A FAIR ASSESSMENT OF TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY
Today’s Zaman
July 8 2012
Turkey
For various reasons, but mainly due to the Syrian crisis, Ankara’s
foreign policy is being questioned both inside the country and abroad.
Some of the criticisms are fair and justified, while others are not.
There is no doubt that Ankara’s claim (in Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu’s words) to “lead the wave of change” in the Middle East is
beyond its means. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government’s
“zero problems with neighbors” policy, based on “soft power” — on
the principles of solving problems with neighbors by dialogue and
diplomacy and by promoting economic interdependence avoiding threats
or use of military force — has substantially contributed to Turkey’s
security, economic growth and international prestige. It has, however,
met with increasing difficulties in the wake of the Arab Awakening,
which has brought about perhaps as radical a context change for
Turkey’s foreign policy as the end of the Cold War.
Ankara is currently engaged in developing a new foreign policy
paradigm that apparently aims to “steer and lead the wave of change”
in the Middle East toward peace and democracy. To judge by Davutoglu’s
recent statement following the downing of a Turkish military plane by
Syria, the new policy will rely on “smart power.” If this means that
Turkey is going to resort to threats or use of force as an instrument
of foreign policy, it deserves all the warnings about the risks that
would entail, not only to the democratization and civilianization of
the regime in Turkey, but also to the socioeconomic development of the
country. Ankara can and should take part in international diplomatic
efforts to promote peace and democratization in its region but should
not for a moment consider using military force to “steer and lead
the wave of change” in the Middle East.
The criticisms directed towards Ankara’s Cyprus policy since
the rejection by the Greek Cypriots of the Annan plan for the
reunification of the island are also fair and justified. Ankara could
have extended the customs union to southern Cyprus as required by its
legal commitments to the EU, and even withdrawn part of its military
presence on the island in line with the once-pursued policy of being
one step ahead in efforts to unify the island. The unresolved Cyprus
problem is blocking Turkey’s accession to the EU while leading to new
tensions concerning the exploitation of natural gas reserves located
in the island’s waters.
There are, however, unfair and unjustified criticisms of Turkish
foreign policy under the AKP government. It is said that a few years
ago Turkey was in a position to facilitate peace negotiations between
Israel and Syria, whereas now relations are tense with both sides.
Well, didn’t Israel itself massacre the Palestinians in Gaza and
undermine any hopes for peace negotiations? Isn’t the current Israeli
government pursuing the policy of occupation and subjugation of the
Palestinians against nearly the entire world? Why would it be wrong
for Turkey to oppose an unscrupulous policy that endangers peace and
stability in the entire region?
Syrian people have risen against a cruel dictatorship that has so far
massacred nearly 14,000 of its citizens and forced nearly 200,000
of them to flee the country. What is wrong with Ankara providing
diplomatic support to the Syrian people against a dictator who has
rejected all calls for reform and lost all legitimacy?
Ankara is also criticized often for not implementing the protocols
signed with Armenia in 2009. Well, isn’t Armenia continuing to occupy
a fifth of Azerbaijan and forcing close to a million Azeris to remain
refugees in their own country? Isn’t Ankara justified in not moving
forward to establish diplomatic ties and open borders, since Yerevan
refuses to take a single step towards reconciliation with Azerbaijan?
It is claimed, most recently by the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad,
that Ankara is pursuing a policy of “sectarianism,” supporting
Sunni groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and others while
discriminating against the Shia or non-Sunnis. Against this claim
one needs perhaps only to raise the following questions: Isn’t Tehran
itself attaching much value to its dialogue with Ankara? Wasn’t Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan the first Sunni leader ever to visit
the shrine of Prophet Ali in Najaf, the religious capital of the Shia?
Hasn’t Ankara a continuing dialogue with Iraqi Shia leaders Ayad
Allawi and Muqtada al-Sadr, while tensions with Baghdad have arisen
due to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s efforts to monopolize power?
The differences between Ankara and Tehran are based not on the
religious identities of its leaders but on the political models they
represent for the region.
And what about the claim that Ankara is pursuing a policy of
neo-Ottomanism? Ankara is surely trying to reconnect with regions
and countries with which it has historical and cultural ties. To
assess these efforts as signs of hegemonistic motives does not make
the slightest sense.