en.pdf